Turkish Officials Research Articles

Tracing the Conflict Between Türkiye and Syria Through the Turkish Mainstream Media's Coverage of the Syrian President Bashar al‐Assad

The Syrian civil war began in March 2011 and spread throughout the country in April 2011. Therefore, in this study news articles and columns published in 2011 were selected and analyzed through purposive sampling. This study uses content analysis to examine the coverage of Syrian President Bashar al‐Assad in mainstream print newspapers with different ideological orientations in Türkiye. The theoretical framework of this study is based on the concept of localization of foreign news. The research has the potential to reveal both the transformation of the tone of media texts over time and the similarities and differences in the coverage of an international conflict by newspapers with different ideological orientations. Despite ideological differences, the study reveals similarities in the orientation of the newspapers studied toward local interests. The dominance of Turkish officials as news actors, the limited portrayal of Syrian security forces, and the selection of photographs reinforce the parallel stance with Turkish foreign policy. The media's tone toward Assad and Syrian politics became more negative and critical as the conflict escalated.

Soft power in Turkey's foreign policy in Europe

Since the mid-2000s, under the rule of the Justice and Development Party, Turkey has included the concept of soft power in its foreign policy agenda. Based on the position of Turkish officials, the practical implementation of soft power is based on public diplomacy, with its “infrastructure” being created at the same time by establishing new or transforming existing state structures in partnership with non-governmental organisations. Ankara has developed the main directions for public diplomacy to be based on interaction with its Turkish people living abroad and closely related Turkic peoples, the preservation and revival of the cultural, historical and material heritage of the Ottoman Empire, and the support of the Muslim community in different parts of the world. In addition, in recent years, relatively new directions have emerged, such as struggling against FETÖ and extension of coverage of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation. One of the regions where the Turkish public diplomacy was implemented was Europe. The latter was divided into three sub-regions: the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe. The Balkan countries were traditionally considered important regions for Ankara with the core goal to break old historical and cultural prejudices about its image and to form a positive one in the eyes of the public. With regard to Eastern Europe, Turkey, skillfully using the Ottoman heritage and/or the Turkic factor, exerts influence in Hungary, Moldova, and Ukraine. And the activity in Western Europe is more based on interacting with the Turkish diaspora. Therefore, the aim of the study is to reveal the main directions of Turkey's public diplomacy in the context of the implementation of the policy of soft power in Europe.

The Loss of the Greek Literary Society in Constantinople: The Dismantling of an Institution, Displacement of a Library, and Dissolution of an Intellectual Hub

Abstract The conditions that paved the way for the population exchange, the unrest created by rising nationalism in Turkey and Greece, and the subsequent search for a homogeneous population on both sides of the Aegean had a direct impact on Istanbul’s intellectual environment, its artistic and literary production, and its architecture, in which Greeks had played a significant role. This article examines the main physical and intellectual properties of the Greek Literary Society in Constantinople, its headquarters in Pera, its library and archive, and their afterlives following their confiscation by Turkish officials. By focusing on the effects of the departure of renowned scholars from Istanbul, particularly those who had conducted archeological research, it discusses the extent of the knowledge and property accumulated within the Greek Literary Society’s circles and evaluates their loss, transportation, and transformation as “cultural (material and human) and social capital” and “brain drain.”

The Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Conference of Constantinople

Key words: Armenian question, conference, delegation, negotiation, territorial issues, ambassador, independence, contract The signing of the treaty between Turkey and the newly independent Transcaucasian republics took place in Batum without the participation of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany, being against the increase of Turkish influence in Transcaucasia at the expense of Germany, made a proposal to review the decisions made in Batum. The Armenian delegation went to Constantinople by the invitation of the Ottoman government. The delegation’s activity was aimed at ensuring the signing of a more favorable agreement compared to the treaty of Batum. The Turks, not attaching any importance to the declaration of independence of Armenia and the documents presented by the Armenian delegates, emphasized that everything came to an end in Batum, the pact was signed thus, it was only necessary for the powers to sign the document. The high-ranking Turkish officials gave abstract and evasive answers to the practical questions of the Armenian delegates, and they unconditionally supported Azerbaijan in territorial issues, resolutely opposing the issue of including Karabakh and Zangezur to Armenia. The Armenian delegation kept hope for the German Empire, but Germany did not intend to extend the patronage of Armenia, let alone protect it from the territorial ambitions of neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan. Austria-Hungarian Empire also had no desire to spoil relations with Turkey because of Armenia. Hopes to receive Bulgarian support did not have any results either. As in Berlin and Vienna, as well as in Constantinople, the countries of the Quad Union did not want to take upon themselves the issues of the Armenians and offend their ally Turkey. Thus, the conference of Constantinople did not take place. The RA delegation stayed in Constantinople until the terms of the Mudros truce became known and returned to Armenia after a four-year wait.

ПРОБЛЕМА ДЕОКУПАЦІЇ КРИМУ У ТУРЕЦЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ВЗАЄМИНАХ ПІД ЧАС ЗБРОЙНОЇ АГРЕСІЇ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ФЕДЕРАЦІЇ ПРОТИ УКРАЇНИ (2014–2023 РР.)

The relevance of the research topic is determined by the crucial role of the Republic of Turkey concerning the de-occupation of Crimea and the support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine in general. At the scientific level, a coherent and comprehensive study of this important problem has not yet been published. Before the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea by Russia in 2014, one of the significant areas of cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine was their joint efforts to support the Crimean Tatar people, who were returning to Crimea after harrowing deportation by the Soviet regime to Central Asia in 1944. During that time, several joint Ukrainian-Turkish projects were implemented in Crimea, particularly in the economic and cultural spheres, aimed at the rehabilitated Crimean Tatar population. These projects included the construction of schools with Crimean Tatar language instruction, the launch of periodicals in the Crimean Tatar language, economic development, local infrastructure improvement, property acquisitions for representatives of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group, and more. After the criminal annexation of Ukrainian Crimea by Russia in February-March 2014, the Republic of Turkey unequivocally expressed its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This support was particularly evident during discussions and voting at the United Nations, as well as in meetings between the two countries’ presidents and at forums like the “Crimean Platform,” which has been held since 2021, etc. Turkey is making significant efforts to protect the rights and freedoms of the fraternal Crimean Tatar people, who were among the first victims of Russia’s criminal repressive machinery. For instance, Ankara has facilitated the release of some political prisoners of Crimean Tatar ethnicity and has assisted in the resettlement and support of Crimean Tatars who were forced to temporarily move to the mainland of Ukraine. Crimea holds a foremost place in Turkey’s security concept in the Black Sea region. Despite Turkey not fully aligning with anti-Russian sanctions, even after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and even offering shelter to Russian businesses seeking to evade Western sanctions, its position on Crimea has consistently been unequivocal. Considering Russia as its main geopolitical rival in the Black Sea, Ankara is unquestionably interested in seeing the return of this strategically important peninsula to Ukraine. There is no doubt about this, the Turkish side will actively participate in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, primarily Crimea, as an integral part of Ukraine. Turkish officials have been emphasizing this repeatedly.

Poseta kralja Petra I Karađorđevića Carigradu 1910. godine

The visit of King Petar I Karađorđević to the Turkish sultan is one of the eight visits in modern Serbian history. Seven meetings of Serbian rulers with sultans took place in Constantinople, except for one that took place in Bulgaria. In the visits made before 1878, the Serbian rulers went as vassals. The meeting between the Serbian king and Sultan Mehmed V Rešad in 1910 was the third in a row since Serbia became an independent state. King Petar I Karađorđević spent the second half of March and the first half of April 1910 travelling. First, he visited Russia, then Constantinople, Mount Athos, and finally Thessaloniki. The trip lasted a little over 24 days, six of which he spent in Constantinople. The Serbian delegation led by the king was warmly received by the sultan, the common people, and the Christian population living in the Turkish capital. Upon their return, the members of the delegation were convinced that Turkey would remain on the path of improving Serbian-Turkish relations, friendly agreement, and strengthening of economic relations. This intention was highlighted in the official statement of the Porte published on the occasion of the visit of the Serbian king. In the announcement, it was expressly emphasized that a complete agreement was reached at the conferences of the foreign ministers of the two countries and that the Turkish side will grant Serbian wishes for strengthening economic and trade relations. It was of great importance for the Kingdom of Serbia to remove the obstacles that existed until that time regarding the construction of the Adriatic railway. In addition, practical results were achieved because Turkish officials expressed their readiness for the greatest possible benefits that would contribute to the export of Serbian goods through Thessaloniki. The visit to Constantinople brought success in the issues regarding religion as well, because after four years of resistance, the Patriarchate and the Synod, just before the king's arrival, accepted the election of the Serb Varnava Rosić as bishop of the Veles-Debar eparchy. The meeting of the two rulers received great attention in the diplomatic circles of European countries, especially Austria-Hungary. The relations between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, apart from the economic aspect, soon fell into the shadows due to the Albanian riots and rebellions that engulfed the entire Kosovo vilayet. In that case too, the Serbian state tried not to interfere in Turkey's internal affairs.

Sweden's ‘complicated’ relationship with genocide recognition

Scholars have unpacked the rhetorically nuanced ways political actors alter state narratives in resisting pressure to comply with international norms. But many of these rhetorical strategies apply in other contexts, where there exists sufficient norm ambiguity, too. For example, in response to Turkey's long-standing denialism, many governments have been asked to recognise the Armenian Genocide (or 1915 Genocide of Christians in the Ottoman Empire). But, because there exists no clear international norm about recognising genocides perpetuated by other states, even some of the most unlikely government officials adapt their rhetoric to resist recognition and pursue ulterior foreign policy objectives. Building on Dixon's rhetorical adaptation framework, this article argues that, between 1999 and 2021, Swedish political actors often adapted their rhetoric in ways similar to Turkish officials as a result of the normative ambiguity of states recognising the Armenian Genocide. In explaining why Sweden consistently resisted Genocide recognition efforts, this analysis focuses on its larger foreign policy commitments of spreading democracy in Turkey and managing the Syrian refugee crisis.

French National Holiday Celebrations in Occupied Istanbul (1919-1923)

Bu çalışmada, 1919-1923 yılları arasında İşgal İstanbul’unda gerçekleştirilen Fransız Millî Bayramı kutlamaları tarihsel araştırma yöntemi kapsamında incelenmiştir. İtilaf Devletleri, başkent İstanbul’u Mondros Mütarekesi uyarınca 13 Kasım 1918’de fiilen, 16 Mart 1920’de ise resmen işgal etmiştir. İstanbul’un işgal altında bulunduğu sırada yaşanan önemli gelişmelerden biri de Fransız Millî Bayramı kutlamalarıdır. 1919-1923 yılları arasında belirli bir program dâhilinde gerçekleştirilen bu kutlamalarda çeşitli etkinlikler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda öncelikle fener alayları düzenlenmiş ve İtilaf Devletleri subaylarının da izleyici olarak katıldığı askerî geçit törenleri yapılmıştır. Ayrıca düzenli bir şekilde Fransız elçiliğinde kabul törenleri gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu törenlerde Fransız yetkilileri günün anlamına yönelik konuşmalar yapmış ve bazı siyasi mesajlar da vermişlerdir. Böylece Fransızlar işgalci bir güç olarak askerî birlikleriyle âdeta bir güç gösterisi yaptıkları gibi kutlamalar üzerinden siyasi propaganda da bulunmuşlardır. Buna karşılık Fransız Millî Bayramı kutlamalarına hiçbir Türk yetkilisi katılmamıştır. Bununla birlikte bayram törenleri İstanbul basınına ayrıntılı bir şekilde yansımıştır. Bu çerçevede törenlere yönelik haber ve izlenimler aktarılmış ve çeşitli siyasi değerlendirmelere yer verilmiştir. Bu değerlendirmelerde, öncelikle Fransız İhtilali’nin tarihçesine ve evrensel düzeydeki kazanımlarına değinilmiştir. Bu kapsamda ihtilalin önemi ile hürriyet, adalet, eşitlik, kardeşlik ve İnsan Hakları Beyannamesi gibi evrensel kazanımları öne çıkarılmıştır. Ayrıca Fransız Millî Bayramı’nın sadece Fransa’nın değil bütün medeni ülkelerin ortak bayramı olduğu dile getirilmiştir. Yapılan değerlendirmelerde öne çıkan bir konu da Türk-Fransız ilişkileridir. Bu konuda, Türk-Fransız ilişkilerinin önemi vurgulanmış ve Fransız İhtilali ile Türk İnkılabı arasındaki benzerliğe işaret edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda 1919-1922 yıllarındaki Fransız Millî Bayramı kutlamaları basında olumlu bir şekilde ele alınmakla birlikte, 1923 yılına gelindiğinde Fransızların İstanbul’da bir bayram kutlaması yapması eleştirilmiştir.

Symbolic Amplification and Suboptimal Weapons Procurement: Explaining Turkey’s S-400 Program

Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of Russian S-400 missile batteries is puzzling. Despite repeated threats of sanctions by the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Turkey purchased a multi-billion-dollar Russian air defense system that remains nonoperational, fails to cover Turkey’s air defense gap, and led to Turkey’s costly expulsion from the F-35 program. We argue unexpected domestic constraints created by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s symbolic diplomacy raised the political costs of backing away from the deal. Collecting data from media reports and interviews, we analyze how Turkey’s AKP wielded the S-400 as a weapons system legitimating an identity narrative of Turkey as regional counterhegemon, facilitating the cultivation of coalitions with multiple, often competing, constituencies. We demonstrate via process tracing how the inherent ambiguity of symbols allowed nationalist constituencies key to the AKP’s hold on power to amplify the S-400 as symbolic of Turkey’s sovereignty, trapping Turkish officials in a costly policy corner. In unpacking Turkey’s S-400 purchase, the article contributes to the literature on symbolic diplomacy, audience costs, weapons procurement, and deterrence failure.

Neki predlozi konzula u Prištini za poboljšanje položaja srpskog stanovništva (1889-1905)

Thanks to the diplomatic work of Serbia and the engagement of its politicians, a consular convention was signed, on the basis of which consulates in the Ottoman Empire were opened. Among the open consulates, the consulate in Priština was of special importance for the Serbian people. Its consuls dealt almost exclusively with the difficult situation of the Serbian people, as evidenced by numerous reports sent to the Government in Belgrade. There were no other consulates in Priština and there was a great need for its work and protection of the large Serbian population north of the Šara Mountain. The position of Serbs in the area of the Priština consulate was hampered not only by the work of Turkish officials, but also by the anarchy and daily tyranny of Albanians, towards which the authorities were lenient. From its founding in 1889 until the liberation in 1912, ten consuls served in the consulate in Priština. It was not uncommon for clerks or dragomans to perform duties in the absence of consuls. Not only did they perform the service, but they also left very valuable written notes of that time, which occupy an important place in domestic historiography. The consuls of the Kingdom of Serbia in Priština witnessed various atrocities against the Serbian population by Albanians. The Turkish authorities acted negligently and did not show the will to take appropriate measures against the rioters. That is why, from the very opening of the consulate, various proposals could be heard, which were sent to the Government in Belgrade. Some of them referred to bringing the consuls closer to the Albanians, establishing contacts and cooperation with the leaders of Albanians, abolishing the consulate and finally arming the Serbian population. The consuls often insisted that the domestic and foreign press be engaged, because they thought that its actions would influence Porta and the sultan to prevent oppression of the Serbian population which, under the pressure, left their property and emigrated outside the Ottoman Empire.

L’inventario della spezieria di Giovanni Zavanti al Cairo (1732)

Abstract The inventory of the apothecary Giovanni Zavanti, a Venetian pharmacist who worked in Cairo in the 1730s, was drawn up by the Egyptian city’s British Consulate in 1732. Since this institution ensured formal juridical protection to the English shopkeepers of the Levant Company, but devoted little attention to their need for health care, this historical source can be considered a rare testimony of European medical-pharmaceutical activity in the Levant. The inventory’s importance is also connected with the specific political and socio-cultural context of Egypt, the most economically important province of the Ottoman Empire. Substantial groups of English, French and Dutch merchants lived in the Muslim society of Cairo and were officially represented by their respective nations in the eighteenth century. The Venetian, also active in Cairo, could not count on the protection of their State institutions during the Turco-Venetian conflicts (1645–1718). In this complex context, Zavanti tried to take advantage of his professional activity and built up different socio-cultural relations to defend his properties and commercial interests. He was in contact with fellow countrymen, Arabic Christians of Egypt, Jews, Turkish officials and the Franciscan confraternity Custodia Terrae Santae. As second-generation immigrants from Venice, the Zavantis experienced a difficult process of cultural integration in Egypt.

Countering counterterrorism: defending human rights and challenging curfews in Turkey

ABSTRACT Turkey imposed open-ended blanket curfews beginning in 2015, resulting in gross human rights violations. This article analyzes strategies employed by domestic activists to address violations. It explains what worked, what did not, and why. It argues that longstanding barriers to mass mobilization, including some that predate de-Europeanization, shaped activists’ mobilization strategies. Because of an unfavorable domestic environment, activists used a boomerang strategy, disseminating information to international allies who applied pressure to Turkish officials. This strategy effectively mobilized transnational human rights networks, resulting in a continuous and concerted effort by international actors to persuade Turkish officials to protect human rights while countering terrorism. Nevertheless, the boomerang strategy and a legal strategy to file applications with the European Court of Human Rights ultimately failed to generate a shift in policy. The article concludes with a discussion about the factors that contributed to this outcome.

Explaining the evolution of Turkey’s diaspora engagement policy: a holistic approach

ABSTRACT This article provides a comprehensive framework to explain why Turkey has adopted a pro-active diaspora agenda since the early 2000s. It shows that Turkey’s diaspora policy is the result of an amalgamation of domestic, transnational, and international factors: Domestically, the AKP’s rise to power resulted in drastic economic and political reforms and the promotion of a new identity based on neo-Ottomanism and Sunni-Muslim nationalism. These developments have transformed Turkey’s state-diaspora relations. The 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 failed coup attempt also played a role. Transnationally, Turkish expatriates’ growing socio-economic and political clout in their host countries, as evidenced by the mushrooming of political parties founded by Turks in Europe, has urged Turkey to reconsider the efficacy of its diaspora as a source of influence abroad as well as a noteworthy electorate in national elections. Various international events have also shaped Turkey’s new diaspora agenda, including Turkey’s increasing bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU since the early 2000s, particularly after the European refugee crisis, and the rise of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 era. I suggest that domestic factors have played the most significant role in shaping Turkey’s diaspora agenda. I examine the domestic dimension both as an independent factor and also in relation to transnational and international factors. The configuration of a new political elite has changed the ways in which Turkey interacts with its transnational diaspora and perceives its international position vis-à-vis European countries. The findings of the article draw on official statements and documents, semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with Turkish officials, the Euro-Turks Barometer Survey, and news sources.

SON NEFESİNDE OSMANLICILIK: BİRİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞINDA ARAP CEPHESİNDE GÖREV YAPAN OSMANLILARIN HATIRALARI

This paper aims to expose the ways in which the leading Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP) officials in the Arab lands during the First World War have internalized, questioned, and interpreted the conditions of their mission. It is based on the memoirs of Falih Rıfkı, aide-de-camp of Commander-in-Chief Cemal Pasha, the writer of the second memoir, and Halide Edip, an ardent defender of the social and educational reforms of the CUP government. Both written after the war, these memoirs reflect not only nostalgia and regret but also the complicated relationship between Turkish officials and Arabs on the dusk of their break up as citizens of the Ottoman State. The paper also questions the orthodox argument that the Turkist and anti-Arabic ideology of the CUP government in general and Cemal Pasha’s crusade against Arab nationalists during the war caused the emergence of Arab nationalism. By contemplating on the memoirs of the CUP members in the Arab lands, it argues that both Falih Rıfkı, Cemal Pasha, and Halide Edip tried to understand the region and its people in order to create a mutual future for the Turks and Arabs in the Ottoman Empire.

Трабзон и Самсун в период национальной борьбы в Турции за освобождение и независимость в путевых дневниках М. В. Фрунзе и Е. Е. Лансере (1921–1922 гг.)

The article strives to restore historical impression of the Turkish cities Trabzon and Samson located on the Anatolian littoral of the Black Sea and episodes of their daily life during the period of National Struggle for liberation and independence under the leadership of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the base of Mikhail Frunze’s travel diary “A Trip to Angora” («Поездка в Ангору») and Silver Age artist Eugene Lansere’s travel diary “Summer in Angora” («Лето в Ангоре»). Frunze visited Trabzon and Samsun in November-December, 1921 during his journey to Ankara and once again in January, 1922 en route back to Russia from Ankara. Lansere also visited Trabzon and Samsun in June, 1922 during his journey to Ankara and repeatedly passed Trabzon in October of the same year, going home to Russia from Turkey. Both Frunze and Lansere became direct eye-witnesses of these cities’ everyday lives during the days of National Struggle in Turkey. Moreover, in their travel diaries they narrated valuable data regarding everyday life, roadsteads, economics, and their meetings with Turkish officials in those cities. Travel diaries of Mikhail Frunze and Eugene Lansere supplement each other in a very precise way, restoring impressions of Trabzon and Samsun. We provide here Eugene Lansere's sketches of the Persian camel caravan in Trabzon, his sketch of passengers and cargo transportation from steamships to the shore in Samsun, while a drawing of wooden barge can serve an additional visual source to Frunze’s records on Trabzon and Samsun.

Refugees and Guesthood in Turkey

AbstractEven as Turkey took in over 3 million Syrians at great expense, Turkish officials were referring to these individuals as guests rather than refugees. Despite significant legal developments in the country, and particularly the formalization of a temporary-protection regime, this choice of labels reveals the influence of underlying political trends on Turkish policymaking regarding refugees. This article compares Turkey’s reactions to the Syrian inflow with its responses to previous refugee groups, including Iraqis in 1988, Bosnians in 1992, Kosovars in 1998 and Chechens starting 1999. In so doing, it demonstrates that the refusal to designate certain populations as asylum seekers or refugees enables Turkey to opt in or out of what might otherwise appear to be generally applicable, national-level policies. Through these strategic semantics, policymakers retain a freedom to manoeuvre in response to international and domestic political incentives.

A Turkish perspective on the ethics of ‘safe zone’: the evolution of the concept in Turkish–American relations from Iraq (1991–2003) to Syria (2012–2016)

‘Safe zone’ is a transnational concept, including a moral understanding. This article departs from the idea that with the onset of the post-Cold War period, the concept of ‘safe zone’ has been a critical point of fluctuation, whereby Turkey and the USA faced important challenges in their bilateral relations. Accordingly, the article aims to examine the understanding of the concept by Turkey, to question the morality of the concept from Turkish perspective and to discuss its implications for Turkish–American relations. It also intends to analyse to what extent the recent discussions on Syria reveal a continuity with or a change from the discussions on Northern Iraq of 1990s. This study refers to Turkish officials’ statements as well as the debates held in Turkish Grand National Assembly, to reveal the evolving perceptions and/or interpretations of ‘safe zone’ by Turkish authorities.

TURKEY'S POSİTİON ON THE BEGİNNİNG OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR 22 SEPTEMBER 1980

The Iraq-Iran war, which began on September 22, 1980, is considered as one of the longest wars in the Middle East in the 20th century. This war has left great and direct effects on Turkey because it has common borders with the two warring states. The significance of the study comes from the fact that it examines the Turkish position since the Iraq-Iran war started. The study becomes more important because of the geographical location of these three countries to Kurdistan region -Iraq, as the political movements in these countries reflected negatively and positively on Kurdistan region. Consequently, it is our duty to follow the history of these countries and study everything related to them. The study tries to raise a number of questions regarding the Turkish position on the beginning of the war. Such questions include how was the position of official Turkish and the media towards the war? Which country was accused by Turkey of being the aggressor and the initiator of the war? And how were the statements of Turkish officials about that war? The economic factor, which had a significant impact on Turkey's position on the war, was also discussed in this study.

Turkey’s future with the European Union: an alternative model of differentiated integration

ABSTRACTTurkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) is one of the most controversial cases in its enlargement policy. Both external and domestic factors complicate its accession, bringing forth questions on geographical, cultural borders of Europe as well as the limits of EU’s institutional capacity. While Turkey’s accession seems to be farther away, it is, nonetheless, functionally integrated to the EU in multiple ways, ranging from trade, common foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs to energy cooperation. It is, therefore, critical to assess whether alternative modes of integration are possible for Turkish–EU relations, going beyond formal membership. To do so, the paper draws upon the in-depth interviews conducted with Turkish and EU officials in 2013, 2015 and 2016. The paper evaluates the degree of differentiated integration between Turkey and the EU, and assesses the trajectory of this functional integration in related policy areas and proposes multiple new avenues to further this cooperation.

Border Crossings between Georgia and Turkey: The Sarp Land Border Gate

ABSTRACTThe Sarp land border gate between Turkey and Georgia has become Turkey’s gateway to the East in recent years. With a large number of individuals crossing every day, it is also a labour gate, where irregular Georgian immigrants cross the border for work in Turkey. In general, border policies are constructed and reconstructed in a dynamic process in which economic, security, ethnopolitical, geopolitical and cultural paradigms interact. The aim of this paper is to observe the complementary and conflicting relationship and negotiation process between economic and security paradigms in particular, with a focus on the perceptions of the officers of the border administration and state bureaucracy at the local level. To this end, field research was carried out consisting of interviews with Turkish state officials responsible for immigration and border crossing in the Sarp gate region. The article sheds light on the interaction between various agencies, actors and stakeholders in border policymaking at the regional level. It also elaborates on the profiles both of incoming immigrants employed as irregular workers and of deportees. The results of the qualitative study show that the dominance of the economic paradigm that underlies the main framework of Georgia-Turkey relations overrides security concerns between the two countries, thus necessitating a more flexible implementation of laws. The field research illustrates that implementation of laws and regulations at the local level varies and while some groups of irregular immigrants are allowed to work, others are not and, what is more, are deported.