Sweden's ‘complicated’ relationship with genocide recognition

Abstract

Scholars have unpacked the rhetorically nuanced ways political actors alter state narratives in resisting pressure to comply with international norms. But many of these rhetorical strategies apply in other contexts, where there exists sufficient norm ambiguity, too. For example, in response to Turkey's long-standing denialism, many governments have been asked to recognise the Armenian Genocide (or 1915 Genocide of Christians in the Ottoman Empire). But, because there exists no clear international norm about recognising genocides perpetuated by other states, even some of the most unlikely government officials adapt their rhetoric to resist recognition and pursue ulterior foreign policy objectives. Building on Dixon's rhetorical adaptation framework, this article argues that, between 1999 and 2021, Swedish political actors often adapted their rhetoric in ways similar to Turkish officials as a result of the normative ambiguity of states recognising the Armenian Genocide. In explaining why Sweden consistently resisted Genocide recognition efforts, this analysis focuses on its larger foreign policy commitments of spreading democracy in Turkey and managing the Syrian refugee crisis.