Османи на трьох континентах, пер. з турецьк. О. Кульчинського

Abstract

Could the Ottomans be successors of Caesars? Ukrainian readers’ interest in the Turkish historian’s book seems to be reasonable because the Ottoman Empire covered much of southern Ukraine from 1475 until the end of the eighteenth century. Ukrainian Cossacks actively participated in fifteenth-through eighteenth-century wars with the Sublime Porte.Definitely, the history of the Ottoman Empire is considered important for the comprehension of the history of Ukraine. The Ottoman influence played a significant role in the history of the Ukrainians and other native peoples in Ukraine—Crimean Tatars, Karaites, Crimeans, and Azov Greeks.Ottomans on Three Continents by I. Ortayli, a professor at Ankara University and a spokesman of the scientific elite and society, is devoted to the history of the Ottoman Empire and clearly states the Ottomans’ claims on the role of a “Third Rome.” It is an edited collection of great public speeches and structurally consists of a preamble and nineteen chapters, proceeding chronologically from the fifteenth century through the fall of the empire, and thematically covers various aspects: major historical milestones, geopolitical position, foreign policy, culture, non-Muslim population’s state, and so forth. Considerations supporting the hypothesis of the Ottoman Empire as the Third Rome are given in different chapters.Thus, the first chapter contains provisions on the comprehension of Ottoman history and identity for exploration of the "most fundamental world civilizations" (p. 13). Formally correct, it states the Ottomans’ claims on heredity regarding previous Mediterranean civilizations.The second chapter contains the thesis on the immediate heredity of the Roman and Ottoman Empires on the basis that the Turks (Seljuk Sultanate of 1077–1307) called themselves Romali (Rumi) and their land and country Roma (Rum), and the conqueror of Constantinople, Mehmed Fatih, took the title Qayser-i-Rum, or Caesar of Rome (p. 25). Obviously, this thesis can hardly be recognized as an argument for considering the Sublime Porte as the Third Rome. Let’s look at an example from the history of Ukraine.Since the time of the Crimean Khanate, in Ukraine, the Rumeis (Romans) have meant an ethnolinguistic group of Azov Greeks speaking Crimean-Greek. The group’s ethnogenesis consists of the Romans (Byzantines), but this does not prove its Roman-Byzantine face; rather, the Rumeis were typical Oriental inhabitants (by language, way of life, culture, consciousness) and the ethnonym just demonstrates ethnogenesis’ peculiarities. By the way, the Ottoman Empire in Ukraine and all over Europe was called Turkey, populated with the Turks because of the Turkic genealogy of the sultans.Obviously, the use of titles, ethnonyms derived from the Roman Empire, and territorial extensity are not sufficient reasons to proclaim the Ottoman Empire to be the Third Rome. For example, Ukrainian researchers determined the Byzantine (Greco-Roman) civilization as one of the sources of the Ottoman civilization, along with other civilizations (Middle Eastern Islamic, Persian, Western European, Slavic-Orthodox, and influences of Jewish and Armenian culture). Undoubtedly, the Roman and Ottoman Empires were typical (classical) and a priori similar in many ways, at least in external signs. However, paraphrasing the famous New Testament plot, we hardly can pour new early-modern Ottoman wine into old antique and medieval Roman-Byzantine wine bags.However, the Ottoman civilization was based on traditions of the steppe Turks—the ruling Ottoman dynasty and beyliks, the steppe identity of the elite and the sultans, the status of the sultan and his court with the rules of succession to the throne, and the political traditions of the state system. Ottoman military strategy and tactics were also based on steppe traditions, despite the external Westernization that made the Ottomans a "gunpowder empire." The strength of the Roman army was based on the careful individual training of legionnaires, followed by activity in the unit and the constant improvement of their skills—it is hard to imagine the sultan in the place of the Emperor Hadrian, supervising the military training.Even improper handling of historical facts regarding military history does not conceal the underestimation of the systemic vision by the Sublime Porte, partly a failure to consider all military and political factors (pp. 81–83). The Roman Empire considered wars comprehensively and systematically, despite temporary defeats, negating the influence of subjective factors, which were decisive, according to I. Ortayli.It should be emphasized that the system of military slavery (devshirme) as the foundation of the Ottoman state and military system, based on the practice of nomadic and Eastern empires, was absolutely incompatible with the traditions of Rome.Not to mention the moral estimation of the conversion into slaves and the Islamization and Turkification of Slavic boys in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the devshirme contributed to the rapid rise of the Ottomans. However, from the end of the sixteenth century, it became a braking and destructive force. The system of military slavery represented a dead end with respect to global political development and could exist only under the specific conditions of some Eastern and Muslim states. The Ottoman society did not know other social and political players, and that led to stagnation, crisis, and disintegration.The foregoing regarding the irrelevance of the Ottomans’ claims on the inheritance of Rome does not affect I. Ortayli’s arguments about the similarity of the Ottoman and Roman Empires (all empires are similar by definition)—a certain universalism; the tolerance of faithful servants in spite of origin; and geographical "imposition," above all, in the Mediterranean region.Private property and market relations with significant material resources and social forces were considered to be the social and economic basis of the Roman Empire. In the Ottoman Empire, the role of private property, traders, and entrepreneurs was ignored; the desire for wealth was dispraised; social and economic life was subordinated to political and military interests; and society did not have the resources for modernization (pp. 53–55). Thus, the fundamental and fatal flaw of the Ottoman Empire as the lack of its own capitalism, with corresponding economic growth and dependence on the conquest of new resources.The Roman Empire was open to dialogue with other civilizations and cultures. The Ottoman Empire deliberately limited foreign innovations, and according to I. Ortayli, the Ottoman history was like a wall (p. 57). The author reserves the greatest philippics for Protestantism, which allegedly "destroyed the culture" of traditional societies. It is clear that with this attitude toward the West’s leading achievements, the prospects of the Ottoman Empire for modernization appear problematic, as well as objectivity for I. Ortayli.In addition, the author has to admit that in the field of law, the judicial system, and legal proceedings, Istanbul can hardly be compared to Rome (p. 67). I. Ortayli also forgot that international law appeared in the Roman Empire, and Istanbul recognized it only because it was defeated in the war of 1683–1699 (pp. 107–108).The author’s claims on the inheritance of Rome regarding the administrative-territorial system are not convictive. However, I. Ortayli’s views on the similarity of the Ottomans and Eastern despotism regarding the domination of the rural community in the absence of private land ownership seem to be correct (p. 66).The main and fundamental difference between Rome and Istanbul concerns the rights of the subjects (in Rome, they were protected by a court) and, in particular, of minorities, in the Roman Empire—any citizen who was loyal to the emperor could make a career in government positions, but the High Porte did not allow Christians to serve in state and prestigious military structures, forbade them from testifying in court against Muslims, and so forth. The Ottoman Empire was, first and foremost, the Balkan Empire—the southern Slavs were one of the sources for the ruling elite, they dominated between the devshirme and janissaries, and the Serbo-Croatian language was common in the army and even in the palace of the sultan. I. Ortayli does not consistently mention this thesis. It should be noted that the South Slavic, Romanian-Moldovan, Crimean Tatar, Kurdish, Arab-Berber, and other ethnic military contingents played a significant role in the victories of the Porte. The Balkans formed the economic and, to a great extent, cultural basis of the Ottoman Empire (pp. 20, 51, 128). More often, Turkish migrants moved to the Balkans, the main object of Turkification and Islamization during the Ottoman period.We emphasize that the reviewers recognize the outstanding role of the Ottoman Empire in the history of humankind and the achievements of this most powerful and stable Muslim empire, such as a developed centralized state with a centralized bureaucracy, the army’s mechanism of servicemen recruitment by abilities, an effective system of province management that preserved their ethno-confessional specificity, tolerant ethno-confessional politics, standard norms of life and inner peace, significant contributions to the world’s treasury of culture, limitation of the aristocracy’s role in public life, effective overcoming of the tribal organization of society, and the ability to confront the most powerful states.Summarizing, we’d like to accentuate that I. Ortayli defines the High Porte as "a Middle Eastern Islamic state" (p. 52) in his text. Thus, the author’s hypothesis about the inheritance of Roman traditions by the Ottomans reflects only a part (not decisive) of the realities of Ottoman society. The opinion that the Ottoman Empire had not inherited ancient institutions is noteworthy as well. An analysis of the book by I. Ortayli shows that the Ottoman society, by typological features, cannot claim the role of a Third Rome, and the author’s hypothesis is not always supported by correct conclusions and generalizations and requires further scientific analysis—particularly, according to the reviewers, first of all, the review of anti-Western investments, the search for the problems of the empire within itself, and the consideration of Ottoman history not only in geographic and spatial terms but also in time coordinates as a part of world history. I. Ortayli brilliantly shows the importance of such approaches by the example of Iran. We believe that new discoveries in the illustrious and didactic history of the Ottoman Empire are expected to be brought forth by researchers.