Following Saddam's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War and their own failed uprising that had ensued, the Iraqi Kurds nevertheless began increasingly to move toward the creation of a de facto state and government in northern Iraq. This was accomplished behind the protection of the Allied Poised Hammer forces stationed in south-eastern Turkey, a United Nations presence sanctioned by Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April, 1991, that had condemned 'the repression of the Iraqi civilian population ... in Kurdish populated areas' and demanded 'that Iraq ... immediately end this repression', and Turkish cooperation and protection. The economic blockade Baghdad began imposing against the Kurds on 23, October 1991, along with the withdrawal of government officials from that area, ironically had the effect of hardening rather than weakening Kurdish resolve. In February and March 1992, for example, Massoud Barzani, the leader of one of the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) travelled through Europe to inform various governments of the Kurdish point of view. In Turkey he 'held useful and positive with President Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, Deputy Prime Minister Erdal Inonu, Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, and other foreign ministry officials. These talks addressed the general political and economic situation in northern Iraq and bilateral ties between the two sides. A few days later Barzani met in France with Bernard Kouchner, the French secretary of state for humanitarian action and denounced the Iraqi blockade. A day later he met with Roland Dumas, the French foreign minister. Elections held in May 1992 led to the formation of an actual government in July and the declaration of a federated state in October. As Jalal Talabani, the leader of the other main Iraqi Kurdish party the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) put it: 'Saddam Husayn's aggression against Kuwait ... led to the emergence of a situation in Iraq which we exploited to establish a free local administration [because] none of the region's states can allow the Iraqi regime to launch a new aggression against Kurdistan.'2 The purpose of this article is to analyse the various factors that led to the emergence of this de facto Kurdish state, its regional effects upon surrounding states and the Kurds living in them, and the prospects for the future.