Tuareg Rebellion Research Articles

Confronting Rifles with Words: The High Islamic Council of Mali and Non-State Armed Groups

Abstract Since the 2012 Tuareg rebellion and the takeover of large areas in the north of Mali by Islamic fundamentalist groups, Muslim religious leaders in the country have spearheaded important negotiation initiatives under the auspices of the High Islamic Council of Mali (HCIM). On more than one occasion, these initiatives have led to the liberation of detainees or the possibility of humanitarian convoys reaching communities caught in the midst of the armed conflict. Why were these initiatives successful (or unsuccessful)? How did religious leaders convince non-state armed groups to adopt conduct that complies with basic humanitarian norms? Drawing on desk-based and fieldwork research conducted as part of the Generating Respect Project, this article seeks to answer these questions and to identify the endogenous and contextual factors that contributed to the successes of the HCIM and its negotiators.

Identity and conflict: Evidence from Tuareg rebellion in Mali

Does internal conflict erode national identity in Sub-Saharan Africa? We explore this question in the context of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali. The timing of the conflict was plausibly exogenous: the fall of al-Gaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 triggered the return of the Tuareg fighters from the demised leader’s Praetorian guard to their homeland in Northern Mali. Using representative survey data on the salience of national and ethnic identities, we perform a difference-in-differences estimation and find that the outbreak of the conflict prompted Malian residents living closer to the conflict zone to decrease their national identity more than the residents further away. We argue that this effect is likely to have been driven by proximity to violent events perpetrated by separatist groups and not by selective migration, exposure to internally displaced persons, communal violence, or other potential alternative explanations. Our results are consistent with the qualitative evidence on the matter. We place these findings in the context of recent theoretical advances in identity economics.

Iklan Aesthetics in Niger: Identity and Adornment from Servility to Self-agency

<i>Iklan</i> Aesthetics in Niger: Identity and Adornment from Servility to Self-agency

The Malian state, social exclusion, political marginalisation and the Tuareg rebellions : a war with no end in sight?

The Malian state, social exclusion, political marginalisation and the Tuareg rebellions : a war with no end in sight?

Transit Migration in Niger

Since 2015, the European Union has stepped up its efforts to curb irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa through increasingly restrictive measures targeting transit countries along migratory routes, including Niger. While the EU has heralded the success of its policies to limit migration through Niger, EU migration policies have disrupted the economic system in Agadez, where transit migration has been one of the main sources of income and a factor of stability since the end of the Tuareg rebellions in 2009. This article discusses the impact that EU migration policies may have at the local level in countries of transit, and highlights the potential for these policies to fuel tensions between local and national authorities. The Agadez case study illustrates the importance of a multilevel approach to migration governance that takes into full consideration the role of local authorities and local communities in countries of transit.

A Social Network Analysis of Islamic Terrorism and the Malian Rebellion

Using social network analysis, our first aim is to illuminate the relationships between the Islamists and the rebels involved in the Malian conflict. We use a selection of newspaper articles to demonstrate that the connection between Islamists and rebels depends on brokers who passed from the Tuareg rebellion to radical groups. Our second objective is to detail the internal relationships within each of the subgroups. Our findings show how Islamists were affected by the accidental disappearance of one the AQMI regional emirs and how the death of one of the architects of the Tuareg rebellion affected rebel cohesion.

Mali and the Sahel: Making Peace in Another Rough Neighbourhood

Since the fourth Tuareg rebellion in January 2012, followed by a military coup in March of the same year against the democratically elected government of Mali, the Malian state and the greater Sahel region have hitherto become a political and security challenge of seemingly unmanageable proportions for the international community. Following the classification of the situation by the UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and security, foreign, regional and international missions faced intractable difficulties in overcoming political intransigence, powerful rebel groups, terrorism, organized crime, weak state institutions and a deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation. Described as an ‘archetypal conflict ecosystem’ by commentators and as one of the most dangerous peacekeeping environments by UN officials, the situation in Mali and the Sahel has little to show in terms of progress after 6 years of foreign intervention of various kinds and therefore remains a still to be solved, typical African peace and security challenge. This contribution explains the root causes of instability and violence in the region, and examines the evolution of foreign, regional and international interventions in the region, the changes in peacekeeping mandates and the relationship between the United Nations and the African Union.

Escalating Complexity in Regional Conflicts: Connecting Geopolitics to Individual Pathways to Terrorism in Mali

ABSTRACTIn 2012, Northern Mali was the theater of a Tuareg rebellion that has rapidly transformed into a much more complex armed conflict. The current situation is affected by various factors, such as the influence of regional geopolitical dynamics, the increasing presence of terrorist, pro-government or secessionist paramilitary groups, and the synergies between terrorism and organized crime. Through analyzing existing literature and field research, this article addresses the question: what factors play a role in the current conflict in Mali? Conflict evolution will be placed in the broader historical and geopolitical framework to then assess individual push and pull factors.

A Southern View on the Tuareg Rebellions in Mali

Abstract:Since Mali’s independence in 1960, the Tuareg, a minority ethnic group, have staged successive rebellions, with the major ones occurring in 1963, 1990, 2006, and 2012. While discussions of “the Tuareg issue” have sometimes led both the Malian and the international press, as well as scholars, to make inaccurate generalizations, it is true that almost all the armed conflicts of the past fifty years in Mali were originated by people of the Tuareg group. Therefore, many of their Malian compatriots hold the Tuareg people responsible for the destruction of life and human rights violations that have taken place since the beginning of 2012. This article focuses on the events of 2012 and their aftermath and explores some social, cultural, and political differences between northern Tuareg and southern Bamana peoples in particular. It asks two specific questions: Is there something about Tuareg society, culture, and politics (i.e., Tuareg identity) that causes an incompatibility with the Mali Republic? And if not, where has the Malian government failed through the successive regimes since independence?

Control social y territorial del norte de Mali por el yihadismo en un contexto de crisis

Este trabajo analiza el control del norte de Mali que ejercieron grupos armados yihadistas entre 2012 y 2013. Para ello, en primer lugar, se exploran los factores que crearon la situación de crisis previa a la ocupación que facilitó el estallido de la rebelión tuareg y el posterior triunfo de las huestes yihadistas. En segundo lugar, se hace un repaso al conflicto tuareg y a las principales características de la miríada de grupos yihadistas que se instalaron en el norte de Mali durante los últimos años. A continuación, se analiza la toma del control del territorio del norte de Mali y de las poblaciones por los yihadistas hasta la intervención militar francesa que los expulsó. Para ilustrar la vida bajo el yugo yihadista se toma el caso de una región concreta en el norte de Mali y se incluyen testimonios de personas que vivieron la imposición de las leyes que los yihadistas aplicaron para hacer realidad un supuesto Estado islámico en el corazón de África Occidental. Para concluir, se aborda la respuesta local y estatal a la crisis y la situación actual del norte de Mali.

Political Orders in the Making: Emerging Forms of Political Organization from Libya to Northern Mali

ABSTRACTThe current political developments in Libya and northern Mali represent nothing less than the renegotiation of the postcolonial political order. The toppling of Libya’s authoritarian regime and the country’s subsequent disintegration into post-revolutionary camps, plus the continuing Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali accompanied by the rise of transnational jihadist forces, have fostered the fragmentation of state structures, greater heterogeneity in politics, and gains by nonstate power groups on the complex political stage. To assess these processes the article proposes three theoretical concepts and fields of research: heterarchy (historical and present), connectivities in northwest Africa, and the importance of local actors/locality.

The conflict in the Republic of Mali

The state of Mali, which used to be an oasis of peace in an unstable region, turned almost overnight into a conflict site. Weapons and refugees from Libya fueled tensions in the north of the country. This was followed by the worst possible scenarios: the rebellion of the Tuareg with separatist aspirations; a military coup; occupation by terrorist organizations; and a foreign military intervention. The paper first analyzes the history and the current positions of the Tuareg, their goals and capabilities, as well as the impact of external factors. Using analysis and comparison, it seeks to reach conclusions about basic characteristics and mutual relations of the armed movements and terrorist organizations operating in the Republic of Mali and the north of Africa. The final section of the paper contains a chronological overview of the most important events that have occurred since the start of the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali.

Mali: From Sanctuary to Islamic State

Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was set up in northern Mali years before the Tuareg rebellion of 2012. A safe haven for its members, this sanctuary allowed the group to raise funds through drug-trafficking and the ransom business. In 2012, AQIM and its local allies took control of northern Mali and attempted to create an Islamic state – an effort which was cut short by the French military intervention in January 2013. Laurent de Castelli dissects the motives which led AQIM to create its sanctuary in northern Mali before 2012, its drive to establish an Islamic state with the support of its allies, and the reasons behind this evolution.

Islamic Terrorism and the Malian Rebellion

Using Social Network Analysis, this article illuminates the relationship between the Islamists and rebels involved in the Malian conflict. We use publicly available data to demonstrate that the connection between Islamists and rebels depends on brokers who defected from the Tuareg rebellion to radical groups. Our work also details the internal relationships within each of the subgroups. By using descriptive network analysis, we are able to show that both groups were affected by the accidental disappearance of one of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb emirs, and the death of one of the architects of the Tuareg rebellion. Both events affected social cohesion. The article concludes with a discussion of the influence that the French-backed intervention may have on the evolution of the conflict, and how network analysis could contribute to a better understanding of terrorist activities in the region.

Rebelión y sharía en el Sahel: una aproximación al estallido de la rebelión tuareg y la ocupación del norte de Mali por grupos yihadistas e islamistas armados

In 2012 and 2013 Mali suffered one of the worst periods of crisis in its recent history. This article provides insights into the key players who have shaped the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali and the subsequent tenmonth occupation by jihadist and Islamist groups.

The Malian Crisis and its Actors

The structural problems characterising Mali interlocked with the dynamics of crisis triggered by the war in Libya in 2011, causing the collapse of one of the few African democracies. The Tuareg rebellion of 2012, the coup d’état and the Islamist takeover of Northern Mali were the three key phases of this crisis, which pushed France – the former colonial patron – to intervene military. After analysing the major local actors involved in the crisis, the article critically analyses the engagement of the EU in the crisis.

Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers: The Struggles for Northern Mali

Mali has been faced with a series of uprisings by its Tuareg over a number of years. Although each of these rebellions was ended by a cease-fire, the Malian government never succeeded in instituting longer term peace agreements. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion has presented even more significant security threats. The environment in northern Mali now is marked by multiple armed groups, with multiple competing agendas. This complex situation, with Tuareg rebels, Islamists with varying goals, and local militias, with a pattern of varying levels of cooperation and conflict, will at best be very difficult to resolve in the long term. Combined with an almost complete security vacuum in northern Mali on the part of the government, this situation could be intractable even with external intervention. At the same time, the focus on counterterrorism in northern Mali may not be conducive to a long-term resolution of what in reality is a much more complicated security environment.

Mali: Politics of a crisis

Mali's presidential elections were only five weeks away when a mutiny in Kati led to the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré, often called ATT. The country's decline into instability appeared to be rapid, but there had been, over time, a consistent erosion of the country's former standing as one of Africa's model democracies. While support for democracy had grown during the first decade of the Third Republic under the presidency of Alpha Oumar Konaré, it dropped steadily under ATT.1 In the months leading up to the March 2012 coup, and the forestalled April 2012 presidential elections, discontent in the country increased dramatically. A resurgent Tuareg rebellion, disgruntled military personnel, and growing tension around a constitutional referendum scheduled to take place at the same time as the presidential election all created a challenging political terrain. Mali had earned a reputation as a democratic success story and yet the reality was far different. In the two decades following the 1991 coup d'état and the 1992 adoption of the constitution for the Third Republic, Mali had used multiple building blocks of democracy to piece together a precarious structure that would not survive a political crisis. At the same time, a Tuareg separatist insurgency and militant Islamist uprising escalated. While the breakdown of political order, imposition of Shari'a law in the north, and subsequent French military intervention have gained worldwide attention, the resolution of the crisis requires political solutions to be found in the north and south. Elections are planned for July 2013. Questions remain as to whether or not the entire country will be ready to hold elections, and whether hundreds of thousands of displaced people will be able to participate. Elections that are rushed will not serve to create legitimate government and may even further exacerbate political tensions. The alternative of delaying elections is not much better as the legitimacy of the current government is weak and the influence of the junta leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo remains powerful. A National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation has been formed to lead the effort at inter-communal dialogue. At the same time, those groups fighting for the creation of an Islamic state in Mali have fled to the mountains and the desert and have continued to attack Gao, Timbuktu, and other towns. While the Secretary-General of the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), Bilal Ag Achérif, is seeking to negotiate with the government, he has refused to disarm prior to negotiations, complicating the prospects for peacebuilding.2

Tourism and gender identities in Agadez, Niger

The Agadez region, Niger, experienced an important tourism development between the 1970’s and 1990’s. Then, it was suddendly interrupted by the two successive Tuareg rebellions and the spread of islamist threat. This development led to the rise of new services in town and the growth and adaptation of craftship for fitting the tourist needs and desires. This transformation also led to a new distribution of profesional tasks between men and women. This paper presents the modalities of this gendered redistribution of tasks and social identities, during and after the tourism period.

Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion

This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006–2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region.