Mali: Politics of a crisis

Abstract

Mali's presidential elections were only five weeks away when a mutiny in Kati led to the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré, often called ATT. The country's decline into instability appeared to be rapid, but there had been, over time, a consistent erosion of the country's former standing as one of Africa's model democracies. While support for democracy had grown during the first decade of the Third Republic under the presidency of Alpha Oumar Konaré, it dropped steadily under ATT.1 In the months leading up to the March 2012 coup, and the forestalled April 2012 presidential elections, discontent in the country increased dramatically. A resurgent Tuareg rebellion, disgruntled military personnel, and growing tension around a constitutional referendum scheduled to take place at the same time as the presidential election all created a challenging political terrain. Mali had earned a reputation as a democratic success story and yet the reality was far different. In the two decades following the 1991 coup d'état and the 1992 adoption of the constitution for the Third Republic, Mali had used multiple building blocks of democracy to piece together a precarious structure that would not survive a political crisis. At the same time, a Tuareg separatist insurgency and militant Islamist uprising escalated. While the breakdown of political order, imposition of Shari'a law in the north, and subsequent French military intervention have gained worldwide attention, the resolution of the crisis requires political solutions to be found in the north and south. Elections are planned for July 2013. Questions remain as to whether or not the entire country will be ready to hold elections, and whether hundreds of thousands of displaced people will be able to participate. Elections that are rushed will not serve to create legitimate government and may even further exacerbate political tensions. The alternative of delaying elections is not much better as the legitimacy of the current government is weak and the influence of the junta leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo remains powerful. A National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation has been formed to lead the effort at inter-communal dialogue. At the same time, those groups fighting for the creation of an Islamic state in Mali have fled to the mountains and the desert and have continued to attack Gao, Timbuktu, and other towns. While the Secretary-General of the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), Bilal Ag Achérif, is seeking to negotiate with the government, he has refused to disarm prior to negotiations, complicating the prospects for peacebuilding.2