Tsai Ing-wen Research Articles

Strategi Pemerintahan Xi Jinping terhadap Taiwan dalam Mengamankan Kedaulatan Tiongkok

The dynamics of China and Taiwan relation which began with a civil war between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party have not ended yet. President Tsai Ing-wen rejected the existence of the One China Policy and continued to strive for Taiwan's independence in various ways. On the contrary, President Xi Jinping firmly declined Taiwan independence and insisted on defending Taiwan position as part of Chinese sovereignty. This paper aims to explain the attempt of Chinese government under President Xi Jinping in responding to Taiwan move using the concept of security sector by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde encompasses the security strategy of the military, political, and economic sectors. Through the analysis form this concept, Chinese government’s attempt in military and political sector succeeded to overcome the threat from Taiwan position while in the economic sector, the outcome is not as expected since Taiwanese government intended not to depend on Chinese economics.

U.S. AND ITS “ONE CHINA” POLICY

Amongst top national goals of the contemporary China’s leadership, the Taiwan issue occupies a particular place. This issue bears a fundamental significance since it deals with national pride, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity of the PRC. Its resolution has also an applied significance – it promotes the legitimacy of the ruling China’s Communist Party and resolves some geopolitical difficulties China faces. Currently relying on the creation of island’s all-pervading economic dependency on China, yet not excluding military invasion as an option, Beijing expects to resolve the Taiwan issue by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC. By using economic statecraft and exerting pressure on the world’s countries and international organizations, Beijing has succeeded in narrowing Taiwan’s international space, thus coming close to the desired goal of bringing back the island. Still, a crucial impediment to the resolution of the Taiwan issue is the US’ support of Taiwan. The article reveals specifics of the so-called “One China” policy, a policy that the US pursues towards the Taiwan issue ever since 1970s. By analyzing in details the provisions of the documents that lay the basis of “One China” policy, the author identifies its enduring principles. The author emphasizes the dual character of the US’ “One China” policy, which is its simultaneous orientation to promote relations with the PRC and to support Taiwan. The author further explains the motivation of the American support of Taiwan. The nature of the China-Taiwan relations – either confrontational (which has been the case with a few exceptions) or peaceful (like in the beginning of the 1990s and 2008–2016) – is seen in the article as a major determinant of the formulation of the US’ Taiwan policy. Beijing’s readiness to return the island with the use of force and China’s rapid military power accumulation determine the US-Taiwan close military ties, including arms sales to the island. By analyzing the development of the situation in the Taiwan Strait through the examples of three Taiwan administrations (the ones of Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen), the author shows that in the 21st century Taiwan leadership’s policy towards mainland China and the independence issue plays the defining role in the Taiwan-China-US triangle relations. It concludes that changes in the basics of the US’s “One China” policy and the termination of Washington’s support of Taiwan are highly unlikely.

Tipping points

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, TaiwanTaiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

Policy options

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, TaiwanTaiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

Introduction

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, TaiwanTaiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

A complex balance of power

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, TaiwanTaiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

A shifting status quo

‘China’s growing assertiveness, America’s declining deterrent capability, and Taiwan’s growing jumpiness, not least as it watches Hong Kong, have all made a stumble into catastrophic conflict across the Taiwan Strait more likely than for decades. Brendan Taylor credibly argues this is only avoidable - however unattractive “muddling through” might be to purists on all sides - by urgently building more robust crisis-management mechanisms. A sober and compelling analysis which policymakers will ignore at their peril.’Gareth Evans, Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group‘The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting, raising the risk of inadvertent and catastrophic great-power conflict. Brendan Taylor’s identification of this window of vulnerability and proposals for crisis-management advance our understanding of one of the most vexing national security problems of the next decade.’Dr Mira Rapp-Hooper, Council on Foreign Relations‘This is certainly a timely book addressing Taiwan’s forthcoming security challenges. Brendan Taylor provides an insightful and thought-provoking analysis regarding the threats Taiwan is facing and at the same time offers valuable suggestions in terms of how to manage this imminent crisis. This is worth reading by all interests.’Andrew N.D. Yang, Former Minister of National Defense, Republic of China, TaiwanTaiwan’s position looks increasingly precarious, and tensions threaten to grow into a major strategic crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central pillar of his vision for China, and has ramped up diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan. Its inhabitants are increasingly estranged from the mainland, and Tsai Ing-wen’s administration refuses to conduct relations with China on Beijing’s terms. Taiwan could take on renewed strategic significance amid the backdrop of the deepening rivalry between China and the United States, and find itself at the centre of a Cold War-style superpower confrontation.While Washington’s support and military power has historically guaranteed Taiwan’s security, this is no longer a certainty. This Adelphi book argues that China’s military modernisation has changed the cross-strait military balance, and the ability of the US to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan may have evaporated by 2030. As China feels increasingly empowered to retake Taiwan, there is significant potential for escalation, particularly given the ambiguity of Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan. Neither Beijing, Taipei nor Washington want such a conflict, but each is challenging the uneasy status quo. Taylor calls for the introduction of a narrower set of formal crisis-management mechanisms designed to navigate a major Taiwan crisis.

The Future Instability of Cross-Strait Relations: Prospect Theory and Ma Ying-Jeou’s Paradoxical Legacy

ABSTRACTThe 2016 Taiwanese elections which saw a sweeping victory of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have revived the question of cross-Strait instability. While observers have generally focus on whether or not the Tsai administration could cross Beijing’s red lines, few have taken into consideration the dynamic nature of these red lines, and how Ma’s presidency had impacted them. This article fills this gap by drawing on prospect theory hypotheses to assess the shift of Beijing’s preferences in the Taiwan Strait. It explains that Ma’s accommodative policy have left a paradoxical legacy as China is likely to be today more risk-acceptant on a comparatively wider range of cross-Strait outcomes, making cross-Strait relations more crisis-prone than they have ever been.

U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations under the Trump Administration

U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations under the Trump Administration Joseph Chinyong Liow (bio) The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States has occasioned intense discussion over the likely shape of his administration's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. Two broad views have emerged in this regard. The first contends that the political neophyte will attempt to make good on his campaign promises to reconsider U.S. commitments to friends and allies, and this will lead him to depart from prevailing policy toward East Asia and upend the order that has undergirded the region's prosperity and economic dynamism. A second view maintains that, after an initial period of bluster, good sense will prevail and policy toward Asia will fall back into a more familiar pattern as a result of geostrategic realities, combined with the appointment of cabinet members who by most measures are of the order of previous incumbents. Needless to say, the dust has yet to settle on this debate, and it continues to be followed with great interest—not to mention a fair amount of trepidation—around the world, not least in Southeast Asia. The first part of this essay highlights the key differences that have emerged in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia under the Obama and Trump administrations. The essay then concludes by discussing the outlook for U.S.–Southeast Asia relations and identifying several reasons for concern. Differences between the Obama and Trump Administrations' Policies toward Asia The Barack Obama years were heady days for Southeast Asia. Not since the ill-fated Vietnam War era had the United States paid as much attention and devoted as many resources to the region. Obama's Asia policy, christened the "pivot" and later the "rebalance," saw the United States initiate the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the way to joining the East Asia Summit. During his presidency, Obama visited all Southeast Asian countries except for Brunei (which he would have visited in October 2013 if [End Page 53] not for the U.S. government shutdown). To demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the rebalance, the Obama administration joined—and eventually led—discussions for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was pitched as the "gold standard" for global trade and involved twelve Pacific Rim countries, including four from Southeast Asia. At the time, the hope and ambition surrounding the TPP also held out the prospect of other regional states coming on board in the future. With the inauguration of the Trump administration in January, Southeast Asian countries found themselves staring at the prospect of a considerable rollback of U.S. interest in the region. In nursing these fears, they were not alone. U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia shared similar concerns. Candidate Trump's decision to adopt a cantankerous line toward China is hardly unusual for U.S. presidential campaigns. What caused greater consternation was his suggestion that he would withdraw the United States from the TPP and review the country's security commitments to regional allies South Korea and Japan. Trump did little to dispel these concerns following his electoral victory in November. He chose to break with tradition and receive a phone call from the independence-leaning Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen. This was followed by capricious comments about possibly reviewing Washington's long-standing one-China policy. Days after assuming office, Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP by means of executive order. The appointment of China hawks to key positions on trade did little to dampen the growing adversarial climate. Meanwhile, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that efforts should be made to prevent China from having access to the artificial islands it had built in the South China Sea, raising concerns that Sino-U.S. relations were headed for conflict. Four and a half months since his inauguration, President Trump's approach to East Asia appears to be more considered than many pundits and observers were expecting. Visits by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary Tillerson, and Vice President Mike Pence to...

Taiwan in Trump's Perspective: A Bargaining Chip?

Many countries in Asia have experienced significant political transitions in the last couple of years. In Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen won a landslide victory for the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan's independence-leaning party, in the January 2016 presidential election. In her inauguration speech, Tsai to preserve the status quo in relations with China, adding Beijing must respect Taiwan's democracy and both sides must ensure there are no provocations.1 However, the status quo has in fact undergone a sea change since Tsai was sworn in as president-cross-strait relations have sharply cooled with the cessation of official communication channels.Besieged by Taiwan's diplomatic isolation and domestically fierce partisan struggles, particularly over intense relations with China, Tsai's administration, even more than its predecessors, needs satisfactory relations with the United States for Taiwan's economic prosperity and national security. While the United States does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, it maintains commitments to the island based on the Relations Act passed in April 1979. This essay will examine the early contacts between the Tsai government and the Trump administration, the Tsai government's broader policy goals, and the role of the China factor in U.S.-Taiwan relations.Relations between the Trump Administration and TaiwanThe United States witnessed an epochal political transition with the election of Donald Trump as president in November 2016. Trump campaigned on a foreign policy that prioritized the interests of the American people and national security above all else. His foreign policy ideas were clear-revive U.S. competitiveness and security, while requiring a reasonable amount of burden-sharing from U.S. allies to make America great again.Tsai called Trump on December 2, 2016, to congratulate him on winning the presidency, and Trump responded by congratulating Tsai on her electoral victory earlier in the year. They talked for over ten minutes and discussed economic and security issues. Their conversation alarmed some observers in the United States and especially China because of the policy signals it sent to China. A phone call between the leader of and a U.S. president-elect was unprecedented, given that Washington switched its diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. Against this backdrop of suspicion and criticism, Trump retorted, Interesting how the U.S. sells billions of dollars of military equipment but I should not accept a congratulatory call.2 In an interview ahead of his inauguration, Trump further heightened the sense of uncertainty when he stated that everything is under negotiation including One China.2 Beijing's resentment coincided with an earlier expression of concern regarding the annual U.S. defense policy bill, which included a plan to conduct high-level military exchanges with Taiwan.4 Tsai also congratulated Trump upon his inauguration over Twitter. According to her office, she vowed to deepen the bilateral ties between the two countries, since Taiwan is the most important international ally of the United States based on the shared values of freedom, democracy and human rights.5Initially, what wanted was to secure a solid communication channel with the incoming president. While acknowledging that the call did not signal any major policy shift by Washington in terms of the Sino-U.S.-Taiwan triangle, Taiwan's officials still thought the conversation with Trump could give the Tsai administration more room to maneuver in improving substantive ties with Washington.6 Many, however, have noted that the call further strained relations between Taipei and Beijing. It also could have proved costly for Tsai by prompting Chinese pushback against both and the United States. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Geng Shuang said that Beijing had urged Washington to honor its commitment to the one-China policy. …

China-U.S. Relations during the Trump Administration: Mixed Signals, Increased Risks

China-U.S. Relations during the Trump Administration:Mixed Signals, Increased Risks Xie Tao (bio) Whether you hold a crystal ball passed down from Thucydides or are trained in the offensive realist tradition, your predictions about the future of China-U.S. relations will probably be the same: the two great powers are destined for war. For those who are skeptical of historical analogies or the practical value of theoretical models, however, the Chinese leadership offers a dose of optimism. Beijing has consistently reassured the international community that it is firmly committed to peaceful development. Most importantly, Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2014 called on his American counterpart to jointly work toward a new model of major-country relations characterized by "non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation."1 Xi now has a new White House occupant to reassure. Despite his frequent criticism of China during the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump the candidate actually had a big following in China. One telltale sign of his popularity was that there were several unabashedly pro-Trump microblogs on Sina Weibo (a Chinese social media tool that combines functions of Twitter and Facebook). In addition to the Trump Fan Club, there were Trump the Great Man from Heaven and Trump Goes to the White House, each boasting thousands of followers.2 The title of an op-ed published in the New York Times shortly after Trump's electoral win in November, "How Trump Is Good for China," perhaps best captured the prevailing optimism among many Chinese officials and analysts. Although the author predicted that "relations may nose-dive in the short run over trade," he argued that "in the long term, [End Page 5] Mr. Trump's America and China are more likely to work with each other than in any other period in recent memory."3 Half a year into the Trump presidency, is it time to dismiss ominous predictions as alarmist or Chinese optimism as premature? What will be the most salient short-term and long-term issues for this bilateral relationship? This essay first examines the uneven start to China-U.S. relations during the Trump administration before assessing four key issues for the two countries: North Korea, the South China Sea, democracy in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the responsibilities of global leadership. Mixed Signals Even before Trump was sworn in, there were worrisome signs that China-U.S. relations would almost certainly have a bumpy road ahead. Early last December, he took a congratulatory phone call from the Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen, an unprecedented move that raised widespread alarm in both Beijing and Washington. Three weeks later, Trump nominated Peter Navarro—a longtime harsh critic of China's trade practices as well as the author of the sensational book and film Death by China—to be the head of the newly created National Trade Council. About two weeks before his inauguration, Trump chastised China for failing to rein in North Korea's nuclear programs. Just as most observers of China-U.S. relations were buckling up for a sharp downturn, President Trump seemed to have a sudden change of mind. On April 6, he hosted President Xi at Mar-a-Lago, where they agreed to, among other things, a 100-day action plan to advance bilateral economic cooperation. A little more than a month later, the two sides released a ten-part trade deal as the initial results of that action plan. A week after his meeting with Xi, Trump announced that his administration would not designate Beijing a currency manipulator, reversing his arguably best-known campaign promise regarding China. In a late April interview, he unequivocally rejected Tsai's suggestion for another phone call on the grounds that Xi was trying his best to pressure North Korea. On June 20, he sent out a tweet to show his appreciation of Xi's efforts to help with Pyongyang. This sequence of events, plus Trump's tweets and remarks, strongly suggests that he and Xi struck a bargain at Mar-a-Lago—that is, the former would offer concessions on currency, [End Page 6] trade, and Taiwan, and the latter would reciprocate with efforts...

China in Taiwanese cities’ sporting mega-event bids: fatal obstructer, neutral bystander and enthusiastic supporter

From 1988 to 2016, Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan, and Kaohsiung, its largest commercial port, completed thirteen sporting mega-event bids and their successes and failures were overwhelmingly related to China. Through an in-depth review of all those bidding projects, this article intends to understand in what situations China would install obstructions at all costs and under what circumstances it would be neutral or even supportive. The findings confirm that the political stances of both Taiwanese central and local authorities were crucial to determine Beijing’s attitudes. They also explain the reason why Taiwan’s quest for sporting mega-events during the current Tsai Ing-wen era is expected to be a journey with tragic endings.

Taiwan, the South China Sea Dispute, and the 2016 Arbitration Decision

The South China Sea (SCS) has been an area of contention among strong powers and weak states since the release of the 1968 UN geological survey indicating this region’s rich resource potential. The disputes among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines have made the US concerned about regional peace and stability, though the US has no territorial claims there. At the center of this drama has been China’s assertive pose and the counter-moves of the US. Taiwan has also played a crucial role; nevertheless, most studies pay little attention to the crucial role it has played in the SCS disputes. This study explores what role Taiwan has played in the game of the SCS maritime dispute. After a brief introduction to the SCS dispute, this study examines Taiwan’s consideration and explores its policy variation between the former Ma Ying-jeou government and the new Tsai Ing-wen government after May 2016.

Taiwan in 2016

The opposition Democratic Progressive Party won decisive victories in the Legislative Yuan and presidential elections. Despite these victories, 2016 proved to be a difficult year for Taiwan’s new ruling party. As 2016 drew to a close, polls showed that most of Taiwan’s population disapproved of Tsai Ing-wen’s performance as president.

The De-Chinization Policy of Tsai Ing-wen and Influence on Cross-Straight Relations

The De-Chinization Policy of Tsai Ing-wen and Influence on Cross-Straight Relations

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections

The 2016 elections in Taiwan resulted in a landslide victory for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It not only won the presidency but also an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan. It is now in full control of the government. An intriguing question is how the DPP government under President Tsai Ing-wen will deal with China which has warned Taiwan time and again that it would attack Taiwan if the latter declares de jure independence. The current study investigates the possible move that may be considered by the Tsai Ing-wen government, that will not irritate its own constituents on the island, and at the same time will not escalate the tension across the Taiwan Strait. Whether Tsai’s policy is tenable given the domestic and international constraints remains to be seen.

China-US Relations Under Trump: More Continuity Than Change

China-US Relations Under Trump: More Continuity Than Change Zha Daojiong (bio) Pragmatism has prevailed but suspense remains. There is, in reality, more continuity than change in how China and the United States relate to each other. Such is the aggregate state of relations between the two countries seven months into the Donald Trump presidency. Work plans announced at the meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping in early April 2017 marked an end to months of suspense. In China, there was a sense of relief that US policy has not followed through—not in letter, that is—on the onerous options Mr. Trump articulated before January 19, 2017, which cover the entire spectrum of political, economic, and military ties. At the same time, hard work remains ahead to prevent the coin from flipping to the other side to conflict escalation. For China, the rise of Trump to the US presidency has introduced a new level of unpredictability into its bilateral relationship with the United States, which is traditionally complex. Chinese foreign policy elites adopted the Western “black swan” analogy to indicate their level of unpreparedness for the arrival of a new style of head of state in the White House. But then, since the legacy of bilateral ties at the end of the Obama administration was hardly cordial and, with the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton having a track record of hawkishness toward China on East Asian regional security and Chinese domestic political issues (Dyer and Mitchell 2016), expectations for an improvement in ties had not been high, either. In this commentary, I am going to try to situate my observations of the US-China relationship during the past half year in the context of some of the structural geopolitical issues that are certainly going to remain throughout and after the Trump administration. These [End Page 701] issues—over which the two sides have differences each finds difficult to walk back from—have worked to shape Chinese policies toward the United States and vice versa. The remaining question is how to manage them in order to avoid the kind of shocks that may risk a downward slide in the relationship to a point of no return. Viewed from China, how the United States acts over Taiwan continues to be the issue that alone can define the overall level of political relationship Beijing can have with Washington, bilaterally and multilaterally. Given Taiwan’s governing Democratic Progressive Party’s refusal to pay even lip service to a One China orientation, an increase in Washington’s contacts with Taipei does not bode well for Beijing at all. North Korea for decades has succeeded in defying calls, including those from China, to denuclearize, and it is too early to say if Trump’s talk of an end to “strategic patience” can make a real difference. China should continue to work with the United States on North Korea, if only to reduce the chance for the latter to drive the wedge between the two even further. The maritime space in East Asia attracted US attention in recent years in part due to the popularity of the simplistic notion of an inevitable clash between the United States in decline and China on the rise. That notion needs to be debunked. Taiwan On December 2, 2016, Trump spoke by phone with Tsai Ing-wen, leader of Taiwan. This was unprecedented for a US president-elect since the United States switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. Coming on the heels of China-bashing as a key component of his campaign, few believed Trump simply found it impolite to take yet another congratulatory call from abroad on his election victory; Trump later made clear this was not the case and that the call was planned (Gearan, Rucker, and Denyer 2016). By the time of the Trump-Tsai conversation, official contacts between Beijing and Taipei had been effectively put on hold, due to Tsai’s refusal to explicitly acknowledge the “one China, respective interpretations” version of the One China principle both sides [End Page 702] have operated under since 1992. Under Tsai’s predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, structural ties between Taiwan and the mainland did...

China’s Troubled Waters: Maritime Disputes in Theoretical Perspective, by Steve Chan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 250 pp. US$99.99 (cloth).

<i>China’s Troubled Waters: Maritime Disputes in Theoretical Perspective</i>, by Steve Chan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 250 pp. US$99.99 (cloth).

U.S.-Taiwan Relations in the Trump Administration: No Big Fixes Needed

U.S.-Taiwan Relations in the Trump Administration:No Big Fixes Needed Richard C. Bush (bio) As the Obama administration officials hand off Asia policy to Donald Trump and his team, one success story is the relationship with Taiwan. Through concerted efforts and in spite of very occasional difficulties, Washington and Taipei have broadened and deepened their bilateral ties over the last eight years. The two governments are working, in the words of one U.S. official, “to build a comprehensive, durable, and mutually beneficial partnership.”1 Going forward, continuity, not reinvention, is the most sensible path. A rift is not impossible, but if it occurs, it will be because a deterioration in Taiwan-China relations drives a wedge between Washington and Taipei. That has happened before, but it need not happen again this time around. Based on current circumstances, a cross-strait downturn is more likely to disrupt U.S.-China relations than U.S.-Taiwan relations. This essay examines the ways in which the U.S.-Taiwan relationship is both normal and unique, the changes brought by the January 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen, and U.S. policy going forward. A Unique Relationship In some ways, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan seems perfectly normal. Its economy is complementary to that of the United States, and with a population of only 23 million people, it is still the United States’ ninth-largest overall trading partner and seventh-largest destination for agricultural exports. In 2015, U.S. two-way trade in goods with Taiwan exceeded $66 billion, a 4.5% increase from 2013.2 In the last year, the United States became Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner after mainland China. Most significantly, Taiwan companies are the vital center of global supply chains that run from the United States through Taiwan to China [End Page 29] and to the world at large. Under a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement, the two governments are working to deepen economic ties and remove barriers. At Taiwan’s request, the United States has sought to find ways to expand Taiwan’s contributions to the international community, despite China’s persistent efforts to exclude it. Facilitating global training is a good example. In June 2015 the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding creating the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, whereby the United States and Taiwan agreed to conduct training programs for various Asian experts to assist their own countries in building capacities to tackle issues where Taiwan has proven experience and advantages. Counterterrorism is another example. In 2015, as a member of the coalition to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Taiwan worked together with the United States to deliver 350 prefabricated homes for displaced families in northern Iraq.3 Finally, as with many other places around the world, over several decades immigrants from Taiwan to the United States have created a human American stake in Taiwan’s future. A significant number of people, probably over one million, in the United States have connections to Taiwan and contribute to American life in myriad ways. In 2015, Taiwan was the United States’ seventh-largest source of international students, higher than the more populous Japan, United Kingdom, or Germany.4 It is when we move from economic, functional, and people-to-people areas to the diplomatic and security arenas that U.S.-Taiwan relations become “not so normal.” The United States does not recognize or have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei but instead recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. Washington has an embassy in Beijing and conducts its ties with Taiwan through a nominally private organization, the American Institute in Taiwan, which is staffed by U.S. government employees. This unique character applies to security as well, with the political and military threat from China perceived by Taiwan closely binding the island to the United States. The ROC fears that through force, coercion, or intimidation, Beijing will compel the island to be incorporated into the PRC. That fear only deepens as China’s military power and willingness to accept risk grow. Under the rubric of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act...

U.S.-Japan Relations in a Trump Administration

Donald Trump shocked many in Japan during his presidential campaign. Trump suggested in a New York Times interview that Japan and South Korea should develop their own nuclear weapons to contend with North Korea, stating that we're attacked, they do not have to come to our defense, if they're attacked, we have to come totally to their defense. And...that's a real problem.1 On the campaign trail, he repeatedly returned to the topic of Japan to note the lack of reciprocity in the security relationship. At a rally in Iowa on August 6, Trump claimed he was told that Japan pays 50% of the costs of basing U.S. troops there, but he then asked, Why don't they pay 100%?2These assertions, however, may have little to do with how the Trump administration manages the U.S. relationship with Japan. What may be most important is how it envisions U.S. interests in Asia and how it approaches the United States' relationship with Japan's neighbor, China.This essay will first discuss the likely changes in U.S. strategy toward Asia under Trump and the implications for U.S.-Japan relations. The next section will then offer several policy options for the Trump administration to consider, while the conclusion will assess the impact of Russia's relations with both the United States and Japan on the alliance.Changes in U.S. Strategy toward Asia and the Implications for JapanThe incoming Trump administration's approach will differ from the Obama administration's rebalance to Asia. Several broad areas of policy change seem likely. First, U.S. policy toward China will be more fraught, and the trade relationship is likely to be the first target of the new administration. Indeed, designating China as a currency manipulator was high on the list of what Trump stated he would do in the first hundred days of his presidency. But since the election, Trump has taken this idea of shaking up the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) a step further by suggesting that he would be willing to abandon the one-China policy that has guided Washington's relationship with Beijing since normalization in the 1970s. Accepting a phone call from Taiwan's president Tsai Ing-wen on December 2 was the first departure, but his statements that followed were even more explicit about his intention to recalibrate the U.S. relationship with the PRC.Second, the Trump administration seems interested in building up U.S. military capabilities, including in the Asia-Pacific. Trump's Asia advisers have used President Ronald Reagan's peace through strength concept to advocate for a demonstration of U.S. military power. At face value, this strategy may not be all that alarming for allies such as Japan, who prefer that the United States maintain a strong military presence in Asia. How the incoming president intends to use those forces, however, could be more worrisome in the context of a far more contentious U.S.-PRC relationship.Finally, it seems unlikely that the incoming administration will prioritize the Asia-Pacific's annual multilateral gatherings to the same degree as its predecessor. Support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its related regional meetings, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, is likely to diminish. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Barack Obama have been strong supporters of ASEAN's efforts to institutionalize a regional summit meeting, and their administrations have supported the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus that seek to find common ground between regional security and military leaders.These broad changes in the U.S. approach to the Asia-Pacific will shape President Trump's relationship with Japan. First, Washington's relationship with Beijing will have a significant impact on bilateral ties between Tokyo and Beijing. Should tensions with Beijing rise, Tokyo will feel the impact. A trade war with China would of course be a disaster for most of the Asia-Pacific economies, and Japan's economy would be badly affected. …