Tsai Ing-wen Research Articles

Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy in Southeast Asia and the ‘China Factor’: Deepening Regional Integration Amid New Reality

Launched by President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the New Southbound Policy (NSP-T) aims to enhance cooperation and exchange between Taiwan and 18 countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Australasia. The policy is a concerted effort designed to expand Taiwan’s presence across these broad regions by leveraging Taiwan’s cultural, educational, technological and economic resources. There is no doubt that the NSP-T has yielded results in terms of economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges between Taipei and Southeast Asia. However, with Beijing pushing forward its own agenda and, at the same time, asserting more pressure on Taiwan, there are questions about how Taiwan should respond. This article argues that China, through its enormous economic influence and constant consolidation of ‘One China Policy’ in Southeast Asia has limited the success and effectiveness of the NSP-T in the region. The impact of this ‘China Factor’ has, however, differed among Southeast Asian countries due to their distinct relationships with China. This article also argues that while China’s economic diplomacy has earned Beijing considerable influence in the region, that influence has not been translated into Southeast Asian support for its foreign policies, principles nor values – leaving Taiwan with rooms to maneuver its strategic space in the region. Therefore, several policy directions, clusters and implementations have been identified for Taiwan’s consideration in order to enhance existing Taiwan-ASEAN relations. These are: the visible and viable institutionalisation of the NSP-T; addressing existing and emerging issues in the NSP-T; and the consolidation of Taiwan-ASEAN long term connectivity.

Conceptualising Taiwan’s Soft Power Projection in its ‘New Southbound Policy’

This paper examines Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP-T) from a soft power conceptual perspective. It traces the origins of the NSP-T before the Tsai Ing-wen administration came into power in 2016 and then discusses the NSP-T’s subsequent implementation. Through an overview of the earlier ‘Go South Policy’ (GSP) during the administrations of Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou (1994–2016), this paper finds that soft power was not institutionalised in the policy despite it being a prevalent concept, and repeatedly propagated by successive Taiwanese presidents for their foreign policy goals. Soft power is now outlined as the ‘overarching link’ connecting Taiwan and the NSP-T countries for the attainment of the former’s three strategic aims ─ identifying a new direction and driving force for a new stage of Taiwan’s economic development, redefining Taiwan’s important role in regional development and creating future value for Taiwan’s engagements in the region. This article seeks to extrapolate how soft power contributes to the achievement of the three policy visions in Southeast Asia. Through assessments of NSP-T cooperation programmes and strategies in its six sectors of medical care, agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, education and civil society, an analytical model is introduced to explain Taiwan’s soft power projection in Southeast Asia.

Reassessing Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy: Does it Really Work?

The research purpose of this article is to explore and analyze the reason and impact of Taiwan's "New Southbound Policy". The results of the study show that although Tsai Ing-wen has always insisted on promoting the development of the "New Southbound Policy" since she came to power in 2016 and hopes to use it to reduce the high economic dependence on mainland China and expand Taiwan's political survival space on the international stage, but in essence, the "New Southbound Policy" did not achieve Tsai Ing-wen's original goal. On the contrary, the economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland are still deepening and consolidating. From a certain perspective, the implementation of the "New Southbound Policy" has indeed promoted Taiwan's economy toward diversification and has achieved multi-level economic development. However, based on the huge economic volume of mainland China, as mainland China releases the control of the Covid-19 epidemic, many companies in Taiwan will not be able to ignore the re-communication and connection with the mainland economy. The economic ties between the two sides will remain close for a long time to come.

Strategy and Tactics of Taiwan’s Foreign Policy Against the Background of Aggravated Tensions with China

Currently, more than seven decades after its emergence in 1949, the Taiwan issue has not lost its relevance, but, instead, against the backdrop of growing U.S.–China tensions, is becoming especially acute. The PRC, which has already built up an impressive financial and economic might and a powerful military, is focused on achieving the so-called second “centennial goal” by 2049, which includes, among other things, the return of Taiwan to Beijing’s control. The return to power in Taiwan in 2016 of the Democratic Progressive Party, which stands on the positions of Taiwan’s movement towards independence, led to an almost complete “zeroing” of all the achievements as the results of the normalization of Sino-Taiwan relations in 2008–2016, dispelled hopes for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem and caused another round of aggravation of tension in the Taiwan Strait. The purpose of this article is to characterize the strategy and tactics of Taiwan’s foreign policy in 2016–2022, when the Tsai Ing-wen administration, which rejected the “one state, two systems” formula of unification, was under strong pressure from Beijing. In its relations with the PRC conducting the “steadfast diplomacy”, the Tsai Ing-wen administration has been taking efforts to promote a narrative in the world discourse that emphasizes the geopolitical, economic, technological, and ideological significance of Taiwan and its autonomous existence from mainland China for the world community and, first of all, its liberal-democratic part. Continuously losing its “diplomatic allies” due to Beijing’s intensified activities in limiting Taiwan’s international space since 2016, the Taiwan administration purposefully builds up and actively uses such advantages as developed democracy, technological power, and competitive, innovative, open economy in order to attract new like-minded partners for close cooperation.

The “hot Taiwanese girl” persona: The dynamics of politics and femininity in Taiwan

ABSTRACT Originating in social media, an unconventional gendered political persona, “hot Taiwanese girl (la tai mei),” of the incumbent President of Taiwan Tsai Ing-wen has become well-known in Taiwan and beyond. Drawing on frameworks of femininity in politics and political persona on social media, this study scrutinizes this persona as an empowering political tool. Using critical discourse analysis, this study examines Dwagie’s rap song, “Hot Taiwanese Girl,” where the persona was created and the media, cultural and political contexts to reveal that it was used to construct understandings about cross-strait conflicts, create a collective Taiwanese identity and win the political favor of voters in election campaigns of Tsai and the Democratic Progressive Party. While this served to subvert the stereotypes of women in politics, the power to interpret femininity remains in the masculine domain. Through the prism of the “hot Taiwanese girl,” this paper seeks to unravel the dynamics between femininity and politics, thereby exploring how the representation of femininity is contingent on the political agenda and its appeals to audiences.

Когнитивное исследование метафоры пути и милитарной метафоры в политическом дискурсе (на материале обращения Цай Ин-вэнь по случаю Дня двух десяток 2022 года и его перевода на русский и английский языки)

Когнитивное исследование метафоры пути и милитарной метафоры в политическом дискурсе (на материале обращения Цай Ин-вэнь по случаю Дня двух десяток 2022 года и его перевода на русский и английский языки)

COVID and Cognitive Warfare in Taiwan.

In this study, we examine China's cognitive warfare coordinated with military air operations during the COVID pandemic in Taiwan. In May 2021, Taiwan experienced its first novel coronavirus outbreak with up to 500 daily cases. The Chinese government launched a series of coordinated "cognitive warfare" campaigns targeting Taiwan in addition to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) frequent air force incursions into Taiwan's air zone. Meanwhile, through manipulation of the vaccine supply, China turned COVID vaccine into a political issue in Taiwan involving multiple players including pharmaceutical developers, tech giants, and local politicians. Combining multiple sources of data, we analyze the Chinese Government's orchestrated cognitive and information warfare (IW) efforts targeted at influencing the Taiwan public's trust in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government as well as its home-developed vaccine. Identifying the patterns of influencing using cognitive and IW, we found China's ultimate goal was to instill skepticism and confusion in Taiwan's public about the President Tsai Ing-wen's health policy and more generally undermine the creditability of the DPP government.

Language Politics and Recognition under Tsai Ing-wen

Abstract This paper surveys developments in language politics and policy in Taiwan under Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency (2016–present). Drawing on historical-institutionalist premises, it shows that recent language policy developments were path-dependent and built upon initiatives proposed under Chen Shui-bian’s presidency (2000–2008). The paper argues that the comparative success of Tsai’s initiatives owed not only to her party forming a legislative majority, but also to a broad sociopolitical consensus on transitional and historical justice, and to an incrementalist strategy that consisted in legislating on minority languages before laying out a comprehensive multilingual legal framework. Although recent language developments do fall within the purview of identity politics, these factors have enabled the Tsai administration to justify and legitimise measures towards language recognition and revitalisation as intrinsic to Taiwan’s democratic consolidation, rather than as tools for identity building.

The Xi Jinping Regime’s Maneuvering against Taiwan: Characteristics and Prospects

This article summarizes the characteristics of the Xi Jinping regime’s policies toward Taiwan and analyzes how they have changed over the course of the reelection of President Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan, the outbreak of the Novel Coronavirus, and the change of administration in the United States. The first result of the analysis is that Xi Jinping’s policy toward Taiwan has increasingly relied on military power as a means to an end. In addition, its purpose and nature have evolved from warning against Taiwan independence and US-Taiwan cooperation to changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait to his own advantage. Second, in non-military United Front operations toward Taiwan, Xi Jinping has focused on unilaterally promoting reunification as an established fact without being influenced by trends in Taiwanese politics or public opinion.

Explaining change in independence–unification views in Taiwan: a within-between model

ABSTRACT Independence–unification (IU) views have been profoundly influential in Taiwan politics. This study uses the rally ‘round the flag effect to explain the increase in support for Taiwan independence after President Tsai Ing-wen rejected China's ‘one country, two systems' proposal. Taking advantage of within-individual differences in panel data, we can estimate the probability of IU views given a set of certain characteristics compared with other values of those characteristics and ascertain the influence of change in variables such as approval of the president's handling cross-Strait relations at different time points. Our preliminary results show that Taiwanese people indeed change their IU views due to the external and domestic environment. People who perceive that the economy has improved and whose views on President Tsai have become more favorable tend to flock towards the independence side. People whose views of President Tsai’s handling of cross-Strait relations have become more favorable also move towards independence. If we only consider differences between individuals, feelings about the KMT and DPP stand out as significant predictors of IU views.

The Potentials and Occlusions of Zhonghua Minguo/Taiwan: In Search of a Left Nationalism in the Tsai Ing-wen Era

Abstract Tsai Ing-wen has consistently referred to the nation that she governs as 中華民國台灣 (The Republic of China Taiwan), the term representing a major rhetorical feature of her administration. Breaking from the exclusively Taiwan-centered discourse which traditionally defined DPP politics, Tsai has seemingly created an entirely new name for the state she governs. This article examines both the discursive potentials, but also the occlusions, of this newly coined neologism. It argues that the term is defined by a lack of materialist critique, in which essential questions regarding labor exploitation and private property regimes remain unaddressed. While Tsai has successfully combined the ROC’s old Cold War raison d'etre (Chinese humanism as anti-Communism) with the Taiwanese independence movement’s desire for global recognition through the nation-state form, what has been lost is any real commitment to a politics of working-class empowerment, which is reflected in the Tsai administration’s abandonment of progressive labor law reform in 2018, as well as increasing trade liberalization policies with the US introduced in 2020. Returning to the roots of Taiwanese socialist discourse, this article will examine the possibility that “ROC-Taiwan” as a political project could still have a socialist future, despite its markedly capitalist past and present.

A Trial on the Current Situation of Cross-Strait Relations, Whether the Issue May Evolve from Friction to War

This essay focuses on the current state of cross-strait relations and whether the issue may evolve from friction to war. In 2022, after Russia declared war on Ukraine, the world is again in the shadow of war, and cross-strait relations have been a powder keg in the international community. Taiwan, as a country with its legislature, political party and complete state system, but not recognized by the international community. It has long been at odds with the PRC, which claimed Taiwan as part of its own. Since the KMT stepped down and the DPP took power in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen (Taiwan’s de facto leader) has denied the 1992 Consensus, and with Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, increasing friction in cross-strait relations, and PLA air forces operating across the centre line of the strait, there is growing concern among the world’s population that cross-strait relations will break down and degenerate into war. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the possibility of cross-strait relations from mutual condemnation to actual conflict in terms of the history of cross-strait relations, the current development of Taiwan and China, and the attitudes of the aborigines on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It also discusses the current situation of cross-strait relations, the future development of the two places, and the attitudes of several Taiwanese and mainlanders toward the cross-strait conflict.

Результативність політичного лідерства в умовах президентських і напівпрезидентських демократичних республік: динаміка основних показників

The purpose of the study is to provide a comparative analysis of democratic leadership effectiveness in the relatively large presidential and semi-presidential countries of the world. Providing powerful political leadership is the essential task for presidents and institutions of the presidency in presidential and semi-presidential democratic republics. Countries with presidential and semi-presidential systems of government should be combined under the term “countries (states) with the executive presidency or presidential states (countries)” that reflects their common feature, namely: critical role of the institution of the presidency. Two main indicators of political leadership effectiveness in democratic states are the EIU’s Democracy Index (DI) and comparable GDP (PPP) per capita that reflect the current situation and comparative dynamics in the political and economic fields of societal development. The United States confidently hold economic leadership in the group of polities with an executive presidency, but the DI in this country during the last 15 years has steadily declined. In the subgroup of presidential republics, three Latin American states – Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica – have noticeably outranked the United States (and South Korea) by the EIU’s DI. The experience of Chile deserves attention: there had been a dramatic upsurge of social unrest in late 2019, but the Chilean president, Sebastián Piñera, and his government took the political initiative and led the process of changing the constitution successfully. In 2020 the semi-presidential Republic of China (Taiwan) had been the absolute leader in political development and economic growth among the states with an executive presidency. The president, Tsai Ing-wen, played a crucial role in implementing and realizing democratic leadership there. Lithuania is the apparent leader in democracy and economic improvement among the European semi-presidential states during the last two decades. The next research of the author in this direction will be devoted to the comparative institutional analysis of the presidency functioning in the United States and Ukraine as the sample countries with presidential and semi-presidential systems of government systems respectively at the present stage of development.

Experiential and Interpersonal Meanings in Women Leader’s Discourses on Covid-19: A Case on Jacinda Ardern and Tsai Ing-wen

This article aimed to study Experiential and Interpersonal Meaning which was found in the discourses of the New Zealand Prime Minister. Jacinda Ardern on March, 23rd 2020, and President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen on January, 30th 2020 related to covid-19. The objective of this study is to discover Experiential and Interpersonal Meaning in the discourse analysis context. This present study tried to highlight the best method to adopt for this investigation by employing the four steps proposed by Miles, Huberman, and Sadana's qualitative research method (2014), i.e., data collection, data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. The results of the study showed that the Material process was prominent in the Experiential Meaning in discourses by 67.23%, The elements of participant's material process in participants were dominant by 54.61%, and location (27.435) was prominent in circumstances elements. Meanwhile, Subject was prominent in the Interpersonal Meaning in Mood Types by 52.47%, and Predicator (52.01%) was dominant in Residue Types. These highlighted how we can learn from these two female leaders in delivering suggestions, reminders, and persuading society during this Covid 19 pandemic.

Caught between two superpowers: Taiwan's left in an age of US-China tensions

Taiwan's major social movements in the past decade were reacting against the possibility of Taiwan's democratic freedoms being lost to China or its domestic proxies. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), currently led by Tsai Ing-wen, have challenged the Kuomintang for power, but have not been able to move beyond the binary of for or against independence. The Sunflower movement and 'Third Force' parties sought to create a space for left and democratic politics, but this appears to be closing down. The Trumpian figure of Han Kuo-yu has been a major problem for the left. There is no easy way out of these dilemmas in an era characterised by increasing US-China tensions.

Two Chinese tales of human rights– Mainland China’s and Taiwan’s external human rights strategies

ABSTRACT The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC’s objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan’s objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society.

The mechanisms of trust formation under different conditions of political identity: An experiment among Taiwanese voters

Trust and cooperation within and between political identity groups are important issues for building a healthy civil society and democratic development. However, this research problem has seldom been analyzed under different political identity conditions by means of experimental design in Taiwan. Presidential elections have reproduced the polarization between two groups of voters supporting different presidential candidates. Therefore, in this article the authors are interested in whether political identity matters in trust exchanges among strangers. This study applies a three-stage trust game experiment to examine how trust is developed within pairs of subjects with either the same or different political identity. In the first stage subjects were randomly matched in pairs as trustor and trustee, and their political identities were not disclosed. In the second stage the pairs were still randomly matched, but each subject was informed of their partner’s political identity. In the final stage each subject could choose the preferred political identity of his/her partner. There were two mechanisms of trust-behavior formation under different identity conditions. The first mechanism was political identity. Supporters of presidential candidate Ma Ying-Jeou were more trustful than supporters of candidate Tsai Ing-Wen. Under the condition of subjects knowing their partner’s political identity, the identity effect became strongly significant in stages 2 and 3 of the experiment, especially for that of the Ma–Ma group. The second mechanism was mutuality. The mutuality effect was very significant in all three stages of the trust experiment, and that effect was stronger for those who voted for Tsai.

Livestreaming Influencers, Influence Types, and Political Participation: A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2020 Presidential Election

Abstract Livestreaming platforms have emerged as an important political communication tool for engaging with constituents. Twitch, YouTube Live, Mixer, and Facebook can broadcast real-time video contents via Web-based services and mobile app platforms. Our case study aims to determine whether livestreaming influencers generated political participation during Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election. This case study is based on a framework that integrates the literature on political communication and influencer marketing. In this article, we describe the rise of livestreaming platforms and explain the role of livestreamers in political communication. We also examine whether the characteristics of livestreaming influencers and the type of influence they exert increased political participation by their fans and followers and whether this accounted for the success of Tsai Ing-wen’s victory in her 2020 campaign for re-election as president.

Hydro-Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The Taiwanese Case

International isolation is the main concern of Taiwan’s foreign politics. The proximity with mainland China urged Taiwan to rely on several different strategies to maintain the coveted geopolitical survival from Beijing’s sovereignty claims. Recently, among the various strategies adopted across the years, Taipei has used hydro-diplomacy to expand its presence in Southeast Asia. The main sponsor of such peculiar form of diplomacy has been President Tsai Ing-wen, in charge since May 2016. In January 2019, her inclusive policies towards ASEAN nations, particularly towards Indonesia, led to the signing of a historic agreement for the construction of a water purification plant in East Java.

Women Leaders Transcending the Demands of Covid-19: A Positive Psychology 2.0 Perspective.

This article explores selected speeches of three global women leaders during the time of the Covid-19 pandemic from positive psychology perspectives. It focuses on speeches to address and manage the pandemic of global women leaders, such as Angela Merkel (Germany), Jacinda Ardern (New Zealand), and Tsai Ing-Wen (Taiwan). This study explores the question what global women leaders' leadership actions and responses are and how they address their nations with regard to the four pillars of PP2.0 and the PURE model during Covid-19. The study uses a post-modernist qualitative research design. It is anchored in the hermeneutical-phenomenological research paradigm, using leadership theories and PP2.0 as a lens to explore and understand their strengths with regard to the Covid-19 pandemic. The authors use thematic analysis to analyse the selected speeches made by the three women leaders at the onset of the pandemic in Germany, New Zealand and Taiwan. The study contributes to improve the understanding of global women leadership during Covid-19. Conclusions are drawn. Recommendations will be made accordingly.