Truth Conditions Research Articles

Davidson on Truth

"Truth-conditional semantics is by far the best-known philosophical contribution of Donald Davidson. The main idea of this approach is to explain the concept of meaning by appeal to the concept of truth. Accordingly, we understand a sentence s of a natural language L, if and only if, we know its truth-conditions. Challenging in its nature, this proposal immediately caught the attention of the philosophical community, being equally appreciated and criticized. The aim of this paper is to argue that Davidson’s approach is too optimistic in its goals. In my view, truth-conditional semantics is unlikely to be the best way to shed light on the concept of meaning. By appealing to Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and assuming a primitive concept of truth, this perspective leaves too many questions unanswered and thus proves its limits. Keywords: Donald Davidson, meaning, truth, Truth-Conditional Semantics. "

Misperceptions in sociopolitical context: belief sensitivity’s relationship with battleground state status and partisan segregation

AbstractNumerous studies have shown that individuals’ belief sensitivity—their ability to discriminate between true and false political statements—varies according to psychological and demographic characteristics. We argue that sensitivity also varies with the political and social communication contexts in which they live. Both battleground state status of the state in which individuals live and the level of partisan segregation in a state are associated with Americans’ belief sensitivity. We leverage panel data collected from two samples of Americans, one collected in the first half of 2019 and the other during the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign season. Results indicate that the relationship between living in battleground states and belief sensitivity is contingent on political ideology: living in battleground states, versus in Democratic-leaning states, is associated with lower belief sensitivity among conservatives and higher belief sensitivity among liberals. Moreover, living in a less politically segregated state is associated with greater belief sensitivity. These relationships were only in evidence in the election year.

P300 as a correlate of false beliefs and false statements.

This study investigates P300 as a component for false belief and false statement processing with and without a communicative context. The purpose is to understand why P300 has been shown to be commonly involved in false belief and lie processing. Participants were presented with a story in which the protagonist holds a true belief and makes a true statement of it (true belief), holds a false belief and makes a true statement (false belief), or holds a true belief and makes a false statement (false statement) while electroencephalograms were recorded. In Experiment 1, featuring a solitary protagonist, stronger posterior P300 was shown in the false belief condition than the true belief and false statement condition. With the installation of a communicative context by including asecondcharacter listening to the protagonist, Experiment2 showed enhanced frontal P300 in the false statement condition compared to the true belief and false belief condition. A late slow wave was more prominent in the false belief condition than in the other two conditions in Experiment 2. The present results suggest a situation-dependent nature of P300. The signal captures the discrepancy between belief and reality more readily than that between belief and words under a noncommunicative context. It becomes more sensitive to the discrepancy between belief and words than that between belief and reality in a communicative situation with an audience, which makes any false statement practically a lie.

Al-Ghazālī, nativism, and divine interventionism

ABSTRACT Al-Ghazālī’s engagement with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error has received much attention in recent literature, often in the context of comparing him with Descartes. However, there is one curious text that has gone largely unnoticed by commentators. In his account of how he overcame scepticism vis-à-vis a divine light cast unto his heart, al-Ghazālī makes a cryptic claim that suggests that primary truths are inherent to the mind, and that said cognitive status of primary truths is related to his overcoming of scepticism. Although this one text does not straightforwardly prove that al-Ghazālī is a nativist, I argue that there are other texts that plausibly reveal his nativism. As such, I argue that al-Ghazālī can be read as a nativist, and I reconstruct a way in which his nativism helps explain how he overcomes scepticism. In doing so, I defend the (standard) strong divine interventionist reading of al-Ghazālī’s response to scepticism, against Hadisi’s recent weak divine interventionist reading.

FIRST-ORDER RELEVANT REASONERS IN CLASSICAL WORLDS

Abstract Sedlár and Vigiani [18] have developed an approach to propositional epistemic logics wherein (i) an agent’s beliefs are closed under relevant implication and (ii) the agent is located in a classical possible world (i.e., the non-modal fragment is classical). Here I construct first-order extensions of these logics using the non-Tarskian interpretation of the quantifiers introduced by Mares and Goldblatt [12], and later extended to quantified modal relevant logics by Ferenz [6]. Modular soundness and completeness are proved for constant domain semantics, using non-general frames with Mares–Goldblatt truth conditions. I further detail the relation between the demand that classical possible worlds have Tarskian truth conditions and incompleteness results in quantified relevant logics.

How can the inferentialist make room for the distinction between factual and linguistic correctness?

ABSTRACT Brandom (1994) made inferentialism an intensely debated idea in the philosophy of language in the last three decades. Inferentialism is a view that associates the meaning of linguistic expression with the role said expression plays in inferences. It seems rather uncontroversial that the correct theory of meaning should distinguish between linguistic correctness and factual correctness. For instance, speaker S can be wrong in saying ‘I have arthritis’ in two distinct ways: (i) S fails to apply a word correctly to make a true statement due to having made a factual error, and (ii) S uses an expression incorrectly because they are wrong about its meaning. In this paper, I show that properly understood normative inferentialism can make room for such a distinction. I propose that linguistic correctness is a structural issue: linguistic mistakes stem from the improper or insufficient acquisition of an inferential role. Factual correctness, on the other hand, is a one-off issue of the correct application of inferential rules to a particular situation. I argue that, by tying the issue of correctness to the game of giving and asking for reasons, inferentialism can establish a reliable method for distinguishing between two types of correctness (and mistakes).

The impact of vaccine information and other factors on COVID-19 vaccine acceptance in the Thai population.

Increased misinformation circulating among the population during the COVID-10 pandemic can trigger rejection to take up vaccines. This study assesses the influence of vaccine information and other factors on vaccine acceptance in the Thai population. Between March and August 2021, six rounds of cross-sectional surveys through village health volunteer networks and online channels were conducted; as well as qualitative interviews with frontline health workers, patients with chronic diseases, and religious believers and leaders. Descriptive and multiple logistic regression with 95% level of confidence were used for survey findings while deductive thematic analysis was used for in-depth interview findings. Among the total 193,744 respondents, the initial COVID-19 vaccine acceptance rate decreased from 60.3% in March 2021 to 44.0% in April 2021, then increased to 88.8% in August 2021. Participants who were able to differentiate true and false statements were 1.2 to 2.4 times more likely to accept vaccine than those who were not. Those who perceived a high risk of infection (Adjusted odds ratio; AOR = 2.6-4.7), perceived vaccine safety (AOR = 1.4-2.4), judged the importance of vaccination (AOR = 2.3-5.1), and had trust in vaccine manufacture (AOR = 1.9-3.2) were also more likely to accept the vaccine. Moreover, higher education (AOR = 1.6-4.1) and living in outbreak areas (AOR = 1.4-3.0) were significantly related to vaccine uptake, except in people with chronic diseases who tended not to accept the vaccine (AOR = 0.7-0.9). This study recommends effective infodemic management and comprehensive public communication, prioritising vulnerable groups such as those with a low level of education and people with chronic conditions. Communication through reliable channels can support higher vaccine acceptance and rapid vaccine rollout. Finally, regular monitoring of misinformation is important such as fact checking support, timely legal actions and specific debunking communication.

Honest Behavior: Truth-Seeking, Belief-Speaking, and Fostering Understanding of the Truth in Others

While people across the world value honesty, it is undeniable that it can sometimes pay to be dishonest. This tension leads people to engage in complex behaviors that stretch the boundaries of honesty. Such behaviors include strategically avoiding information, dodging questions, omitting information, and making true but misleading statements. Though not lies per se, these are nonetheless deviations from honesty that have serious interpersonal, organizational, and societal costs. Based on a systematic review of 169 empirical research articles in the fields of management, organizational behavior, applied psychology, and business ethics, we develop a new multidimensional framework of honesty that highlights how honesty encompasses more than the absence of lies—it has relational elements (e.g., fostering an accurate understanding in others through what we disclose and how we communicate) and intellectual elements (e.g., evaluating information for accuracy, searching for accurate information, and updating our beliefs accordingly). By acknowledging that honesty is not limited to the moment when a person utters a clear lie or a full truth, and that there are multiple stages to enacting honesty, we emphasize the shared responsibility that all parties involved in communication have for seeking out and communicating truthful information.

The Effect of Repetition on the Perceived Truth of Tobacco-Related Health Misinformation Among U.S. Adults

As concerns about the effects of health misinformation rise, understanding why misbeliefs are accepted is increasingly important. People believe repeated statements more than novel statements, an effect known as truth by repetition, however this has not been examined in the context of tobacco information. Misbeliefs about tobacco are rampant and novel facts about tobacco are viewed as less believable. This paper examines how repetition of true and false tobacco statements affects truth perceptions. We recruited an online sample of 1,436 U.S. adults in May 2021. In an exposure phase, each participant rated their interest in 30 randomly selected statements about tobacco products and general knowledge trivia, half of them true and half false. The study had a two (tobacco product) by two (familiarity of statement claim) between-subjects design and a two (statement truth) by two (statement repetition) within-subjects design. During the testing phase participants rated the truthfulness of 24 repeated statements and 24 unseen statements. Repetition of true and false tobacco statements increased their subjective truth (diff=.20, p < .001), and the effect was larger for false claims compared to true claims. This underscores the importance of strategies to inoculate people against misinformation and calls for interventions that can stop the repetition of newly generated false claims.

Pragmatist quietism: A meta‐ethical system. By Andrew Sepielli, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2022. vi + 231 pp. £55 (Hbk)

Pragmatist quietism: A meta‐ethical system. By Andrew Sepielli, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2022. vi + 231 pp. £55 (Hbk)

The Syntax of the Epistemic Modal kaan in Jordanian Arabic

The goal of this study is to investigate the syntax of the epistemic modal item kaan in Jordanian Arabic (JA). It was pointed out that kaan is a deductive epistemic modal marker that expresses probability based on sensory fact/s. We have argued that this kaan is an epistemic modal adverb heading Epistemic Modal Phrase (MepP) in the left periphery, above TP. That kaan precedes existential fii, sentential negation, and a topicalized item as well as a focused item empirically supports the hypothesis that kaan resides in the left-periphery. In order to explain lack of agreement affixes on kaan along the lines of the minimalist approach (Chomsky 2000, 2001), we have assumed that kaan does not carry semantically uninterpretable features and lexically unvalued features that need to be checked. Finally, it was found that epistemic kaan may not occur in non-declarative sentences. This exclusion was explained in light of the truth conditions that non-declarative clauses lack. Keywords: Modal, Epistemic Modal, Left-Periphery, Syntax, Jordanian Arabic.

The importance of being earnest: How truth and evidence affect participants’ judgments

Truth-value judgments are one of the most common measures in experimental semantics and pragmatics, yet there is no standardized way to elicit such judgments. Despite anecdotal remarks on how proper choice of prompts or response options could help disentangle pragmatic from semantic effects, little is known regarding the relation between parameters of the task and what it actually measures. We tested a range of prompts and two response options for their sensitivity to truth of the target sentence, prior evidence, and the interaction between these two factors. We found that participants attribute high value to true statements, even when they are not backed by evidence. Moreover, our results confirm that prompts vary wildly in their sensitivity to pragmatic factors, and should allow researchers to make an informed choice depending on what they want to test. There was no difference between the results generated by the response options, although the Likert scale required fewer participants and may therefore be preferable. In addition, we discuss some theoretical consequences of our results for pragmatics, philosophy of language, and social psychology.&amp;nbsp;

Speech-Language Pathologists' Endorsement of Speech, Language, and Literacy Myths Reveals Persistent Research-Practice Gap.

We explore the extent to which speech-language pathologists (SLPs) are operating under assumptions about speech, language, and literacy that are not supported by evidence or are contradicted by evidence. SLPs (N = 106) marked the degree to which they endorsed or rejected four true and 11 myth (i.e., false) statements on a visual analog scale via an online survey. We analyzed the degree to which participants agreed or disagreed with these statements related to speech, language, and literacy development and impairment. Based on results of one-sample t tests, participants as a group correctly rejected seven myth statements and correctly endorsed three true statements. Participants as a group provided equivocal responses to the remaining four myth statements and one true statement. Scores for each statement spanned all or nearly all of the possible range. Even when participants overall showed relatively strong disagreement with a particular myth statement, at least a few participants endorsed the myth statement. The findings indicate areas of relative strength for SLPs' knowledge of current evidence for augmentative and alternative communication, bilingualism, and language input that supports language development. Identified areas of relative weakness include knowledge of the expected grammatical and speech production skills of children with typical development and the influence of ear infections in childhood on language impairment. Additional research is needed to evaluate efforts to enhance SLPs' knowledge and use of evidence-based practices.

Truth or lie: Exploring the language of deception.

Lying appears in everyday oral and written communication. As a consequence, detecting it on the basis of linguistic analysis is particularly important. Our study aimed to verify whether the differences between true and false statements in terms of complexity and sentiment that were reported in previous studies can be confirmed using tools dedicated to measuring those factors. Further, we investigated whether linguistic features that differentiate true and false utterances in English-namely utterance length, concreteness, and particular parts-of-speech-are also present in the Polish language. We analyzed nearly 1,500 true and false statements, half of which were transcripts while the other half were written statements. Our results show that false statements are less complex in terms of vocabulary, are more concise and concrete, and have more positive words and fewer negative words. We found no significant differences between spoken and written lies. Using this data, we built classifiers to automatically distinguish true from false utterances, achieving an accuracy of 60%. Our results provide a significant contribution to previous conclusions regarding linguistic deception indicators.

Use of Interrupted Case Studies to Teach Scientific Communication: Examples from the Effects of Mining on Water Resources in Brazil

The mining industry in Brazil, despite contributing to economic growth, is one of the human activities that negatively impacts the environment. This situation can be contextualized in discussions of several curricular chemistry topics. One way in which science, technology, society, and environmental issues can be discussed in classes is through case studies. This article reports on three interrupted case studies, based on research articles, which were developed and implemented in a Scientific Communication Course offered to first-year undergraduate Chemistry students at the University of São Paulo, Brazil. During two sessions of this course, students, divided in groups, developed hypotheses, chose sampling points and equipment for instrumental analyses, and evaluated data provided in the case studies. Results from a Descending Hierarchical Classification Analysis of oral presentations, performed on IRAMUTEQ software, and from a quiz containing 11 true or false statements (response rate of 79%) provide evidence for the effectiveness of the case studies for conceptual understanding of different topics in chemistry, such as heavy metals, sediments, and principles of instrumental chemical analysis, and for the development of communication and oral presentation skills.

Semantics of Non-Doxastic Attitude Ascriptions from Experimental Perspective

The paper presents novel experimental data regarding reports of non-doxastic attitudes (expressed by verbs such as “wants”, “fear”, “is glad”, and etc.) As observed by some theorists, non-doxastic attitude ascriptions differ from the ascriptions of doxastic attitudes (e.g., “believes”) in that they do not support simple entailments or presuppositions of their complement clause. In particular, an ascription may intuitively change its truth-value if we alter the informational structure of the embedded clause without modifying its truth conditions. We present two experiments whose results support this observation. Experiment 1 shows that the truth-value and acceptability judgements of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions in a context generally depend on the informational structure of the embedded clause. Experiment 2 reveals that the truth-value judgements vary if we manipulate not only the “presupposition-assertion” structure of embedded clause, but also the components related to non-presuppositional entailments of the clause. This conclusion suggests that the contents on which attitude verbs operate should be represented as structured entities.

Valid Arguments as True Conditionals

AbstractThis paper explores an idea of Stoic descent that is largely neglected nowadays, the idea that an argument is valid when the conditional formed by the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true. As will be argued, once some basic features of our naïve understanding of validity are properly spelled out, and a suitable account of conditionals is adopted, the equivalence between valid arguments and true conditionals makes perfect sense. The account of validity outlined here, which displays one coherent way to articulate the Stoic intuition, accords with standard formal treatments of deductive validity and encompasses an independently grounded characterization of inductive validity.

Verbal deception in picture naming.

Telling a lie requires several cognitive processes. We investigated three cognitive processes involved in verbal deception: the decision to deceive, the suppression of the true statement, and the construction of the false statement. In a standard picture-naming task, participants were instructed to commit true and false naming statements. Critically, participants could freely decide to name the picture (i.e., true naming events) or to commit a verbal deception and use a different name (i.e., false naming events). Different types of analysis were performed with the aim of exploring the influence of semantic, lexical, and phonological information of the target picture in the decision, suppression, and construction processes. The first type of analysis revealed that participants decided to lie more often when the target picture was less typical or less familiar. The second and third types of analysis focused on the false naming events. False naming latencies turned out to be faster when the name of the target picture was a highly frequent or an earlier-acquired name, suggesting an influence of lexical variables in the suppression of the true statement. The third analysis type explored the phonological relationship between the word that participants uttered in the false statements and the target picture name. No phonological influences emerged in this last analysis. These findings demonstrate that verbal deception is tied to semantic and lexical variables corresponding to true statements.

Game Edukasi Untuk Menghafal Al-Quran Secara Sederhana Menggunakan Game Development Kit

The Covid-19 pandemic has greatly impacted various aspects around the world, the education aspect has not escaped attention, forcing students and workers to do activities at home. And most students (especially Islamic schools) who when they enter school are memorizing the Al-Quran forget to return when they return to school. This is very unfortunate considering the virtue of memorizing the Qur'an is very great reward and also the goodness in it. Various methods are also widely used by parents and teachers, including through learning media in the form of games. Education Game "Ngaji Yuk" is based on the problem of memorizing the Al-Quran using a Game Development Life Cycle (GDLC) game development kit based with AppGameKit Classic programming language. This game is made so that players can memorize the Al-Quran in a very simple way, namely by choosing true or false statements in the questions that appear in front of the screen. It is hoped that this game can become an interactive game for everyone, especially children who are learning to memorize the Al-Quran. It is also hoped that this game can become a new learning medium that can help raise children's enthusiasm to memorize the Al-Quran with the main emphasis on always repeating memorization (Muroja'ah), with this learning being carried out properly, because this game has gone through the testing phase using Cyclomatic Complexity. From the results of the questionnaire that the author conducted with respondents aged 18 to 34 years who are still active with computers, it can be concluded that the game "Ngaji Yuk" has been developed according to user needs.

WHY I BELIEVE IN MONSTERS (AND YOU SHOULD TOO)

According to Kaplan’s bidimensional theory of demonstratives, the descriptive content of any indexical term (and the sentences they appear in) is only employed to determine its reference in any possible world rigidly but cannot be expressed by the sentence’s truth conditions. Kaplan then argues that an indexical sentence’s informativeness depends on what he calls its character, a property of the context that relates a particular context to a concrete content, but it cannot be a part of the proposition the sentence entertains (its content), primarily given the logical inconsistencies the opposite would show in the theory of conditionals and counterfactuals. I agree with Kaplan that indexicals should not be considered disguised descriptions. Nevertheless, I believe that their content is informative and, therefore, part of the proposition these sentences express, even though that implies accepting the existence of content shifting operators within the same context --what Kaplan dubbed monsters. This paper, therefore, presents an alternative account to indexical terms and sentences employing the Interactive Theory introduced in Colomina-Alminana (2022). This approach considers that the meaning of any sentence, the proposition it expresses, depends upon three interrelated factors: the speaker’s intentions when uttering, the audience’s potential uptakes of such statement, and the conventions established by the speech community both speaker and audience belong, or the linguistic interaction takes place. The critical element is the so-called speaker's point of view, an objective perspectival networking background that allows lexical and syntactic mechanisms to trigger and update potential conceptual presuppositional content shared by both speaker and audience and whose existence is prior to any context and circumstances.