Truth Conditions Research Articles

Enhanced Solutions to Intuitionistic Fuzzy Multiobjective Linear Fractional Optimization Problems via Lexicographic Method

Optimization involving fuzzy numbers generally, and intuitionistic fuzzy numbers particularly is more and more an essential part of any computational intelligence method; and might be of interest in modeling fuzzy control systems, or carrying out a fuzzy sensitivity analysis. The recent literature includes many research papers related to both theoretical modelling, and practical implementation of fuzzy decision support systems. Fuzzy optimization is one of the main part in such decisionmaking tools. A realistic solution to a fuzzy optimization problem is always desired, and similarly, a Pareto optimal solution to a multiple objective optimization problem is always a need. In this paper we analyze the shortcomings; and eliminate the weaknesses of a solution approach from the literature proposed by Moges et al. in 2023. Firstly, Moges et al. used an accuracy function to de-fuzzify the original intuitionistic fuzzy optimization problem; then linearized the obtained crisp problem; and finally involved fuzzy goals to solve the derived multiple objective linear problem. We present two faulty key points of their approach, namely the de-fuzzification and linearization steps; prove the inappropriateness of their results; and propose some improvements. The final aim in addressing the first key point is to clarify the border between defuzzifications made in accordance to true theoretical statements, and those made for modeling reasons. The methodological improvement we propose is related to the second key point and it assures that Pareto optimal solutions - highly required in multiple objective optimization - are obtained. To illustrate our point of view, we use a numerical example from the literature, and report better numerical results derived by the improved methodology.

ДИСКУРСИВНІ ФУНКЦІЇ ДАВНЬОГРЕЦЬКИХ ФОРМУЛ ПРИСЯГАНЬ У КОМЕДІЯХ АРІСТОФАНА

Background. This paper investigates the pragmatic and sociolinguistic features of oaths in the corpus of Aristophanes' comedies, with a particular focus on "Acharnians" and "Lysistrata." From a communicative perspective, oaths are part of a complex ritual that combines verbal and non-verbal actions to confirm the truthfulness of a declaration and ensure the fulfillment of promises through an appeal to a deity. Typically, concise formulas invoking higher powers generally introduce the declaration and only occasionally specify sanctions for breaking the oath. Thus, oaths function not only as commissives, expressing promises and commitments, but also as representatives, focusing on the truthfulness of statements; expressives, enhancing the emotional background; and declaratives, performing speech acts. Methods. This article employs structural and corpus methods, functional and discursive analysis, conversational analysis, and hermeneutic techniques. Results. Using constructivist approaches to language study, the article analyses multifunctional idiomatic units, considering their structural elements such as particles, theonyms, noun case forms, articles, and sentence position. The analysis reveals that variations in these elements create pragmatic and sociolinguistic implicatures related to the presence or absence of propositional or presuppositional negation, focus of attention, modification of the illocutionary force of the utterance, and representation of the speaker's socio-cultural identity. Specifically, gender, dialectal, thematic, and genre-stylistic markings of the formulas are identified. Conclusions. The application of constructivist and hermeneutic methods allows for the examination of idiomatic oath formulas on both the local and discursive levels, uncovering implicit meanings essential for comic effects that cannot always be reflected in translations. A corpus analysis of formula variability in dramatic genres highlights their stylistic predominance in comedy and conversational style in particular. The study concludes with a comprehensive examination of a fragment from "Lysistrata" (78-89) to reveal the contextually driven dynamics of the oaths.

Hard Truths: Libel by Implication Doctrine and the Need for a Uniform Standard

Since the inception of the tort of libel, claims against the media have created a tension between the First Amendment’s commitment to a free press and the desire to prevent reputational harm to individuals. Further complicating the issue are cases in which plaintiffs allege that literally true statements are defamatory based on implications created through juxtapositions or omissions of facts. This is known as libel by implication, a tort currently governed by states through a patchwork of varying standards and interpretations. Not only does the lack of uniformity leave journalists without due notice of the law in the jurisdictions they are reporting on, but also it encourages forum shopping by plaintiffs and attacks against the media. A solution is critical: libel by implication claims have become increasingly popular with politicians seeking to dispel criticism — precisely the speech the First Amendment was intended to protect. To best protect crucial reporting in an era of animus towards the press, this Note argues that states need to adopt a uniform standard for governing libel by implication that requires a showing that (1) the implications of the article are false and (2) the journalist acted with actual malice in publishing them. “I imagine it’s no surprise by now that many courts and commentators have complained that defamation law is a ‘quagmire,’ lacks ‘clarity and certainty,’ is ‘overly confusing’ and ‘convoluted,’ leaves courts ‘hopelessly and irretrievably confused,’ and ‘has spawned a morass of case law in which consistency and harmony have long ago disappeared.’” Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 643 (Tex. 2018) (internal citations omitted).

ADOLESCENTS’ KNOWLEDGE ABOUT STRESS AND DEPRESSION QUESTIONNAIRE (AKSDQ): VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY TEST

Background: Adolescence is a period of growth that is very vulnerable to stress. This is due to the relatively high demands on adolescents, both in the field of education and daily life. Objective: The purpose of this study was to analyze the results of the validity and reliability tests of the Adolescents' Knowledge about Stress and Depression Questionnaire (AKSDQ). Methods: This study used a descriptive analysis research design with a cross-sectional approach. The research was carried out in August 2023 at Senior High School Darul Ulum 3 Peterongan Jombang. The instrument used in this study was the Adolescents' Knowledge about Stress and Depression Questionnaire (AKSDQ). This questionnaire consists of 10 items with 7 items in the form of positive statements and 3 items in the form of negative statements. This questionnaire uses the true and false statement method. Data analysis was carried out in this study using SPSS 21. The data analysis presented is the mean, standard deviation, Item-Content Validity Index (I-CVI), and Kuder-Richardson. Result: Based on the research results, it was found that the Adolescents' Knowledge about Stress and Depression Questionnaire (AKSDQ) had a good enough reliability value marked by a KR-20 value of .601. In addition, the results of the validity test using the Item-Content Validity Index (I-CVI) method showed that the Mean I-CVI is 0.90. Conclusion: The results of this study indicated that the Adolescents' Knowledge about Stress and Depression Questionnaire (AKSDQ) can be used in a study to assess the level of knowledge of adolescents related to stress and depression.

In Constructive and Informal Mathematics, in Contradistinction to any Empirical Science, the Predicate of the Current Knowledge in the Subject is Necessary

We assume that the current mathematical knowledge K is a finite set of statements from both formal and constructive mathematics, which is time-dependent and publicly available. Any formal theorem of any mathematician from past or present forever belongs to K. Ignoring K and its subsets, sets exist formally in ZFC theory although their properties can be time-dependent (when they depend on K) or informal. We explain the distinction between algorithms whose existence is provable in ZFC and constructively defined algorithms which are currently known. By using this distinction, we obtain non-trivially true statements on decidable sets X \(\subseteq\) \(\mathbb{N}\) that belong to constructive and informal mathematics and refer to the current mathematical knowledge on X . This and the next sentence justify the article title. For any empirical science, we can identify the current knowledge with that science because truths from the empirical sciences are not necessary truths but working models of truth about particular real phenomena.

Detecting deceit within a predominantly true statement using two parallel assessment methods: A pilot study

Abstract In human intelligence, a verbal statement from a source is seldom 100% true or false, and not very often is the source a total liar or a truth teller. From this standing point, a simple dichotomy of a liar or a truth teller might not offer an adequate diagnostic value for the purposes of human intelligence. A more diagnostic approach would be to assess which parts of the predominantly truthful verbal statement are likely to be true and which parts are assessed to be doubtful. In addition, the use of two parallel methods to detect deceit should improve the diagnostic value of the results. A pilot study in laboratory conditions (n = 8, yielding 190 assessment points) utilising an applied mock crime scenario was conducted. Correlation calculations showed that a dual-method approach slightly improved the within-statement truth accuracy, and it was achieved mainly by decreasing the number of false positives. As the truth accuracy was increased, the lie accuracy within the test group slightly decreased. The results confirmed that by applying parallel orienting response (EDA) and cognitive load (speech-related indices)-based assessment methods, it is possible to detect embedded lies successfully in an information-gathering interview setup.

The information status of iconic enrichments: modelling gradient at-issueness

Abstract Linguistic structures can contribute different types of meaning alongside standard assertions, such as conventional implicatures and presuppositions, which have long been described as being non-at-issue meaning contributions. Although information status has long been handled as a binary opposition between non-at-issue and at-issue content, recent research suggests that a gradient approach may be more appropriate. Building on new – and in the formal linguistic framework so far mostly neglected – data targeting spoken and gestural iconicity, specifically iconic gestures and ideophones, this paper investigates the information status of such iconic contributions in spoken language and suggests a new theoretical concept of at-issueness by spelling it out as a gradient category. The paper highlights a range of factors which can affect the information status of iconic contributions, proposing a scale for iconic phenomena based on these factors. To formally model this scale, we propose an approach in which at-issueness is analysed as a gradient property based on a given structure-inherent at-issueness status and the corresponding proposition’s relevance to a Question Under Discussion in a given context. This analysis accounts for the variations in information status observed between different iconic enrichments and their impact on truth conditions and paves the way for an approach to Common Ground updates using this model. The analysis outlined here allows for a more nuanced understanding of non-at-issue content and its interaction with at-issue content and provides predictions which can guide further experimental work on information status and the factors that influence it.

Probability or confidence, a distinction without a difference?

ABSTRACT How analytic uncertainty is presented can affect critical policymaker decisions. Analysts are told to offer separate: (1) assessments of the likelihood an analytic statement is true and (2) confidence statements that express how strongly analysts believe their assessments. The distinction between likelihood and confidence sounds clear but is not. The IC defines confidence poorly. Most intelligence products fail to distinguish likelihood from confidence and use the terms interchangeably to mean probability. The IC should abandon its confusing shorthand confidence descriptions. Instead, analysts should provide explanations of the nature and strength of evidence, and the reasoning behind analytic judgments.

Φήμη in Herodian’s Roman History

Abstract This article offers a usage study of the word φήμη throughout Herodian’s Roman History. It sets Herodian’s practice in a broader literary picture that includes other historians, but also epic and the novel, and then suggests that the extremely high frequency of φήμη in Herodian is unique among Greek-language historians and that Herodian is indebted to Latin-language historiography for this technique. The following sections examine how Herodian perceives the phenomenon of φήμη and makes it a salient feature of his historiographical strategy. The discussion shows that φήμη, regardless of its truth status, has multiple functions in Herodian’s narrative. First, it contributes to the portrayal of historical agents. Second, it is a crucial dramatic factor that signals turning points in the story and generates vividness and an atmospheric narrative. Third, it acts as a plot-driver in the story. Fourth, it has a role in the composition of the narrative by creating intratextual associations and narrative patterns. Finally, it has metanarrative ramifications, since there is a parallel between the use of φήμη by the historical agents and by Herodian himself. Overall, the analysis advances our understanding of Herodian’s narrative technique and his construction of historical truth.

Are you sure? Examining the potential benefits of truth-checking as a learning activity.

Learners may be uncertain about whether encountered information is true. Uncertainty may encourage people to critically assess information's accuracy, serving as a kind of desirable difficulty that benefits learning. Uncertainty may also have negative effects, however, leading people to mistrust true information or to later misremember false information as true. In three experiments, participants read history statements. In one condition, all statements were true, and the participants knew it. In the other two conditions, some statements were true, and others were false. Participants were either told the statements' accuracy or they guessed the statements' accuracy prior to feedback, a manipulation we refer to as truth-checking. All participants were then tested on recalling the true information and on recognising true versus false statements. We observed a significant benefit of truth-checking in one of the three experiments, suggesting that truth-checking may have some potential to enhance learning, perhaps by inducing people to encode to-be-learned information more deeply than they would otherwise. Even so, the benefit may come at a cost-truth-checking took significantly longer than study alone, and it led to a greater likelihood of thinking false information was true, suggesting costs of truth-checking may tend to outweigh benefits.

Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths?

Some alethic pluralists maintain that there are two kinds of truths operant in our alethic discourse: a realist kind and an anti-realist kind. In this paper, we argue that such a binary conception cannot accommodate certain social truths, specifically truths about race. Most alethic pluralists surprisingly overlook the status of racial truths. Douglas Edwards is, however, an exception. In his version of alethic pluralism—Determination Pluralism—racial truths are superassertible (anti-realist) true rather than correspondence (realist) true. We argue that racial truths exhibit features of both superassertibility (anti-realism) and correspondence (realism). This suggests a fuzzy boundary between realist and anti-realist kinds of truth. There may be a continuum rather than a dichotomy of truths. We conclude by sketching one way for alethic pluralists to accommodate such a notion.

Illusory Signs as Frustrated Expectations: Undoing Descartes’ Overblown Response

Descartes held that it is impossible to make true statements about what we perceive, but I go over alleged cases of illusory experience to show why such a skeptical conclusion (and recourse to God) is overblown. The overreaction, I contend, stems from an insufficient awareness of the habitual expectations brought to any given experience. These expectations manifest themselves in motor terms, as perception constantly prompts and updates an embodied posture of readiness for what might come next. Such habitual anticipations work best when they efface themselves, so it is easy to blame perception when our expectations get frustrated. I illustrate this misdirected blame with the example of a stick partially in water: it is only because we expect the stick to be straight that its appearance as bent is deemed problematic. I thus conclude that, if we factor in the habitual interpretations operative in perception and switch to a processual view that allows practical engagement, we can deflate the worries that led Descartes to rule out perceptual truths. Distancing myself from the naïve “sign” of folk semiotics, my critique draws inspiration from the triadic semiotic model developed in some late medieval schools of Portugal.

Understanding language rules in Ruth Garrett Millican's biosemantics

The purpose of this study is to clarify how the rules of language are understood in Ruth Garrett Millikan's biosemantics. The specificity of the biosemantic language research program is that the language functions and norms are defined by analogy with biological ones. The function of the normal using language structures is to stabilize them and preserve the current usage. The philosophical foundation of Millikan's biosemantics is naturalistic realism, which includes the belief in the existence of real types and real categories independent of theory. Every person has abilities to recognize and track the same things at their variety– unitrackers, as well as unique individual interconnections of various aspects of information about the same things – unicepts. Moreover, Millikan's philosophy of language is based on the understanding linguistic signs as natural conventions; on usage-based theoretical approaches in linguistics; on the classical correspondence theory of truth and the related understanding of meaning as based on conditions of truth or justification. If rules are understood as unambiguous algorithms or prescriptions observed by the absolute majority, the violation of which necessarily entails the application of sanctions, then, for Millikan, the language conventions are not rules. But the patterns of the sign presenting onto the reality it signifies are rules in that the truth or justification conditions for the sign use can either be met or not, and an utterance using this sign fulfills its stabilizing function only in the first case.

Norms and necessity: replies to critics

ABSTRACT The critics in this volume raise several important challenges to the modal normativist position developed in Norms and Necessity, including whether the relation I claim holds between semantic rules and necessity claims generates spurious claims of metaphysical necessity, whether the view is circular (implicitly relying on a more 'robust' form of modal realism), and whether it conflicts with truth-conditional semantics. They also raise probing questions about how it compares to other views of modality, including a Lewisian view and an essentialist view. In these replies, I respond to these challenges in ways that precisify the relevant understanding of ‘semantic rules' and the forms they can take, that make clearer the direction of explanation in modal normativism in ways that show the view doesn't rely on a more ‘robust’ form of modal realism, and that give reason for thinking that there is actually no conflict between modal normativism and truth-conditional semantics. I also aim to give a fuller assessment of how it compares to other approaches to modality, including an essentialist approach.

Discursive Constructions of Communicative Rationality in Kenyan Presidential Election Petitions of 2022 at the Supreme Court of Kenya

How communicative rationality is constructed and shared among interlocutors in a court in the seeking of justice, given the background of distrust in the Kenyan Presidential Election context, gave attention to this study. The study investigated the construction of communicative rationality in the courtyard. The study assessed the types of illocutionary forces and their discursive legal practices and determined how interlocutors redeem the illocutionary logic in the courtyard. A documentary review of the written judgment of Ruto against Odinga in the presidential election of 2022 was used as the data collection method. The analytical frameworks involved Austin's (1962b) Speech Act theory and Searle and Vanderveken's (1985) illocutionary commitments. The findings showed that petitioners chose illocutionary forces to downgrade respondents' claims. The discursive nature of their legal practices was characterized by a lack of fairness, transparency, and integrity of IEBC and its Chairperson. Respondents used illocutionary forces, including denials, for face protection and repair. Their discursive legal practices were characterized by compliance, transparency, and accountability to win the Court's decision. Petitioners and respondents used much propositional content, modes of achievement, and preparatory conditions to construct their validity claims. In achieving justice, the group of Judges must consider interlocutors' presentations of credible statements of truth and acceptable normative statements of legal practices. A group of Judges needs to take precautions against the interlocutors' tricks and manipulation of the Constitution for effective decision-making.

Prejudice, generics, and resistance to evidence

ABSTRACT In his book, Prejudice, Endre Begby offers a novel and engaging account of the epistemology of prejudice which challenges some of the standard assumptions that have so far guided the recent discussion on the topic. One of Begby's central arguments against the standard view of prejudice, according to which a prejudiced person necessarily displays an epistemically culpable resistance to counterevidence, is that, qua stereotype judgments, prejudices can be flexible and rationally maintained upon encountering many disconfirming instances. By expanding on Begby's analysis, I argue that, given the variety of truth conditions for true generic statements, the generic form of stereotype judgements can sometimes make prejudice extremely resistant to encounters with statistical facts about the distribution of the property among members of a certain group. At the same time, I argue that a more careful consideration of the generic form of stereotypes also allows us to recognize that evidence about how many members of the kind instantiate a property is not the only type of evidence which could disconfirm a prejudice. Evidence of no explanatory relation between a kind and a property should also have a direct effect on a prejudicial belief. For this reason, things may not look as dim for the standard view of prejudice in assessing paradigmatic instances of prejudicial beliefs as irrationally resistant to evidence.

Keeping context in mind: a non-semantic explanation of apparent context-sensitivity

Arguments for context-sensitivity are often based on judgments about the truth values of sentences: a sentence seems true in one context and false in another, so it is argued that the truth conditions of the sentence shift between these contexts. Such arguments rely on the assumption that our judgments reflect the actual truth values of sentences in context. Here, I present a non-semantic explanation of these judgments. In short, our judgments about the truth values of sentences are driven by heuristics that are only fallible reflections of actual truth values. These heuristics can lead to different truth-value judgments in different contexts, even when the sentence at issue is not semantically context-sensitive. As a case study, I consider Sterken’s (Philos. Imprint, 15, 2015a) argument for the context-sensitivity of generic generalisations. I provide a non-semantic explanation of Sterken’s truth-value judgments, which builds on Leslie’s (Philos Perspect 21(1):375–403, 2007; Philos Rev 117(1):1–47, 2008) theory of default generalisation.

Generic examples in undergraduate topology: a case study

Expert mathematicians use examples and visual representations as part of their informal mathematics reasoning when constructing proofs. In contrast, the ways undergraduates reason and work toward creating proofs is an open area of investigation, particularly in advanced mathematics. Furthermore, research on students’ reasoning in topology is largely unexplored. Building on findings from Gallagher [(2020). Identifying Structure in Introductory Topology: Diagrams, Examples, and Gestures. Doctoral Dissertation, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia. https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/7599/ (MS #8610)], we present a case study of an undergraduate taking a first course in general topology and her use of generic examples in argumentation prior to producing formal proofs and counterexamples. We discuss patterns that emerged in her use of generic examples when proving true statements and disproving false claims. We compare and contrast this student’s generic examples with other generic examples in the literature from other content areas within mathematics, and we argue that generic examples are not one-size-fits-all but rather must be fit-for-purpose. Our results suggest that generic examples may be particularly useful for students writing proofs when they may not have access to specific examples.

Infection prevention and control in computed tomography: creating a national survey

BackgroundInfection prevention and control (IPC) is essential for quality healthcare, with healthcare associated infections (HAI) a known risk to patients requiring medical imaging (MI). To date, few papers have adopted a national approach to understanding or benchmarking the knowledge of, attitudes toward, and practice (KAP) of IPC in the context of MI and no validated surveys or scales are identified in the literature. The Computed Tomography (CT) suite is a unique MI environment where radiographers deliver prescription medicines to patients via intravenous (IV) means through an injector system. This paper describes the development of a survey that informs the use of IPC processes in the CT suite. MethodsStandard Precautions via current national guidelines formed the benchmark of the survey, with a KAP survey used as the framework to explore IPC. The questions and associated responses are developed based on the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) guidelines, industry/professional protocols and adapted to the equipment and practices commonly used in the CT suite of MI departments by radiographers and nurses. ResultsKey survey development steps are described to include the justification of the benchmarking source, the survey framework and design. Detailed information is given to show the evolution of truth statements and sources, KAP question variations, and rationales for the methodology of question responses. National guidelines are mapped to survey questions and responses and pilot testing reflections are included. ConclusionThis paper reports on the construction of a standardised KAP survey for IPC specific to the CT suite in the Australian healthcare setting. The survey is ready for dissemination amongst MI departments. Documented use will aid validation and reliability as a survey tool to measure and map IPC specifically in relation to IV contrast administration.

An Honest Joker reveals stereotypical beliefs about the face of deception

Research on deception detection has mainly focused on Simple Deception, in which false information is presented as true. Relatively few studies have examined Sophisticated Deception, in which true information is presented as false. Because Sophisticated Deception incentivizes the appearance of dishonesty, it provides a window onto stereotypical beliefs about cues to deception. Here, we adapted the popular Joker Game to elicit spontaneous facial expressions under Simple Deception, Sophisticated Deception, and Plain Truth conditions, comparing facial behaviors in static, dynamic nonspeaking, and dynamic speaking presentations. Facial behaviors were analysed via machine learning using the Facial Action Coding System. Facial activations were more intense and longer lasting in the Sophisticated Deception condition than in the Simple Deception and Plain Truth conditions. More facial action units intensified in the static condition than in the dynamic speaking condition. Simple Deception involved leaked facial behaviors of which deceivers were unaware. In contrast, Sophisticated Deception involved deliberately leaked facial cues, including stereotypical cues to lying (e.g., gaze aversion). These stereotypes were inaccurate in the sense that they diverged from cues in the Simple Deception condition—the actual appearance of deception in this task. Our findings show that different modes of deception can be distinguished via facial action analysis. They also show that stereotypical beliefs concerning cues to deception can inform behavior. To facilitate future research on these topics, the multimodal stimuli developed in this study are available free for scientific use.