Truth-conditional Content Research Articles

‘Or’-parentheticals, ‘that is’-parentheticals and the pragmatics of reformulation

The classification of that is, or (in other words), and or rather as reformulation markers would seem to suggest that the utterances they introduce achieve relevance in the same way. However, the examination of a range of discrepancies between reformulations introduced by or, on the one hand, and reformulations introduced by that is, on the other, suggests that any account of the pragmatics of reformulation must be a non-unitary one. In this paper, I build on Burton-Roberts' (1993) suggestion that the reformulations introduced by or are meta-linguistic in character, and show how these can be distinguished from the reformulations introduced by that is, which must be analysed at the level of conceptual representation. I also show how this distinction corresponds to a distinction between the different ways in which a parenthetical construction may be pragmatically integrated with its host. As Potts (2005) would predict, parenthetical that is-reformulations are not themselves part of the truth-conditional content of their hosts. However, in contrast with or-reformulations, they communicate information about the propositional content of their hosts, and in this way can contribute to the identification of their truth-conditional content at the level of pragmatic interpretation.

Linguistic communication and the semantics/pragmatics distinction

Most people working on linguistic meaning or communication assume that semantics and pragmatics are distinct domains, yet there is still little consensus on how the distinction is to be drawn. The position defended in this paper is that the semantics/pragmatics distinction holds between (context-invariant) encoded linguistic meaning and speaker meaning. Two other ‘minimalist’ positions on semantics are explored and found wanting: Kent Bach’s view that there is a narrow semantic notion of context which is responsible for providing semantic values for a small number of indexicals, and Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore’s view that semantics includes the provision of values for all indexicals, even though these depend on the speaker’s communicative intentions. Finally, some implications are considered for the favoured semantics/pragmatics distinction of the fact that there are linguistic elements (lexical and syntactic) which do not contribute to truth-conditional content but rather provide guidance on pragmatic inference.

Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts

In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to be understood in terms of socially shared make-believe games. By appealing to pretense so conceived, I will show that the fictionalist perspective is halfway between an intentionalist perspective, according to which the above indexical sentences have to be interpreted in a shifted intended context, (this perspective is primarily defined by Predelli 1998, Analysis 58, 107; Mind and Language 13, 400) and a conventionalist perspective, according to which indexical reference shifts in accordance with a conventional setting. (For this perspective, cf. Corazza et al. 2002, Philosophical Studies 107, See also Corazza 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford University Press). Finally, I will claim that the fictionalist analysis of cases of non-ordinary uses of indexicals like “here” and “now” can be retained in face of a new alternative analysis of those cases in terms of an ‘unbound anaphora’ – theory (cf. Corazza 2004, Synthese 138, 145).

Epistemic modality and truth conditions

Within the linguistics literature it is often claimed that epistemic modality, unlike other kinds of modality, does not contribute to truth-conditional content. In this paper I challenge this view. I reanalyze a variety of arguments which have been used in support of the non-truth-conditional view and show that they can be handled on an alternative analysis of epistemic modality.

Zif is If

A conditional takes the form 'If A, then C'. On the truth-conditional view of conditionals, conditional statements state things with truth-conditions. On the suppositional view, conditional statements involve the expression of a supposition. I develop and defend a view on which conditional statements both state things with truthconditions and express suppositions. On this view, something is fundamentally right about standard truth-conditional and standard suppositional views. Considerations in favor of conditional contents lead us to attribute truth-conditional contents to conditional statements; considerations in favor of the suppositional view then lead us to an unexpected account of these contents. The resulting view has a number of benefits, including a unified treatment of conditional speech acts, a plausible account of our practice of ascribing truth-values to conditional statements, a simple explanation of the apparent equivalence between probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities, an intuitive treatment of 'Gibbardian stand-offs', a plausible logic of conditionals, and an explanation of why theorizing about conditionals has proved so difficult.

On Grice's circle (a theory-internal problem in linguistic theories of the Gricean type)

This paper deals with a theory-internal problem inherent in current pragmatic theories which Levinson (2000) dubbed ‘Grice's circle’. The expression ‘circle’ stems from the fact that conversational implicatures take their input from truth-conditional content, whereas the latter is constituted on the basis of pragmatic augmentations. The paper deals with a conversational fragment whose analysis can contribute to the understanding of the semantics/pragmatics debate (by providing a clear-cut and irreducible example of pragmatic intrusion) and of Grice's circle. After ample discussion of the current literature, the paper explores a logical possibility: explicatures (or implicitures) are non-cancellable: hence there is a way out of the apparently vicious circularity called ‘Grice's circle’. It follows that conversational implicatures take their input from contextually supplied, non-cancellable truth-conditional content and that a neat distinction can still be made between meaning augmentations that are cancellable (conversational implicatures) and those that are not.

Do discourse connectives encode concepts or procedures?

Discourse connectives such as but and moreover, while obviously meaningful, are widely seen as not affecting the truth conditions of the utterances they occur in; instead, they indicate how the truth-conditional content is to be understood. One way of explaining this is to analyse them as encoding procedural meaning, whose function is to guide pragmatic inference rather than to form part of the communicated message (cf. Blakemore, 2002). In this paper, I defend the idea of procedural meaning and reply to the main objections that have been raised against it. I focus on discourse connectives, showing how a procedural analysis explains their non-truth-conditional contribution, and compare this approach with that of Bach (1999), on which some discourse connectives are seen as contributing to ‘what is said’ by an utterance. I also discuss cases of discourse connectives embedded in attitude contexts, where their behaviour has been seen as a major obstacle to a procedural account, and suggest how such examples can be accommodated.

Remarks on Impure Quotation

Quotation marks are ambiguous, although the conventional rules that govern their different uses are similar in that they contain quantifications over quotable expressions. Pure uses are governed by a simple rule: by enclosing any expression within quotation marks one gets a singular term, the quotation, that stands for the enclosed expression. Impure uses are far less simple. In a series of uses the quotation marks conventionally indicate that (part of) the enclosed expression is a contextually appropriate version of expressions uttered by some relevant agent. When the quotation marks have this meaning, it is tempting to think of them as contributing that indication to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. I adopt a cautious attitude towards this hypothesis, for the evidence in its favor is inconclusive. In other uses the quotation marks conventionally indicate that the enclosed expression should be used not “plainly” but in some broadly speaking “distanced” way, or that it is being so used by the utterer, and typically context makes clear the exact nature of the “distance” at stake. In these cases the quotation marks do not even appear to contribute that indication to the truth-conditional content of the utterance.

Metalinguistic negation and truth functions

Metalinguistic negation (MN) is a specialized use of the negative operator where it functions as a device for registering an objection to a preceding utterance on any grounds other than its truth-conditional content. In this paper, I describe how MN is used in Egyptian Arabic, where it can be expressed differently from descriptive negation. Moreover, I discuss its language specific properties such as the use of an overt complementizer in a matrix clause, and propose two diagnostics for MN in this language: (a) it licenses double negation, an otherwise ungrammatical structure, and (b) it cannot be used emphatically. Negation in Egyptian Arabic is ambiguous only if the speaker suppresses the formal properties of MN to strengthen the double processing effect, so as to achieve certain communicative goals such as humor, surprise, and irony. Although there are two ways of expressing negation in Egyptian Arabic, I argue that there is only one negative operator, and that the different ways of expressing negation are a result of the grammaticalization of pragmatic functions. The facts about negation in Egyptian Arabic strongly support Horn's account of MN as non truth-functional, as the negated clause can be conjoined to its rectification without triggering a truth-functional, therefore contradictory, interpretation.

Truth Conditional Discourse Semantics for Parentheticals

It has been often argued that parentheticals, discourse adverbials and certain parts of speech like interjections do not contribute to the truth conditional content of the assertions of which they are part. In this paper I argue that many of these constructions do contribute a truth conditional content, and I propose a semantics for parentheticals and discourse adverbials that treats these constructions similarly to SDRT's treatment of presuppositions. I also point out differences between standard presupposition triggers on the one hand and parentheticals or discourse adverbials on the other.

Misinformation

It is well known that informational theories of representation have trouble accounting for error. Informational semantics is a family of theories attempting a naturalistic, unashamedly reductive explanation of the semantic and intentional properties of thought and language. Most simply, the informational approach explains truth-conditional content in terms of causal, nomic, or simply regular correlation between a representation and a state of affairs. The central work is Dretske (1981), and the theory was largely developed at the University of Wisconsin by Fred Dretske, Dennis Stampe, and Berent Enc. Recently, informational semantics has roamed far beyond its Wisconsin home, and built a sizeable collection of followers. Converts include Jerry Fodor (1987), Robert Stalnaker (1984) and, less faithfully, Paul and Patricia Churchland (1983) and Hartry Field (1986). But for some years informational semantics has been hounded by a problem with error – the classic presentation is Fodor (1984) – and no other problem has hounded the theory so persistently.

The Projection Strategy and the Truth: Conditions of Conditional Statements

'Indicative are merely expressions of 'conditional beliefs', that is, of 'the agent's dispositions to change what he accepts in response to new information' (p. 102). As argued by Alan Gibbard (I98I) they do not also have truth-conditional contents, or (what for present purposes comes to the same thing) express propositions. More accurately, they are 'too closely tied to the epistemic states of the agents who utter them for those conditionals to express propositions which could be separated from the contexts in which they are accepted' (p. i i i). Other conditional statements, including 'subjunctive conditionals' do, however, express such propositions. The truth conditions of these conditionals are to be secured by the projection strategy, according to which the propositions they express 'should be understood as propositions about features of the world which justify certain [rational] policies for changing one's belief[s] in response to potential new information' (p. II9). The application of the projection strategy, finally, supports Stalnaker's own well-known possible worlds semantics for conditionals (see Stalnaker, I98I, and Stalnaker and Thomason, I970), and casts doubt on its rivals (such as the semantics of Lewis, I973).