Trust In Political Institutions Research Articles

Political Responses to Economic Shocks

How does the experience of economic shocks affect individuals' political views and voting behavior? Inspired partly by the fallout of the financial crisis of 2008, research on this question has proliferated. Findings from studies covering a broadening range of countries and economic contexts highlight several notable patterns. Economic shocks—e.g., job loss or sharp drop in income—exert a significant and theoretically predictable, if often transient, effect on political attitudes. In contrast, the effect on voting behavior is more limited in magnitude and its manifestations less understood. Negative economic shocks tend to increase support for more expansive social policy and for redistribution, strengthening the appeal of the left. But such shocks also tend to decrease trust in political institutions, thus potentially driving the voters to support radical or populist parties, or demobilizing them altogether. Further research is needed to detect the conditions that lead to these distinct voting outcomes.

‘Lordy Me!’ Can donations buy you a British peerage? A study in the link between party political funding and peerage nominations, 2005–2014

Trust in political institutions has declined across developed democracies. One of the main reasons cited for this lack of trust has been the role of money in politics, while standing up to ‘big money’ has been a common rallying cry of populists of both left- and right-wing variants. Political scientists have tried to examine the role of big money in two main steps: firstly, by showing that money can buy access to legislators; and, secondly, that legislators are thereby more responsive to the wishes of donors when writing and voting on laws. Researchers have used experiments and other techniques to show that Congressional staffs are more responsive to requests from donors compared to others and have also shown aggregate trends in responsiveness to the preferences of the wealthier. In this paper we try and go one step further: to show that donors can become legislators. We do this by looking at the example of the House of Lords. Compiling an original dataset of large donations and nominations for peerages, the authors show that, when the ‘usual suspects’ for a position, like former MPs and party workers, are accounted for, donations seem to play an outsize role in accounting for the remaining peers.

Do environmental preferences in wealthy nations persist in times of crisis? The European environmental attitudes (2008-2017)

AbstractHow do economic recessions affect European citizens’ attitudes towards environmental policies? In this article we investigate the attitudes of European citizens towards environmental protection considering its importance both at individual and country levels and adopting a longitudinal view. In light of the existing research on the link between pro-environmental attitudes and economic affluence of societies, including Ronald Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism, we hypothesise that levels of economic well-being as well as trust in political institutions are important drivers of Europeans’ attitudes towards environmental protection. Taking into consideration some macroeconomic indicators and the environmental attitude of public opinion, our main results show that even in time of crises, citizens’ pro-environmental attitudes persist in terms of importance, both at country and individual levels.

Adolescents' conceptions of wealth and societal fairness amid extreme inequality: An Argentine sample.

This study examined how Argentine adolescents' judgments about the fairness of their society are related to their perceptions of actual and ideal societal wealth distribution, just world beliefs, and trust in political institutions. Six hundred ninety-nine Argentine adolescents from three age groups (12-14 years, 15-16 years, and 17-18 years) in high schools from diverse SES communities were presented with five images depicting more or less egalitarian patterns of national wealth distribution. Participants chose the images that best represented actual and ideal wealth distribution in Argentina, and also rated their level of political trust, general and personal beliefs in a just world (BJW), and views regarding the fairness of Argentine society. Findings revealed that there was a significant gap between adolescents' conception of current wealth distribution and their more egalitarian choices for ideal wealth distribution. In addition, adolescents who judged that the distribution of actual economic resources was more egalitarian had more positive views of the fairness of Argentine society, as well as higher levels of political trust and BJW. Moreover, regression analyses revealed that adolescents' views of the overall fairness of society were independently predicted by both their economic judgments and their noneconomic judgments (political trust and both general and personal BJW), and these effects were not moderated by adolescents' age group or school SES. Notwithstanding the lack of moderated effects (i.e., relations among variables), older adolescents and those from higher SES schools had more negative views of overall fairness of society, the egalitarian nature of existing wealth distribution, political trust, and BJW. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Unpacking the relationship between religiosity and conspiracy beliefs in Australia

We examined the interrelation between religiosity, anti-intellectualism, and political mistrust in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. Improving on previous psychological research on the link between religiosity and societal and political attitudes, we assessed the predictive power of religious self-categorization and the importance attached to one's own (non)religious worldview predicting belief in conspiracy theories separately. Applying quota sampling in a study in Australia (N=515), the sample consisted of 48.9% believers (i.e., those who self-categorized as religious persons) and 51.1% non-believers (i.e., those who self-categorized as non-religious persons). The results showed that believers and non-believers did not differ in the belief in conspiracy theories. Unpacking this further though, we did find that the extent to which religious worldviews were endorsed predicted belief in conspiracy theories. Among believers, the importance attached to their religious worldview was directly associated with higher belief in conspiracy theories and this link was partly mediated by higher anti-intellectualism. Political trust, in turn, served as an inhibitor of the link between religiosity and conspiracy beliefs. Among non-believers, there was no direct association between the importance of non-religious worldview and belief in conspiracy theories. However, we found that higher trust in political institutions accounted for the negative association between non-religious worldview and lower belief in conspiracy theories. The results underline the importance of distinguishing religiosity as a self-categorization and religiosity as a worldview. We find that it is not the self-categorization as religious, but the extent to which religious worldviews are endorsed that could predict people's beliefs in conspiracy theories.

Does Quality of Government and Trust Explain the Cross-National Variation in Public Support for Climate Policies?

In accordance with the Paris agreement, the signing countries have undertaken to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, implying more government intervention to steer the behaviors of different actors with climate policy measures. However, states face very different possibilities for gaining support for such interventions, especially those targeting the consumption patterns of individual citizens, due to for example the variation in economic development, the quality of political institutions, and other country covariates. While most research on climate policy support has focused on individual factors, such as ideological position, values and socio-demographic factors, there are also studies out there showing that there is quite some variation in country support for various climate change policies. Using newly published data from the European Social Survey, we explore whether variation in climate policy support is associated with levels of quality of government (QoG) and individuals’ trust in political institutions and people in general, and if these associations vary across different types of climate policies. We find that QoG and generalized trust are positively linked to support for climate taxes, but we find no associations with support for climate subsidies and climate bans. Moreover, we find that political and institutional trust are more strongly linked to support for climate taxes than to support for climate subsidies and climate bans.

The Popularization of Political Communication

This article presents and adopts a new definition of the popularization of political communication, which is defined as a strategic communicative action through which political actors try to create new connections with those citizens who do not still know, follow and support them and to emotionally strengthen the political bond with their current sympathizers. Second, a comparative analysis of the Facebook pages of the main political leaders of 31 countries shows that the popularization of political communication is a relevant phenomenon on Facebook, while a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) indicates that the presence of a presidential system, a high digitalization of the media system, and a high level of trust in political institutions are three sufficient conditions for a “pop” communication on Facebook. Finally, the article identifies and discusses its main properties and development under the current hybrid media system.

The wisdom of crowds versus the madness of crowds

Declining trust in northern liberal democratic institutions poses serious challenges to legislatures (parliaments). That mistrust extends to traditional media at a time when new digital media are fanning ‘fake news’ and a ‘madness of crowds’. Will the ‘wisdom of crowds’ on which liberal democracy critically depends prevail over the ‘madness’? Can parliaments resolve that tension positively? In New Zealand trust in political institutions is still high, but voter turnout has slid, especially among the young. Parliament has work to do.

Deliberative democracy and trust in political institutions at the local level: evidence from participatory budgeting experiment in Ukraine

ABSTRACTDeliberative democracy assumes that management decisions based on open voluntary and fair procedures are rational and just. This article presents arguments that deliberative democracy can bolster trust in democratic institutions. Moreover, deliberative practices can increase citizens’ level of political trust not only in stable democracies but also in hybrid regimes. This is demonstrated through an examination of participatory budgeting in Ukraine, with the use of data from a field experiment in 2015–2016 (with 740 participants).

New Realignment of Fears in France and Europe

This article is based mostly on a study conducted throughout 2016 in France, Poland, the UK, Spain, Sweden and Germany with the think tank Demos and the Institute Notre Europe – Institut Jacques Delors, called ‘Nothing to fear but fear itself’. The paper focuses mainly on France and departs from the statement that we are living a sort of backlash against the ‘multiculturalist’ approach to integration. This, as shown throughout the paper, cannot always be linked to some of the new fears European societies are facing, but it is the necessary contextual starting point when analysing one of those new fears, namely the hardening of social attitudes on immigration and diversity. This paper points out three of the most common symptoms regarding the new alignment of fears in Europe. It suggests that Europe is not only witnessing a rise of fearful attitudes about terrorism or uncertainty, but also the rise of a society that shows signs of exhaustion regarding the values that used to be the bed stone of European openness. The three symptoms described are: i) growing support for authoritarian populist parties, ii) a low and failing trust in political institutions, iii) a hardening of social attitudes regarding immigration and diversity.Received: 10 January 2018 Accepted: 9 May 2018 Published online: 31 October 2018

National Systems of Civic Culture: Social Media, Civic Education, Trust and Democracy in ICCS 2016

This paper proposes modeling national trust and civic culture systems among 14- year-old students in schools comparatively using ICCS 2016 data on 24 countries and territories. Data include more than 94,000 students in their eight grade of schooling in about 3800 schools. Based on previous studies, it is hypothesized to find (1) a positive effect of institutional trust on interpersonal trust, (2) a positive effect of trust in political institutions on democratic values and behavior, and (3) that social media use may cause institutional distrust and negatively affect democratic values and behavior. Proposed trust and civic culture systems (1)-(2) are studied using SEM. LCA is used to investigate (3). Results surprisingly indicate that (1) distrust in political institutions may instead provoke civic participation and democratic values, (2) distrust in political institutions can instead breed interpersonal trust, and (3) there is no significant student institutional distrust due to trust in social media.

Youth Activism in Political Squats between Centri Sociali and Case Occupate

Nowadays a lot of research describes most young people as barely interested in politics, expressing little trust in political institutions and far from any forms of institutional political participation. Moreover, most of the engaged youth are involved in forms of participation described as more civic and social than political, weakly ideological, more and more often digital and developed in virtual space, and usually experienced as one among several components of everyday personal lives. The article explores youth activism in political squats because it is a form of participation which, in countertendency, is political and radical in its aims and strategies, explicitly ideologically inspired, strongly rooted in physical places, and often quite central in everyday personal lives. The text is based on research conducted in the city of Turin (Italy) by means of qualitative interviews, participant observation and document analysis. Four main interconnected thematic dimensions are considered: Individuals’ biographical paths and meanings of activism; distinctive lifestyles and cultural sensitivities among the activists; collective narratives about contemporary society and possibilities of social change; patterns of intervention and forms of organization. On the basis of these analyses, the article maintains that this form of activism can be usefully interpreted as a real lifestyle, which has an explicit and intense political sense, but which young activists also connect with a much wider, more differentiated set of meanings.

Economic inequality, perceived responsiveness and political trust

From a representation theory point of view, trust in political institutions is strongly related to the responsiveness of these institutions to citizens’ preferences. However, is this also true when the political power of citizens is not equal, which is often the case in more unequal societies? In this article, it is argued that the link between perceptions of responsiveness to individual preferences and political trust differs across equal and unequal societies. We find that in inclusive societies, perceived political responsiveness is strongly related to political trust, whereas this link becomes weaker in more unequal societies. In other words, when economic inequality and exclusion are high, traditional accountability mechanisms between political actors and their citizens are less apparent. We speculate that this weaker link is due to habituation or a lack of political engagement, causing citizens to withdraw from political life altogether. The focus of this article lies on European and OECD-member countries. The study uses data from the International Social Survey Programme and the European Social Survey.

A Step Forward in the Minimization of Political Corruption in Financial Support of Political Parties: The Experience of Ukraine and Lithuania

Abstract Political corruption as a negative phenomenon hampers the democratic and economic development of any state. The experience of foreign countries across the world testifies to the existence of number of reasons conducive to the spread of political corruption. Its study is important both for Ukraine, which is actively taking measures to combat political corruption, and for other countries with a high level of political corruption. The article begins with a study of various approaches to understanding the concept of “political corruption”, the reasons for its emergence and determination of the level of citizens’ trust in political institutions in Ukraine and foreign countries. The main obstacles to minimizing the phenomenon of political corruption in Ukraine are the existence of an effective mechanism for financial support of political parties and control over their financial activity. Based on the analysis of scientific literature, international acts, and legislative acts of Ukraine and Lithuania, the authors disclose the experience of Ukraine and Lithuania in the sphere of state financing of political parties and control over their financial activity. The methods of descriptive comparative analysis and observation of the latest scientific research on this issue guide the work. Proceeding from the existing problem of minimizing the phenomenon of corruption in the funding of political parties in Ukraine and taking into account the development of Ukraine’s legal system, the article presents a number of proposals on improving the legislation of Ukraine on financial support of political parties. The authors also provide a proposal on the need to improve the legislation in Lithuania in the area of indirect state funding of political parties. This article aims to disclose the notion of “political corruption”, to study experience of Ukraine and Lithuania in the sphere of minimizations of corruption in the funding of political parties and control over the use of such financial support, to determine the areas for improving the legislation of Ukraine and Lithuania in this issue, and to show the optimal mechanism of overcoming corruption in political parties, since Ukraine is not the only state where this phenomenon reaches its peak.

Conocimiento y entendimiento: determinantes de la confianza en el Presidente

What roles do citizens’ knowledge of the political life of the country and the understanding of political affairs play in the public’s trust in the president? By using a Latin American Pu-blic Opinion Project (lapop 2014) survey, and Ordinary Least Squares (ols) models, which include 1 100 observations, the present paper examines the determinants of people s confi-dence in the Mexican Executive. The argument is that citizens’ knowledge of political life and citizens’ understanding of political issues have different effects on public confidence in the President. In the first case, knowledge returns to the critical public opinion of the President, and the trust is hardly granted; in contrast, the belief of the citizens that they understand the affairs of national life, makes the public opinion “generous” as regards the granting of their trust to the Executive. This finding suggests that knowledge and understanding of political issues are two distinct variables whose effects on trust in political institutions are opposite: knowledge has negative effects on trust; while the understanding has positive effects.

Critical social media information flows: political trust and protest behaviour among Kazakhstani college students

ABSTRACTIn political regimes where traditional mass media are under state control, social networking sites may be the only place where citizens are exposed to and exchange dissident information. Despite all the attempts, complete control of social media seems to be implausible. We argue that the critical information that people see, read and share online undermines their trust in political institutions. This diminishing trust may threaten the legitimacy of the ruling regime and stimulate protest behaviour. We rely on original survey data of Kazakhstani college students to confirm these expectations. The data are unique in that they directly measure exposure to critical/dissident information, as opposed to simply assuming it. The analysis leverages Coarsened Exact Matching to simulate experimental conditions. This allows us to better identify the consequential mechanism and the attitudinal precursor by which social media influence protest in an authoritarian context.

Icelandic politics in light of normative models of democracy

Icelandic politics are analysed from the perspectives of three normative models of democracy: the liberal, republican and deliberative democratic theories. While the Icelandic constitution is rooted in classical liberal ideas, Icelandic politics can be harshly criticized from a liberal perspective, primarily because of the unclear separation of powers of government and for the extensive involvement of politics in other social sectors. Despite strong nationalist discourse which reflects republican characteristics, rooted in the struggle for independence from Denmark, republicanism has been marginal in Icelandic politics. In the years before the financial collapse, Icelandic society underwent a process of liberalization in which power shifted to the financial sector without disentangling the close ties that had prevailed between business and politics. The special commission set up by the Icelandic Parliament to investigate the causes of the financial collapse criticized Icelandic politics and governance for its flawed working practices and lack of professionalism. The appropriate lessons to draw from this criticism are to strengthen democratic practices and institutions. In the spirit of republicanism, however, the dominant discourse about Icelandic democracy after the financial collapse has been on increasing direct, vote-centric participation in opposition to the system of formal politics. While this development is understandable in light of the loss of trust in political institutions in the wake of the financial collapse, it has not contributed to trustworthy practices. In order to improve Icelandic politics, the analysis in this paper shows, it is important to work more in the spirit of deliberative democratic theory.

Examining macroeconomic determinants of trust in parliament: A dynamic multilevel framework

The extensive literature on political trust has long suggested a link between macroeconomic conditions and public trust in political institutions. However, empirical evidence regarding this relationship remains ambiguous. Conflicting results appear to be related to differences in research design: while cross-sectional studies tend not to find evidence of a link between macroeconomic variables and trust in political institutions, most longitudinal studies do. In this paper, using recent advances in multilevel methodology, we examine both cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of macroeconomic variables on trust in national parliament within a single dynamic multilevel framework. By analyzing all seven waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2014), we demonstrate that declining macroeconomic performance has a negative within-country effect on trust in national parliament. At the same time, we find limited evidence in support of this association at the between-country level. This discrepancy suggests the presence of confounding factors that are unaccounted for in cross-sectional designs. We therefore argue for the importance of examining within-country effects as they provide a more stringent test of causality.

Youth Political Engagement in Australia and the United States: Student Councils and Volunteer Organizations as Communities of Practice

Purpose: Lave and Wenger’s Communities of Practice is presented as a conceptual framework for examining extracurricular activities as a part of democratic schools’ contribution to students’ civic engagement. Data from the IEA Civic Education Study is analyzed to investigate research questions on the association between participation in two civic communities of practice (student council and volunteer organizations) and two types of expected adult political participation as well as trust in political institutions in Australia and the United States. Method/Approach: The methodology examined data from students in nationally representative samples of schools that surveyed 14-year-olds in 1999. This was the most recent large scale study of civic education in which these two countries participated. Analysis of variance examined main effects and statistical interactions, especially by gender. Findings: Findings were that in both countries, participation in the two civic communities of practice was associated with higher levels of trust in political institutions and greater expectations to become an informed voter and an active citizen. The results also suggest that male and female students in the United States experience these communities of practice in different ways. Practical advantages to encouraging democratic communities of practice are important to the experience of democracy at school.

Social and Institutional Trust in Times of Crisis: Greece, 2002\u20132011

Focusing on 2002–2011, we analyse levels of trust in Greece and compare them with 17 other European countries. During this period, Greece endured a serious economic crisis. Signs of increasing mistrust in all societal institutions became evident and the nation witnessed extreme phenomena, such as violent demonstrations, the surfacing of radical political ideas, parties with nationalistic and racist characteristics, and noncompliance with rules, regulations, and taxes. However, little is known about generalised social trust, i.e. interpersonal trust between individuals, during the crisis. We analyse data from the European Social Survey Rounds 1, 2, 4, and 5 to test whether the crisis affected the levels of various forms of trust among Greeks. In addition to social trust, we distinguish between trust in political institutions (e.g. politicians and the national parliament) and impartial institutions (e.g. the police and legal system). The results reveal that the level of trust people show towards political and impartial institutions decreased substantially in Greece. Surprisingly, however, interpersonal social trust did not collapse; rather, it remained stable or even slightly increased concurrently with the notable decrease in political trust. This suggests that during an economic crisis, people do not deterministically lose their trust in other individuals; instead, in the Greek case they appear to lean on each other when both political and impartial institutions fail. Moreover, it is possible that shared experiences of nearly overwhelming adversities in Greece during the crisis increase a sense of togetherness among individuals, which in turn contributed to the robustness of social trust.