True Virtue Research Articles

Kant and Bolzano on logical form

In the works of Kant and his followers, the notion of form plays an important role in explaining the apriority, necessity and certainty of logic. Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), an important early critic of Kant, found the Kantians' definitions of form imprecise and their explanations of the special status of logic deeply unsatisfying. Proposing his own conception of form, Bolzano developed radically different views on logic, truth in virtue of form, and other matters. This essay presents Bolzano's views in the light of his criticisms of the Kantian logicians.

Real options and business practice

The logic of real options is increasingly gaining importance nowadays because it helps decision makers have a more accurate and realistic view of their investment plans and at the same time secure projects in terms of handling uncertainty. The objective of this paper is to make a brief bibliographical overview of the real options approach helping readers understand the true meaning and virtues of real options and at the same time give useful examples regarding their application areas. It unfolds the aspects of real options, contrasting them with standard investment evaluation techniques and sorting them into ‘on’ and ‘in’ projects. Applications but also boundaries of real options are also included in this paper in order to make the connection between theory and business practice.

Analyticity and Justification in Frege

That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which analyticity is couched in terms of “truth in virtue of meanings”, Frege’s notions of analytic and a priori concern justification, respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists. Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which is not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched.

THE ROLE OF PERCEPTION IN JONATHAN EDWARDS'S MORAL THOUGHT: The Nature of True Virtue Reconsidered

ABSRACT This essay provides an interpretation of Jonathan Edwards's moral thought that calls attention to the motif of perception in his conception of true virtue. The aim is to illumine the extent to which Edwards's virtue ethics can be included in and contribute to prevailing approaches to virtue in contemporary theological ethics. To advance this proposal, this essay attends to the question of moral agency that Edwards's reflections on charity, the new spiritual sense, and religious affections raise. This procedure offers an acute sense of the significance of perception for Edwards's virtue ethics, which in turn allows for a constructive Edwardsean entry into current theological discussions on the narrative character of virtue.

Truth in Virtue of Meaning. By Gillian Russell

Truth in Virtue of Meaning. By Gillian Russell

Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell.

Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell.

Jonathan Edwards, The Ethics of Virtue and Public Theology

AbstractIn The Nature of True Virtue, Jonathan Edwards does not deny that common morality is important; benevolence, beauty, conscience, justice, love for family and country are all threads in the fabric of a common morality. Without love for God as their chief end, however, the ‘virtues’ of common morality do not rise to the level of true virtue. This incommensurability can be problematic for Christian ethics in the public square. Edwards understood his project within the horizon of a commonwealth founded on Christian faith, but modern liberal democracies envision a different relationship between religious discourse and public life. In these contexts, so different from Edwards’ setting, pluralism and tolerance are among the keys to a peaceful pursuit of the common good. With these differences in view, then, I explore what contribution Edwards’ work on virtue might make to the practice of public theology in the areas of environmental ethics, bioethics and immigration policy.

"An Event in Sound" Considerations on the Ethical-Aesthetic Traits of the Hermeneutic Phenomenological Text

In this article, we discuss some of the linguistic features of hermeneutic-phenomenological writing and, in so doing, we point to the close connection between lived experience and the ethical-aesthetic traits of writing the experience. Our exploration starts by contemplating texts written by the so-called Utrecht School. We reflect on their orientation as it has been understood, developed, and advocated by Max van Manen. The literary style of the Utrecht orientation is sometimes misunderstood and questioned. This article aims to explicate why and how hermeneutic phenomenology needs an expressive language to "write the lived experience" rather than to simply write "about" the lived experience. Lived experiences are always past experiences that we try to bring into the present, and so the difference between recollections and memories are discussed in connection to writing the experience. We argue that what is being told and not seen is, metaphorically speaking, an event in sound, which can have ethical and aesthetic virtues of truth and beauty. Lived experiences, whether written as anecdotes or as other kinds of experiential accounts, can shine forth through the use of expressive language. But is this kind of language poetry? Can such an account be regarded as poetic writing? If it is poetic writing, exactly how does it differ from academic writing? Our exploration of questions like these leads us to the tentative conclusion that, as hermeneutic phenomenological researchers, we dwell in the borderland between a "poetic attitude" and a utilitarian writing style.

Truth in virtue of meaning

Truth in virtue of meaning

Disunity of Virtue

This paper argues against the unity of the virtues, while trying to salvage some of its attractive aspects. I focus on the strongest argument for the unity thesis, which begins from the premise that true virtue cannot lead its possessor morally astray. I suggest that this premise presupposes the possibility of completely insulating an agent’s set of virtues from any liability to moral error. I then distinguish three conditions that separately foreclose this possibility, concentrating on the proposition that there is more to morality than virtue alone—that is, not all moral considerations are ones to which some virtue is characteristically sensitive. If the virtues are not unified, the situationist critique of virtue ethics also turns out to be more difficult to establish than some have supposed.

THE IMAGO DEI AND HUMAN PERFECTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTOLOGY FOR GREGORY OF NYSSA'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE HUMAN PERSON

THE <i>IMAGO DEI</i> AND HUMAN PERFECTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTOLOGY FOR GREGORY OF NYSSA'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE HUMAN PERSON

Sanctification in Milton's Academy: Reassessing the Purposes in Of Education and the Pedagogy of Paradise Lost

Sanctification in Milton's Academy: Reassessing the Purposes in <i>Of Education</i> and the Pedagogy of <i>Paradise Lost</i>

Truth in Virtue of Meaning

In recent work on a priori justification, one thing about which there is considerable agreement is that the notion of truth in virtue of meaning is bankrupt and infertile. (For the sake of more readable prose, I will use ‘TVM’ as an abbreviation for ‘the notion of truth in virtue of meaning.’) Arguments against the worth of TVM can be found across the entire spectrum of views on the a priori, in the work of uncompromising rationalists (such as BonJour (1998)), of centrist moderates (such as Boghossian (1997)), and of uncompromising empiricists (such as Devitt (2004)). My aim is to dispute this widespread opinion.The outline is as follows: first, §§II-III consist of preliminary stage-setting. Then, in §IV I will argue that some of the most prevalent arguments against the worth of TVM — in particular, one which is given clear expression by Quine (1970), and is recently reinforced by Boghossian (1997) — do not engage with the core idea motivating TVM. After deflecting this charge of incoherence, the aim of §§V-VIII is to work toward developing a useful conception of TVM.

Teaching in the Name of Jesus

This article explores a biblical and theological reflection on the meaning of teaching in Jesus’ name. It proposes that the five Christian virtues of truth, love, faith, hope, and joy serve to guide teaching that faithfully represents Jesus today.

The Desire for Recognition in Plato's Symposium

The Desire for Recognition in Plato's Symposium Alessandra Fussi In Plato's Symposium, Eros unifies the multiplicity of human goals by drawing the entire soul towards the desire for the good. Since, however, we cannot find anything explicit about the composite nature of the soul in this dialogue, the unifying power of Eros does not seem to extend from the soul's goals to its internal parts. This is all the more puzzling given that the Symposium is generally thought to be very close to the Republic chronologically. One may wonder, bearing the distinctions of the Republic in mind, whether someone whose character is mostly shaped by thumos will pursue happiness by identifying goals, and ways to attain them, that are intrinsically different from those identified by someone whose character traits are marked by reason or by appetite. In other words, if we assume that the soul is not monolithic, we can expect that the unifying force of Eros will allow for different overarching goals as well as for different modalities in which such goals will be pursued. If we look at Diotima's speech closely enough, we find some indications that she might have in mind a distinction between three kinds of "goods" towards which three different kinds of character types can be moved by Eros. For example, after distinguishing between generic love and specific love, she offers at 205d three examples of activities spurred by generic love with their respective goals: money, gymnastics, philosophy. It is certainly not difficult to detect in this tripartition a prefiguration of the three classes in Plato's Republic: the money-making class, the guardian class mainly trained in gymnastics, and the class of the philosophers. The distinction between character types in the Symposium is further highlighted when Diotima explains that there are three fundamental modes of striving [End Page 237] for immortality. Those bound to the body will beget children; those fertile in their souls—moved by the desire to be honored—will generate beautiful speeches or beautiful deeds; but only those initiated into the Greater Mysteries will be able to generate true virtue and thus become truly immortal by contemplating eternal Beauty (212b1). As G. R. F. Ferrari points out, in the realm of the Lesser Mysteries love of honor (philotimia) is the highest aspiration, while "in the Greater Mysteries it will be philosophy that leads us to the ultimate goal (210d6). The transition from Lesser to Greater bears comparison, then, with the crucial shift of focus in the Republic from institutions grounded in the honor code (Books II–IV) to those derived from rule by philosopher kings (Books V–VII)."1 Though the soul's tripartition is not discussed in the Symposium, the dialogue provides the ground for a phenomenological account of the difference between the thumoeidetic and the rational manifestations of Eros. In the Republic itself, it is not easy to discern how the characteristics ascribed to thumos fit together in a coherent whole.2Thumos in the Republic is something in-between a raw drive (the sheer aggressiveness of the lion, 588d) and a cluster of complex emotional responses, such as anger when one is convinced of having being wronged or belittled (440c, 441bc), a longing for competitive success (φιλονικία, 548c, 550b) and strong desires for glory and honor (φιλοτιμία, 475a, 548c, 549a). If properly educated, thumos gives rise to the virtue of courage, (429c–30b, 442b–c). Thumos is ultimately a motivational source rooted in the agent's self-image and emotionally linked to the esteem one earns from others. As the case of Leontion indicates, a thumoeidetic personality will be very sensitive to shame and inclined to embrace conventionally held beliefs and values.3 In this sense, someone driven by thumos will also be sensitive to injustice and ready to flare up in indignation at wrongs done. However, in contrast with [End Page 238] λογιστικόν, thumos does not strive towards universality. Judgment based on thumoeidetic motivations is thus often partial, relying on first appearances rather than on a well-examined state of affairs (at 440c, thumos is said to be enraged by the opinion of a wrong done and to start fighting for what appears to be just...

Accuracy, Sincerity and Capabilities in the Practice of Teaching

This paper examines the relative strengths of two conceptions of teaching. The thinner conception, which underpins a report of the Ministerial Committee on Teacher Education in South Africa, takes the definitive purpose of teaching as the organization of systematic learning. The thicker conception draws on work by Martha Nussbaum and Bernard Williams and comes from my ongoing thinking about the conditions for trustworthy practice. I propose that educative teaching is a practice whose definitive purpose is to enable people’s flourishing by developing their capabilities as these are connected to what Williams calls ‘the virtues of truth’—‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’. I consider the case for claiming (i) that the purpose of educative teaching is to enable learners to develop the virtues of truth and (ii) that trustworthy practice depends on teachers having these virtues themselves. En route I challenge MacIntyre’s grounds for refusing to admit teaching as a practice.

Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Beauty, Benevolence, and Virtue in Jonathan Edwards’sThe Nature of True Virtue

Previous articleNext article No AccessBeauty, Benevolence, and Virtue in Jonathan Edwards’s The Nature of True VirtueWilliam J. Danaher Jr.William J. Danaher Jr.The General Theological Seminary Search for more articles by this author The General Theological SeminaryPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Religion Volume 87, Number 3July 2007 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/516740 Views: 40Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref © 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Elizabeth Agnew Cochran CONSENT, CONVERSION, AND MORAL FORMATION: Stoic Elements in Jonathan Edwards's Ethics, Journal of Religious Ethics 39, no.44 (Nov 2011): 623–650.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2011.00500.xKi Joo Choi THE ROLE OF PERCEPTION IN JONATHAN EDWARDS'S MORAL THOUGHT: The Nature of True Virtue Reconsidered, Journal of Religious Ethics 38, no.22 (Jun 2010): 269–296.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2010.00429.x

Helping Friends Manage Impressions: We Like Helpful Liars But Respect Nonhelpful Truth Tellers

People help friends make desired impressions on others. The strategic presentation of friends can involve a mix of truth, exaggeration, and even lies. Given that we extol the virtues of truthfulness and admire honesty, how do we respond to people who stretch the truth to help their friends? In 2 experiments, scenarios depicted a central character describing a same-sex friend to a potential suitor who was attractive and whose "ideal date" preferences were clear. The central character either told the truth, which resulted in a suboptimal impression, or tried to help by exaggerating and, in one condition, lying about the friend. Results showed that central characters were liked more and preferred as friends if they stretched the truth (exaggerated or lied); however, they were respected more if they told the truth.

The Nature of True Virtue: Theology, Psychology, and Politics in the Writings of Henry James, Sr., Henry James, Jr., and William James (review)

The Nature of True Virtue: Theology, Psychology, and Politics in the Writings of Henry James, Sr., Henry James, Jr., and William James (review)