Truth Conditions Research Articles

Pengaruh Strategi True Or False Terhadap Hasil Belajar Siswa pada Mata Pelajaran Fiqih di MTss Proyek Kandepag Medan

ln education, achieving learning goals with good Iearning outcomes is a driving force that motivates individuals to do it optimally, and it is one of the desires that must be fulfilled. ln order to achieve learning goals, teachers are also required to understand and choose strategies, methods, or media that are engaging for students to implement. This is because several research studies have shown a positive relationship between learning strategies and students' learning achievements, with the frequency of using learning strategies significantly predicting academic performance or student achievement. Therefore, this study aims to determine the influence of the true or false strategy on students' learning outcomes in the subject of Fiqh in class VIII of MTSS Proyek Kandepag Medan. The method used in this study is quantitative research with quasi-experimental research data analysis, using a non-equivalent controi group design. The sampling technique used as purposive sampling, with two research samples, namely class VIII A (Control Class) and VlIl B (Experimental Class), the research instrument used was a test instrument consisting of 20 true or false statements. The research results found an average with the control class of 55.32, while the experimental class obtained an average of 79.86, so in this case, the true or false strategy influences the learning outcomes of students in the Fiqh subject.

Development and psychometric evaluation of a questionnaire to measure university students' knowledge on the effects of alcohol use during pregnancy.

Alcohol consumption during pregnancy can lead to fetal alcohol spectrum disorders. This study developed and validated a questionnaire to assess university students' knowledge regarding the effects of alcohol during pregnancy. We designed an instrument with true-false-I do not know statements. Initially, 45 true statements were formulated and subjected to content validation by 19 experts. Based on the Content Validity Index (CVI), 17 items were selected. The instrument, called the Fetal Alcohol Consequences Test (FACT), was first assessed by 31 university students for the level of understanding. Then, the questionnaire was administered to a national Brazilian sample of university students, and an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted. Each correct FACT answer was worth 1 point, and the knowledge was categorized as high (total score ≥ 80%), moderate (score between 60 and 79%), and low (score ≤ 59%). When the questionnaire was being designed, the CVI values ranged from 0.779 to 1.0, and all statements were considered suitable by the target audience. For psychometric evaluation, 768 students from 24 Brazilian states participated. In the EFA, five statements were removed, revealing a tool with 12 items and two latent factors: "fetal alcohol spectrum disorders" and "conceptions and guidance on alcohol consumption during pregnancy." The KMO index (0.76426) and Bartlett's sphericity test (6362.6, df = 66, p < 0.00001) both supported the final EFA model. The goodness-of-fit indices for the factor structure were adequate: χ2 = 119.609, df = 43, p < 0.00001; RMSEA = 0.048; CFI = 0.977; TLI = 0.965. The mean total FACT score among participants was 7.71 ± 2.98, with a median of 8; 32.03% of the students had high (10-12 points), 24.09% moderate (8-9 points), and 43.88% low knowledge (<8 points). The questionnaire proved reliable, with a floor effect of 1.17%, a ceiling effect of 9.25%, and a Cronbach's alpha index of 0.798. The FACT can be utilized in university students' health education processes, contributing to greater knowledge and information dissemination about the effects of alcohol during pregnancy, in addition to the formulation of policies on the subject directed to this group of young adults.

Most quantifiers have many meanings.

In this paper, we investigate, by means of a computational model, how individuals map quantifiers onto numbers and how they order quantifiers on a mental line. We selected five English quantifiers (few, fewer than half, many, more than half, and most) which differ in truth conditions and vagueness. We collected binary truth value judgment data in an online quantifier verification experiment. Using a Bayesian three-parameter logistic regression model, we separated three sources of individual differences: truth condition, vagueness, and response error. Clustering on one of the model's parameter that corresponds to truth conditions revealed four subgroups of participants with different quantifier-to-number mappings and different ranges of the mental line of quantifiers. Our findings suggest multiple sources of individual differences in semantic representations of quantifiers and support a conceptual distinction between different types of imprecision in quantifier meanings. We discuss the consequence of our findings for the main theoretical approaches to quantifiers: the bivalent truth-conditional approach and the fuzzy logic approach. We argue that the former approach neither can explain inter-individual differences nor intra-individual differences in truth conditions of vague quantifiers. The latter approach requires further specification to fully account for individual differences demonstrated in this study.

The ambiguity of “true” in English, German, and Chinese

Through a series of empirical studies involving native speakers of English, German, and Chinese, this paper reveals that the predicate “true” is inherently ambiguous in the empirical domain. Truth statements such as “It is true that Tom is at the party” seem to be ambivalent between two readings. On the first reading, the statement means “Reality is such that Tom is at the party.” On the second reading, the statement means “According to what X believes, Tom is at the party.” While there appear to exist some cross-cultural differences in the interpretation of the statements, the overall findings robustly indicate that “true” has multiple meanings in the realm of empirical matters.

The effect of value on context and target recollection in memory for truth and falsity

Memory for truth and falsity has recently been investigated from the perspective of the dual-recollection theory, showing better context and target recollection for truth than falsity. In this paper, we examine whether these memory effects obtained for true statements are similar to the value effect, whereby true statements are given higher priority in encoding. For this purpose, we implemented value-directed remembering (VDR) into the conjoint-recognition paradigm. In our first experiment, the primary goal was to verify how VDR influences the processes defined by dual-recollection theory. At study, prioritized/important items were linked to higher numerical values (e.g., 10), while unimportant ones had lower values (e.g., 1). At test, the participants’ task was to recognize whether a particular sentence was important, unimportant, or new. We found that both context and target recollection were better for important items. In the second experiment, the main goal was to study the combined effects of importance and veracity on memory. In the between-subjects design, participants were monetarily rewarded for memorizing true or false sentences. The results demonstrated differences in the ability to prioritize truth over falsity. Specifically, we found a substantial increase in context recollection for prioritized true information but not for prioritized false information. Moreover, we found higher context recollection for true than false sentences in the true-prioritized condition, but not in the false-prioritized condition. These results indicated that people are able to prioritize true information better than false, and suggested that memory for truth may be a special case of the value effect.

It Is Clean, But It Still Seems Dirty to Me: Implicit and Explicit Truth of Imagined Contamination as an Explanation of Ego-Dystonic Experience of Obsessions

Individuals suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder often experience obsessions as ego-dystonic, knowing that a mental event does not reflect reality but acting as if it does. Imagination has been suggested as an important process involved in this mismatch about the actual truth value of obsessions. Imagining false events has been found to impact spontaneous truth evaluations (implicit truth value; ITV), even when people explicitly acknowledged the imagined event as false (explicit truth value; ETV; Shidlovski et al., 2014). The current study examined discrepancies between ITV and ETV along with effects of imagination and their relationship to obsessive-compulsive contamination symptoms. Sixty-two students, recruited across the range of contamination symptoms, participated in this study. First, a table, at which participants were seated, was cleaned in their presence. Next, in a double-categorization autobiographical implicit association test (aIAT), participants classified true or false autobiographical statements together with “clean” or “contaminated” statements regarding the table. Then, they imagined that the table was contaminated prior to the second aIAT administration. ETV was measured by classifying the statements explicitly as true or false. Imagination was associated with reduced ITV, this association did not depend on symptoms, contrary to our predictions. However, symptoms were associated with elevated ETV evaluations of the contaminated statements. Finally, ETV correlated with ITV only for low symptom participants. This correlation was no longer significant following the imagination induction. In conclusion, individuals with contamination symptoms may be more likely to overweigh their explicit evaluations in the presence of contradictory implicit evaluations, creating a discrepancy. This process may account for ego-dystonic experiences reported by OCD patients.

Asesmen Sumatif dalam Pembelajaran Bahasa Indonesia Fase D Kurikulum Merdeka

The aim of this research is to describe the implementation of summative assessment in the Indonesian language learning reading element phase D. Data collection uses observation, interviews and documentation. The object of this research is summative assessment in Indonesian language learning. The subjects of this research were Indonesian language teachers and class VIII students at SMP Muhammadiyah Surakarta. The data used is a summative assessment in the Indonesian language learning material for reading element phase D. The data source was obtained from the implementation of summative assessment in Indonesian language learning for reading element phase D class VIII at SMP Muhammadiyah Surakarta. Data analysis uses descriptive methods. The data analysis technique used includes three stages, namely 1. Data reduction; 2. Data display; 3. Drawing conclusion. The findings show that summative assessments are carried out at the end of every semester. Summative assessment is carried out at the end of the odd semester through the Final Semester Assessment (PAS). There are four types of questions in the Final Semester Assessment (PAS), namely multiple choice questions, true or false statements, matching, and essays. The total number of questions is 50 questions which are divided into several types of questions. There are 25 multiple choice questions, 10 true and false statements, 10 matching questions, and 5 essay questions.

Probabilistically coherent credences despite opacity

Abstract Real human agents, even when they are rational by everyday standards, sometimes assign different credences to objectively equivalent statements, such as ‘Orwell is a writer’ and ‘E.A. Blair is a writer’, or credences less than 1 to necessarily true statements, such as not-yet-proven theorems of arithmetic. Anna Mahtani calls this the phenomenon of ‘opacity’. Opaque credences seem probabilistically incoherent, which goes against a key modelling assumption of probability theory. I sketch a modelling strategy for capturing opaque credence assignments without abandoning probabilistic coherence. I draw on ideas from judgement-aggregation theory, where we face similar challenges of defining the ‘objects of judgement’.

Age differences in the context of climate change: Does exposure to a fake consensus statement make a difference?

The present study examined whether people of different age groups respond differently to a true versus fake consensus statement concerning climate change. In total, 309 participants were randomly exposed to a true consensus statement about climate change and 311 were exposed to a false statement. Subsequently, respondents were asked to respond to items about attitudes, feelings, and behavioral intentions concerning climate change. Compared with younger people, older persons are significantly more concerned about climate change, more likely to report that climate change is real and more willing to take climate change action. Nevertheless, older persons also are more likely to be willing to post both fake and truthful information about climate change, thus, possibly serving as spreaders of both fake and truthful information. The findings suggest that it is younger people who will benefit from further education about climate change and older people who may benefit from education about the spread of information in social media. Our findings also suggest that simply providing individuals with consensus information has only limited impact on their climate change attitudes, feelings and behavioral intentions.

Counterpossibles, consequence and context

ABSTRACT What is the connection between valid inference and true conditionals? Many conditional logics require that when A is a logical consequence of B, ‘if B then A’ is true. Taking counterlogical conditionals seriously leads to systems that permit counterexamples to that general rule. However, this leaves those of us who endorse non-trivial accounts of counterpossible conditionals to explain what the connection between conditionals and consequence is. The explanation of the connection also answers a common line of objection to non-trivial counterpossibles, which is based on a transition from valid arguments to the corresponding conditionals. It also contributes to the wider project of illuminating the connections between contexts of utterance, on the one hand, and the truth-conditions of conditionals uttered in those contexts, on the other.

Naïve Truth and the Evidential Conditional

This paper develops the idea that valid arguments are equivalent to true conditionals by combining Kripke’s theory of truth with the evidential account of conditionals offered by Crupi and Iacona. As will be shown, in a first-order language that contains a naïve truth predicate and a suitable conditional, one can define a validity predicate in accordance with the thesis that the inference from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion is valid when the corresponding conditional is true. The validity predicate so defined significantly increases our expressive resources and provides a coherent formal treatment of paradoxical arguments.

Non-doxastic Attitude Reports, Information Structure, and Semantic-Pragmatic Interface

AbstractTruth conditions of sentences ascribing non-doxastic propositional attitudes seem to depend on the information structure of the embedded clause. In this paper, we argue that this kind of sensitivity is a semantic phenomenon rather than a pragmatic one. We report four questionnaire studies which explore the impact of the information structure on the truth conditions of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions from different perspectives. The results of the first two studies show that the acceptability of those ascriptions can be affected by some structural modifications of the embedded clause, in particular, when we replace a simple form by an equivalent complex conjunctional form (‘p and q’). However, it is possible that different evaluations of such ascriptions have a pragmatic source, namely, the ascriptions with embedded conjunction imply that the agent’s attitude transfers to both conjuncts. In the second pair of studies, we further investigate the nature of this implication which can be classified as ‘Conjunction Elimination’ (CE) in the scope of an attitude verb. The results show that CE-inferences in the context of non-factive non-doxastic attitude ascriptions are not easily cancellable and hence of a semantic rather than pragmatic nature. The results are not conclusive when it comes to the factive non-doxastic attitudes. We conclude our findings by some considerations about a potential source of the observed difference between non-factive and factive attitude verbs and the significance of our general findings to the semantic theory of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions.

Assessing prevalence of misperceptions in agricultural activities of smallholder farmers in Tanzania

Misperceptions in agriculture are challenging the adoption of agricultural technologies in African developing countries. Incorrect beliefs such as agricultural inputs have effects on soil, crop yields and human health, have led some smallholder farmers conduct traditional agriculture, resulting in low yields, of poor quality. This research studied prevalence of misperceptions among smallholders in Tanzania when dealing with agricultural inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and seeds). To accomplish this, agricultural extension officers in research areas were interviewed to learn inaccurate beliefs held by farmers which were then validated by agricultural experts through semi-structured interview to identify misperceptions; identified misperceptions helped to design a questionnaire with TRUE and FALSE statements, rated on a 5-point Likert scale, which was administered to 431 smallholders in four districts in Tanzania. Descriptive statistics helped to learn prevalence of misperceptions, regression analysis determined association of predictors on misperceptions. Results revealed respondents were confident with inaccurate beliefs while dealing with agricultural inputs which confirmed prevalence of misperceptions among smallholder farmers in pursuit of agricultural activities. To help smallholders adopt agricultural technologies, agricultural extension systems need to minimize associated misperceptions and adopt strategies that can help farmers access correct agricultural information. The essence is to improve yields, efficiency and profitability in agricultural sector.

Practical perceptual representations: a contemporary defense of an old idea

According to ‘orthodox’ representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven’t always been, and needn’t continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz appear to have rejected orthodox representationalism while nonetheless endorsing perceptual representations of a fundamentally practical kind not captured by orthodox representationalism. Moreover, we argue that the perceptual science called on by contemporary philosophers to defend orthodox representationalism instead motivates a return to this older view, and we suggest that contemporary philosophers may conceptualize fundamentally practical perceptual representations as ‘de agendo’ representations, a species of representation that has constitutive appropriateness rather than veridicality conditions.

Apophatic Beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium

Abstract Plato’s discourse on beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium is distinctly apophatic in nature. Plato describes beauty in terms of what it is not (an approach sometimes referred to apophasis, or the via negativa). In this paper, I argue that Platonic apophatic practise in the Hippias Major and the Symposium depicts beauty as an ally to certain aspirations of philosophical discourse. In the first section, I offer some brief prefatory remarks on the nature of apophasis and its presence in Plato’s thinking. In the second section, I provide some background to the dialogue of the Hippias Major and highlight the apophatic nature of the descriptions of beauty offered therein. In the third and final section, I discuss the Symposium, a dialogue within which, in addition to representing beauty apophatically, Plato illustrates how we may become able to achieve some positive, or cataphatic, insights into the nature of beauty. I conclude that the purpose of the Platonic apophatic portrayal of beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium is to show that, while beauty cannot be reduced to a series of assertive truth statements, it can nevertheless function as an accessory to other dimensions of philosophical thinking.

(297) Assessment of the Accuracy of Chatgpt on Testosterone Management Uncovers the Limits of Generative Artificial Intelligence

Abstract Introduction Testosterone has become an increasing cultural touchstone. It is estimated that one third of men on testosterone replacement are not testosterone deficient and that another large percentage of men who would qualify for treatment do not receive it. This is likely partially due to the significant amount misinformation and disinformation available online. Recently there has been an explosion of interest in generative artificial intelligence (AI). Given the sensitive nature of questions regarding sexual health, many men may see generative AI as an anonymous, confidential, and accurate source of information. Specifically, OpenAI’s ChatGPT is the most used generative AI that offers an easy to navigate conversation-based resource where patients may inquire about many topics including sexual health concerns. This study aims to validate ChatGPT responses to questions about testosterone and evaluate the references used for its claims. Objective To evaluate the accuracy of ChatGPT responses to common questions about testosterone therapy and the sources substantiating claims. Methods Questions regarding testosterone function and therapy were created based on American Urological Association (AUA) Care Foundation brochures for patient education on testosterone. ChatGPT was prompted to respond to these questions during a single interactive session with the ending phrase, “include references,” to evaluate the sources of responses. Responses were then separated into individual statements made by the AI and their associated references. Each response was evaluated for accuracy by matching the AI generated statements to AUA guidelines and published AUA resources. References were evaluated on the accuracy of the authors, article, journal, and date of publication based on the PubMed index, Google Scholar, and the cited journal’s website. Results A total of 9 questions were posed to the generative AI. The interactive session with ChatGPT yielded 53 separate statements backed by 21 references. The majority of queries yielded true statements by matched criteria to AUA guidelines (50/53, 94.3%). The references provided by the generative AI were drawn primarily from peer-reviewed journals (15/21, 71.4%); hospital websites (3/21, 14.3%), unknown sources (2/21, 9.5%) and AUA guidelines (1/21, 4.8%). The mean impact factor for the cited peer reviewed journals was 27.2 (SD 60.5). A majority of references were found to be legitimate sources (13/21, 61.9%). However, 4 (19.0%) included citation errors and 4 (19.0%) references were found to be fabricated by the AI. The question yielding the most fabricated references (3/4, 75%) was “How do I boost my testosterone levels naturally?” Conclusions We found that ChatGPT offers a reliable conversation-based resource where patients may receive accurate information in response to their testosterone related questions. However, when queried about topics with fewer references, the large language model fabricated sources with real reputable authors and real journals. This is highly concerning as the general public would not be able to differentiate between real and fake information. Patients should be counseled with caution, and guardrails should be put in place for the safety of patients using large language models for medical information. Disclosure No.

Logical Form, Conditionals, Pseudo-Conditionals

This paper raises some questions about the formalization of sentences containing ‘if’ or similar expressions. In particular, it focuses on three kinds of sentences that resemble conditionals in some respects but exhibit distinctive logical features that deserve separate consideration: whether-or-not sentences, biscuit conditionals, and concessive conditionals. As will be suggested, the examples discussed show in different ways that an adequate formalization of a sentence must take into account the content expressed by the sentence. This upshot is arguably what one should expect on the view that logical form is determined by truth conditions.

Upside-Down Logics: Falsification of the Truth and Truthification of the False

This paper is about funny science, recreational mathematics, upside-down thinking, or contradictory reasoning (to think backward). Since a statement in some conditions may be true, in other conditions false, and a third type of conditions partially true and partially false. The paper presents for the first time two types of Upside-Down Logic, the first one is falsification of the Truth (when a true statement is transformed into a false one), and the second one is the opposite: Truthification of the False (when a false statement is transformed into a true one) - within the frame of Recreational Neutrosophy. All transformations from &lt;A&gt; to &lt;antiA&gt; or vice versa should be real, making sense in our real world. Kind of magic logic! Falsification and Truthification are mostly used in the Social Sciences (Anthropology, Archaeology, Economics, Geography, History, Law, Linguistics, Politics, Psychology, Sociology), Philosophy, etc. excelling in Politics:Falsifying the Truth of Enemies[We seek to diminish the enemy's positive side to the point of cancellation and to increase the enemy’s negative side to the point of exaggeration;] and Truthifying the False of the Friends[The opposite: We seek to decrease the friend’s negative side to the point of cancellation, and to increase the friend's positive side to the point of exaggeration.].

Chinese-English bilinguals prefer being truthful in the native language

Bilinguals make decisions differently across languages likely due to reduced affect in the foreign language, but very little is known about language use in relation to deception. Here, we tested whether late Chinese-English bilinguals prefer to lie in the foreign language when betting against a virtual opponent. In each trial, participants freely announced bets in Chinese or English depending on whether they had drawn a coin or not. Results showed that bilinguals preferred using their native language, Chinese, over their foreign language, English, when being truthful—namely, announcing a coin when they had one. Even though participants did not choose English more to lie than to tell the truth, our results can be interpreted as a tendency to lie more in English when their behavior in the truth condition is considered the baseline. Participants also switched between languages more often after telling the truth than lying, and after telling the truth they switched more to Chinese. These results provide the first empirical evidence for strategic language use in bilinguals.

How experts and novices judge other people’s knowledgeability from language use

How accurate are people in judging someone else’s knowledge based on their language use, and do more knowledgeable people use different cues to make these judgments? We address this by recruiting a group of participants (“informants”) to answer general knowledge questions and describe various images belonging to different categories (e.g., cartoons, basketball). A second group of participants (“evaluators”) also answer general knowledge questions and decide who is more knowledgeable within pairs of informants, based on these descriptions. Evaluators perform above chance at identifying the most knowledgeable informants (65% with only one description available). The less knowledgeable evaluators base their decisions on the number of specific statements, regardless of whether the statements are true or false. The more knowledgeable evaluators treat true and false statements differently and penalize the knowledge they attribute to informants who produce specific yet false statements. Our findings demonstrate the power of a few words when assessing others’ knowledge and have implications for how misinformation is processed differently between experts and novices.