True Sentences Research Articles

Fregean Aletheic Objectualism, the Flaw of False Assertion, and Truth as a Norm of Assertion

Gottlob Frege is an aletheic objectualist who regards truth as an object. For him, truth is the truth-value True, which is an object referred to by true sentences. Some interpreters argue that Frege’s claim that the True is an object is merely a byproduct of the technical features of his formal logic, Begriffsschrift. However, Frege’s works instead suggest that aletheic objectualism constitutes his philosophical position on the metaphysics of truth. Although Fregean aletheic objectualism may seem counterintuitive and unfruitful, it is, in fact, quite useful. Viewing truth as an object provides a new explanation for why there is a pro tanto reason to consider false assertion flawed. This explanation in turn strengthens support for the popular view that assertion is a norm-laden speech act.

Entailment and Truthmaking: The Consequentia Rerum from Boethius to the Ars Meliduna

In Categories 12 (14b11–22), Aristotle famously claims that [1] true sentences and reality stand in a mutually implicative relationship, and that [2] reality causes the truth of sentences but not vice versa. In this paper, I first argue that Boethius’ reading of the above passage led medieval logicians to assess [1] and [2] within the framework of a theory of consequence. Then, I consider two important questions raised by Boethius and later logicians in relation to [1] and [2], and, namely, whether the implication described in [1] really satisfies the requirement for consequence, and whether the truthmaking relation posited in [2] can be boiled down to the relation of consequence. Boethius himself, I argue, answered affirmatively to both questions and thus (much like some contemporary truthmaker theorists) committed himself to an account of truthmaking as entailment. I then consider criticisms to Boethius’ account found in the writings of William of Champeaux, two anonymous authors connected to the school of Jocelyn of Soissons, Peter Abelard, and the author of the Ars Meliduna. Here, I argue that the emergence of a concern for relevance drives the need for abandoning Boethius’ account as well as his conception of truthmaking as entailment.

Definitions by abstraction and Leibniz's notion of quantity

AbstractThis paper analyses the abstractionist account of quantity championed by Leibniz, especially in the 1680s. Leibniz introduced the notion of quantity in an indirect way, via an abstraction principle. In the first part of the paper, I identify the context in which this approach arose in light of Leibniz's criticism of his earlier dream of an ‘alphabet of human thought’. Recognising the impossibility of such a project led him to realise that, when dealing with terms referring to abstract objects, we should always consider them within the true sentences in which they occur. In the second part, I describe this approach in detail. This allows us to look at some key concepts of Leibniz's theory of quantity. In particular, I raise the problem of the relationship between the two sides of the abstraction principle: how should we think of the relation between the claim that a and b are equal, and the claim that the quantity of a is identical to the quantity of b? I argue that we can find a positive answer to this problem in Leibniz.

Disentangling inhibition and prediction in negation processing

Negation as a universal feature of human language is used effortlessly in everyday communication. However, experimental research has shown that the comprehension of negated sentences seems to require additional cognitive resources compared to affirmative sentences. Many studies investigating the processing of negation report longer reading and reaction times for negative compared to affirmative sentences and many studies report a Polarity by Truth interaction: false affirmative sentences lead to longer response times and larger N400 event-related potentials (ERPs) than true affirmative sentences, whereas the pattern is reversed for negative sentences where it is the true sentence that elicits longer reaction times and higher N400 ERPs compared to false negative sentences. These interactions have been discussed in the light of lexical associations, predictability, and the need to construct two subsequent mental representations. Furthermore, recent studies have shown that the comprehension of negated sentences seems to make use of neural resources that are typically involved in cognitive control and inhibitory mechanisms. As both processes have been associated with two different and temporally overlapping ERP components (the N400 and the P300), we focus on studies with high temporal resolution. We discuss linguistic aspects of negation, such as semantic similarity and contextual invariance of negation. We furthermore discuss the role of the verb as well as the position of the negative marker with respect to the verb, and their respective relevance for predictive and inhibitory mechanisms in negated sentences.

Is creativity computable?

ABSTRACT Is creativity based on the brain's computations? Some scientists say, No, because of Gödel's argument that humans can grasp the truth of sentences that formal algorithms cannot. A taxonomy implies that only three sorts of algorithm could be creative: neo-Darwinian algorithms, neo-Lamarckian ones and Multi-level ones. These algorithms accommodate “breaking the rules”, and they have the computational power—the working memory for intermediate results—needed for natural language and for the creation of informal algorithms. A programme illustrates how jazz musicians can improvise with the minimum of power—no use of working memory—because they have access to a long-term memory for chord sequences created using a similar computational power to natural language. A programme that reverse engineers Boolean electrical circuits uses a verification algorithm to check that they are correct. And programmes that verify sentences obviate Gödel's argument. Hence, whether creativity is computable is an open question.

Truth in Sentencing, Incentives and Recidivism

Truth in Sentencing, Incentives and Recidivism

Cognitive load reduces context recollection for true sentences

ABSTRACT The dual-recollection model has been successfully applied in research on memory for truth and falsity, suggesting that “true” feedback is better recollected than “false” feedback. We used this approach to test whether the Cartesian or the Spinozan model would be a better framework to describe processes underlying memory for truth and falsity. Our sample consisted of 108 students, who performed the conjoint recognition test under: no-load, refreshing-interference or rehearsal-interference conditions. We found no difference in the rate of falsely attributing “true” label to false sentences than vice versa under cognitive load, which supported the Cartesian model. Multinomial processing tree model analyses confirmed better context memory for true than false sentences in no-load condition. Cognitive load mostly influenced context recollection for true sentences, with nonsignificant effects on context recollection for false sentences, which contradicts the Spinozan model.

Sentences Apparently About Composite Objects: True Even Without Composite Objects

Abstract A compositional nihilist believes that the only objects that exist are simples. However, a non-nihilist believes in the existence of composite objects and challenges the nihilist to explain why there are true sentences about chairs, tables, etc., if composite objects do not exist. Different nihilist views have been suggested to explain this (the paraphrase strategy and the truthmaker theory), but I believe that they are unsuccessful (either they do not successfully paraphrase every sentence apparently about composite objects, or they are not precise about the truthmakers of those sentences). I will suggest that a new truthmaker theory, which uses resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy, can give such an explanation and does not face the problems of other theories. Therefore, we have a good reason to accept this truthmaker theory as the best nihilist way to accommodate sentences apparently about composite objects.

One True Sentence: Writers & Readers on Hemingway’s Art by Mark Cirino and Michael Von Cannon

Reviewed by: One True Sentence: Writers & Readers on Hemingway’s Art by Mark Cirino and Michael Von Cannon Kayla Forrest One True Sentence: Writers & Readers on Hemingway’s Art. By Mark Cirino & Michael Von Cannon. Godine, 2022. 240 pp. Hardcover $26.95. In July of 2019, Mark Cirino and Michael Von Cannon released the first episode of One True Podcast, a project based on a seemingly simple question: “What is your ‘one true sentence’ and why?” Since the premier episode, Cirino and Von Cannon have interviewed over 100 individuals, discussing all things Hemingway and inviting listeners to learn more about the writer and his work. One True Sentence: Writers & Readers on Hemingway’s Art brings the podcast to print, highlighting excerpts of 38 episodes, organized as individual chapters, and presented as questions and answers, reflecting the relaxed, conversational tone of the podcast. Each chapter offers a significant portion of the original episode, and begins by identifying “one true sentence” (or “sentences,” as some individuals admit to bending the rules). Regardless of whether one has been a faithful subscriber to the podcast, the book is an excellent read for Hemingway aficionados, casual readers, and all those in between. The appeal of this volume lies in both its organization, as a series of interviews about Hemingway’s work and life, and in its breadth, examining simple and complex sentences, pulling from a wide range of texts (including letters), and featuring a varied array of guests. Moreover, the book’s emphasis on close reading illuminates a clear understanding of Hemingway’s style and explores the myriad interpretations of “true sentences.” As a whole, One True Sentence looks at truth from two perspectives: the “truth” of the chosen sentences and the meaning of “true” in Hemingway’s famous “one true sentence” dictum. The focus on a specific Hemingway sentence as the starting point for each chapter reflects the power of close reading to elucidate meaning, or the “truth” of any given text from a reader’s perspective. The conversations between Cirino, the interviewer, and each guest tease out the significance of each chosen sentence. As Ken Burns and Lynn Novick write, in their introduction to the book, the discussions inspired by the elected sentences “reveal the power of Hemingway’s iceberg principle, as the dialogue works to [End Page 120] unpack the meaning Hemingway often leaves buried” (13). Guests also discuss their personal connections to and interest in Hemingway and his writing, including historical, biographical, and theoretical approaches to his work. The guest interviews in One True Sentence include many Hemingway scholars, such as Verna Kale, who explores an affecting line of dialogue from Harold Krebs’s mother in “Soldier’s Home,” and the late Scott Donaldson, who discusses the opening sentence of A Farewell to Arms. There are also a number of fiction writers, who often relate Hemingway’s impact on their work or writing process. Several of the included conversations are with PEN/Hemingway Award winners, like Jennifer Haigh, who reflects on writing her own true sentences, and Kawai Strong Washburn, who describes conveying truth to readers. The collection also includes guests whose professions and experiences diverge from studying or writing literature. Actors, Adrian Sparks and Stacy Keach, tell stories of reading Hemingway’s prose to prepare to play him on the stage and screen, and John McCain’s longtime aide and speechwriter, Mark Salter, explains the impact of Robert Jordan on the senator. While the interviewees, perspectives, and topics often vary significantly from one chapter to the next, the organization of the chapters in no overt order, with relatively similar chapter lengths, results in a unified feel to the collection as a whole. While the interviewees offer varying backgrounds, professions, and experiences with Hemingway’s life and work, one of the more intriguing elements of this text is the delightful diversity of sentences chosen for this project. In their preface to the book, Cirino and Von Cannon challenge readers to really consider what it means for a text to be “Hemingwayesque,” especially by examining sentences that are long and complex or unremarkable at first glance. One example of such a sentence, is Mark P. Ott’s choice from “Big Two-Hearted...

Current Bibliography

Current Bibliography Steve Paul and Kelli A. Larson [The current bibliography aspires to include all serious contributions to Hemingway scholarship. Given the substantial quantity of significant critical work appearing on Hemingway’s life and writings annually, inconsequential items from the popular press have been omitted to facilitate the distinction of important developments and trends in the field. Annotations for articles appearing in The Hemingway Review have been omitted due to the immediate availability of abstracts introducing each issue. Kelli Larson welcomes your assistance in keeping this feature current. Please send reprints, clippings, and photocopies of articles, as well as notices of new books, directly to Larson at the University of St. Thomas, 333 JRC, 2115 Summit Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55105-1096. E-Mail: Kalarson1@stthomas.edu.] The Hemingway Bibliography Online Database: The Hemingway Bibliography is a searchable database consisting of the most comprehensive record of annotated Hemingway-related scholarship published worldwide in English from 1990 to the present. Researchers can search by title, author, subject, keyword, publisher, or periodical. The database is updated annually. Visit The Hemingway Bibliography at https://ir.stthomas.edu/hemingway/ BOOKS Buchholtz, Miroslawa and Dorota Guttfeld. Ernest Hemingway in Interview and Translation. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2022. [Brings together interview and translation studies to explore how interviewers and translators serve as mediators between EH and his audience, creating versions of the author and his writing through their hands-on approach. Section One draws on interview theory to examine some of EH’s last conversations with George Plimpton and others within their Cold War context. Focuses not only on EH’s response but also on the interviewer’s agenda and dynamics of their exchange. Concludes that these “’last’ conversations repeatedly expose Hemingway’s resistance to interviewing and publishing of interviews,” with the interview-savvy author adopting different personas depending on the interviewer. Section Two details the life and career of Bronislaw Zieliński, the Polish translator of EH’s works beginning with his 1956 translation of OMS. Chronicles their brief 1958 meeting in Ketchum, Idaho, which grew into an epistolary friendship against the backdrop of Cold-War paranoia. Pieces together their relationship through correspondence and Zieliński’s notes and private diary. Closes with commentary on Zieliński’s 1959 article on why EH is a “Polish writer.” Section Three discusses an experiment using Polish MA-level student translations of EH’s “Cat in the Rain” to illustrate the dangers faced by translators when confronted with ambiguity or simplicity. Research results show the students’ unconscious tendency to embellish meaning according to stereotypical notions of literariness, thus narrowing the story’s range of possible interpretations. Finds this same disturbing tendency present in the story’s canonical version by professional translator Bronislaw Zieliński.] Cirino, Mark and Michael Von Cannon, eds. One True Sentence: Writers & Readers on Hemingway’s Art. Boston: Godine, 2022. [Inspired by and drawn from the editors’ ongoing “One True Podcast,” this collection of conversations with a wide range of scholars, authors, and celebrities offers even general readers valuable glimpses into the pleasures of reading EH. Each participant begins with a “true sentence” from somewhere in EH’s oeuvre—from fiction, non-fiction, even letters—and the subsequent interview delves into sometimes familiar and often fresh aspects of meaning, interpretation, context, and style.] Evans, Robert C., ed. Critical Insights: The Old Man and the Sea. Ipswich, MA: Salem P, 2022. [Collection of sixteen new critical essays on EH’s classic no-vella ranging in topic from religion to film adaptation. Appendix features over twenty black-and-white photographs, chronology of EH’s life, and selected bibliography. Includes index. See individual contributions arranged alphabetically by author under ESSAYS.] Hemingway, Brendan and Stephen Adams, eds. Dear Papa: The Letters of Patrick and Ernest Hemingway. New York: Scribner, 2022. [Collection of selected letters between EH and middle son, Patrick, spanning 1932 to 1961. Topics include family, school, travel, writing, hunting, and fishing. Patrick writes in his prologue: “The man I knew tried very hard to be a good family man. I think our correspondence shows he was intimately connected with his wives and his children all his life.” Includes index.] Kurlansky, Mark. The Importance of Not Being Ernest...

A Critical Apraisal of the Concept of Natural Epistemology – from the Perspective of Navya Nyaya Philosophy

The connotation of the term “epistemology” is the science of knowledge. While science having two broad branches i.e., normative and positive, knowledge comes under the normative perspective. Thus normative concept of epistemology is although disregarded by many philosophers like Quine, however Quine’s theory was later criticized by Colin McGuinn. In my paper I have first explained some points of Quine’s theory from the perspective of Navya Nyaya and then made a comparative analysis of Quine’s theory and Navya Nyaya theory of knowledge. Finally, I have come to the conclusion that, logically true sentence i.e., analytic statement is established by inference, which is claimed both by Quine and Navya Nyaya.

Об истоках множественности логик

The article presents a brief analysis of how the existence of various logics became possi­ble. This is shown on the example of such well-known logical theories as syllogistics, temporal, multivalued, intuitionistic, paraconsistent and quantum logics. Each of them arose not on someone’s whim, but to solve specific problems. They are based on the most general ontological assumptions about the subject area under study. In formal logic onto­logical assumptions are refined in the concept of a model structure. Since it is impossible to talk about logic in isolation from the language used, the most general epistemic as­sumptions about the nature of the relationship of linguistic expressions to those objects of extralinguistic reality that they represent are also accepted. One of the most important of these relationships is the concept of the truth of sentences, which was first formulated by Plato and Aristotle. Taking certain ontological and epistemic assumptions depending on the problem being solved, we obtain different logics. Process logic is primarily char­acterized by special ontological assumptions that are fundamentally different from the as­sumptions of other currently existing logics. The ontology of processes is an ontology of developing processes, not things. Historically, it was most vividly described in the writings of Heraclitus. In the overwhelming majority of modern approaches to the de­scription of processes, we see attempts to reduce them to sequences of states, which de­values the very concept of a process, just as a cinematic picture of the flow of time deval­ues the concept of time. Since logics are built on the basis of various ontological and epistemic assumptions, they are inherently theories of these accepted assumptions, and not universal reasoning tools that don’t depend on the characteristics of the study area and the categories of linguistic expressions. Universal logic is possible if one rises from the level of specific languages to a higher level of sign theory.

Safety first: making property talk safe for nominalists

Nominalists are confronted with a grave difficulty: if abstract objects do not exist, what explains the success of theories that invoke them? In this paper, I make headway on this problem. I develop a formal language in which certain platonistic claims about properties and certain nominalistic claims can be expressed, develop a formal language in which only certain nominalistic claims can be expressed, describe a function mapping sentences of the first language to sentences of the second language, and prove some facts about that function and facts about some sound logics for those languages. In doing so, I prove that, given some plausible metaphysical assumptions, a large class of sentences about properties of concrete objects are “safe” on nominalistic grounds. Whenever some true sentences about concrete objects and some sentences belonging to this class that are true according to platonists collectively entail a conclusion about concrete objects, some nominalistically acceptable sentences are true and entail the same conclusion. Because the proof can itself be formulated without abstract objects, it provides a nominalistic explanation of the success of theories that invoke properties of concrete objects.

Shedding Light on the “Eclipse” Narrative: Some Notes on Pragmatism in the Twentieth Century

Shedding Light on the “Eclipse” Narrative: Some Notes on Pragmatism in the Twentieth Century

, , AND REINHARDT’S PROGRAM

AbstractIn “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”, Reinhardt [21] famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {KF}$ ) in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view $\mathrm {KF}$ as a tool for generating “the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ ”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the form $\mathrm{Tr}\ulcorner {\varphi }\urcorner $ . The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible “to justify the use of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant sentences”. This question was answered negatively by Halbach & Horsten [10] but we argue that under a more careful interpretation the question may receive a positive answer. To this end, we propose to shift attention from $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true sentences to $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true inferences, that is, we shall identify the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ with the set of pairs $\langle {\Gamma , \Delta }\rangle $ , such that $\mathrm {KF}$ proves that if all members of $\Gamma $ are true, at least one member of $\Delta $ is true. In way of addressing Reinhardt’s question we show that the provably true inferences of suitable $\mathrm {KF}$ -like theories coincide with the provable sequents of matching versions of the theory Partial Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {PKF}$ ).

The Role of Predictability During Negation Processing in Truth-Value Judgment Tasks

In experiments investigating the processing of true and false negative sentences, it is often reported that polarity interacts with truth-value, in the sense that true sentences lead to faster reaction times than false sentences in affirmative conditions whereas the same does not hold for negative sentences. Various reasons for this difference between affirmative and negative sentences have been discussed in the literature (e.g., lexical associations, predictability, ease of comparing sentence and world). In the present study, we excluded lexical associations as a potential influencing factor. Participants saw artificial visual worlds (e.g., a white square and a black circle) and corresponding sentences (i.e., “The square/circle is (not) white”). The results showed a clear effect of truth-value for affirmative sentences (true faster than false) but not for negative sentences. This result implies that the well-known truth-value-by-polarity interaction cannot solely be due to long-term lexical associations. Additional predictability manipulations allowed us to also rule out an explanatory account that attributes the missing truth-value effect for negative sentences to low predictability. We also discuss the viability of an informativeness account.

Educational Opportunity and the Carceral System: Sentencing Policies and Black Men's College Enrollment

This paper explores whether the Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which increased the disproportionate incarceration of young Black men, was also associated with changes in the likelihood of college enrollment for Black men in states with more punitive sentencing laws. I measure the association between the introduction of state sentencing laws, such as truth-in-sentencing (TIS), and college enrollment. These laws could have decreased the likelihood of Black male college enrollment by removing these men from the population in the years in which they would have attended college. To explore the impact of the passage of sentencing laws on college enrollment, I carry out a differences-in-differences analysis and an event study from 1992 to 2000. In the years after TIS passed, significant decreases occurred in the likelihood of college enrollment for Black young men when compared to the college enrollment of young White men in TIS states. However, there were no significant decreases when comparing college enrollment of young Black men in TIS states with enrollment for young Black men in non-TIS states. With respect to state sentencing schemes, voluntary guidelines, determinate sentences, presumptive recommended sentences, presumptive determinate sentences, and recommended determinate sentences were associated with a lower likelihood of college enrollment for Black men.

A New Argument for the Groundedness of Grounding Facts

Many philosophers have recently been impressed by an argument to the effect that all grounding facts about “derivative entities”—e.g. the facts expressed by the (let us suppose) true sentences ‘the fact that Beijing is a concrete entity is grounded in the fact that its parts are concrete’ and ‘the fact that there are cities is grounded in the fact that p’, where ‘p’ is a suitable sentence couched in the language of particle physics—must themselves be grounded. This argument relies on a principle, Purity, which states that facts about derivative entities are non-fundamental. Purity is questionable. In this paper, I introduce a new argument—the argument from Settledness—for a similar conclusion but which does not rely on Purity. The conclusion of the new argument is that every “thick” grounding fact is grounded, where a grounding fact [F is grounded in G, H, …] is said to be thick when at least one of F, G, H, … is a fact—a condition that is automatically satisfied if grounding is factive. After introducing the argument, I compare it with the argument from Purity, and I assess its cogency relative to the relevant accounts of the connections between grounding and fundamentality that are available in the literature.

There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences†

AbstractWe argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about the Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel’s theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.

Conjoining Meanings: Semantics without Truth Values

<i>Conjoining Meanings: Semantics without Truth Values</i>