Abstract
Gottlob Frege is an aletheic objectualist who regards truth as an object. For him, truth is the truth-value True, which is an object referred to by true sentences. Some interpreters argue that Frege’s claim that the True is an object is merely a byproduct of the technical features of his formal logic, Begriffsschrift. However, Frege’s works instead suggest that aletheic objectualism constitutes his philosophical position on the metaphysics of truth. Although Fregean aletheic objectualism may seem counterintuitive and unfruitful, it is, in fact, quite useful. Viewing truth as an object provides a new explanation for why there is a pro tanto reason to consider false assertion flawed. This explanation in turn strengthens support for the popular view that assertion is a norm-laden speech act.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
