Troop Contributions Research Articles

Memory and history of the Great(er) War and India: from a national-imperial to a more global perspective

This essay explores memorial and historiographical aspects of British India in World War One. In India today there is little interest in either commemorating or researching the topic. In the West, there is growing interest in the contribution of Indian troops and the commemorations of the Great War centenary. We argue that India’s role in the First World War is a subject that should not be overlooked in the new global historical perspective on the conflict. We submit that studying the war in relation to the contribution of the colonial empires, particularly the British Empire in India is of crucial importance in understanding the post-war world, the anti-colonial movement, the stability of the British Empire in Asia and the international relations of the sub-continent.

International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and Effectiveness.

This article takes stock of some of the important contributions to the study of peacekeeping (PK). Two key topics stand out: peacekeeping burden sharing and mission effectiveness. For burden sharing, the theoretical foundation is the private provision of public goods and joint products. Implications for burden sharing differ whether financial or troop contributions are being shared, with the latter driven by jointly produced country-specific benefits. Financial burden sharing can also differ between United Nations (UN)-led and non-UN-led peacekeeping operations, wherein country-specific benefits are especially important for the latter. Many articles gauge peacekeeping effectiveness by the mission’s ability to maintain the peace or to protect lives for a set time period. More recently, multiple criteria are raised for evaluating peacekeeping in today’s world of multifaceted peacebuilding operations.

Transferring Responsibility?

This article examines the influence and interpretation of international law in Australia’s policy and conduct regarding captured individuals during the recent Afghanistan Conflict. By critically analysing declassified government documents, Parliamentary statements, and original interview data with former Foreign Minister and Defence Minister Stephen Smith, I advance a two-pronged argument. First, contrary to what other sombre studies of the anti-torture norm might predict, Australia’s understanding of fundamental international legal rules pertaining to captured individuals in armed conflict – including the humane treatment principle and the prohibition on torture – helped regulate its policies and actions during the Afghan war. By regulate, the article posits that Australia’s policies and behaviour were governed or controlled in part by a felt sense of legal obligation among some key policy-makers. Second, like its allies Britain and Canada, Australia claimed it did not formally detain individuals during the initial years of the Afghanistan Conflict, even though it appears to have factually captured and transferred some people to United States (us) and Afghan authorities. As the war dragged on, and Australia’s troop contributions increased and local hostilities worsened, Australia – again like its allies – relied on detainee agreements and changed its conduct to try to protect captured individuals and transferees from abuse. Despite such agreements and changes, critics contend that transferred captives faced a significant risk of torture in Afghan jails, particularly those run by the country’s intelligence agency. This suggests that state and non-state views of what the prohibition on transferring to possible torture requires in practice are less settled than related shared understandings of other fundamental prisoner protections in international law and armed conflict.

A European return to United Nations peacekeeping? Opportunities, challenges and ways ahead

ABSTRACTThis introductory article outlines the main rationale of the Special Issue and places the topic of the so-called ‘European Return to United Nations Peacekeeping’ in the wider context of recent policy developments and conceptual discussions related to the literature on UN troop contributions. It then outlines some of the key findings of the nine case studies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) included in this issue. The article concludes that despite a recent engagement of a group of European countries in the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), expectations of a large-scale ‘return of Europe’ to UN peacekeeping are premature. While the MINUSMA experience will certainly spark important discussions and developments related to the future of UN peacekeeping and Western contributions, European countries will continue to commit only selectively troops on a case-by-case basis and only if a wide range of facilitating factors align as much as they did in the Mali case.

Germany and United Nations peacekeeping: the cautiously evolving contributor

ABSTRACTThis article examines Germany’s past, present and future approach to UN peacekeeping, particularly in the context of a potential ‘European return to UN Peacekeeping’ and the country’s recent commitment to contribute to the Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). By applying a conceptual framework for assessing facilitating and inhibiting factors related to Germany’s past and current participation in UN peacekeeping operation, the article argues that core reasons for German troop contributions range from bilateral partnerships and multilateral pressures, to the role of individual policy entrepreneurs and inter-organizational aspects. Yet, Germany’s culture of restraint and public scepticism towards military operations act as important inhibiting factors. Most crucially, Germany has since the early 1990s pursued an instrumentalist approach to UN peacekeeping in order to strengthen its international profile within a discourse of ‘assuming more responsibility’, to advance ‘normalization’ in security affairs and to enhance internal political and external bilateral security cooperation schemes. Germany’s recent commitment to MINUSMA and its discourse will not result in a ‘big bang’ return to UN peacekeeping, but rather to selective commitments on a carefully assessed case-by-case basis.

Between self-interest and solidarity: Norway’s return to UN peacekeeping?

ABSTRACTNorway has been a firm supporter of, and contributor to, UN peacekeeping operations. However, while increasing its financial support since the end of the Cold War, Norway has significantly downscaled its troop contributions to the UN, focusing on NATO operations. Rather than interpreting this as lessened interest in the UN, we point out that support and commitment cannot be measured solely in numbers of troops deployed. Norway’s commitment to UN peacekeeping should be understood as part of its strategic culture, here read as a synthesis between self-interest and solidarity, and between the UN and NATO. This article details the institutional, political and material challenges and opportunities for renewed engagement in UN peacekeeping.

Exiting the Coalition: When Do States Abandon Coalition Partners during War?

When do countries abandon coalition partners during war? Prominent arguments about alliance dissolution focus on peacetime, yet the ability of alliances to inuence international politics ultimately hinges on their cohesion or dissolution during war. In this paper, I argue that battleeld circumstances heavily inuence the likelihood of defection from coalitions. First, countries ghting independently from their partners make attractive candidates for wedge strategies and hence are more likely to defect. Second, coalitions are more likely to collapse when it appears less likely that the coalition will triumph in the war as a whole. I test hypotheses about wartime developments statistically using new time-varying data on both front-level troop contributions and battle deaths. Consistent with theoretical predictions, countries are more likely to abandon coalition partners if they are ghting alone and when the coalition has fared worse in recent ghting.

Public health emergencies: a new peacekeeping mission? Insights from UNMIL’s role in the Liberia Ebola outbreak

The UN Security Council meeting on 18 September 2014 represented a major turning-point in the international response to the Ebola outbreak then underway in West Africa. However, in the light of widespread criticism over the tardiness of the international response, it can be argued that the UN, and particularly the Security Council, failed to make best use of a potential resource it already had on the ground in Liberia: the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This article examines whether UNMIL could have done more to contribute to the emergency response and attempts to draw some lessons from this experience for potential peacekeeper involvement in future public health emergencies. UNMIL could have done more than it did within the terms of its mandate, although it may well have been hampered by factors such as its own capacities, the views of Troop Contributing Countries and the approach taken by the Liberian government. This case can inform broader discussions over the provision of medical and other forms of humanitarian assistance by peacekeeping missions, such as the danger of politicising humanitarian aid and peacekeepers doing more harm than good. Finally, we warn that a reliance on peacekeepers to deliver health services during ‘normal’ times could foster a dangerous culture of dependency, hampering emergency responses if the need arises.

The United States as the Reluctant Ally

ABSTRACT: US leadership in NATO has been declining since the Cold War ended. From a European perspective, the United States looks more and more like a reluctant ally. A re-nationalization of European security could occur without strong US leadership. The United States should, therefore, reassert itself in European security affairs--not with costly troop contributions, but by facilitating European unity and the development of relevant force structures. ********** Since its creation in 1949, NATO has been the most important alliance for America. US engagement and leadership in NATO has, however, been declining since the Cold War ended; this has been especially true during the Obama administration and in particular since the Libya War in 2011. In general, Obama's administration has engaged less in international security affairs; the strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific has definitely moved the US focus from Europe to that region. (1) Although the US government plans to send more troops to Europe during 2017 and takes Russian aggression seriously, military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria have moved Washington's focus from Ukraine and Russia to the Middle East. In addition, the appetite for supporting Europe among US politicians and the American public seems to have declined. From a European perspective, the United States looks more and more like a reluctant ally, a characterization normally used by Washington to describe some of NATO's allies during the Cold War. (2) How does this reluctance manifest itself? What might it lead to? How should the United States act to facilitate more security in the transatlantic region without increasing the costs for American taxpayers? A re-nationalization or division of European defense and security is likely to occur without strong US leadership, and that will probably lead to a stronger Russian influence in European affairs which is clearly not in Washington's interest. The United States should, therefore, regain its leading role in European security affairs--not with massive troop contributions, as in the Cold War, but with strong and firm leadership that can facilitate European unity and help to create relevant force structures capable of defending Europe and contributing to its security. NATO's Declining Role in US Grand Strategy During the Cold War, Europe had a major role in US grand strategy and the United States led NATO with a firm hand. There was never any doubt the United States was the primus inter pares in European security affairs. To borrow Max Weber's concept, Washington led NATO in a charismatic way. (3) That has changed however. Even the Ukraine Crisis failed to make Europe a major player in US grand strategy. For example, in his comprehensive speech about the US foreign policy agenda for 2016 at the National Defense University (NDU) in January 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry, used just one sentence to describe the situation in Europe, and in that sentence he mentioned NATO once. (4) The demonstration of Europe's decreased importance in US security policy was not new. When Robert Gates gave his last major speech as Secretary of Defense he criticized NATO for being a two-tiered alliance, for having a dim, if not dismal future, and said future US political leaders may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost. (5) Gates' view of NATO meetings was they were excruciatingly boring, and he had to do crossword puzzles to stay awake. (6) The Obama administration's decline in interest in Europe compared to other regions and the reluctance to lead NATO in traditional ways have been demonstrated over and over again, especially since the Libyan War in 2011. (7) That war caused a comprehensive discussion in the United States about burden-sharing in NATO between the United States and Europe, and especially who should take the lead in such an operation. …

Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?

How do approaching elections affect the security policy states conduct? We build on classic political economy arguments and theorize that one problem likely faced by democratic policy makers near elections is that of time inconsistency. The time-inconsistency problem arises when the costs and benefits of policy are not realized at the same time. We develop an application of the argument to the case of allied troop contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. In that case, we argue that the expectation should be one of fewer troops committed close to elections. The exogenous timing of elections allows us to identify the effects of approaching elections on troop levels. Our finding of significantly lower troop contributions near elections is arguably the first identified effect of electoral proximity on security policy.

The Forgotten Victory

Waterloo has always been overshadowed by the 1813 Battle of Leipzig in German national memory. Given the salient contribution of Prussian, Hanoverian, Brunswick and Nassau troops to the final victory over Napoleon, this reticence may at first glance seem surprising. Jasper Heinzen contends that Waterloo failed to become a symbol of national achievement in the nineteenth century because of the regional and political fissures it laid bare. If the First World War produced a consensus at last, the price was a subversion of the Anglo-German comradeship so integral to the original event. The resulting mnemonic distortions and, since the Second World War, Franco-German partnership have served to keep Waterloo on the sidelines, yet the battle still holds important lessons for policy-makers today.

Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?

How do approaching elections affect the security policy states conduct? We build on classic political economy arguments and theorize that one problem likely faced by democratic policy-makers near elections is that of time-inconsistency. The time-inconsistency problem arises when the costs and benefits of policy are not realized at the same time. We develop an application of the argument to the case of allied troop contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (“OEF”) and the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) mission in Afghanistan. In that case, we argue the expectation should be one of fewer troops committed close to elections. The exogenous timing of elections allows us to identify the effects of approaching elections on troop levels. Our finding of significantly lower troop contributions near elections is the first arguably identified effect of electoral proximity on security policy.

Back in Blue?

Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has generally made only modest military troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. As it prepares to review its defence and security strategy after the end of its long commitment to combat operations in Afghanistan, however, troop requirements for UN peacekeeping activities may appear again on the radars of policy-makers. Adrian L Johnson argues that there are broadly four options that the UK could take, the most likely being modest re-engagement with the military dimension of UN peacekeeping.

Why Contribute? Understanding Asian Motivations for Troop Contribution to Peace Operations

This article provides an overview of South and Northeast Asian motivations for contributing troops to United Nations peace operations. It identifies five groups of countries based on their motivations and characteristics: (1) Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, (2) India and China, (3) Japan and South Korea, and two individual cases, (4) Mongolia and (5) Pakistan. It argues that the size and level of development of a troop-contributing country are important determinants for the pattern a country follows and for the size of its contribution. In addition, the article suggests that countries with both political and military motivations for contribution tend to provide the most troops, with either economic or geostrategic motivations reinforcing the commitment for contribution. In every case, normative considerations and the perception of a positive international image serve as motivations for contribution, but these do not explain the size of a country’s contributions.

Coalitions of the willing? International backing and British public support for military action

Studies of public support for war highlight the importance of context. Most people do not simply support or oppose the use of force but instead assess its merits depending on various aspects of the situation. One such aspect is the extent of international backing – whether from individual states or supranational organizations – for military action. This backing may be active, notably through the contribution of troops, or more a passive matter of endorsement or authorization of action. In this article, a survey experiment embedded in a major internet survey of British foreign policy attitudes (N = 2,205) is used to explore how international backing affects public support for military action. Britain’s military potential and recent history make it an obvious case study here. Both active and endorsement backing prove to have separate and significant positive effects on support. Importantly, the absolute number of troops involved matters far less than the proportion of total troop numbers to be contributed. And the perceived strength of the enemy predicts support only when the British are to contribute a large proportion of total forces. Predispositional variables are used to investigate the sources of the experimental effects but with little success: the impact of international backing proves remarkably consistent across the sample.

Continuing Impunity of Peacekeepers: The Need For a Convention

Since the end of the Cold War United Nations (UN) authorised peacekeeping missions have tended to be not only more complex, but also much more interventionist and more robust than could ever have been imagined in the early days of peacekeeping.1 However, because peacekeeping is not explicitly provided for under the UN Charter, and has developed ad hoc in response to changing perceptions as to the nature of the role and responsibilities of peacekeeping missions, it is often unclear what laws are applicable to peacekeeping missions and when those laws apply. This paper explores the implications of that lack of clarity, focusing in particular on gaps in the international law regulating the conduct of peacekeepers. The author argues that the current approach, whereby prosecution for crimes committed by peacekeepers is dealt with primarily through the domestic law of the Troop Contributing State, is unsatisfactory, and is likely to remain unsatisfactory despite efforts to persuade Contributing States’ to establish the legal and administrative frameworks necessary to prosecute and punish their troops for crimes committed outside their territorial borders. A convention based regime specifically tailored to ensuring that peacekeepers are held accountable to internationally agreed standards would be the most effective way of enabling the UN to comply with the rule of law standards it itself espouses.2 Such a regime would enable the UN to retain legitimacy internationally and in the eyes of the communities where missions are deployed. In addition the UN should expand its Office of Internal Oversight Services to encompass a dedicated fully resourced criminal justice unit.3 Arguably the accountability gap in relation to non-military personnel is even greater than for military personnel since, although troops generally have complete immunity from prosecution in the host State under a Status of Forces Agreement, they are normally covered by their home State’s military justice system; whereas non-military personnel have functional immunity in the Host State, under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,4 but may not be subject to the jurisdiction of their home State at all whilst they are deployed abroad.5 However not all Troop Contributing States have independent codes of military justice operating in peacetime, and in those countries that do not, responsibility for punishing any wrong-doing by military personnel falls to the ordinary courts and disciplinary bodies.6 In addition some countries have removed serious crimes that violate human rights from the jurisdiction of military courts.7 But even where military personnel are subject to their home State’s military justice system, and it covers the crime in question, Troop Contributing States are often reluctant to prosecute.8 Since the track record on holding UN troops accountable for crimes and other serious misconduct remains poor; and since the majority of allegations of crimes and misconduct reported in the press continues to be against soldiers; and since soldiers outnumber other personnel in UN operations by a wide margin,9 this paper focuses in particular on military personnel.

A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed ssr–ddr in Rwanda?

This article aims to critically examine Rwanda's security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (ssr–ddr) process through a theoretical framework outlining four different models of peace processes in order to identify the sort of peace that can emerge from Rwanda's ssr–ddr approach. The author analyses how the Rwandan government has managed to keep the process ‘locally’ owned, while largely financed by external actors, despite strong criticism of its apparent lack of democratisation. The ‘genocide credit’, the Rwandan government's preference for national, rather than international solutions and its recent troop contribution to peacebuilding operations in the region are identified as the main reasons for this development. The paper argues that the peace emanating from the ssr–ddr process may be considered a hybrid form of state formation and state building, because of the local agency's preference for security and stability while simultaneously enjoying financial and technocratic support for its ‘liberal’ peacebuilding actions in the region.

Supplying peace: Participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions

We explore the supply side of peacekeeping – the determinants of a country’s voluntary contributions to peacekeeping operations. We focus on troop contribution and examine a large set of operations, from UN-led missions to operations led by NATO, the African Union, the European Union, and ad hoc coalitions. We rely on a theoretical model of the private provision of public goods and a dataset on troop contribution across 102 states and 45 operations from 1999 to 2009 to explain both the conditions under which third-party actors are more or less likely to intervene in peacekeeping operations and the factors determining the size of their personnel contribution. We use the characteristics of the conflict to identify which types of conflicts attract outside intervention and the characteristics of the intervener to identify the countries more willing to provide troops. We show that at the domestic level, contributions are driven by the comparative advantage in manpower – or the relative value of labor – and constrained by the tolerance of casualties and the sustainability of multiple and concurrent missions. At the international level, the most robust explanations of when states choose to intervene are the level of threat to global and regional stability, the proximity to the conflict area, and the number of displaced people. In particular, security and humanitarian concerns trigger nation-specific responses. Our empirical findings provide further evidence of the centrality of country-specific gains in explaining the participation in peacekeeping. However, contributor-specific benefits play the same role in UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions, in contrast with previous empirical studies on the financial burden-sharing.

Peacekeeping Effects in South America: Common Experiences and Divergent Effects on Civil–Military Relations

Participation in UN peace operations has increased differences in civil–military relations in South America. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have internalized and implemented divergent defence policies, even as they have increased their troop contributions and been involved in similar or identical peacekeeping missions. This is caused not only by the fact that these countries have very different motivations for participating in peace operations; they have also drawn very different lessons from their exposure to peacekeeping.

Challenge or Confi rmation? The Role of the Swedish Parliament in the Decision-making on the Use of Force

AbstractThe Swedish parliament has a strong position in the decision-making on the international use of force. Still, its role is affected by the rapid internationalization of the Swedish defence. More and quicker decisions have to be taken on Swedish contributions to international peace operations. The origin of the decisions of the Swedish parliament, moreover, can be traced to international decision-making bodies on which the Swedish parliament and sometimes even the Swedish government have no influence at all. Parliament is conscious of its important role and looks after its interests in the domestic decision-making context. Sometimes it challenges the government on specific issues relating to the operations, but in the end parliament always tend to agree and unanimously as well. This article studies the involvement of the Swedish parliament in the decision-making on the contribution of armed troops to international peace operations since the end of the Cold War. The article gives particular attention to the use – or not – of the law delegating the decision-making power over troop contributions entirely to the government. The issue of self-defence against armed attacks on the Realm is also taken up and the potential impact of an expanded notion of self-defence on the decision-making role of parliament. Concerns of democratic accountability form the background to the reasoning in its entirety.