Triparty Repo Market Research Articles

Market power in wholesale funding: A structural perspective from the triparty repo market

I model and structurally estimate the equilibrium rates and volume in the Triparty repo market to study imperfect competition in wholesale funding. Even in this systemically important market, where seemingly homogeneous repos trade, I document persistent rate differences paid by dealers. I characterize the Triparty market as cash-lenders allocating their portfolios among differentiated dealers who set repo rates. I find that cash-lenders’ aversion to portfolio concentration and preference for stable lending grant dealers substantial market power: between 2011 and 2017, dealers borrowed at rates that were 26 bps lower than their marginal value from intermediating the borrowed repo funds. Dealers’ market power makes the observed wholesale repo rate understate the financing rate available to market participants who rely on repo funding, and offers a novel explanation for funding spreads such as the Treasury cash-futures basis and the Treasury swap spread.

The Dynamics of the U.S. Overnight Triparty Repo Market

<ns2:p>The overnight segment of the triparty repurchase agreement (repo) market plays a pivotal role in the normal functioning of the U.S. financial system by acting as an important source of secured short-term funding and supporting the liquidity of key fixed income markets, including U.S. Treasury and agency securities. This over-the-counter market accounts for over $1 trillion in daily transactions and provides a unique venue in which a diverse set of market participants invest their cash as well as obtain short-term funding.</ns2:p>

Liquidity windfalls: The consequences of repo rehypothecation

This paper presents a model of repo intermediation in which dealers intermediate secured financing between lenders and borrowers using the same collateral. Lenders are insulated from dealers through their repo’s collateral, but borrowers are exposed to dealers through the loss of their collateral. This makes lenders’ repo terms insensitive to dealers’ default, while borrowers’ repo terms are not. The model shows that when repos serve to intermediate collateral, haircuts are negative. This paper explains the difference in haircuts between the bilateral and tri-party repo market and the different run dynamics observed across these markets during the financial crisis.

The Information Content of Periodic Disclosure of Asset-Backed Securities

This paper examines the impact of mandatory loan-level disclosure on the convenience yield of AAA-rated asset-backed securities. Relying on the put-call parity relationship to estimate the daily risk-free interest rate unaffected by the convenience features of safe assets, we first show that the average bond yield for AAA-rated ABS is consistently below the risk-free rate, suggesting a convenience yield exists for these assets. We then find that, using non-AAA rated ABS issued by the same trusts, backed by the same underlying loan portfolios, and traded in the same month as a control group, the average difference between the risk-free rate and yield of AAA-rated ABS (Box spread) decreases by approximately 50% after the mandatory loan-level disclosures. This result is stronger when the quality of loan-level disclosure is high, when the price of bonds subject to loan-level disclosure is volatile, and when the ABS market is tight. Corroborating our main results, we also find AAA-rate ABS subject to loan-level disclosure requirement is less likely to serve as collateral in the tri-party repo market. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence supporting recent theoretical developments that increased transparency reduces pledgeability, and thus the convenience yield of safe assets.

Do higher capital standards always reduce bank risk? The impact of the Basel leverage ratio on the U.S. triparty repo market

Abstract While simpler than risk-based capital requirements, the leverage ratio may encourage bank risk-taking. This paper examines the activity of broker-dealers affiliated with bank holding companies (BHCs) and broker-dealers not affiliated with BHCs in the repurchase agreement (repo) market to test whether this may be occurring. Using data on the triparty repo market, the paper arrives at three findings. First, following the 2012 introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), broker-dealer affiliates of BHCs decreased their repo borrowing but increased their use of repo backed by more price-volatile collateral. Second, the paper finds that regardless of whether a U.S. BHC-affiliated broker-dealer parent is above or below the SLR requirement, the announcement of the SLR rule has disincentivized those dealers affiliated with BHCs from borrowing in triparty repo. Finally, the paper finds an increase in the number of active nonbank-affiliated dealers in certain asset classes of triparty repo since the 2012 introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio. This illustrates how regulation can have competitive effects on the financial sector and may result in activities shifting among financial firms.

Supplementary Leverage Ratio and Repo Supply

While simpler than risk-based capital requirements, the leverage ratio may encourage bank risk-taking. This paper examines the activity of broker-dealers affiliated with bank holding companies (BHCs) and broker-dealers not affiliated with BHCs in the repurchase agreement (repo) market to test whether this may be occurring. Using data on the triparty repo market, the paper arrives at three findings. First, following the 2012 introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), broker-dealer affiliates of BHCs decreased their repo borrowing but increased their use of repo backed by more price-volatile collateral. Second, the paper finds that regardless of whether a U.S. BHC-affiliated broker-dealer parent is above or below the SLR requirement, the announcement of the SLR rule has disincentivized those dealers affiliated with BHCs from borrowing in triparty repo. Finally, the paper finds an increase in the number of active nonbank-affiliated dealers in certain asset classes of triparty repo since the 2012 introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio. This illustrates how regulation can have competitive effects on the financial sector and may result in activities shifting among financial firms.

Do Higher Capital Standards Always Reduce Bank Risk? The Impact of the Basel Leverage Ratio on the U.S. Triparty Repo Market

While simpler than risk-based capital requirements, the leverage ratio may encourage bank risk-taking. This paper examines the activity of broker-dealers affiliated with bank holding companies (BHCs) and broker-dealers not affiliated with BHCs in the repurchase agreement (repo) market to test whether this may be occurring. Using data on the triparty repo market, the paper arrives at three findings. First, following the 2012 introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), broker-dealer affiliates of BHCs decreased their repo borrowing but increased their use of repo backed by more price-volatile collateral. Second, the paper finds that regardless of whether a U.S. BHC-affiliated broker-dealer parent is above or below the SLR requirement, the announcement of the SLR rule has disincentivized those dealers affiliated with BHCs from borrowing in triparty repo. Finally, the paper finds an increase in the number of active nonbank-affiliated dealers in certain asset classes of triparty repo since the 2012 introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio. This suggests risks may be shifting outside the banking sector.

Window-Dressing and Trading Relationships in the Tri-Party Repo Market

We analyze changes in monetary and regulatory policy on trading relationships in the U.S. repo market. We estimate that when the Federal Reserve (Fed) introduced its reverse repo (RRP) facility, money market mutual funds (MMFs) eligible to lend to the Fed cut their lending in the triparty repo market to broker-dealers (dealers) by 16%, on average. By providing a backstop, the RRP facility shifted bargaining power towards MMFs eligible to lend to the Fed, and away from dealers. Although the RRP facility strengthened trading relationships between MMFs and dealers, it also prevented some foreign dealers, who were subject to less stringent implementation of the Basel III leverage ratio, from engaging in regulatory arbitrage as effectively. We find that these policy changes influenced the way MMFs managed their balance sheets and made MMFs that were eligible to lend to the Fed safer.

Regulatory Arbitrage in Repo Markets

Non-U.S. banks with relatively low capital ratios appear to temporarily remove an average of $170 billion from the U.S. market for tri-party repurchase agreements (repo) before each quarter-end in order to appear safer and less levered. This amount is more than double the $76 billion market-wide drop in tri-party repo during the turmoil of the 2008 financial crisis and represents about 10% of the entire tri-party repo market. Such window dressing-induced deleveraging spills over into agency bond markets and money market funds and affects market liquidity each quarter.

THE RISK OF FIRE SALES IN THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET

This paper studies the risk of “fire sales” in the tri-party repo market, a large and important market where securities dealers find short-term funding for a substantial portion of their own and their clients' assets. We distinguish between fire sales of assets by a dealer who, facing a run that could lead to default, sells securities to generate liquidity, and fire sales of assets by repo investors after a dealer's default has occurred. While fire sales do cause damage no matter how they arise, the tools available to lessen the harm from the two types of fire sales are different. We find that limited tools are available to mitigate the risk of predefault fire sales and that no established tools currently exist to mitigate the risk of postdefault sales. (JEL G01, G18)

Intermediation and Pricing in Tri-Party Repo Market

We investigate how tri-party repo transactions are intermediated and priced in the post-crisis period using proprietary transaction-level data of all tri-party trades. Computing the daily average repo rate and borrowing amount, we show that the non-primary dealers that are less active in general tri-party market pay higher borrowing rate than U.S. and foreign primary dealers that are more active. The repo volume of foreign primary dealers decrease sharply at quarter ends because of regulation-induced balance sheet reductions, which may constrain their intermediation capacity between general tri-party repo market and GCF market. The repo volume of U.S. primary dealers increase at quarter ends, but the associated repo rate shoots higher, which may hinder their intermediation capacity henceforth.

The repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act and the Federal Reserve’s extraordinary intervention during the global financial crisis

:Before the global financial crisis, the assistance of the lender of last resort was thought to be limited to commercial banks. During the crisis, however, the Federal Reserve created a number of facilities to support brokers and dealers, money market mutual funds, the commercial paper market, the mortgage-backed securities market, the triparty repo market, and so on. In this paper, we argue that the elimination of specialized banking through the eventual repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act (GSA) has played an important role in the leakage of the public subsidy intended for commercial banks to nonbank financial institutions. In a specialized financial system, which the GSA had helped to create, the use of the lender-of-last-resort safety net could be more comfortably limited to commercial banks. However, the elimination of GSA restrictions on bank-permissible activities has contributed to the rise of a financial system where the lines between regulated and protected banks and the so-called shadow banking system have become blurred. The existence of shadow banking, which is directly or indirectly guaranteed by banks, has made it practically impossible to confine the safety to the regulated banking system. In this context, reforming the lender-of-last-resort institution requires fundamental changes within the financial system itself.

Regulation and Governance of Banks: An American Perspective

The basic structure of U.S. banking and financial regulation is in place, and is unlikely to change significantly. Ongoing rulemaking continues to write the hundreds of rules required to implement the Dodd-Frank Act. For commercial banking, particularly important rulemaking efforts are revisions to capital requirements and implementing the Volcker Rule. Outside of Dodd-Frank, also noteworthy is the New York Federal Reserve's consideration of tri-party repo market regulation.

The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Reserve's Extraordinary Intervention During the Global Financial Crisis

Before the global financial crisis, the assistance of a lender of last resort was traditionally thought to be limited to commercial banks. During the crisis, however, the Federal Reserve created a number of facilities to support brokers and dealers, money market mutual funds, the commercial paper market, the mortgage-backed securities market, the triparty repo market, et cetera. In this paper, we argue that the elimination of specialized banking through the eventual repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) has played an important role in the leakage of the public subsidy intended for commercial banks to nonbank financial institutions. In a specialized financial system, which the GSA had helped create, the use of the lender-of-last-resort safety net could be more comfortably limited to commercial banks. However, the elimination of GSA restrictions on bank-permissible activities has contributed to the rise of a financial system where the lines between regulated and protected banks and the so-called shadow banking system have become blurred. The existence of the shadow banking universe, which is directly or indirectly guaranteed by banks, has made it practically impossible to confine the safety to the regulated banking system. In this context, reforming the lender-of-last-resort institution requires fundamental changes within the financial system itself.

Tri-Party Repo Pricing

In this paper, we examine the pricing determinants in the systemically important tri-party repo market. Taking advantage of the recently available N-MFP reports filed by money market funds, we construct a novel dataset that contains tri-party repo transactions between money market funds and dealer banks. We find a large cross-sectional heterogeneity in repo pricing, reflected most significantly in the haircuts of repos backed by equity and corporate bonds. Surprisingly, it is the fund families, not bank dealers, who are the dominant factor in determining the pricing. Moreover, the repo market exhibits significant segmentation, with fund families adopting three different pricing schemes: counter-party sensitive, counter-party and collateral sensitive, and uniform. Most fund families use uniform haircuts by fixing a constant haircut, which itself varies across families, for all repos within each asset class, regardless of the quality of collateral or counter-party. Investigating further on the lending/borrowing relationship between fund families and dealers, we find that, when faced with such a rich pricing pattern, dealers do not shop around for a better haircut and are inclined to maintain a stable relationship with their lenders. Finally, for repos backed by Treasury securities, there is little variation in both haircuts and spreads, regardless of the fund family.

Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market

This paper provides a quantitative account of the tri-party repo market during the recent financial crisis. Using data from July 2008 to January 2010, we show that the level of haircuts and the amount of funding were surprisingly stable in this market. The stability of the haircuts contrasts with evidence from the bilateral repo market, where, as shown by Gorton and Metrick (2011), haircuts increased sharply. During the crisis, adjustments in the volume of funding to dealers were not gradual; instead, the amount of funding in the tri-party repo market can decrease precipitously. Our findings suggest that runs in the tri-party repo market resemble traditional bank runs.

The Risk of Fire Sales in the Tri-Party Repo Market

This paper studies the risk of in the tri-party repo market, a large and important market where securities dealers find short-term funding for a substantial portion of their own and their clients' assets. We distinguish between fire sales of assets by a dealer who, facing a run that could lead to default, sells securities to generate liquidity, and fire sales of assets by repo investors after a dealer's default has occurred. While fire sales do cause damage no matter how they arise, the tools available to lessen the harm from the two types of fire sales are different. We find that limited tools are available to mitigate the risk of pre-default fire sales and that no established tools currently exist to mitigate the risk of post-default sales.

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: How to Manage and Help to Avoid Systemic Liquidity Risk

In the summer of 2010, when legislative and regulatory responses were being finalized to address financial institution and market liquidity problems, the Financial Economists Roundtable, a group of prominent financial economists over 50 years old, convened with the aim of developing principles that would address both market‐wide and institution‐specific liquidity problems exposed by the 2007–2008 financial crisis. As summarized in this statement, the eight principles that came out of this meeting should be used to assess the strengths and weakness of not only the Dodd‐Frank legislation that was passed, but also of the regulatory proposals to implement the law as they continue to emerge.Among the eight principles endorsed, the Roundtable urges regulators to seek to ensure that: the failures of large complex institutions are independent events so as to minimize spillover effects; the interdependence of capital and liquidity requirements is recognized; such requirements are flexible and cost‐effective; central banks continue to provide lender‐of‐last‐resort lending against sound collateral; and the disclosure of institutions' risk exposures is timely and transparent. The Roundtable also concluded that the crisis revealed critical weaknesses in the tri‐party repo market, and recommended consideration of reforms to the market that include moving such transactions to organized exchanges, and reducing dependence on the two private sector financial institutions that operate that market's infrastructure. Additional useful reforms would include limiting daylight overdrafts, imposing margin requirements on counterparties to limit systemic risk and prohibiting re‐hypothecation. Finally, the Roundtable believes that improved transparency of transactions and prices would enhance monitoring by responsible regulatory agencies.

The Tri-Party Repo Market before the 2010 Reforms

This paper provides a descriptive and quantitative account of the tri-party repo market before the reforms proposed in 2010 by the Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure (Task Force 2010). We provide an extensive description of the mechanics of this market. We also use data from July 2008 to early 2010 to document quantitative features of he market. We find that both the level of haircuts and the amount of funding were surprisingly stable in this market. The stability of the margins is in contrast to evidence from other repo markets. Perhaps surprisingly, the data reveal relatively few signs of stress in the market for dealers other than Lehman Brothers, on which we provide some evidence. This suggests that runs in the tri-party repo market may occur precipitously, like traditional bank runs, rather than manifest themselves as large increases in margins.