Tripartite Strategy Research Articles

Inhalation of Bioorthogonal Gene‐Editable Spiky‐Pollen Reprograms Tumor‐Associated Macrophages for Lung Cancer Immunotherapy

AbstractAs a major component of tumor infiltration, tumor‐associated macrophages (TAMs) primarily promote the M2 phenotype of tumors in the tumor microenvironment. Additionally, the overexpression of anti‐phagocytic molecules in TAMs facilitates tumor cell evasion of TAMs’ phagocytic arrest. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop a reliable strategy to reprogram TAMs for more effective anti‐tumor outcomes. In this study, innovative inhalable bioorthogonal gene‐editable microparticles (SPR) have been engineered that reprogram TAMs for lung cancer therapy based on spike‐covered sunflower sporopollenin exine capsules (SECs). These microparticles utilize SECs as delivery vehicles, with reduced palladium (Pd) nanoparticles on their surface carrying CRISPR/Cas9 lipid nanoparticles (LNP‐RNPs) that specifically knock down the anti‐phagocytic SIRPα gene on TAMs. The SPR microparticles employ a tripartite strategy to reprogram the TAMs: the physical stimulation through pollen spikes, the production of a Toll‐like receptor 7 agonist (imiquimod, IMD) via Pd‐mediated bioorthogonal catalysis, and the employment of CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing. In an orthotopic mouse model, the inhalation of SPR microparticles not only reprograms macrophages efficiently but also bolsters their tumor‐fighting abilities. Notably, the cured mice show no signs of recurrence even upon re‐exposure to the tumor, indicating a long‐lasting anti‐tumor effect.

Government policies on port resilience amid strike events—A two-stage Van Damme based tripartite evolutionary game

In contrast to natural phenomena, such as extreme weather, accidents, disasters, and public health emergencies, labor strikes are human-induced emergent circumstances arising from low real wages in most cases. During disputes with ports, the labor typically exerts control over the duration and scale of strikes to negotiate improved benefits, while port authorities may seek collaboration with neighboring ports to enhance resilience and mitigate transportation disruption risks. Should the government participate as a third party in the game as an indirect stakeholder? The government must assess the necessity of engagement in the first stage and select an appropriate strategy in the second. Within the framework of tripartite equilibrium, this study examines the evolutionary paths of stability points, dual-stable states, and unstable states under different government engagement policies, as well as the influence of each factor on the tripartite strategy choice. The results reveal that (1) the right timing and policies for government engagement can mitigate more than half of the damage from the strike to the overall system; (2) port alliances can speed up 50 % of the evolution time of the labor to terminate the strike; (3) the government will play the dominant role when the risk of the strike to labor is increased; and (4) the expected duration of strikes can have an inverted “U”-shaped effect on port strategies but a “U”-shaped effect on government policies. The application of the two-stage evolutionary game model in this study develops an analytical framework that provides better reference for the government’s actual decision-making.

Evolutionary game and system dynamics for analysis on stakeholder strategies of regional high-speed rail project in investment decision stage

This paper studies the strategic choices under the conflict among stakeholders of regional high-speed rail project at the investment decision stage in the context of the ‘high-speed rail controversy’. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model among the central government, the local government and China Railway, analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy, discusses the influence of multiple factors on the choice of tripartite strategy, and further calculates and analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the tripartite evolutionary game system. Then the dynamic change trend of strategy choice brought by the change of each factor is investigated through system dynamics simulation. The results show that the lower the intervention cost and reward to the other two parties, and the increase of the opportunity cost of non-intervention and punishment to the other two parties, the faster the convergence of the central government's choice of intervention strategy. The increase of the rewards and punishments, and the increase of negotiation profits, non-negotiation costs, and loss of reputation for non-negotiation, and the decrease in the negotiation costs and non-negotiation profits all contribute to the shortening of the convergence time of the local government's choice of negotiation strategy. The increase of the rewards and punishments, the increase of support profits, the loss of reputation for non-support, and the decrease of the profits for non-support and the extra cost for support will promote the convergence of China Railway's choice of the support strategy. Finally, the simulation results are discussed so as to target feasible coordination strategies, which provides a theory basis for the practice of conflict coordination among stakeholders of regional high-speed rail project at the investment decision stage.

Evolutionary game model for decarbonization of shipping under green shipping corridor

Abstract The journey of zero-emission shipping has begun. In the context of green shipping corridor, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of the government, shipping enterprises and shippers, and analyzes the stability of the game model. Based on the corresponding policy and market environments, a sensitivity analysis of the key parameters is carried out using MATLAB tools. The results show the following: (1) The tripartite strategy will eventually evolve into {government adopts active policy, shipping enterprises respond positively, consignor respond positively}. This evolutionary result is also more consistent with the reality of emission reduction under the high cost of shipping emission reduction today. (2) Government subsidies, social financing, and the increase of carbon price level can lead shipping enterprises to respond positively. (3) Attention should be paid to the idea of decarbonization driven by the demand side, and the power of all parties should be gathered to participate in the decarbonization of shipping to achieve the carbon reduction target as soon as possible.

Agricultural Pest Detection Methods and Control Measures Combining Deep Learning Algorithms

Abstract Agricultural pests and diseases critically impact the quality and yield of crops, thereby underscoring the practical importance of their automatic monitoring, identification, and timely management in agricultural production. This study develops a targeted detection model using a deep learning approach, specifically by enhancing the Faster R-CNN algorithm. Modifications were implemented in three key areas of the basic Faster R-CNN: First, the DIOU-NMS technique was employed to optimize the ancillary network during the feature extraction phase. Secondly, an attention mechanism along with an SE module was integrated within the DIOU-NMS to augment the network’s capability. During the training phase, optimization was facilitated through stochastic gradient descent. The efficacy of the refined Faster RCNN model was established via ablation studies, and its performance was benchmarked against existing methodologies for small and general target detection. Results indicate that the enhanced Faster R-CNN framework surpasses conventional small target and generic detection models in accuracy, achieving a 6.4% higher detection rate for various pest categories compared to its predecessor. The findings affirm the potential of the advanced Faster R-CNN in effective agricultural pest detection. Furthermore, this paper advocates a tripartite strategy for pest management, encompassing phytosanitary measures, agricultural interventions, and chemical controls.

A tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model of complex technological products in a transnational supply chain

The effective operation of a transnational supply chain under economic globalization is a key way to promote scientific and technological progress and a realistic requirement for the development of social productivity. However, the long-term dynamic interaction between the transnational operation decision-making behavior and the random interferences owing to multiple uncertain factors is difficult to explain using traditional game theory. Therefore, we establish a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model among multinational corporations, foreign distributors, and the government. We consider It̂o’s stochastic differential equation to analyze stability conditions through stability analysis, numerical simulation, and in-depth case simulation. The results show that the game’s evolutionarily stable strategy comprises eight pure strategies, and obtains the critical value of the key parameters which can effectively guide the evolution of the multinational supply chain to a reasonable long-term optimal path. We innovatively use the tripartite evolutionary path iterative algorithm to propose a dynamic strategy selection scheme and find that the consumer preference for complex technology products significantly affects the tripartite strategy.

Regulatory strategies of water environment treatment PPP projects operation

PurposeThe operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.FindingsFirst, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.Research limitations/implicationsThe theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.Practical implicationsBased on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.Social implicationsBased on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.Originality/valueThis paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

Blockchain governance and governance via blockchain: decentralized utopia or centralized dystopia?

Is blockchain the technological blueprint of a utopian decentralized future or a dystopian centralized one? In search of an answer to this question, this article juxtaposes blockchain governance and the state’s utilization of blockchain to govern citizens. This juxtaposition reveals that whilst being a disruptive general-purpose technology emerging from mistrust of centralized institutions, blockchain could also be the vehicle delivering centralized state surveillance and behavioral control. This juxtaposition further reveals that in contrast to the expectations of blockchain enthusiasts, states’ approach to blockchain does not appear to be entirely antagonistic but it consists of a tripartite strategy of appropriation, regulation and rejection depending on which satisfies the state interests in a given context. As most constructs of governance via blockchain are still at an embryonic stage, it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions about what the future holds for blockchain’s impact on citizenship. Nevertheless, this article argues that it is necessary to follow blockchain-based governance critically to identify whether there will be a further divergence between the two worlds of blockchain.

Governing land use planning in pursuit of customary tenure security: A case of Kilombero District in rural Tanzania

Purpose This paper aims to explore the role of participatory governance to actors’ participation in land use planning for tenure security in rural Tanzania. Three case studies where land use planning project implemented were selected to make assessment on how local actors were involved in the process. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses qualitative research methods, whereby semi-structured interviews with village landholders and key informants were conducted to get their perspectives on land use decisions and land tenure (in)security. Besides, focus group discussions with the village landholders were also used. Findings The research findings indicate low participation of local actors in land use planning process. Decisions on land use by the local actors were very minimal. Further, communication between the involved actors was also difficult. Originality/value The study offers insights on participatory governance into land use planning for tenure security. The study develops a framework to improve land use planning process toward tenure security outcome. A tri-partite strategy consisting of enabling mechanisms of governance capacity, institutional capacity and converging discourses articulates a framework for the evolution in the degree of local actors’ participation to improve security of land rights through land use planning process in rural Tanzania.

Trading behavior strategy of power plants and the grid under renewable portfolio standards in China: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

China is facing the challenge of selecting appropriate policies to implement tradable green certificate (TGC) under the renewable portfolio standards (RPS). This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model among thermal power plants, green power plants and the grid under the RPS and TGC policy to analyze the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) of unilateral subjects and systems and use numerical simulation to discuss the influence of different types of TGC purchase ratios and different trading markets on the choice of tripartite strategy. The results are as follows. (1) When the renewable energy consumption quota ratio is 21%, thermal power plants are more and more active in choosing to trade TGC as the ratio of wind power TGC and photovoltaic TGC gradually increases from 1:5 to 5:1. (2) In the TGC market where the price of wind power and photovoltaic TGC is 50 yuan, green power plants are more inclined to hold TGC; in the subsidized TGC market, where the price of wind power TGC is 190 yuan and the price of photovoltaic TGC is 650 yuan, green power plants tend to sell TGC. (3) With the price of excess green electricity consumption gradually decreased from 700 yuan/MWh to 100 yuan/MWh, the activity of three parties participating in TGC trading gradually increased, effectively activating the TGC market. Finally, from the perspective of policy management, we provide suggestions for the long-term sustainable development of the TGC market.

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Healthcare Fraud Supervision under the Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism.

This study aims to provide useful insights for the Chinese government in dealing with healthcare fraud by creating an evolutionary game model that involves hospitals, third-party entities, and the government based on the government reward and punishment mechanism. This paper analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant's strategy choice, discusses the influence of each element on the tripartite strategy choice, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the tripartite game system. The results show that (1) the government increasing fines on hospitals is conducive to compliant hospital operations, and the incentive mechanism has little effect on such operations; (2) the lack of an incentive mechanism for third parties results in false investigations by third parties; and (3) rewards from higher levels of government promote strict supervision by local governments, but that the high cost of supervision and rewards for hospitals inhibits the probability of strict supervision. Finally, Matlab 2020a is used for simulation analysis to provide a reference for the government to improve the supervision of healthcare fraud.

Nanodepots Encapsulating a Latency Reversing Agent and Broadly Neutralizing Antibody Enhance Natural Killer Cell Cytotoxicity Against an in vitro Model of Latent HIV.

Current antiretroviral therapies (ART) for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are not curative, as the virus persists in latent reservoirs, requiring lifelong adherence to ART and increasing the risk of co-morbidities. "Shock and kill" approaches to reactivate HIV from latent reservoirs followed by administration of anti-HIV drugs represent a promising strategy for eradicating latent HIV. To achieve effective shock and kill, we describe a strategy to eradicate the HIV reservoir that combines latency reversing agents (LRAs), broadly neutralizing antibodies (bnAbs), and natural killer (NK) cells. This strategy utilizes a polymer nanodepot (ND) that co-encapsulates the LRA and bnAb to reactivate latent infection and elicit enhanced cytotoxicity from co-administered NK cells. Poly(lactic-co-glycolic acid) (PLGA) NDs were synthesized using the nanoprecipitation method to co-encapsulate an LRA (TNF-α) and a bnAb (3BNC117) (TNF-α-3BNC117-NDs). ACH-2 cells were used as a cellular model of latent HIV infection. An NK92 subline, genetically modified to constitutively express the Fc receptor CD16, was administered to ACH-2 cells in combination with TNF-α-3BNC117-NDs. ACH-2 cell death and extracellular p24 were measured via flow cytometry and ELISA, respectively. Stable PLGA NDs co-encapsulated TNF-α and 3BNC117 with high efficiencies and released these agents in physiological conditions. NK92 phenotype remained similar in the presence of TNF-α-3BNC117-NDs. TNF-α released from NDs efficiently reactivated HIV in ACH-2 cells, as measured by a 3.0-fold increase in the frequency of intracellular p24 positive cells. Released 3BNC117 neutralized and bound reactivated virus, targeting 57.5% of total ACH-2 cells. Critically, TNF-α-3BNC117-NDs significantly enhanced NK92 cell-mediated killing of ACH-2 cells (1.9-fold) and reduced extracellular levels of p24 to baseline. These findings suggest the therapeutic potential of our novel ND-based tripartite strategy to reactivate HIV from latently infected cells, generate an HIV-specific site for bnAb binding, and enhance the killing of reactivated HIV-infected target cells by NK92 cells.

A Novel Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Internet Consumer Financial Regulation

Due to many social problems caused by Internet consumer finance, Internet consumer finance regulation has always become one of the main concerns of governments and society. Based on a novel three-dimensional mixed strategy game matrix, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model for regulators, Internet consumer financial institutions, and consumers. In this model, we establish the dynamic replication equation of the three parties above, analyze the influence of factors on the tripartite strategy selection and discuss the stability of model equilibrium points through numerical simulation. The results show that the model will get six evolutionary stable points in Internet consumer financial regulation under different conditions. Moreover, strict regulation, verification, and contract keeping are the most ideal evolutionarily stable strategies. In addition, three critical factors affect the evolution results of the three parties, namely losses to institutions caused by loose regulation and verification, punishment for loose verification under strict regulation, and losses from breaking the contract.

The Game Analysis among Governments, the Public and Green Smart Supply Chain Enterprises in Necessity Purchase and Supply during COVID-19 Pandemic

During the COVID-19 pandemic, panic buying, price inflation, and the pollution of production processes led to economic and social unrest. In response to the current situation, the current research takes less account of the subjective perception of public panic buying and the lack of reference to the reality of effective governance. First, this paper uses prospect theory to portray the public’s perceived value of goods in panic buying and non-panic buying situations. Then, drawing on the experience of effective governance in China, a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, the public and green smart supply chain enterprises is constructed under the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. Then, this paper analyzes the strategic choices of each game player and the stability of the system equilibrium. The structure of the study suggests the following. (1) Improving local government subsidies and penalties, the cost of positive response and the probability of response can lead to an evolutionary direction where the public chooses not to panic buy and green smart supply chain enterprises choose to ensure a balance between supply and demand and increase pollution control in the production process. (2) Our study yields three effective combinations of evolutionary strategies, of which an ideal combination of evolutionary strategies exists. Non-ideal evolutionary strategy combinations can occur due to improper incentives and penalties of local governments and misallocation of limited resources. However, we find four paths that can transform the non-ideal evolutionary strategy combination into an ideal evolutionary strategy combination. (3) The central government’s reward and punishment mechanism is an important tool to stabilize the tripartite strategy, but the central government cannot achieve effective governance by replacing incentives with punishment.

Research on Promotion and Application Strategy of Electric Equipment in Plateau Railway Tunnel Based on Evolutionary Game

Under China’s modern development concept, it is necessary to promote the application of electric equipment to improve the construction environment of high-altitude railway tunnels and to address the efficiency reduction in high-altitude construction of traditional fuel oil equipment. Based on the analysis of the development status of electric equipment for tunneling projects in China, a tripartite evolutionary game approach is used to establish the game payment matrix of the government, equipment manufacturers, and construction units. The impact of the relevant parameters on the tripartite strategy is investigated based on numerical simulations. It has been shown that in the early stages of popularization and application, the government should actively regulate and control, and in the later stages of popularization and application, the government should play a leading role in market mechanisms. Evolutionary stability strategies are affected by the brand revenue that manufacturers earn through technological innovation on electric equipment and the additional research and development costs that need to be paid. The conclusions of this study can help provide a reference for the promotion and application strategy of electric equipment in China’s plateau railway tunnels.

A tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency supplies joint reserve among the government, enterprise and society

Natural disasters seriously threaten the security and stability of human society. After natural disasters occur, humanitarian rescue is the top priority to prepare sufficient emergency supplies and send to disaster areas. However, many disaster relief practices worldwide show that there is always a huge supply gap in the initial stage. It is difficult to meet the tremendous materials demand of the disaster area only by separate reserve from the government or humanitarian relief organizations (HROs). Because of this problem, this paper takes emergency supplies joint reserve mode (ESJRM) as the research subject, and explores the specific conditions and influencing factors of realizing government-enterprise cooperation by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, enterprise and society. We aim at obtaining the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of this tripartite evolutionary game system. It is found that the equilibrium of tripartite strategy is affected by income variables, cost variables, initial willingness and stakeholder behaviors. Focusing on these influences, we put forward some management inspirations and suggestions. This paper makes a preliminary exploration of the conditions of ESJRM, which is conducive to providing theoretical guidance for the practice of emergency supplies reserve.

Research on Environmental Protection Strategy of Urban Construction Subject Based on Evolutionary Game

With the urban renewal and development, the impact of urban construction projects such as old city reconstruction on the surrounding environment has always attracted social attention in the construction process. The strategies of the participants in the project construction in the process of environmental protection need to be further clarified. Taking the government investor and contractor as the construction subject, combined with questionnaire survey and evolutionary game, determines the three-party evolutionary stable game strategy and clarifies the internal mechanism of the evolution trend of the construction subject through simulation. The results show that the investor and contractor have a certain awareness of environmental protection, but they have limited understanding of the relevant policies and regulations issued by the government and believe that the government has little supervision and governance. The optimal evolutionary stability strategy adopted by the construction subject in promoting environmental protection is {Incentive, Effective supervision, Proper protection}, in which the stability conditions are J1 > M1 and T1 > N1. Reducing G1, A, M1, N1 and T1 or increasing J1 and the construction subject’s willingness to take measures can promote the model to stabilize and evolve. The government should establish and improve the incentive system, improve the environmental protection awareness of the construction subject, urge the investor and the contractor to take effective measures to achieve the long-term stability goal of the tripartite subject strategy, and minimize the impact on environmental protection.

Exploring the EPR system for power battery recycling from a supply-side perspective: An evolutionary game analysis

As a core component of new energy vehicle development, power battery will bring serious environmental pollution if it is not disposed of in a standardized way after retirement, so a scientific recycling mechanism is the key to achieve sustainable development. This paper explores the EPR mechanism of power battery recycling from a supply-side perspective based on a game theory approach. The system dynamics evolution model was constructed using Vensim software. Model testing, reward and punishment mechanism design and analysis of key parameters changes were carried out. The results show that the initial state of tripartite strategy choice is not conducive to the positive operation of reverse supply chain. The curve gradually fluctuates toward positive strategy side after the introduction of static reward and punishment mechanism, at which time the three parties show a cyclical behavior pattern. The dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can make consumers and almost 97% of the new energy vehicle manufacturers (NEVMs) participate in the environmental protection of power battery recycling, which has a better effect. In addition, the high cost of recycling will prevent a higher percentage of NEVMs from participating in supply chain construction. At the same time, the recycling price raised by private enterprises and small workshops is also one of the key factors that interfere with the participation of supply-side groups in formal recycling.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Last Mile Delivery Resource Integration—Exploring the Behavioral Strategies between Logistics Service Providers, Property Service Companies and Customers

As resource integration plays a significant part in improving operational efficiency in the last mile delivery industry, there is an increasing popularity for logistics service providers (LSPs) to collaborate with property service companies (PSCs). Based on the evolutionary game theory, considering the dual role of PSCs when collaborating with LSPs, a trilateral evolutionary game model between PSCs, LSPs, and customers (Cs) is established to analyze the strategic choices and explore the influencing factors on the tripartite strategy. The results show that (1) There are optimal profit allocation coefficients and cost-sharing coefficients to cause the system to reach a steady state. (2) The integration cost between LSPs and PSCs and the home delivery cost inhibit the strategic integration of the two enterprises. (3) PSCs are more sensitive to their benefits and costs than LSPs in the process of resource integration. (4) More precisely evaluating their potential loss caused by temporary integration will help the tripartite to make a more scientific choice of strategic behavior. (5) The increase of community premium income helps to improve the enthusiasm of Cs supporting strategic integration. (6) The behavior and decision-making choices of the three game players affect each other in the last mile delivery resource integration. (7) The indirect benefits, such as advertising during their integration, play a positive role. Finally, the MATLAB2020a software is applied to simulate and analyze the impact of key factors on strategy evolution, and we propose several useful suggestions to promote the development of last mile delivery resource integration.

Energy recovery enhancement from gas hydrate based on the optimization of thermal stimulation modes and depressurization

Natural gas hydrate is a potential and clean energy with abundant reserves in marine and permafrost areas. Efficient and safe extraction of the methane gas from gas hydrates has aroused worldwide attentions. In this work, the hydrate dissociation and gas production performances have been investigated in a high pressure reactor using two vertical wells by depressurization and its combinations with different injection modes, including warm water injection, room-temperature water flooding, and electric heating. The external heat supply rate is set identical in the cases with thermal stimulation. Results show that direct electrical heating combined with depressurization can dramatically increase the deposit temperature and eliminate the heat loss in the pipelines during fluid transportation, but a limited heat transfer radius exists in the vicinity of the heated wellbore due to the low thermal conductivity of the porous media. For the case with warm water injection, thermal convection becomes the key factor governing the heat transfer process, while the heat loss is inevitable during the transportation of the injected water in the pipelines. However, the heat can be more efficiently transferred to the hydrate-undissociated region through the water movement by enforced thermal convection than the electric heating. Comparatively, the novel tripartite strategy of electrical heating, room-temperature water flooding and depressurization shows the advantages of simultaneously reducing heat loss and enhancing heat transfer during hydrate exploitation, which results in the best energy recovery efficiency in this study. It suggests a good commercial exploitation value and shows important practical significance for future field studies.