Abstract

Under China’s modern development concept, it is necessary to promote the application of electric equipment to improve the construction environment of high-altitude railway tunnels and to address the efficiency reduction in high-altitude construction of traditional fuel oil equipment. Based on the analysis of the development status of electric equipment for tunneling projects in China, a tripartite evolutionary game approach is used to establish the game payment matrix of the government, equipment manufacturers, and construction units. The impact of the relevant parameters on the tripartite strategy is investigated based on numerical simulations. It has been shown that in the early stages of popularization and application, the government should actively regulate and control, and in the later stages of popularization and application, the government should play a leading role in market mechanisms. Evolutionary stability strategies are affected by the brand revenue that manufacturers earn through technological innovation on electric equipment and the additional research and development costs that need to be paid. The conclusions of this study can help provide a reference for the promotion and application strategy of electric equipment in China’s plateau railway tunnels.

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