Trial Lawyers Research Articles

False Confessions From 53 Persons With Intellectual Disabilities: The List Keeps Growing

Today, persons with intellectual and related disabilities are being seen as citizens in full standing in their own neighborhoods. We see them on the street, on buses, in restaurants—even attending classes in their own neighborhood schools and working at jobs they are able to do. It wasn’t always that way. In earlier years they were seen as objects of rejection. Most were removed from their communities and sent to live in large, out-of-the-way, state-funded institutions. Now that they are back in the midst of our neighborhoods, we are learning to understand and support them as never before. Most—but not all—seek to be friendly with local police officers. They do it because they need to depend on authority figures around them to live in the community successfully. Police officers need to know that some tend to be overly vulnerable and pliable when placed under pressure in interrogation rooms. In such a situation they may say whatever these authority figures want to hear. They will even confess to crimes they did not commit. Today, 53 persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities have confessed to serious felonies—murder, rape, arson, and robbery—that they did not commit. These cases have been extracted from three sources: They come from my own 30year collection of files and from sifting through a list of all false confessors produced earlier by two of the top experts on all false confessions (Drizin & Leo, 2004). More recently they have been sifted from a constant stream of false confession reports flowing out of the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University’s School of Law. All of the 53 individuals have been legally exonerated. The number of persons on this list will increase in the years to come. For example, I can name 15 other false confessors with intellectual disabilities I believe to be innocent, but they will not be placed on this list until they have been exonerated by a formal legal action. Six factors gleaned from this list may be worth pondering:

Suits And Suitability

Suits And Suitability

M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court

M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2005), 3 vols, 2000 pp. US$350.00 (Hardback) ISBN 1571051562 Fergal Gaynor, Fergal Gaynor Trial Attorney, OTP, ICTRMember of the Editorial Committeefergal.gaynor@gmail.com Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Laura K. Morris Laura K. Morris LL M (LSE), and former defence intern, ICTRlauramorris@hotmail.com Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 6, Issue 4, September 2008, Pages 815–819, https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqn049 Published: 11 November 2008

EXAMINING EXPERIENCE AND ITS ROLE IN DYNAMIC VERSUS STATIC DECISION-MAKING EFFECTIVENESS AMONG PROFESSIONALS.

The article discusses the effect of experience on effective decision making. Examples are cited from research which involved interviews with trial attorneys, observation of their decisions in the c...

Metapragmatics in a courtroom genre

Taking as a starting point a broad conception of metapragmatics (Lucy 1993), this study describes a wide range of reflexive elements in closing arguments of criminal trials, and on the basis of their habitual use by trial lawyers, it enquires about the general underlying function as part of the sociocultural practice (Bourdieu 1990). The corpus of was collected at twenty-two criminal trials observed and recorded by the researcher. Five kinds of metapragmatic indexes – from the maximally explicit to the implicit – are identified and analyzed in their interactional, situational and societal context: (1) performatives, which count as official acts by the trial lawyer, (2) formulations and other evaluations of speech, (3) descriptions of aspects of the sociocultural practice and allusions to the principles governing the event, (4) strategic descriptions of contextual conditions, which are exploited with group identity and relational effects, and (5) style. The analysis reveals that these metapragmatic features contextualize the communication as expressing a specific social capital, and at the same time, they contribute to define what does not count as legitimate practice. Apart from the specific effects of individual types of indexes, in closing arguments metapragmatic indexes basically function signaling that the social actor and the practice they are engaged in rightfully belong to the social field of the law.

Federal preemption: states' powers, national interests

When does federal law trump state law? The arcane topic of federal preemption has become the stuff of public debate and major news stories. The partisan lines are clearly drawn. On one side, consumer advocates, plaintiffs' attorneys, and state officials argue that broad federal preemption claims interfere with the states' historic police power to protect their citizens against corporate misconduct. On the other side, corporations and federal agencies maintain that preemption is a vital safeguard against unwarranted and inconsistent state interferences with the national economy and against aggressive trial lawyers and attorneys general. Fierce struggles along these lines dominate the political debate, judicial decisions, and legal commentary in a wide range of regulatory arenas, from financial regulation to automobile safety; from clean air laws to the regulation of telecommunications, energy, and other network industries; from securities law to consumer products standards; from pharmaceutical drugs to pesticides to outboard motors. In all these areas, billions of dollars hang on regulatory nuances and arcane points of legal interpretation. The preemption debate is also being waged in the shadow of broader, sometimes constitutional arguments concerning the role and utility of federalism and states' rights in a modern, highly mobile, integrated economy. Legal scholars are sharply divided over both the substance of those arguments and the extent to which they should dominate economic considerations or statutory language. What the preemption debate needs is an examination that reflects the delicate interplay between our constitutional structure and the details of specific regulations. In Federal Preemption: States' Powers, National Interests, Richard A. Epstein and Michael S. Greve, two leading scholars in the field of preemption, have assembled an exceptional group of prominent legal scholars and practicing attorneys for a probing analysis and spirited discussion of these difficult issues. The vo

<span xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:m="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" style="font-style:italic;">Sodom on the Thames: Sex, Love, and Scandal in Wilde Times</span> (review)

Reviewed by: Sodom on the Thames: Sex, Love, and Scandal in Wilde Times Brian Lewis Sodom on the Thames: Sex, Love, and Scandal in Wilde Times. By Morris B. Kaplan. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005. Pp. 328. $35.00 (cloth). In 1889, in an unpublished letter to the radical journal Truth during the Cleveland Street affair, a scandal about prominent men having sex with working-class youths in a male brothel, the reliably nonconformist George Bernard Shaw mocked the press and public opinion for their moral cowardice in failing to stand up for individual rights. Although he peppered his remarks with orthodox references to the "nasty and ridiculous" alleged conduct of the accused, he recognized that same-sex desire had moved many men and women throughout history and that for them it was perfectly natural to act on such impulses. "I appeal now to the champions of individual rights," [End Page 295] he wrote, "to join me in a protest against a law by which two adult men can be sentenced . . . for a private act, freely consented to and desired by both which concerns themselves alone" (quoted on 191). Those champions failed to step forward. In 1895, in the wake of the Oscar Wilde trials, published letters in the radical Reynolds' Newspaper made similar points. One writer, "Ethicus," thought that anyone with a reasonable knowledge of history would recognize that homosexual sex was "common to all men and all classes of men at all times and in all countries"; that it could not be unnatural, since animals engaged in it; and that "it evidently does not disgust those who practice it. On what is the principle founded that what is disgusting to some is illegal for all?" (quoted on 257). Another writer, "Crede Experto," speculated that there was a purpose—population control—to same-sex desire: "This passion is not a fashion or a passing craze, it is universal in all ages and all countries. . . . It would be strange if anything so usual were without a purpose. It would be inconsistent with all experience if such an inclination were without advantage." Moreover, "it is not wise to treat with contempt a human passion that has survived the rigour of the most ruthless laws, that has defied the ordnances of religion, and is so irresistible as to have conquered sometimes the very ministers of religion themselves" (quoted on 259-60). Such voices in the wilderness, anticipating the language of gay rights debates in the second half of the twentieth century, are among the delights in Morris Kaplan's engaging study of sexual scandal in late-nineteenth-century England. The book covers well-trodden ground—the Boulton and Park case of 1870-71, the Cleveland Street scandal of 1889-91, the Wilde trials of 1895—and also has a segment on the perhaps less familiar territory of Greek love at Eton College. A trial lawyer before he became a professor of philosophy, Kaplan revels in the engrossing detail of the legal process, the attendant publicity, and the political fallout. He draws on but does not engage much with other historians, and he self-confessedly minimizes his own interpretations, quoting at length from trial records, newspaper accounts, correspondence, memoirs, and a pornographic novel in the hope that his cast of characters will somehow "speak for themselves." Anyone seeking a clear opinion on any of the big debates in recent queer historiography will be frustrated. Much of the recent writing on homosexuality in late-nineteenth-century Britain has sought to undermine a widely held belief that a recognizably modern homosexual identity was created through the power of new medical and legal categorization. It points to alternative and preexisting sources of self-identification and tends to downplay the significance of the big trials and scandals.1 Kaplan's reflections on much of this are confined [End Page 296] to a brief introduction and conclusion, and he wastes little time justifying a revisiting of some of the set pieces of British queer history. But he is by no means methodologically naive, nor is his work a throwback to an older school of gay scholarship and activism hot in pursuit of gay ancestors. "My own...

Abstract of "Seeing the Power Struggle Between Doctors, Lawyers, and Patients Through a Foucauldian Point of View−a Need for Medical Liability Reform"

One of the most pressing issues in the American health-care industry today is the need to reestablish an equitable balance of power between three competing loci of influence: patients who seek and pay for treatment, doctors who provide treatment in return for restitution, and trial lawyers who mediate any disagreements between the aforementioned parties. Michel Foucault, a prominent tewntieth-century French philosopher, theorizes how power manifests itself in society, and how it is relocated within a network of individuals in certain situations. His theories can be useful in analyzing the forces that are involved: first to contextualize the excessive degree of legal intervention that has jeopardized American health care, and then to explain why this intervention has effectively destroyed the balance of power between the parties. Lawyers have exercised their power through discourse and art of persuasion in an effective manner in the courtroom. The courtroom serves as an important institution in which societal constructions are often established−in this case, that patients are entitled to sue for less-than-perfect treatment. However, this expectation is not completely unfounded; patients are responsible for these rising medical costs created by new technology and research. In a society where most things are “ 100% guaranteed−or your money back,” patients expect perfection, especially if they are paying a lot of money. This eventually leads to high insurance premiums and scarcity of doctors in certain states and specialties. How ethical is it that lawyers are capitalizing on this societal mentality that is handicapping doctors who are trying to save people's lives? Certainly, doctors need to be held accountable for negligence or carelessness, but people must realize that complications from medical procedures, even with the utmost care, is ineluctable. This calls for a change not only in a legal sense, but how society views this issue as a whole.

An Interview with Judge Michael G. Bagneris

An Interview with Judge Michael G. Bagneris Charles Henry Rowell This interview was conducted on December 5, 2007, in the judge's chambers at the Orleans Parish Civil District Court on Loyola Avenue in New Orleans, Louisiana. ROWELL: Will you briefly describe your work here as a judge? BAGNERIS: This is the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish. Civil jurisdiction gives the judge jurisdiction over all matters that are non-criminal. There's a criminal district court that handles only criminal cases, felonies and misdemeanors. Civil court, where I sit, would handle all non-criminal matters. An example would be personal injury cases, slip and fall cases, breach of contract cases, discrimination cases, admiralty cases, and employment cases. The litany goes on in terms of all of the matters that come before civil court. Anything that is not criminal and doesn't belong in what we call a specialized court, like traffic court or municipal court, then, if it's not in a family court, if it's not in a specialized court, and if it's not a criminal offense, it's going to find its way into my court room or one of my colleagues', obviously, who sits on the civil court bench. ROWELL: Your description tells me that you're in a position to describe much that Hurricane Katrina and the flooding did to the city of New Orleans. What happened to the city when the courts were not able to operate here? Did the city shut down? BAGNERIS: We received from the Supreme Court, our state's Supreme Court, the authority to operate in another location. The court was closed in New Orleans and obviously Katrina closed the city, so the court was definitely closed here in the aftermath of Katrina. We're proud of the fact that the civil court of Orleans Parish established itself very quickly. We were able to obtain a location in Baton Rouge Parish and in Gonzales, which is in Ascension Parish, and operated out of that area for those matters that needed addressing for Orleans Parish. If memory serves me right, we were the first court to establish ourselves outside of the geographical boundaries of our parish and we conducted work again in either Baton Rouge or Gonzales to deal with whatever legal issues needed to be addressed at that time. I might also add we were given the ability to operate in St. Tammany Parish. We had two courtrooms in Covington that we were able to utilize to handle the on-going matters of Orleans Parish, and to all our neighboring parishes which graciously opened up their courtrooms to us we're very thankful. In fact we also rented places to operate the judicial [End Page 506] business of Orleans Parish. So we were up and operating. We may have been somewhat separated, and no question we were geographically separated, but the business of the court continued. ROWELL: How did cases reach you? How did people know to contact you in Baton Rouge or in Gonzales or in St. Tammany Parish? BAGNERIS: Thank God or Al Gore for the internet [Laughs]. The very first thing that occurred after the courts were declared officially closed was that the Supreme Court had a website which was able to link to a number of other judicial/legal websites. There were various websites: the Louisiana State Bar Association, the New Orleans Bar Association, the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association, the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel, the Louisiana District Judges Association, and the website of Civil District Court. By clicking onto the Supreme Court website, or anyone of those other websites that I mentioned, you could link to whichever legal or judicial website you were seeking. And we immediately put a message up, or put a message out, indicating where courts were going to be operating and first of all giving people time. Letting folks know, "look, everything that is scheduled is off the books until otherwise notified, but you," with "you" being the attorneys, "are able to contact the court and inform the court as to whether you are ready to proceed in this matter or, because of some ill effect of Katrina, you...

William Wirt

William Wirt GALEN N. THORP If a mind stored with all the learning appropnate to the profession of the law, and decorated with all the elegance of classical literature—if a spirit imbued with the sensibilities of a lofty patriotism, and chastened by the meditations of a profound philosophy—if a brilliant imagination, a discerning intellect, a sound judgment, an indefatigable capacity, and vigorous energy of application, vivified with an ease and rapidity of elocution, copious without redundance and select without affectation—if all these, united with a sportive vein of humor, an inoffensive temper, and an angelic purity ofheart—ifall these intheircombinationare the qualities suitable for an Attorney General ofthe United States—in him they The Supreme Court has long attracted prominent and colorful lawyers. But the Court in the mid-nineteenth century may be un­ matched for the uniqueness and stature of the advocates who appearedbefore it. Names such as Daniel Webster, Roger Taney, and Henry Clay continue to be recognizable, thanks to the wide impact of their forceful characters. Oth­ ers, such as Francis Scott Key, are remembered solely for activities far removed from law. Yet among all these distinguishedfigures, one man was hailed as “the most beloved of American advocates.”2 Who was he? An author oflitera­ ture and biography, a renowned trial lawyer, the longest-serving Attorney General of the United States, a sought-after orator, a thirdwere all eminently combined. —Former President John Quincy Adams1 party presidential candidate, and a Supreme Court advocate. Among his 170 appearances before the Court are such momentous cases as McCulloch v. Maryland? Gibbons v. Og­ den? and Worchester v. Georgia.5 But today his primary memorials are a county bearing his name in West Virginia6 and a pillar in a neglected cemetery near the Anacostia River.7 It has been suggested that “the gap between the man’s prestige during his lifetime and now is greater than for any other public figure in American history.”8 William Wirt has attracted little scholar­ ship over the years. He has been viewed as one of those figures who passes through life more influenced by events and precedents than 224 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY As Attorney General from 1817 to 1829, William Wirt argued forty-one cases for the government. He was said to have worked feverishly preparing for oral ar­ guments, staying up late into the night to work. changing the flow of history.9 The only fulllength biography to be published is now more than 150 years old,10 and the few articles that address Wirt’s life provide but limited augmen­ tation ofthatwork.11 Hopefully that deficitwill soon be remedied.12 While his direct impact on the course ofevents may have been limited, Wirt’s life is illuminating, not least because he left behind a voluminous correspondence that provides a colorful portrait of practical life in his time.13 This brief exploration of the life of William Wirt seeks to recover his identity and use it to place early nineteenth-century advo­ cacy in its human setting. First is a biograph­ ical sketch describing his rise from orphaned boyhood to Virginia lawyer and ultimately to national esteem. Part II briefly sets out his most significant cases before the Court, along with the jury trials that launched him into the pub­ lic eye. Part III describes the Supreme Court in this era with as much circumstantial detail as could be gathered. Part IV illustrates Wirt’s advocacy style through portions of some of Wirt died at the age of sixty-one while in Washington preparing a case for argument. Both the Senate and the Supreme Court adjourned in his honor. He was buried in this vault at the Congressional Cemetery (erected in 1853). WILLIAM WIRT 225 his most famous arguments. The appendices round out the picture with a full list of cases and illustrations of his correspondence. I. Biographical Sketch William Wirt’s life was bound up in the des­ tiny of his young country’s. He was bom on November 8, 1772, in the village of Bladens­ burg, Maryland,14 while war was brewing with Britain and nothing but a swamp occupied the nearby ground that would...

An Application of Rhetorical Theory for Improving Effects of Persuasion Dialog between the Judge, the Jury and the trial Lawyer

An Application of Rhetorical Theory for Improving Effects of Persuasion Dialog between the Judge, the Jury and the trial Lawyer

Knowledge Translation at the Macro Level: Legal and Ethical Considerations

Macro-level legal and ethical issues play a significant role in the successful translation of knowledge into practice. The medicolegal milieu, in particular, can promote clinical inertia and stifle innovation. Embracing new clinical practice guidelines and best practice models has not protected physicians from superfluous torts; in some cases, emerging evidence has been used as the dagger of trial lawyers rather than the scalpel of physicians. Beyond the legal challenges are overarching justice issues that frame the broad goals of knowledge translation (KT) and technology diffusion. Optimal implementation of the latest evidence requires attention to be paid to the context of the candidate community and the key opinion leaders therein, characterized by the “8Ps” (public, patients, press, physicians, policy makers, private sector, payers, and public health). Ethical and equitable KT also accounts for the global burdens and benefits of implementing innovation such that disparities and gaps in health experienced by the least advantaged are prioritized. Researchers and thought leaders must attend to questions of fairness, economics, and legal risk when investigating ways to promote equity-oriented KT.

Knowledge Translation at the Macro Level: Legal and Ethical Considerations

Macro-level legal and ethical issues play a significant role in the successful translation of knowledge into practice. The medicolegal milieu, in particular, can promote clinical inertia and stifle innovation. Embracing new clinical practice guidelines and best practice models has not protected physicians from superfluous torts; in some cases, emerging evidence has been used as the dagger of trial lawyers rather than the scalpel of physicians. Beyond the legal challenges are overarching justice issues that frame the broad goals of knowledge translation (KT) and technology diffusion. Optimal implementation of the latest evidence requires attention to be paid to the context of the candidate community and the key opinion leaders therein, characterized by the "8Ps" (public, patients, press, physicians, policy makers, private sector, payers, and public health). Ethical and equitable KT also accounts for the global burdens and benefits of implementing innovation such that disparities and gaps in health experienced by the least advantaged are prioritized. Researchers and thought leaders must attend to questions of fairness, economics, and legal risk when investigating ways to promote equity-oriented KT.

Humanity, terrorism, terrorist war: Palestine, 9/11, iraq, 7/7…, by Ted Honderich, London: Continuum, pp. VII + 206, £12.99the philosophy of war and peace, by Jenny Teichman, exeter: Imprint academic, pp. VIII + 260, £17.95

“I hate war,” de Fontenelle confessed, “for it spoils conversation.” And does it spoil philosophy too, which is always a kind of conversation? Or can philosophers write about war, as now we surely must, in a way that keeps the conversation going without belligerence? Only so, perhaps, can philosophy shed light on this dark field; but how to do it is itself obscured by the passions that wars evoke. Ted Honderich advocates advocacy, “an advocacy of arguments and judgements. A decent philosopher dealing with moral and political questions … is in a line of life higher than that of a trial lawyer, but not out of sight of that line of life. If there is what can be called moral truth, it is not ordinary truth. Desire sits onto it” (7). Honderich's book may be viewed in this light as a sustained speech for the prosecution in the impeachment of Tony Blair and George W. Bush for waging terrorist war and supporting the terrorist wars of others. It is, then, a polemical work, but, unlike a lawyer's, founded on Honderich's own convictions, which are themselves rooted in philosophical belief.

Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by Litigation

The bootleggers and Baptists public choice theory of regulation explains how durable regulatory bargains can arise from the tacit collaboration of a public-interest-minded interest group (the Baptists) with an economic interest (the bootleggers). Using the history of tobacco regulation, this Article extends the bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation to incorporate the role of policy entrepreneurs like the state attorneys general and private trial lawyers who joined forces to regulate tobacco by litigation. We denominate these actors televangelists and demonstrate that they play a pernicious role in regulation. The Article begins by showing how tobacco regulation through the 1980s fit the traditional bootleggers and Baptists public choice model. It then explores the circumstances that made it possible for the emergence of the televangelists as a regulatory partner that the bootleggers would prefer. The Article then criticizes televangelist-bootlegger bargains as likely to result in substantial wealth transfers from large, unorganized groups to the coalition partners. It also shows how televangelist-bootlegger coalitions are more pernicious than bootlegger-Baptist coalitions. Finally, it concludes with suggestions for how to make televangelist-bootlegger coalitions less durable.

How Lawyers (Ought to) Think

This short essay discusses the problem of cognition errors in law practice. There are substantial literatures is some professions - medicine, clinical psychology, and social work, for example - addressing the need to recognize and correct for cognition errors. Interestingly, very little has been written on the subject for lawyers, and even less for judges. It is deeply regrettable that judges are not more attuned to potential cognition errors, although it is understandable given that they are subject to extreme confirmation bias. A judge's resolution of disputed facts is self-confirming, seldom disturbed even on appeal, thus providing little occasion for reexamination. Taking cognition bias to the extreme, Justice Antonin Scalia once remarked about death penalty appeals that, have been on the court for 20 years and I have not seen a case where I thought there was the slightest doubt about the person's innocence. Statistically, that would seem to be nearly impossible; but heuristically, it makes perfect sense. Practicing lawyers face a different challenge. They need to be aware of their own possible cognition errors, which can cause problems interviewing clients, negotiating with other counsel, assessing witnesses, or evaluating evidence. Uniquely among professionals, however, trial lawyers must also consider the potential cognition errors of judges and jurors, in order to counteract the most likely mistakes or, to put it politely, to accommodate them.

The Superior Court Trial Lawyers Case: A Battle on the Frontier between Politics and Antitrust

In his chapter in the forthcoming book Antitrust Stories (Foundation Press, Eleanor Fox and Dan Crane editors), Don Baker retells the story of the FTC's enforcement action against the D.C. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, who agreed not to take further criminal indigent defendant work until they received a pay raise.

Holy Rebellion: Religious Assembly Laws in Antebellum South Carolina and Virginia

Journal Article Holy Rebellion: Religious Assembly Laws in Antebellum South Carolina and Virginia Get access Nicholas May, J.D., B.A. Nicholas May, J.D., B.A. *Vanderbilt; Pomona College; Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice. I thank Professor James Ely of Vanderbilt University Law School for insightful comments. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, Volume 49, Issue 3, July 2007, Pages 237–256, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/49.3.237 Published: 01 July 2007

Tort reform: the pathologists’ perspective

Physicians who become ensnarled in malpractice litigation often feel that the tort system has treated them unfairly. This negative perception has fueled physician efforts to enact "reforms" intended to mitigate the damage that allegations of medical negligence currently have on both individual physicians and on the practice of medicine itself. Although physicians are generally enthusiastic about "reform," there is currently no definition that allows tort "reform" to be separated from related initiatives. Some physicians largely restrict the term to defendant-friendly changes in the rules and procedures governing the workings of the tort system, whereas others take a somewhat broader view. In the present paper, we have favored the broader approach to the topic, leading to a discussion of 30 measures that have been presented in the context of tort "reform." Although most of these measures involve changes in the complex rules governing the malpractice tort system itself (eg, capping jury awarded damages), our broader view of "reform" also includes attempts to exert influence on the tort system from the outside (eg, peer review of expert testimony) and measures designed to keep patient dissatisfaction out of the tort system (eg, apology for error). Some would argue for an even broader view of tort "reform" that would including measures for reducing the pool of dissatisfied patients. For example, trial lawyers have claimed that physicians have put far too much effort into "reforms" that reduce the legal consequences of committing medical errors, and not enough effort into "reforms" that would reduce the errors themselves. The latter point may or may not have some validity, but there is a natural demarcation between measures designed to align medical outcomes with patient expectations (eg, error reduction, better diagnostic technology) and others designed to improve the processes that resolve patient dissatisfaction. Only the latter meet our definition of tort "reform."

Medical Malpractice: Understanding the Law, Managing the Risk.

* The Law of Malpractice and Informed Consent: * Condition Critical, Prognosis Guarded * What Is and Isn't Malpractice * Legal Duty * Standard of Care * Causation * Damages * Expert Testimony * Affirmative Defenses * Physician Countersuits * Informed Consent * Patients Who Drive: A New Worry for Doctors * End-of-Life Issues * Complementary and Alternative Medicine * Products Liability * Institutional and Managed Care Liability * Medical Trainees * Risk Management: * Medical Reports and Confidentiality * Cyber-Medicine * What Do Malpractice Lawsuits Look Like? * How to Avoid Becoming a Horror Story * Medical Errors and Their Disclosure * Understanding Malpractice Insurance * What to Expect Now that You've Been Sued * Reforming the System: * Medical and Legal Reforms * Multiple Choice Questions and Answers * Glossary of Legal Terms