Treaty Of Rapallo Research Articles

Soviet Psychiatry through the Prism of Circulation: The Case of Outpatient Psychiatry in the Interwar Period

Soviet Psychiatry through the Prism of CirculationThe Case of Outpatient Psychiatry in the Interwar Period Grégory Dufaud (bio) and Lara Rzesnitzek (bio) The whole mental hygiene movement in Russia has completely revolutionized the concept of psychiatry in the direction of medical, biological, and social hygiene disciplines. —Lev Rozenshtein, First International Congress on Mental Hygiene, 19301 This article examines the transnational dimension of Soviet psychiatry by focusing on outpatient psychiatry. By “outpatient psychiatry,” we mean the policy of care and prevention that took place beyond the walls of psychiatric hospitals and the structures that supported them. This policy was formulated in opposition to the asylum tradition, which had advocated confining patients to help them regain their sanity.2 We use this syntagma less narrowly in reference to the Russian expression to which it corresponds—vnebol´nichnaia psikhiatriia or vnebol´nichnaia psikhiatricheskaia pomoshch´, and more broadly to encompass the various terms most heavily used during the interwar years, [End Page 781] such as “mental hygiene” (psikhogigiena) and “psychiatric assistance” (psikhiatricheskaia pomoshch´). Competing with one another in usage, these terms evolved semantically, as occurred with “psychiatric assistance,” which had by the early 1930s come to designate psychiatric policy in general. In choosing the term “outpatient psychiatry,” we wanted not only to avoid lexicographic difficulties but also to use a fairly neutral expression that allows for establishing equivalency with words that, in languages other than Russian, refer to closely related ideas and similar approaches. Soon after the revolution, psychiatrists developed outpatient psychiatry with the support of officials at the Commissariat of Health (Narkomzdrav), who prioritized the new approach in the late 1920s, once collectivization and forced industrialization began. Through outpatient psychiatry, psychiatrists sought to reduce overcrowding in hospitals, counter the development of chronic symptoms in patients, and attend to pathologies that lacked acute psychotic symptoms but nonetheless required appropriate care. To what extent and in what ways were Soviet psychiatrists’ initiatives inspired by the ideas of their foreign colleagues? Did outpatient psychiatry, as it was implemented in the Soviet Union, generate interest abroad? How were exchanges carried out in practice? In taking up these questions, our investigation draws on the historiography on circulation of knowledge and practices. As Yves Cohen points out, the study of circulation entails resetting global phenomena in a local context. This literature is concerned with the successive transformations of ideas, practices, and objects and with the potential effects of their movement on the original situation. Cohen emphasizes the necessity of identifying “who” and “what” was being displaced, and of studying the discourses that accompany circulation and borrowings.3 For the USSR, this effort raises, of course, the question of the reflective capacity of the actors involved. The image of a country that is self-sufficient and inward-looking has been largely overturned by recent historiography examining transnational exchanges. The area of medicine and health in the interwar period has been largely overlooked, however, while forms of cooperation have drawn the most attention. Susan Solomon has edited a book on collaborations between [End Page 782] German and Soviet doctors. Cast out of the international community, Germany and the USSR drew closer with the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo. Doctors took advantage of this alliance, using their prior connections to develop joint projects that allowed these two medical communities each to pursue their own agendas. After the loss of its colonies at the end of the war, Germany was in need of a new terrain for observation and experimentation; the Soviet Union in turn benefited from German skills and intermediaries who helped Soviet scientists publish their work abroad.4 Michael Z. David has studied the Soviet effort to combat tuberculosis, with preventive mechanisms put in place in the early 1920s culminating in the introduction of the vaccine BCG in the late 1930s. The BCG solution would not have been possible without Soviet collaboration with the Pasteur Institute in France, and David has traced that collaboration step by step from the Soviet side.5 This article covers a wide variety of interactions, drawing on a range of sources from various locations, including Russia, Germany, and the United States. In some regards, our study intersects with Benjamin Zajicek’s analysis...

Silent Conflict: A Hidden History of Early Soviet-Western Relations, by Michael Jabara Carley

Silent Conflict: A Hidden History of Early Soviet-Western Relations, by Michael Jabara Carley. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. xvii, 478 pp. $45.00 US (cloth). This book--handsome in appearance, with the watercolor New Horseman by Nicolai Kogut adorning its front cover--is a study of the relations of the USSR and the major Western powers between 1917 and April of 1931. The study begins with the USSR's inception in October (O.S.) 1917 and concludes with a major agreement between the German and USSR governments. Under the terms of the agreement, the German government advanced 300 million marks to Moscow and the treaty of friendship between the two governments, first signed in 1922, then renewed in 1926, was renewed yet a third time. Let it be said at once. What Michael Jabara Carley has produced here is indeed a fine and impressive work, one that fills an important gap in the literature. It is hard to think of anyone else who could have brought the experience, the insights, and the quality of analytical scrutiny that Carley has given to this subject. The book's thirteen chapters examine all the great events that marked the hidden history of early Soviet-Western relations in the years between 1917 and 1930--the struggles of the new government to gain diplomatic recognition from the Western Powers; the treaty of Rapallo and the Genoa conference; the various attempts of the two sides to conclude trade and credit agreements; Moscow's struggles to achieve military security; Anglo-Soviet disputes over China; and the repeated panics and tensions with France so sharp that at one point in 1927 they resulted in the recall of the Soviet ambassador. These events also provided the background against which the titanic struggle between Josef Stalin and Leon Trotsky played itself out. The first thing to be said about this volume is the author's mastery of the overwhelming--indeed (to this reviewer's eyes) almost unmanageable--abundance of source material, not only the enormous collections of public documentary evidence but, above all, the comparable documents of the Russian Foreign Ministry for the period in question that have never before seen publication. Carley has made extensive use of these new sources and he does so in a vigorous style. The underlying theme of the book is the conflict that took place between the two sides during the thirteen years in question. Conflict is an understatement. It was nothing less than a clash of two worlds: the Western, whose reaction to the other provided precious little room for compromise; and the Soviet which, though certainly animated by an abiding hostility toward the West, often attempted to season dogma with pragmatism--that is, to change Western views. Throughout this period there continued to exist in the West a substantial, politically influential, and aggressive body of opinion to exorcise the spectre of a great and fearful external enemy. The Die-Hard triumvirate in Great Britain, the Bloc Nationale in France, and successive Republican administrations in Washington, blocked Soviet efforts to improve relations at every turn. …

Kons IKARUS, TIGER in fašizem

Kosovelov postgravitacijski kons Ikarus in drugi konsi z ikarsko tematiko in načrtovana pesniška zbirkaIkarov senso ne le časovno, prostorsko, ampak tudi politično obarvani in dokazujejo pesnikovo intenzivno vmeščenost v osrčje konstruktivističnega avantgardizma, potrjujejo pa tudi, da je Kosovel v evropskem prostoru uspešno uveljavil literarni konstruktivizem. Z ikarsko tematiko sta dva izjemna ustvarjalca, Tatlin z Letatlinom in Kosovel z »Ikarovim snom«, sanjala »sanje, stare kot človeštvo«, da bi se z njihovo pomočjo osvobodila dveh strahotnih režimov tedanjega časa, fašizma in stalinizma. Kosovelu so bili pritem uporu zgled prav homunkuli, ki so se počlovečili tako, da so se dokopali do čustev in strasti in s tem presegli načrte svojega stvaritelja, fašistične diktature, ki jih je želela brez duše in čustev, v celoti podrejene mehaničnemu suženjskemu delu.

Diplomats and Missionaries: The Role Played by the German Embassies in Moscow and Rome in the Relations between Russia and the Vatican from 1921 to 1929

The radical changes undergone by the Church in 1917/18, and the course subsequently taken by religious affairs in Russia, had an impact on Europe that has not up to now been given the attention it deserves.1 The tsar was replaced as the head of the Russian Orthodox Church by a new patriarchate, created at the Church Council in 1917/18; on November 5, 1917 (st.v.) the patriarch Tichon (Vassily I. Bellavin), metropolitan of Moscow, was nominated.2 The loss of the Polish and Baltic regions resulted in the number of Catholics falling in Russia from 15 to 1.6 millions, but the radical new winds of change aroused fresh hopes of a union between the Catholic and Orthodox faiths.3 From Rome's perspective, the obvious way to promote Catholic interests in Russia seemed, at first, to be to act via the Polish Church and the newly resurrected Polish state.4 However, the precipitate plans nurtured in some quarters in Poland to recover Russia for the Roman Catholic faith, together with the war fought between Poland the Soviet Federal Republic (1920/21), made the Vatican more amenable to the idea that it might instead be better to take the neutral position on Russia and Poland,5 and to use the good offices of other friendly powers to pursue its goals. On the fringes of the Conference of Genoa (1922), Germany arranged a meeting between Under-Secretary of State Giuseppe Pizzardo and the People's Commissar Georgij Vasilevich Chicherin, at which the problem of religion in Russia was discussed.6 Cautious efforts to sound out the chances of arranging a concordat between the Holy See and the Soviet Union continued right up to 1927, with the meetings at times taking place on German territory and invariably accompanied by the active involvement of the German embassies in Rome and Moscow. The rapprochement with the Vatican, indeed, the support lent to its interests in Russia, was driven on the German side by two principal motives. To begin with, the Catholic Center Party now enjoyed new scope to exert influence on German foreign policy, an influence embodied in 1921/22 by the Reich Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Joseph Wirth.7 Secondly, the famous Rapallo policy was being pursued, and Germany tried to be well connected with Russia due to the Treaty of Rapallo (April 16, 1922) in order to compensate the political tensions dominating its relations to the Western powers. Support for the Vatican, or indeed for the Christian churches in general in their dealings with the Soviet Union, offered Germany additional scope to pursue good relations with its former enemy, Russia, without arousing the suspicions of the western powers. The Persecution of the Orthodox Church Otto von Radowitz, who served as counselor to the German Embassy in Moscow (1922-1924), wrote a number of searching analyses on the relationships between the Soviet government and the Orthodox Church.8 He realized that, in view of the deep-seated authority enjoyed by the Russian Church, the new government would not be able to permit it to continue to exist as an autonomous body, but that it would, on the contrary, want to instrumentalize that authority for its own purposes. In Radowitz's eyes, the confiscation of sacred utensils and the desecration of martyrs' graves and reliquaries represented a deliberate provocation calculated to strip the clergy of its power once it reacted, as it was bound to, to split the Church and to pave the way for the imposition of a patriarch compliant to the government's wishes. The traditional Church found itself competing with a so-called new Church, led by the priest Antonin (formerly a liberal in the Revolution of 1905), a Federation of rebirth, led by the priest Alexander Vvedenskij, and a living Church under the priest Vladimir Krassnitzkij.9 Patriarch Tichon was subjected to a terror, thinly disguised as criminal proceedings, that abated somewhat only after he had publicly assured the regime of his loyalty in June, 1923. He suddenly died on April 7, 1925. …

DREAM AND EXPERIMENT

Who were those people who made Berlin the cultural centre of Russian emigration? They were a heterogeneous crowd of emigres: the Russian aristocracy and intelligentsia, the Russian artists, many of them Jewish‐born, and the representatives of various Yiddish and Russian modernist movements. Some of them proclaimed themselves to be emigrants; others considered Berlin merely a gathering point, a transitional staging post, rather than a declared destination of emigration. A further group of Russian Berliners emerged following the Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922, whereby Germany accorded de jure recognition to the USSR: pro‐Soviet intellectuals, travelling legitimately on Soviet passports. Despite deep antagonisms between these groups, in many instances intellectual exchanges took precedence over political recriminations, and their encounters led to an enormously fruitful cultural production, reflected by some 150 Russian political journals and reviews, as well as 34 Yiddish periodicals, including journals of parties and organisations, as well as those addressing a wider audience, the so‐called Publikumszeitschriften.

Carl Graap and the Formation of Weimar Foreign Policy Toward Soviet Russia from 1919 until Rapallo

Even though the conviction that Russia was evolving in a more moderate direction was an important underlying assumption of German policy in the months leading up to the Treaty of Rapallo, it has been essentially ignored in the scholarship on Rapallo. Equally ignored is the central role played by Carl Graap in promoting this assumption in Berlin. This article aims toward filling this gap and toward improving our understanding of the relationship between Germany and Russia in the twentieth century in general and in the period from 1919 to 1922 in particular.

Sovershenno sekretno: Moskva-Berlin, 1920-1933: Voenno-politicheskie otnosheniia mezhdu SSSR i Germaniei, and: Sovershenno sekretno, Alians Moskva-Berlin 1920-1933 gg. (Voenno-politicheskie otnosheniia SSSR-Germaniia) (review)

The special relationship between the Soviet Union and Weimar Germany after the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 was an important feature of European interwar history. In the 1950s, memoirs, eyewitness reports, and German archives began to shed light on the origins of the Rapallo period in Russian-German relations. Recently, the opening of the Russian archives has further enriched our knowledge on the Soviet-German military cooperation. Thanks to Sergei Alekseevich Gorlov, a Russian diplomat 1 and specialist (kandidat istoricheskikh nauk) on Russian/Soviet-German relations, we now have a vivid presentation of the ties between the Red Army and Reichswehr. Gorlov's work also shows the importance of German investments in Russia for the emerging Soviet military-industrial complex, and he gives a detailed description of the political, diplomatic, and military links between the two international "outsiders" in the 1920s-early 1930s. Gorlov presents much new knowledge based on scrupulous research in Russian archives, including political, diplomatic, military, and foreign-trade repositories. He makes good use of published German and other documentaries on foreign policy, and proves familiar with the Western literature in the field.

Zadar on the Crossroad of Nationalisms in the 20th Century

Zadar, the ex capital of Dalmatia (South Croatia), within the borders of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, reached the 20th century as a well developed administrative and governing centre. It is a city situated on the eastern (Croatian) Adriatic coast, with an almost 3000 years old tradition and rich cultural and art heritage. After the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was proclaimed (later: the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Zadar, as a separate enclave (in Italian named Zara), was annexed to the Kingdom of Italy. It was the result of the Treaty of Rapallo, by which Zadar was separated from its region. This alienated enclave covered 57 km2 and there were about 20,000 inhabitants. In this way, the normal regional function of Zadar was interrupted which lasted untill the end of WW II. It was a period of isolation, economic stagnation, smuggling, political marginality and military-strategical importance. Zadar became not only one of the symbols of the failure of Croats to create their independent state after Austro-Hungarian disintegration but also a symbol of the realisation of nationalistic aspirations of the Kingdoms of Italy and Serbia. In the first place Zadar lost its function as a leading governmental and strong economical centre of South Croatia (Dalmatia). The great majority of Croatian inhabitants had to leave the city. Thousands of Italians immigrated, which led to a complete change in the ethnic structure. The most disastrous consequence was the air-raid destruction of Zadar during WW II., in which about 5000 people died. After the destroyed town had been returned to the motherland Republic of Croatia, the restoration took a long time. The borders of Zadar district were often changed, its territory reduced or increased. Since Croatia gained independence, the role of this geographic area has become politically extremely important. Today, Zadar numbers 80,000 inhabitants. The recent NATO intention of installing a logistic basis near it (1998) also proves that strategic and geopolitical interests, regarding this city and its region, continue.

On the Eruption of the German Volcano (Part I: Response to Feher and Heller)

Suffering from defeat in the war and from the Versailles Treaty, Weimar Germany attributed blame to external and internal enemies: the power politics of the Western nations and the November criminals (Novemberverbrecher). Eager for national revenge, and in need of economic outlets, Weimar saw an opportunity to achieve both in rapprochement with the USSR. Politically, therefore, the Rapallo Treaty symbolized Germany's wandering between two European worlds, combining nationalist elements of German culture with a fascination for the anti-bourgeois Russian Revolution. A new Rapallo West German self-Finlandization would establish a cordon santiaire, allowing the Soviet Union to maintain unaltered its sphere of influence in the overall socio-political structure, while economically supplying the Eastern bloc's population, and simultaneously coping with Western technological and military development. This new Rapallo would be of disastrous consequences for Poland and for Eastern Europe as a whole. I agree with Feher and Heller that Zeitgeist may be expressed most accurately and precisely by minority groups amalgamating the quintessence of otherwise heterogeneous motifs and orientations, and which guide the politics of divergent social groups and strata. National Bolshevism is a metaphor, as is Rapallo. It signifies nationalism, anti-Westernism, and a fascination for revolution.

The Origin of Pynchon's Tchitcherine

His right knee hinged with threads of gold, Vaslav Tchitcherine limps through Gravity's Rainbow bearing a portfolio of a name. Terry Caesar (PN 5, 1981) rightly calls attention to its multiple puns and arcane allusions, but he discloses no knowledge of what those references may be. Then David Seed (PN 5 again) tracks a red herring when he proposes that the fictional Vaslav and the historical Georgi Tchitcherine are secret sharers, despite Pynchon's warning that He [vaslav] is no relation at all to the [Georgi] Tchitcherine who dealt the Rapallo Treaty (GR, 338). Well, why not take Pynchon at his word?

Pynchon's Two Tchitcherines

In Part 3 of Gravity's Rainbow, during a factual introduction of Tchitcherine where at last identifying details are given the reader about this character, Pynchon states, He is no relation at all to the Tchitcherine who dealt the Rapallo Treaty with Walter Rathenau (338). This Tchitcherine (Georgi) also participated in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, where he briefly met Ernest Hemingway.

Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo

The Treaty of Rapallo, concluded between Soviet Russia and the Weimar Republic on April 16, 1922, has been interpreted by Western historians as a logical result of the process of the reestablishment of the close economic ties which Germany and Russia had shared before the First World War. “A long tradition built on a solid foundation of common interest,” writes Edward Hallett Carr, “favoured the rapid development of commercial relations. … Links so strong and so profitable to both parties were not easily broken.” Strengthened by the limitations imposed on German exports by the Allies after the war, this natural tendency “impelled the whole of German industry to face east.” The revival of a substantial commerce between the two countries was forestalled, however, by the Allied blockade, until it was lifted in January 1920, and by German hopes for the collapse of the Soviet regime and fears of Bolshevism. These last two obstacles, it is claimed, disappeared in early 1921, at the same time that the introduction of the New Economic Policy in Russia was stimulating even greater German interest in the restoration of trade with her. “During the rest of 1921 there took place a steady thickening of the Russo-German link. … At first this took a predominantly economic form,” in which “rapid strides” were made. Opening up “the Russian market became a major preoccupation of German policy” in the latter half of that year. Thus economic goals were an important reason —one historian calls them “the real inducement”—for the Rapallo Treaty.

Agreement Supplementary to the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo

Agreement Supplementary to the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo

The Treaty of Rapallo

The Treaty of Rapallo

The Treaty of Rapallo

The Treaty of Rapallo