Thorium is a promising alternative to uranium as nuclear fuel with advantages such as higher abundance, lower production of long-lived transuranic elements, and potentially better proliferation resistance. However, thorium presents a potential pathway for proliferation where produced 233Pa can be diverted for the clandestine production of safeguarded 233U. To prevent this, the ability to detect and measure 233Pa must be assessed. This paper reviews several nuclear material accountancy techniques to determine their suitability for detecting 233Pa extracted from irradiated thorium fuel. Hybrid K-edge densitometry and passive gamma spectroscopy have been found to be the best options based on technology maturity, cost, accuracy, and acquisition time. Thorium can be used in various reactor designs such as pressurized water reactors (PWRs), Canada deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors, and molten salt reactors (MSRs). Therefore, thorium-uranium oxide fueling was modeled for three representative reactors (PWR, CANDU, MSR), burning the fuel to 47 GWd/MTHM for PWR, 19 GWd/MTHM for CANDU, and at a steady power of 52.711 MW/MTHM for MSR. Within each model, the protactinium element in the used fuel was extracted and its isotopic content analyzed. Simulated results indicated that 233Pa can be detected using passive gamma spectroscopy in each fuel type at all decay times (0–300 days) following separation.
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