Transnational Climate Change Governance Research Articles

Politicians and climate change: A systematic review of the literature

AbstractPoliticians' engagement with climate change is the focus of an emerging literature, but this research has not been subjected to systematic analysis. To address this important gap, we perform a systematic review of 141 articles on politicians and climate change published between 1985 and 2021. We find a growing research area; almost half of the articles were published after 2018. Existing research is fragmented and focused on a small number of democracies in the Global North, with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Australia being the most‐heavily studied. Substantively, we analyze politicians' motivations, the incentives and barriers they face, and the strategies they employ to block/enable climate action. We find evidence of politicians being both intrinsically and extrinsically motivated. Intrinsic motivations often derive from formative experiences occurring prior to entering politics. Extrinsic motivations most commonly include publics/voters and external events. Importantly, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations vary in different political contexts, and indeed these two motivations may pull politicians in different directions. Politicians may employ various strategies—such as reframing—to achieve their desired policy outcomes. Moreover, politicians' motivations and strategies in relation to climate change are not static, but often vary. We conclude that there is an urgent need for research on how politicians are enabled and/or constrained by political system characteristics. Research is especially called for in the Global South and/or less democratic systems, as well as on investigating how politicians are (not) decarbonizing difficult‐to‐abate sectors and how they reconcile the sometimes‐competing demands for climate change mitigation and adaptation.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > National Climate Change Policy Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Supply‐side climate policy: A new frontier in climate governance

AbstractFrom the margins of climate governance, supply‐side policies that seek to restrict the production of climate‐heating fossil fuels and keep sizeable quantities of remaining reserves in the ground are gaining greater prominence. From national‐level production bans and phase‐out policies to divestment campaigns and the creation of “climate clubs,” such as the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA), an increasing number of such policies are being adopted by national and state governments, cities and financial actors around the world. This marked shift in climate governance reflects a growing recognition that the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement cannot be achieved without enhanced efforts to leave large swathes of remaining fossil fuel reserves in the ground and actively phase‐out existing fossil fuels infrastructures. Unsurprisingly, there has been increasing scholarly attention to different dimensions of supply‐side policy: from identifying the nature and scale of the “production gap” (between planned fossil fuel production and that which is compatible with climate goals), to initial attempts to map and explain the adoption of supply‐side policies across different regions and sectors, as well as forward‐looking analysis of possible pathways to multilateral supply‐side agreements. This article surveys this academic and policy landscape to review what we currently know about supply‐side policies: how, when, why and by whom they are adopted, how significant they are, and the ways in which national and regional measures might be supported multilaterally.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance Climate, Nature, and Ethics > Climate Change and Global Justice

Toward an evidence‐informed, responsible, and inclusive debate on solar geoengineering: A response to the proposed non‐use agreement

AbstractA prominent recent perspective article in this journal and accompanying open letter propose a broad international “non‐use agreement” (NUA) on activities related to solar geoengineering (SG). The NUA calls on governments to renounce large‐scale use of SG, and also to refuse to fund SG research, ban outdoor experiments, decline to grant IP rights, and reject discussions of SG in international organizations. We argue that such pre‐emptive rejection of public research and consultation would deprive future policy‐makers of knowledge and capability that would support informed decisions to safely and equitably limit climate risk, sustain human welfare, and protect threatened ecosystems. In contrast to the broad prohibitions of the NUA, we propose an alternative near‐term pathway with five elements: assess SG risks and benefits in the context of related climate risks and responses; distinguish the risks and governance needs of SG research and deployment; pursue research that treats uncertainties and divergent results even‐handedly; harness normalization of SG as a path to effective assessment and governance; and build a more globally inclusive conversation on SG and its governance. These principles would support a more informed, responsible, and inclusive approach to limiting climate risks, including judgments on the potential role or rejection of SG, than the prohibitory approach of the NUA.This article is categorized under: Climate and Development > Social Justice and the Politics of Development Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance Policy and Governance > National Climate Change Policy

Toward global net zero: The voluntary carbon market on its quest to find its place in the post‐Paris climate regime

AbstractThis focus article traces the evolution of the voluntary carbon market (VCM), putting emphasis on the more recent developments following the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. It focuses on the interplay between the privately governed VCM and the global climate regime under the United Nations (UN). For years, the VCM and the UN carbon market operated in parallel and mutually influenced each other. The adoption of the Paris Agreement, however, marked a turning point for the VCM. It triggered the proliferation of net zero targets, sparking the interest in the VCM as a supplier of carbon credits to offset companies' remaining emissions. At the same time, the global scope and ambitious targets set by the agreement have put the future of the VCM in limbo, raising concerns about double claiming and more generally, questioning the adequacy of offsetting. Considering these challenges, numerous stakeholders have started a process to redefine the rules of the market to ensure its credibility and legitimacy. While some areas of convergence were identified, the VCM's private governance has long been unable to address the question of how to deal with double claiming and the claims companies should be allowed to make. In this situation, signals from international policy and regulation under national policy point the way forward for the VCM. By moving from offsetting toward a contribution claim model, the VCM may overcome its “identity crisis” and find a new place within the broader climate change regime.This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance Policy and Governance > Private Governance of Climate Change

Green New Deals in comparative perspective

AbstractIn February 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio‐Cortez and Senator Ed Markey introduced into the US Congress a non‐binding resolution for a Green New Deal, with the aim to catalyze policies and programs to rapidly decarbonize the US economy while achieving wider progressive economic, social and environmental goals. This motion sparked widespread interest, in and beyond the US, in the potential for more ambitious and solidaristic climate policy under the banner of a Green New Deal (GND). This Overview, after introducing the history of the GND concept and exploring its dimensions in theory, provides a snapshot of GNDs proposed (or adopted/enacted) by politicians, candidates for political office, political parties and governments around the world in the period 2019–2022. Drawing on theories of comparative politics and comparative political economy, the Overview illuminates key patterns in the prevalence and content of this set of GND proposals, as well as their ideological underpinnings and implicit “theories of change.” Specifically, it ventures that: GND policies are more commonly proposed in high‐income, industrialized democracies; variation in GNDs' prevalence and content are associated with varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions; GND policies are more commonly proposed by left‐of‐center parties and candidates; and GNDs are being proposed at all levels of government, but their content is shaped by constraints on government powers. On the basis of this analysis, the concluding section proposes a detailed research agenda on GNDs, with an emphasis on comparative research.This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Benefits of Mitigation Policy and Governance > National Climate Change Policy Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Measuring It, Managing It, Fixing It? Data and Rights in Transnational and Local Climate Change Governance

AbstractThe Paris Agreement, related intergovernmental decisions, and transnational climate change governance initiatives mobilize data as a means of measuring, managing, and addressing changing climatic conditions. At the same time, the Paris Agreement formally acknowledges the human rights implications of the unfolding climate crisis. Given the reliance on data and rights in climate change governance, the aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, it analyzes how processes of datafication at transnational and local levels promise, yet struggle, to render the climate governable. Secondly, the article critically reflects on the capacity of human rights to complement datafied governance processes meaningfully – specifically, in what ways rights can (and cannot) alleviate local concerns regarding datafication. Methodologically, the article develops a perspective that foregrounds situated sense-making and experience in place. It is based on an empirical case study of the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, a transnational alliance of cities that have committed to working towards the goals of the Paris Agreement; and it engages with ethnographic literature that conceptualizes rights as lived forms of meaning-making, articulation, struggle, and resistance. Attending to place, the article confronts problematic assumptions about the universality, neutrality, and representativeness of data and rights, raising critical questions about their capacity to ‘govern’ climate change.

Three decades of EU climate policy: Racing toward climate neutrality?

AbstractThe European Union (EU) began developing climate policy in the 1990s. Since then, it has built up a broad portfolio of mitigation policy measures and governance tools, including legally binding targets to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and policy measures addressing emissions trading, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and more. In 2019, the European Commission—the EU's executive arm—published the European Green Deal (EGD), an overarching policy framework to achieve the goal of climate neutrality by 2050. The EGD aims to push EU climate policy and governance far beyond incremental policy development. In this article, we ask: does the EGD represent a break from past patterns of EU climate governance? We argue that it maintains several past patterns, but nevertheless breaks from other established policy and governance trends. We review insights from politicization and new institutionalist theoretical lenses to help us understand these findings. We reveal certain tensions and challenges inherent in the EU's climate governance approach—around speed and coherence, effectiveness and just transition—that highlight future research needs, and raise questions about the EU's ability to implement its climate policy goals.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Climate change on Twitter: Implications for climate governance research

AbstractThere is increasing public debate about the governance of climate change and its repercussions for nature and human livelihoods. In today's digitalized communication landscape, both public and private actors involved in climate change governance use social media to provide information and to interact with stakeholders and the broader public. This Focus Article discusses two main aspects of debates about climate change and climate governance on Twitter, which previous theories suggest to shape climate governance across domestic and global levels: non‐state climate action and public opinion formation on the social media. We see significant advancement in the environmental social sciences studying these two areas. Yet, we also see the need for a better understanding of how public and private actors in the climate governance complex interact on Twitter, and how these actors shape, and are shaped by, experiences, values, and positions. This understanding will help to advance climate governance theories. This article proceeds in three steps. We first discuss previous social media research on non‐state climate action and public opinion formation related to climate change and its governance. Then we sketch avenues for future research, elaborating how Twitter data might be used to investigate how non‐state climate action and public opinion formation on social media are linked to and influence climate governance. We conclude by making the case for drawing together Twitter data and climate governance research into a more coherent research agenda.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Private Governance of Climate Change Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Communication Policy and Governance > National Climate Change Policy Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Is carbon removal delaying emission reductions?

AbstractCarbon dioxide removal is rapidly becoming a key focus in climate research and politics. This is raising concerns of “moral hazard” or “mitigation deterrence,” that is, the risk that promises of and/or efforts to pursue carbon removal end up reducing or delaying near‐term mitigation efforts. Some, however, contest this risk, arguing that it is overstated or lacking evidence. In this review, we explore the reasons behind the disagreement in the literature. We unpack the different ways in which moral hazard/mitigation deterrence (MH/MD) is conceptualized and examine how these conceptualizations inform assessments of MH/MD risks. We find that MH/MD is a commonly recognized feature of modeled mitigation pathways but that conclusions as to the real‐world existence of MH/MD diverge on individualistic versus structural approaches to examining it. Individualistic approaches favor narrow conceptualizations of MH/MD, which tend to exclude the wider political‐economic contexts in which carbon removal emerges. This exclusion limits the value and relevance of such approaches. We argue for a broader understanding of what counts as evidence of delaying practices and propose a research agenda that complements theoretical accounts of MH/MD with empirical studies of the political‐economic structures that may drive mitigation deterrence dynamics.This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Benefits of Mitigation The Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Sociology/Anthropology of Climate Knowledge Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Agent‐based modeling to integrate elements from different disciplines for ambitious climate policy

AbstractAmbitious climate mitigation policies face social and political resistance. One reason is that existing policies insufficiently capture the diversity of relevant insights from the social sciences about potential policy outcomes. We argue that agent‐based models can serve as a powerful tool for integration of elements from different disciplines. Having such a common platform will enable a more complete assessment of climate policies, in terms of criteria like effectiveness, equity and public support.This article is categorized under: Climate Models and Modeling > Knowledge Generation with Models The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Rethinking governance in international climate finance: Structural change and alternative approaches

AbstractInternational public finance plays an increasingly prominent role in global efforts to combat climate change and, as it grows, it faces a familiar challenge: governance. Global organizations not only disburse climate funding, but are also expected to ensure the “good governance” of climate programs in recipient countries. Many of these same organizations faced similar challenges in disbursing development finance. In what became known as the “institutionalist turn,” they sought to reform governance and build effective institutions in recipient countries. At first glance, the approach to governance in climate finance appears to be a continuation of these largely ineffective policies. I argue, however, that important structural differences between climate finance and development finance have been overlooked, and that these differences create space for alternatives approaches to governance. I first examine the literature on what led to the ineffectiveness of governance reforms tied to development finance, concluding that global organizations have been consistently unable to recognize and grapple with how power actually works in recipient countries, especially informal power. I then highlight three new principles underlying climate finance: (1) that it is restitution not aid, (2) that recipient countries should control resource allocation, and (3) that funding should support mitigation and adaptation. I demonstrate how each new principle has produced shifts in decision‐making authority away from contributors and toward recipient countries. I discuss how alternative approaches could emerge both from forums where recipient countries exercise newfound authority, and from experimentation on the part of multilateral organizations.This article is categorized under: Climate and Development > Social Justice and the Politics of Development Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Rethinking polycentricity: on the North–South imbalances in transnational climate change governance

The transnational climate change governance (TCCG) landscape, led by sub- and non-state actors including businesses, municipalities, and NGOs, holds legitimate potential for tackling persisting climate injustices, in part by virtue of its polycentric character. However, while in theory polycentric governance systems could serve to correct structural power imbalances, the geography of TCCG remains remarkably uneven. This article explores this puzzle in the context of polycentric governance theory and the allegedly paradoxical relationship between polycentricity and equity. Two interrelated empirical and analytical research questions are addressed: (1) How is TCCG organized geographically along the global North–South divide? And, based on the geography of TCCG, (2) Does its polycentric character contribute toward more equitable governance across the global North and South? Following a large-N analysis of a novel dataset containing 174 governance arrangements and 1196 stakeholders with decision-making powers, I argue that the geography of TCCG is remarkably resistant to change, gravitating unmistakably toward the global North and its existing diplomatic hotspots. I argue that the TCCG system currently in place resembles a system of concentrated polycentricity—a product of an overarching system of rules shared with the international regime that could, in turn, potentially explain the persisting North–South inequities in a still seemingly increasingly polycentric climate.

Non‐ and sub‐state climate action after Paris: From a facilitative regime to a contested governance landscape

AbstractThe Paris Agreement marks a significant milestone in international climate politics. With its adoption, Parties call for non‐ and sub‐state actors to contribute to the global climate agenda and close the emissions gap left by states. Such a facilitative setting embraces non‐state climate action through joint efforts, synergies, and different modes of collaboration. At the same time, non‐state actors have always played a critical and confrontational role in international climate governance. Based on a systematic literature review, we identify and critically assess the role of non‐state climate action in a facilitative post‐Paris climate governance regime. We thereby highlight three constitutive themes, namely different state‐non‐state relations, competing level of ambition, and a variety of knowledge foundations. We substantiate these themes, derived from an inductive analysis of existing literature, with illustrative examples and propose three paradigmatic non‐state actor roles in post‐Paris climate governance on a continuum between compliance and critique. We thereby highlight four particular threats of a facilitative setting, namely substitution of state action, co‐optation, tokenism, and depoliticization. Future research should not limit itself to an effective integration of NSSAs into a facilitative climate regime, but also engage with the merits of contestation.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Climates of democracy: Skeptical, rational, and radical imaginaries

AbstractHow will the theories and practices of democracy fare in a climate changing world? Are conventional democratic institutions ultimately doomed or are they able to become more responsive to a changing climate? Is there a need to reimagine democracy and how might it be reimagined? This article reviews the different responses to these questions by distinguishing between three “political imaginaries” in which the relationship between climate change and democracy takes distinct forms. I start by showing how the concept of “political imaginaries” can facilitate the comparison of the different ways in which the relation between democracy and climate change is constructed, before reviewing three such imaginaries. The skeptical imaginary, found in the “eco‐authoritarianism” of the 1970s that is echoed by much sociopolitical analysis today, casts doubt on the possibilities of democratic mechanisms to respond adequately and swiftly to the problem of climate change. Those who resist such skepticism often defend democracy by arguing that institutions and processes of democracy can be made more “ecologically rational”—the rational imaginary of climate democracy involves improvements in political representation and participation. Finally, I present the alternative radical democratic imaginary, in which the crisis of climate change provides a moment for the rupture of existing sociopolitical structures and the formation of alternatives. The article concludes that although none of these imaginaries is able to capture the entirety of climate change politics around the world, the radical democratic imaginary is responsive to the inevitable and valuable plurality around the issue of climate change.This article is categorized under: Climate, Nature, and Ethics > Ethics and Climate Change Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Adaptation to transboundary climate risks in trade: Investigating actors and strategies for an emerging challenge

AbstractThere is growing recognition that international trade can transmit climate risks across borders, requiring new forms of and approaches to adaptation. This advanced review synthesizes knowledge on how, by whom and where adaptation actions can be taken in the agriculture and industrial sectors to reduce these transboundary climate risks (TCRs). We find a material difference in the literature on TCRs in agriculture as compared with industrial sectors. Operational and market risks, in particular reductions in food availability, dominate in agriculture, while supply chain and trade‐related risks are highlighted for industry. While the origin of the risk (source) is the primary target of adaptation to agricultural TCRs, the general governance structure, such as UNFCCC and WTO deliberations, are important targets in both sectors. Adaptation at the country of destination and along the trade network is of minor importance in both sectors. Regarding the type of adaptation option, agriculture heavily relies on trade policy, agricultural adaptation, and adaptation planning and coordination, while in industry knowledge creation, research and development, and risk management are seen as essential. Governments and the international community are identified as key actors, complemented by businesses and research as critical players in industry. Some measures, such as protectionist trade policies and irrigation, are controversial as they shift risks across countries and sectors, rather than reduce them. While more research is needed, this review shows that a critical mass of evidence on adaptation to TCRs is beginning to emerge, particularly underscoring the importance of international coordination mechanisms.This article is categorized under: Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change > Institutions for Adaptation Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Risk? Crisis? Emergency? Implications of the new climate emergency framing for governance and policy

AbstractThe term “climate emergency” represents a new phase in climate change framing that many hope will invigorate more climate action. Yet there has been relatively little discussion of how the new emergency framing might shape broader governance and policy. In this advanced review, we critically review and synthesize existing literature on crisis and emergency to inform our understanding of how this new shift might affect governance and policy. Specifically, we explore the literature on crisis governance and policy to argue that there is no simple answer to whether the “climate emergency” framing will be supportive of climate governance and policy; rather, more work needs to be done to understand how different political actors respond according to their perceptions, interests and values. To assist this endeavor, we develop a typology of four policy pathways, ranging from “no emergency,” to “no emergency, but recognize risk,” “emergency as a threat” and “emergency as an opportunity.” We highlight the need to consider the effects of multiple and overlapping emergency frames, using the example of the intersection of climate change and COVID‐19. Finally, we suggest new interdisciplinary research directions for critically analyzing and refining this new phase of climate change framing.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Governing Climate Change in Communities, Cities, and Regions Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Climate finance governance: Fit for purpose?

AbstractThis article consists of a critical review of the conceptual scholarship on the governance of climate finance and includes an overview of the institutional arrangements and governance logics that provide climate finance. New decentralized, polycentric structures allow for climate finance to more effectively reach the sub‐ and non‐state actors most directly implementing climate change governance. However, the expansion of climate finance into market‐inflected forms of blended finance, as well as debt‐based financing, express a neoliberal logic that shifts power to market actors. This may challenge the efficacy of climate finance. We suggest that further research is needed on polycentric systems in climate finance, since an apparent expansion in the diversity of providers is also accompanied by a counter‐intuitive concentration of decision‐making power with financial fund managers. We join others in suggesting that the weight of scholarship advocates for a strong return to public authored finance and governance, under the auspices of Green New Deal programs and more widely.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Toward a relational approach in global climate governance: Exploring the role of trust

AbstractWhat role does trust play in global climate governance? For decades, claims of mistrust and distrust have dominated climate change policy arenas: doubts about climate change science and disagreements over rights and responsibilities related to mitigation, adaptation, loss, and damages undermine trust, impeding progress toward effective global climate action. And although frequently invoked in explanations of weak or failed climate action, there is limited research exploring the role oftrustas a distinct concept in global climate governance. Here we seek to address this gap by developing a relational framework that focuses attention on how trust dynamics shape cooperation in four types of relationships: reliance, reciprocity, responsibility, and recognition. Applying this framework to the UNFCCC, we consider how efforts like expanded participation impact the relational landscape in global climate governance. We focus in particular on Indigenous Peoples and non‐state actors to demonstrate how the UNFCCC's efforts to address its legitimacy and credibility problems have neither adequately considered trust nor created opportunities to develop the transformative relationships needed for more effective climate governance. We suggest that greater attention to trust can help scholars and practitioners better understand how relational phenomena shape the landscape of governance possibilities.This article is categorized under:Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Linking ocean and climate change governance

AbstractIncreasing links are being made between ocean sustainability and climate change, as illustrated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report on the ocean and cryosphere, and the billing of the 2019 UN climate change conference as the “Blue COP.” This review of these linkages is framed by the “bandwagoning” literature in global environmental politics to examine how ocean action has been constructed as being relevant for both climate mitigation and adaptation. This includes growing interest in “blue carbon” and the emerging narrative of the ocean as a “solution” to climate change, and drawing attention to climate impacts on ocean ecosystems and marine biodiversity. It highlights the roles played in constructing this link by entrepreneurial states and the NGO community in building an ocean‐climate bandwagon with the existing processes of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. As broader political attention is paid to ocean health, this review also highlights how these climate bandwagoning efforts overlap or clash with other ocean‐related international environmental processes.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

The politics and governance of research into solar geoengineering

AbstractResearch into solar geoengineering, far from being societally neutral, is already highly intertwined with its emerging politics. This review outlines ways in which research conditions or constructs solar geoengineering in diverse ways, including the forms of possible material technologies of solar geoengineering; the criteria and targets for their assessment; the scenarios in which they might be deployed; the publics which may support or oppose them; their political implications for other climate responses, and the international relations, governance mechanisms, and configurations of power that are presumed in order to regulate them. The review also examines proposals for governance of research, including suggested frameworks, principles, procedures, and institutions. It critically assesses these proposals, revealing their limitations given the context of the conditioning effects of current research. The review particularly highlights problems of the reproduction of Northern norms, instrumental approaches to public engagement, a weak embrace of precaution, and a persistent—but questionable—separation of research from deployment. It details complexities inherent in effective research governance which contribute to making the pursuit of solar geoengineering risky, controversial, and ethically contentious. In conclusion, it suggests a case for an explicit, reflexive research governance regime developed with international participation. It suggests that such a regime should encompass modeling and social science, as well as field experimentation, and must address not only technical and environmental, but also the emergent social and political, implications of research.This article is categorized under: Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Knowledge and Practice Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance