Transmission Of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Research Articles

Highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak mitigated by seasonal low pathogenic strains: Insights from dynamic modeling

The spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 remains a threat for both wild and domestic bird populations, while low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) strains have been reported to induce partial immunity to HPAI in poultry and some wild birds inoculated with both HPAI and LPAI strains. Here, based on the reported data and experiments, we develop a two-strain avian influenza model to examine the extent to which this partial immunity observed at the individual level can affect the outcome of the outbreaks among migratory birds in the wild at the population level during different seasons. We find a distinct mitigating effect of LPAI on the death toll induced by HPAI strain, and this effect is particularly important for populations previously exposed to and recovered from LPAI. We further investigate the effect of the dominant mode of transmission of an HPAI strain on the outcome of the epidemic. Four combinations of contact based direct transmission and indirect fecal-to-oral (or environmental) routes are examined. For a given infection peak of HPAI, indirect fecal-to-oral transmission of HPAI can lead to a higher death toll than that associated with direct transmission. The mitigating effect of LPAI can, in turn, be dependent on the route of infection of HPAI.

Risk analysis for the highly pathogenic avian influenza in Mainland China using meta-modeling.

A logistic model was employed to correlate the outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) with related environmental factors and the migration of birds. Based on MODIS data of the normalized difference vegetation index, environmental factors were considered in generating a probability map with the aid of logistic regression. A Bayesian maximum entropy model was employed to explore the spatial and temporal correlations of HPAI incidence. The results show that proximity to water bodies and national highways was statistically relevant to the occurrence of HPAI. Migratory birds, mainly waterfowl, were important infection sources in HPAI transmission. In addition, the HPAI outbreaks had high spatiotemporal autocorrelation. This epidemic spatial range fluctuated 45 km owing to different distribution patterns of cities and water bodies. Furthermore, two outbreaks were likely to occur with a period of 22 d. The potential risk of occurrence of HPAI in Mainland China for the period from January 23 to February 17, 2004 was simulated based on these findings, providing a useful meta-model framework for the application of environmental factors in the prediction of HPAI risk.

Assessment of Farm-Level Biosecurity Measures after an Outbreak of Avian Influenza in the United Kingdom

During Avian Influenza outbreaks in England, the 'AI Order' states that a poultry keeper may be required to keep domestic birds separate from wild birds. This study aimed to assess a) how effectively this was done and b) the negative impact this had for bird owners and animal welfare during the November 2007 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) outbreak in Suffolk, UK. A voluntary questionnaire was posted to holdings (n=296) that were within 10 km of an infected premises; these holdings were required to separate domestic and wild birds where possible. Holdings were identified during outbreak investigations conducted by the authorities. Holdings of all sizes were included. A sample of holdings received a follow-up visit or telephone call to validate the questionnaire (n=29). From the 38% of eligible holdings that responded, 13% (95% CI 7-22%) left their birds outdoors throughout the outbreak. If game birds were excluded, 9% (CI 4-17%) of holdings did not house their birds. Major cost and welfare problems were rare; however, there were exceptions. Enforced housing was often relaxed before a minor welfare problem deteriorated. Contact between wild and domestic birds was greatly reduced during the outbreak, resulting in a reduced probability of HPAI transmission via wild birds for most, but not all, holdings.

Spatial dynamics of bar-headed geese migration in the context of H5N1.

Virulent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) since 2005 have raised the question about the roles of migratory and wild birds in the transmission of HPAI. Despite increased monitoring, the role of wild waterfowl as the primary source of the highly pathogenic H5N1 has not been clearly established. The impact of outbreaks of HPAI among species of wild birds which are already endangered can nevertheless have devastating consequences for the local and non-local ecology where migratory species are established. Understanding the entangled dynamics of migration and the disease dynamics will be key to prevention and control measures for humans, migratory birds and poultry. Here, we present a spatial dynamic model of seasonal migration derived from first principles and linking the local dynamics during migratory stopovers to the larger scale migratory routes. We discuss the effect of repeated epizootic at specific migratory stopovers for bar-headed geese (Anser indicus). We find that repeated deadly outbreaks of H5N1 on stopovers during the autumn migration of bar-headed geese could lead to a larger reduction in the size of the equilibrium bird population compared with that obtained after repeated outbreaks during the spring migration. However, the opposite is true during the first few years of transition to such an equilibrium. The age-maturation process of juvenile birds which are more susceptible to H5N1 reinforces this result.

Spatial transmission of avian influenza (type H5) in birds

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 continues to threaten domestic and wild birds, as well as human health. However, the mechanism of spatial transmission of HPAI is still unclear. We analyzed the current distribution of HPAI occurrences based on World Organization for Animal Health reported data from 3049 sites in the world from December 2003 to June 2006, and found that these sites were spaced at distances with a frequency peak of 100-200 km. We built a cellular automata model to simulate the spatial transmission process of HPAI as a function of transmission distance, variance of the transmission distance, infection rate, and transmission times (how many times HPAI transmits from one host to another before suppression). We determined that the transmission distance between HPAI occurrences is approximately 100 km on the basis of historical HPAI occurrences from 2003 to 2006 in both wild and domestic birds. To effectively reduce the long-distance spreading of HPAI, preventing close contact between domestic birds and waterfowl within a radius of 100 km around HPAI occurrence sites is essential.

Modelling control of avian influenza in poultry: the link with data

In this paper the authors discuss the use of modelling in the evaluation of strategies designed to control epidemics of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in poultry. Referring to a number of published models for HPAI transmission in poultry, the authors describe the different ways that modellers use quantitative information. Quantitative information can be used for model building, parameter estimation, and model validation. The authors emphasise that in the case of HPAI transmission in poultry there are important gaps in our understanding. Due to these gaps the models for the effects of certain control strategies, especially those involving vaccination of poultry, need to be based on provisional assumptions. Hence, it is necessary to validate these models and to do research to improve our understanding of the underlying processes in order to better parameterise the models and better estimate the parameters.

Molecular epidemiological analysis of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 subtype isolated from poultry and wild bird in Thailand

A comprehensive molecular epidemiological analysis was performed on highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype derived from poultry and wild bird during 2004–2007 in Thailand. Sequence analysis followed by phylogenetic analysis was applied to all eight segments of the viruses. Viruses belonging to clades 1 and 2.3.4 in the HA phylogenetic tree have been shown to circulate in Thailand. Our analysis revealed differential evolution of the HPAI viruses among clade 1 strains. Isolates from Phichit province in 2006 resided in two distinct branches, designated 1.p1 and 1.p2. A hemagglutination inhibition test with a panel of monoclonal antibodies demonstrated a possible antigenic drift between the Phichit isolates. Involvement of free-grazing duck practice in the area was discussed as a cause of the differential evolution among the Phichit isolates. A branch, designated 1-TGWB and consisting exclusively of isolates from zoological tigers and wild birds, was evident in all phylogenetic trees constructed in the study. The branch’s existence indicated that the HPAI viruses could have been maintained in the wild bird population for a certain period, although no involvement of wild birds in HPAI transmission to poultry was evident in this study.

Avian Influenza H5N1: Risks at the Human–Animal Interface

Great concern has arisen over the continued infection of humans with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) of the H5N1 subtype. Ongoing human exposure potentially increases the risk that a pandemic virus strain will emerge that is easily transmissible among humans. Although the pathogenicity of a pandemic strain cannot be predicted, the high mortality seen in documented H5N1 human infections thus far has raised the level of concern. To define the three types of influenza that can affect humans, discuss potential exposure risks at the human-animal interface, and suggest ways to reduce exposure and help prevent development of a pandemic virus. This review is based on data and guidelines available from the World Health Organization, the scientific literature, and official governmental reports. Epidemiological data on human exposure risk are generally incomplete. Transmission of HPAI to humans is thought to occur through contact with respiratory secretions, feces, contaminated feathers, organs, and blood from live or dead infected birds and possibly from contaminated surfaces. Consumption of properly cooked poultry and eggs is not thought to pose a risk. Use of antiviral containment and vaccination may protect against development of a pandemic. To most effectively decrease the risk of a pandemic, the public health and animal health sectors--those which are responsible for protecting and improving the health of humans and animals, respectively--must collaborate to decrease human exposure to HPAI virus, both by controlling virus circulation among poultry and by assessing the risks of human exposure to avian influenza virus at the human-animal interface from primary production through consumption of poultry and poultry products, and implementing risk-based mitigation measures.

The management of highly pathogenic influenza h5n1 virus with possible interhuman transmission

Background: Avian influenza is an infectious disease of birds caused by A strain of the influenza virus. Some strains are highly contagious causing rapidly a fatal disease in poultry. The strains are known as HPAI (highly pathogenic avian influenza). Until year 1997, direct transmission of HPAI to humans was not known. During the last large outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in South-East Asia in 2004, the virus was transmitted to relatively low number of humans with a high mortality rate. The measures were taken to contain the outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in South-East Asia. However, there is a possibility that the disease might spread to other parts of the world. There is also a certain degree of concern regarding more intensified spread from birds to humans and frequent interhuman transmission. Conclusions: In our paper, we present the recommended infectious control precautions in health care facilities with possible or confirmed case of HPAI H5N1, control measures in case of outbreak of HPAI in poultry in Slovenia and recommendations for travellers to the affected areas.