The U.S. political establishment appears to have adopted a policy of "damage control" to limit the political costs (both in Mexico and internationally) of the Chiapas Insurrection against the government and economic policies of Carlos Salinas. Under this policy, the government of Mexico is being treated almost as if it were a part of the U.S. domestic scene. Or perhaps it reflects the United States's gratitude for Salinas's impressive achievements, such as the unilateral opening of the Mexican domestic market, the privatization of some of the most important sectors of the Mexican economy (thus socializing the costs and privatizing the benefits), all sorts of Constitutional modifications designed to suit foreign interests, and the transformation of Mexico into an exclusive paradise for U.S. and Canadian investors by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFI'A). After listening to a speech on the Mexican privatization program and the proposed new Laws for Foreign Privatization and Foreign Investment delivered last year at the State Department by Jos6 C6rdoba (then the Chief of Staff of the Salinas Executive Office), a U.S. entrepreneur expressed his satisfaction by calling that the Salinas regime "Io mejor que nos ha ocurrido desde que L6pez de Santana nos entreg6 poco mils de la rnitad del territorio mexicano" (" . . .the best thing that has happened to us since L6pez de Santana delivered more than half of the Mexican territory to the United States"). In apparent agreement with this sentiment, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen recently visited Mexico and acted as if he were already the Secretario de Hacienda of Mr. Salinas's