The work raises the question of what place the problem of man occupies in the transcendental philosophy of I. Kant. The author believes that the appearance of the famous fourth question ‘What is man?’, to which, allegedly, according to the remark of I. Kant himself, the other three questions of his philosophy are reduced, does not mean that I. Kant himself was going to answer it, that is, to build the actual transcendental anthropology. The paper shows that I. Kant did not intend to build a separate anthropological doctrine. His entire philosophy is permeated with anthropological meta-text and boils down to the fact that man, as a noumenal and free being, cannot be an object of knowledge, about which a corresponding anthropological concept must be built. The author does not believe in this regard that the philosophy of I. Kant is anti-anthropological, as some other authors believe. At the same time, contrary to popular belief, I. Kant did not create anthropology itself on the basis of the transcendental method and did not intend to do so. In this regard, the author admits that the refusal to define man as an object of knowledge makes I. Kant a kind of forerunner of the anthropological turn that occurred in the twentieth century, since the bearers of this turn not only raised man as the main problem of science and philosophy, but also sought to change the very paradigm of thinking, abandoning the objective, doctrinal definition of man in favor of a non-classical discourse that considers man in the categories of event-based anthropology, according to which the main thing is not the search for definitions of man, but the search by man himself for his eventful place in the world. The author admits in this regard that in this case the fourth Kantian question can be changed and posed in a new edition: instead of ‘What is man? one must ask: ‘Where and when is man possible?’
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