“To Shift to aHigher Structure” Desire, Disembodiment, and Evolution in theAnime of Otomo,Ishii, and Anno G e r a l d M i l l e r U N C C H A P E L H I L L Every time desire is betrayed, cursed, uprooted from its field of immanence, a priest is behind it. The priest cast the triple extrinsic rule, and the transcendent ideal. Facing north, the priest said. Desire is lack(howcoulditnotlackwhatitdesires?).Thepriestcarriedoutthefirstsacri¬ fice, named castration, and all the men and women of the north lined up behind him, crying in cadence, “Lack, lack, it’s the common law.” Gilles Deleuze and F61ix Guattari,AThousand Plateaus desire: the negative law, the c u r s e o n Humans are desiring machines, but what is the nature of this desire? How can conceiveofapsychicstructurethatissoamorphousandsointimatelylinkedto ourverynature?Onecouldarguethatdesirefunctionsasthefundamentalmotor of human endeavor on both an individual and sociocultural level and that it rep¬ resents the most instrumental force in the production of identity, social interac¬ tion, and society, hence marking desire anydefinitionof“thehuman.”Ifitissuchapowerfulandcomplexforce,then how are we to conceive of desire’s structure? In his second seminar, Jacques Lacan arguesthathumanidentityispredicateduponafundamental“lack,”whichacts thedrivingforceofallhumandesire:“Desireisarelationofbeingtolack.Thisis that, but lack of w e of the most basic components m a s o n e a s the lack of being properly speaking. It isn’t the lack of this or beingwherebythebeingexists”(Lacan,SeminarII223).Therefore,desirecan never be satiated because it is driven by this manque ditre (“want to be or lack ofbeing”),whichhumansseektofillwithvarioussubstituteobjects.Butthebelief that humans can truly fill their lack through such sublimation potentially repre¬ sentsafantasyinitself;thatis,suchsublimationonlyofferspartialfulfillmentfor the subject. In alater seminar, Lacan further complicates tifie concept of desire whenhestatesthat“man’sdesireisthedesireoftheOther,”whichimpliesthatthe subjectdesiresnotonlythats/hereceiverecognitionfromtheOtherbutalsothat s/hebedesiredbytheOther(Lacan,SeminarXI235).'Ineffect,then,thesubject mustalwaysremainlackingbecauses/hemustalwaysdependuponobjectsand other subjects for satiation, and, even then, this satisfaction remains limited. Thus,accordingtoLacan,thefoundationofdesire’sstructureislack,afundamen¬ tal absence that generates both desire and human identity. SeeingLacan’sconceptionofdesireasinherentlydystopicandoppressivefor [ntcrtexts,Vo\. 12, No. 1-2 2008 ©Texas Tech University Press I N T E R T E X T S 1 4 6 the subject, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari sought methods of fusing psycho¬ analysis with Marxist discourse in order to produce aliberatory theory of the human subject that they termed “schizoanalysis.” Many philosophers had tried to resolve the apparently contradictory claims of Freud and Marx, for Marx claimed that “our thought is determined by class (‘class consciousness’)” whereas, “in Freud, we are determined by our unconscious desires (stemming, usually, from familial conflicts)” (Smith 71). For Deleuze and Guattari, these two schemas of desire prove identical, and, consequently, atheory of desire must function “by discovering how social production and relations of production are an institution of desire, and how affects and drives form part of the infrastructure itself. For they are part of it, they are present there in every way while creating within the eco¬ nomic forms their own repression, as well as the means for breaking this repres¬ sion” {Anti-Oedipus 63). Thus, the socioeconomic sphere produces our desires, and simultaneously those desires function as part of Marx’s conception of the infrastructure, yet Deleuze and Guattari do not conceive of desire in terms of lack; instead, they argue that desire is always positive, and, if alack exists, then it is forced upon the subject by the sociocultural milieu in which s/he is situated. These social systems constrain the subject to asystem of morality based on tran¬ scendence, for Deleuze consistently maintained adistinction between morality (basedontranscendence)andethics(basedonimmanence). For Deleuze, morality represents any system that “presents us with aset of constraining rules of aspecial sort, ones that judge actions and intentions by con¬ sidering them in relation to transcendent values,” whereas “ethics is aset of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to ways of existing” (“Life” 100). Because of its appeal to transcendence, morality “effectively ‘per¬ verts’desire, to the point where we can actually desire our own repression, asepa¬ ration from our own capacities and power” (Smith 68). Thus, it is such moralistic systems that inscribe lack in the subject, and Deleuze and Guattari believe that only by analyzing unconscious drives and affects (the...