Transboundary Water Pollution Research Articles

Pollution Load Coordination and Eco-Compensation for Trans-Boundary Water Pollution Control: The Case of the Tri-Border Region of the Yangtze Delta

A partitioned governance mode, in the absence of multilateral cooperation, always culminates in recurring instances of trans-boundary conflicts and critical degradation of water bodies in border regions. Addressing the existing gaps in quantitative trans-boundary pollution control research in extensive river network, a new approach was designed to strategically guide water pollution control initiatives throughout the entire tri-border region of the Yangtze Delta (TBYD) via the following steps: (1) Building upon an analysis of the trans-boundary river hydrodynamics, the tri-border effective coordination scope (TECS), i.e., a strategic coordination scope for coordinated pollution control, was delineated, and 13 county-level administrative districts were identified as effective contributing regions for detailed coordination. (2) Considering water quality standard (WQS) attainment in the trans-boundary cross-sections, a one-dimensional mathematical model covering the complex river network was established. Then, the load capacities for all the contributing administrative regions were determined to facilitate coordinated pollution load reduction across the TECS. (3) Leveraging from the sewage treatment costs within the TECS, a standardized eco-compensation criterion was established to guide the coordinated compensation practices across the TECS. (4) By comparing the practical pollution discharging amount, the coordinated load reduction rates and eco-compensation payments of all 13 contributing administrative districts for trans-boundary pollution control were assessed. These assessments will guide policy promulgation and provide quantitative data support for harmonizing pollution control policymaking and addressing intricate trans-boundary pollution issues in complex river networks.

Responsibility-sharing and compensation scheme of transboundary water pollution embodied in China's inter-provincial trade: a perspective from economic value capturing.

Transboundary water pollution induced by inter-regional trade is a complex and challenging issue due to the multiple jurisdictions involved. This study combined water pollution discharge inventory, multi-regional input-output analysis, discharge responsibility-sharing, and ecological compensation model to advance the collaborative control of water pollution embodied in China's inter-provincial trade. Over a fifth of China's water pollution discharges in 2017, equivalent to 1376 Kt, were a result of inter-provincial trade, which primarily flowed from wealthier coastal provinces to less developed ones. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates a mismatch between economic gains and environmental costs. In particular, Jiangxi and Guangxi bear the greatest environmental impact (64 and 58 Kt, respectively) while only receiving meager economic returns (131 and 80 billion Yuan). The economic benefit shared responsibility results for the great majority of provinces fell between production- and consumption-based discharges, and this compromise-based allocation of responsibility is more likely to gain acceptance across various regions. Provinces such as Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Beijing necessitate the highest compensation volumes to others, with 31 Kt, 25 Kt, and 20 Kt, respectively, while provinces including Guangxi, Jiangxi, and Ningxia require the largest inflows of compensation, totaling 26 Kt, 23 Kt, and 18 Kt, respectively. The compensation outcomes ensure that less developed regions, bearing a greater pollution burden, receive compensation from more developed regions with lower pollution burdens. The compensation values aligned with compensation volumes, with a few exceptions driven by variations in shadow prices of water pollution. Our study sheds light on the inter-provincial water pollution burdens and benefits and provides a quantitative basis for optimizing the responsibility-sharing and compensation strategies in China, thereby promoting regional cooperation on water pollution control.

Application of eco-compensation to control transboundary water pollution in water diversion projects: The case of the Heihe River transfer project in China

Controlling transboundary water pollution is particularly crucial for the sustainable development of diversion basins, while eco-compensation is an essential incentive for multistakeholder transboundary water pollution control. Considering the dynamics of the various actors' pollution control behavior in the Heihe River water transfer project and utilizing differential game theory, we construct a baseline strategy, a horizontal eco-compensation strategy, and an incentive coordination strategy under scenarios with and without authority incentives. The corresponding equilibrium solutions are then determined, and comparisons are made between the payoffs of the players in the six different structures, thus defining the optimal scenario for the different programs. In the case of the largest ecological water transfer project of the Heihe River in Northwest China, according to the research findings, (1) when eco-compensation is funded through a single source, incentive coordination scenarios can contribute effectively to water pollution control instituted by the main participants in water diversion projects; when multiple financing sources are available, horizontal ecological compensation scenarios are more compatible with the individual interests of local municipalities to improve the water quality environment. (2) Water-receiving cities voluntarily eco-compensate for water-supplying cities, and this incentive structure for eco-compensation facilitates a significant improvement in the effectiveness of water pollution control and therefore the harmonious promotion of sustainable economic and environmental development in eco-fragile areas. (3) Water transfer projects, for which the two participants are at widely.different levels of development and the environment is inherently fragile, can facilitate, via an eco-compensation mechanism that combines horizontal and vertical scenarios, sustainable development-oriented policies for eco-compensation systems in which the authority participates as a third-party game player. The research supports the establishment of policies for the governance of the transboundary water diversion project basins to address conflicts in water pollution management.

China’s environmental pollution crisis: A comparative analysis of newspaper coverage of the Songhua River Spill

This article scrutinizes global media coverage of the 2005 Chinese Songhua River Spill, a significant transboundary water pollution crisis. It compares media narratives in China’s Party press, liberal press, and U.S. newspapers, revealing divergences in the symbolic communication of environmental risk. China’s Party press altered its reporting in response to criticisms and new events. U.S. newspapers consistently targeted Chinese government institutions and officials. Meanwhile, China’s liberal newspapers provided nuanced, topic-specific accounts, navigating between journalistic professionalism and political restrictions.

Application of Principle of Sustainable Development in Governing Transboundary Water Pollution

International water law, based on the two major water conventions, imposes two main obligations of due diligence and cooperation on the complicated issue of governing transboundary water pollution. Meanwhile, principles of sustainable development, as one of the basic principles of international environmental law, are reflected in international water law documents. The practice of preventing, controlling and reducing transboundary water pollution under international water law explains the implications of equity and continuity under principles of sustainable development. Furthermore, advancing cooperation in transboundary water pollution governance also contributes to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals stipulated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Transboundary water pollution coordination decision-making model: an application in Taihu Basin in China

Transboundary water pollution coordination decision-making model: an application in Taihu Basin in China

Assessing the effect of the joint governance of transboundary pollution on water quality: Evidence from China

The joint governance of transboundary river pollution is an important means to resolve disputes between upstream and downstream, to achieve regional coordinated development and water environment governance. In this paper, dissolved oxygen, chemical oxygen demand and ammonia nitrogen are used to measure water quality. Regarding the joint governance of transboundary water pollution as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper employs a difference-in-differences model of causal judgment to assess the effect of the policy on transboundary water quality based on the water quality monitoring week data from 2004 to 2016 in China. The results show that compared with non-trans-provincial rivers, the joint governance of water pollution at the provincial boundary could significantly promote the rise of dissolved oxygen, while reducing the chemical oxygen demand and ammonia nitrogen emissions. Additionally, the long-term dynamics based on the dynamic trend suggests that the implementation of this policy has fluctuations in the improvement of dissolved oxygen, but has a strong continuous effect on the reduction of chemical oxygen demand and ammonia nitrogen. These results stand up to robustness tests. Moreover, the green promotion pressure of officials and stakeholder supervision are important influence mechanisms of transboundary joint pollution control on improving transboundary water quality. An important implication is to provide a long-term way for collaborative water pollution control and solving transboundary water pollution disputes.

Impact of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution on River Water Quality: Evidence From China

Identifying the effect of agricultural non-point source pollutants on water quality is very important for water pollution management. This study used NH3N as an indicator to empirically study the influence of fertilizer application on river water quality based on panel data of 46 prefecture-level cities and 18 state-controlled water quality monitoring points through which the main streams of Yangtze River and Yellow River flow from 2004 to 2019. It is found that: (1) An increase in agricultural fertilizer application amount will exacerbate water pollution, and the worsening water quality in the upper watershed and the influence of precipitation will lead to transboundary water pollution in the lower watershed. (2) The amount of fertilizer application and fertilizer application intensity had a threshold effect on river water quality pollution. When the former exceeded the threshold value of 11.496 tons, and the latter exceeded the threshold value of 7.991 ton/km2, the positive effect of fertilizer application on pollutants in rivers was further enhanced. (3) The amount of fertilizer applied had a long-term effect on water quality through a lagged effect, and as the number of lags increased, the accumulative effect of the negative influence gradually rose. Based on the findings of the empirical study, it is proposed that the inter-basin and inter-regional synergy should be formed in the prevention and control of agricultural non-point source pollution, and the overall top-level design of agricultural subsidies and agricultural environmental policies in the areas along the basin should be considered.

Comparison of Regional Urban Water Pollutants Emission Standards and Determination of Factors Influencing Their Integration—A Case Study of the Biopharmaceutical Industry in the Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration

Urban pharmaceutical industries are responsible for high intensity emissions of water pollutants. The regional water pollutant emission standards vary greatly throughout the Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration (YRDUA) in China, which, to some extent, results in increased risks and hidden dangers to regional water environment safety, especially water quality. Under the national strategy of Yangtze River Delta ecological and green integration development, a unified standard of water pollutant emissions should be integrated into the integration development process, but differences between characteristic items, concentration limits, and conditions among four local standards of water pollutant emission have become a key influencing factor in their integration in industry and in green transformation. When comparing the water pollutant emission standards of the biopharmaceutical industry in three provinces and one municipality of the YRDUA, the factors influencing integration were determined and caused by the main differences in local water pollutant emission standards, namely, the race to the bottom of the biopharmaceutical industry, the inconsistency of environmental protection regulation law, and transboundary water pollution risks. From the perspective of urban water quality safety, we propose the following strategies for promoting the integration of water pollutant emission standards in the YRDUA: (1) increasing government funding for local water pollution governance and encouraging industries to adopt the third-party governance model for pollution control in the YRDUA; (2) unifying water pollutant emission standards and environmental law enforcement standards in the YRDUA with a mechanism involving shared economic responsibility; and (3) establishing a platform for sharing data and governance performance for the emission of water pollutants in the YRDUA.

The Ecological Compensation Mechanism in a Cross-Regional Water Diversion Project Using Evolutionary Game Theory: The Case of the Hanjiang River Basin, China

As a vital method to resolve conflicts between water use in upstream and downstream areas and solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, watershed ecological compensation is widely used worldwide. It is necessary to analyze the influencing factors of watershed ecological compensation from the perspective of how different governments interact with each other. However, the previous literature has paid less attention to the special situation of cross-regional water diversion projects, the changing processes of governmental behavior, and the interventions by the central government. Therefore, when taking the upstream and downstream governments and the central government in the basin of a cross-regional water diversion project as research objects, it is important to study their behavior and influencing factors to improve the ecological compensation system in the basin. This paper first analyzes the interactions among upstream, downstream, and central governments in the basin, based on evolutionary game theory. Second, the evolutionary game models before and after the interventions by the central government were developed separately, and the effects of different contexts on the dynamic evolutionary process were analyzed. Finally, taking the Hanjiang River Basin as an example, which is where the water source area of China’s South-to-North Water Diversion Middle Project is located, the opportunity cost of protecting the water environment in the upstream areas of this basin was estimated by establishing an econometric regression model using data on water quality and gross domestic product. The results show that (1) the initial probabilities of governments affect their final behaviors; (2) even without the supervision of the central government, it is still possible for upstream and downstream governments to reach the desired state spontaneously; (3) the supervision of the central government can promote upstream and downstream governments to reach a stable state faster; and (4) the current level of compensation from the central government is significantly lower than the opportunity cost of protecting the water environment for upstream governments in the Hanjiang River Basin. This paper can provide helpful insights for improving the ecological compensation system in the basin, which helps promote cooperation in water environment protection.

Minimum conflict consensus with budget constraint based on social network analysis

In the consensus reaching process (CRP), the asymmetric trust relationships among decision-makers (DMs) and discrepancies of DMs’ opinions may exacerbate the intra-group conflicts. In this paper, we investigate a consensus-building approach based on minimum conflicts under budget constraint to alleviate the conflicts. First, a conflict measurement method based on opinion similarity and the degree of asymmetric trust is presented to construct the conflict network among DMs. Then, the weights of DMs are obtained by analyzing the structure of the conflict network. To achieve a consensus, a minimum conflict consensus model with budget constraint (MCCMBC) is built. Considering that the impact of acceptance degree of recommendations on consensus results, we further develop the ε-MCCMBC, the rejection-based (RB)-MCCMBC, and the divergent-based (DB)-MCCMBC to handle compromise limit, rejection, and divergent behaviors, respectively. Furthermore, three kinds of minimum cost budget models are constructed to provide the reference budget of CRP. Finally, the validity of the proposed consensus models is verified by the case of trans-boundary water pollution treatments in China’s Poyang Lake Basin. The results show that: under the optimal budget, the group conflict degree and the collective opinion derived from the MCCMBC lie somewhere between that of the RB-MCCMBC and DB-MCCMBC. In addition, the moderator needs to spend more budget to facilitate the CRP when DMs adopt rejection or compromise limit behaviors.

Optimal allocation and transaction of waste load permits for transboundary basin: A Bi-level programming approach based on node-arc

Inadequate water quality exacerbates global water resources scarcity. Hence, water quality of the river basin is increasingly perceived as a global obstacle to sustainable development because of the limited water carrying capacity. Efficient waste load permits (WLPs) allocation plays a critical role in enhancing water quality by controlling the emission cap. Considering transboundary water pollution and transaction among regions, a bi-level objective model is proposed to analyze the WLPs allocation based on the node-arc method. Motivated by alleviating regional development differences, the watershed management committee concentrates on equitable distribution of WLPs to regions. Furthermore, regional authorities focus on how to guarantee the maximum economic development and balance the WLPs emissions from the municipal, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Practicality and efficiency of the constructed model is demonstrated by applying it to Tuojiang River Basin. Through the analysis of the results, three management recommendations are proposed for Tuojiang River: strengthening the prevention of agricultural non-point source pollution, sticking to the cooperation between upstream and downstream regions, and speeding up the construction of sewage environmental tax system. The results illustrate that as the proposed method can control the total amount of sewage, it could provide decision-making references for the amelioration of water environment.

Can the central environmental protection inspection reduce transboundary pollution? Evidence from river water quality data in China

This paper explores the impact of central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) on transboundary water pollution. The triple difference method (DDD) is adopted to estimate the impact of CEPI on transboundary pollution. The results show that CEPI can significantly reduce transboundary water pollution. The transboundary pollution in the area subject to CEPI is lower than that in other areas, among which COD is weakened by 0.356 and NH3–N by 0.148. And CEPI has a stronger inhibitory effect on transboundary pollution in the eastern areas and tributaries. This study can provide reference to further promote the central environmental supervision policy, and it is significant to solve transboundary pollution.

Analysis on Decision-Making Changes of Multilevel Governments and Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

Watershed ecological compensation has been widely accepted as a system to promote the cooperation of various stakeholders to solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, but the existing research does not fully consider the impact of compensation fee paid by different governments on stakeholders’ decision-making. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between upstream governments, downstream governments, and the central government by using evolutionary game theory and determines the influence of different factors on the decision-making process of each player through simulation. The results show the following: (1) the initial probability significantly affects the decision-making behavior of each player; (2) daily supervision of the central government and the reduction of the environmental protection cost can promote the implementation of watershed ecological compensation; (3) the fine to downstream governments makes the decisions of the central government and downstream governments change periodically; and (4) the increase of ecological compensation fee urges downstream governments to choose noncompensation, and compensation fee paid by the central government has a critical value.

Can China's pollution reduction mandates improve transboundary water pollution?

This paper discusses how the pollution prevention mandate imposed by China's central government triggers water pollution across provincial borders. Because the central government has put the pollutant reduction into the promotion evaluation, and pollution control in the downstream area of a province mainly brings benefit to other regions, the provincial officials are incentivized to reduce the water pollutants away from the downstream city and strengthen environmental regulation within the province. We apply the difference-in-differences-differences (DDD) method to the dataset on water quality in cities along 18 major rivers in China from 2007 through 2016. We find that compared with the interior cities, the most downstream city of a province faces worse water quality. Besides, we find that environmental policy significantly increases the extent of pollution across jurisdictional boundaries. Then, we turn on the mechanism and find that the pollutant reduction target is significantly lower in the most downstream city of a province. Unanticipated provincial government behavior leads to severe transboundary water pollution.

Research on the method of responsibility division of transboundary water pollution

With the rapid development of China’s economy and society, there has been a serious crisis in the field of water environment safety. Due to the mobility of water and the spatial distribution of water in the basin and other reasons, cross-border water pollution has become a major issue of general concern to the state and the whole society. In this paper, the scope of responsibility of pollutants is generated using the one-dimensional steady-state water quality dynamics based on the basic data of the target area, the corresponding basic data of water quality, water quantity, administrative scope and responsible person so on, so as to realize the comprehensive responsibility division of water quality of cross-border water bodies. The pollutant attenuation coefficient was used to calculate the pollution concentration of pollutants from the initial section of the upstream of the responsibility jurisdiction to the section of the river section at the end of the jurisdiction, which can avoid the calculation error caused by the concentration changes of the pollutants under the comprehensive effects of hydrology, hydraulics, chemistry, physics, geography, biochemistry, climate, location and meteorology in the process of transportation, and improve the accuracy of pollution liability definition of each administrative area.

Turnover of environmental protection officials and transboundary water pollution

Considering the situation of the frequent turnover of Chinese environmental protection officials (EPOT), this paper analyzes its impact on transboundary water pollution. The results show that EPOT can reduce transboundary pollution. EPOT can reduce the concentration of DO by 0.261 and NH3-N by 0.167 in the downstream river. And the impact shows a first strong and then weak change over time. EPOT can restrain transboundary pollution by reducing the production of polluting enterprises and promoting public pollution reporting, and it aggravates transboundary pollution by reducing environmental law enforcement and collaborative governance. In addition, the impact of EPOT on transboundary pollution has a distance effect. Within the regulatory distance of 50 km, EPOT has strong inhibition on transboundary pollution. When the governor and the environmental protection official (EPO) change tenure at the same time, the inhibition of transboundary pollution is the strongest. In addition, EPOs from the central government and with working experience in environmental protection departments can control transboundary pollution better.

Incentive coordination for transboundary water pollution control: The case of the middle route of China’s South-North water Transfer Project

The transboundary water pollution control is often complex and challenging due to the multiple jurisdictions or countries involved. However, current studies fail to comprehensively examine the issue of incentives in transboundary water pollution control, nor do they consider dynamic changes in the behavior of local actors. Multiple administrative boundaries and multiple actors are spanned in the middle route of China’s South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP-MR) making it an ideal case for applying the theory of neoliberal environmentality to examine the governance of transboundary water pollution, as it provides a lens to carefully observe how incentive coordination as a techne of neoliberal environmentality shapes the behavior of local actors to improve water quality. By constructing a baseline scenario, an eco-compensation scenario, and an incentive-coordination scenario, this paper provides a differential game modeling approach to examine and compare the behavioral differences of local actors under different scenarios, and to understand the benefits distribution mechanism under Chinese non-democratic and non-western system. The findings demonstrate that incentive coordination for transboundary water pollution control has the same political and economic roots as neoliberal environmentality. Moreover, compared to eco-compensation modeled as a leader–follower game, incentive coordination as a social planner optimization makes local actors’ interests more compatible with improving water quality, and thus is more similar to the voluntary transactions envisaged by PES. Finally, the neoliberal incentive structure constructed by incentive coordination for transboundary water pollution control can help to improve the effectiveness of water pollution control under the existing eco-compensation systems that rely on command-and-control instruments.

Dynamic Optimal Control of Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning-by-Doing Depreciation

This paper analyzes a dynamic Stackelberg differential game model of watershed transboundary water pollution abatement and discusses the optimal decision-making problem under non-cooperative and cooperative differential game, in which the accumulation effect and depreciation effect of learning-by-doing pollution abatement investment are taken into account. We use dynamic optimization theory to solve the equilibrium solution of models. Through numerical simulation analysis, the path simulation and analysis of the optimal trajectory curves of each variable under finite-planning horizon and long-term steady state were carried out. Under the finite-planning horizon, the longer the planning period is, the lower the optimal emission rate is in equilibrium. The long-term steady-state game under cooperative decision can effectively reduce the amount of pollution emission. The investment intensity of pollution abatement in the implementation of non-cooperative game is higher than that of cooperative game. Under the long-term steady state, the pollution abatement investment trajectory of the cooperative game is relatively stable and there is no obvious crowding out effect. Investment continues to rise, and the optimal equilibrium level at steady state is higher than that under non-cooperative decision making. The level of decline in pollution stock under finite-planning horizon is not significant. Under the condition of long-term steady state, the trajectories of upstream and downstream pollution in the non-cooperative model and cooperative model are similar, but cooperative decision-making model is superior to the non-cooperative model in terms of the period of stabilization and steady state.

Can regional integration control transboundary water pollution? A test from the Yangtze River economic belt.

Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the establishment of the Yangtze River economic belt, this paper uses a difference-in-difference-in-differences model (DDD) to test the impact of regional integration on transboundary pollution. The results show that regional integration can significantly reduce transboundary water pollution. Regional integration reduces chemical oxygen demand (COD) by 0.357, ammonia nitrogen content (NH3-N) by 0.155, and dissolved oxygen content (DO) by 0.088 in the downstream of the provincial boundary. And regional integration has a long-term inhibitory effect on transboundary pollution. The heterogeneity results show that the regional integration has a stronger inhibition effect on the transboundary pollution of the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River economic belt and the tributaries. At the government level, regional integration can reduce transboundary pollution by strengthening the government's environmental regulation and collaborative governance. At the industry level, it can inhibit transboundary pollution by promoting industrial structure optimization and green technology innovation. At the market level, regional integration can promote market competition to reduce transboundary pollution and expand market scale to intensify transboundary pollution. At the society level, regional integration can intensify transboundary pollution by promoting population agglomeration and effectively alleviate transboundary pollution by enhancing public environmental supervision.