1. Introduction The term Governance was barely presented before decade of 90's, although unclassified and non-scientifically proved evidence exist since date of Adam Smith. Unfortunately, usage of Governance did not follow rapid research of concept of Governance. It can be characterized as a system of principles, which are concerned about management and administration of Through Governance organizations can be more efficiently governing, transparent, and can control actions as well as proceedings of managers. However, there is not a convergence of thoughts between various researchers as far as exact interpretation of this concept. Keasey and Wright (1993) think Governance as the system of principles that includes structures, approached, values, and systems, which contribute to successful management of organizations. Keasey, Thompson and Wright (1997) consider that Governance contains wide system of formal and informal connections that are related with organization as well as their consequences for society. Another more general approach is that of Mayer (1988). According to researcher, Corporate Governance is concerned about ways through which interests of managers and investors can be reconciled in order organizations to operate in favor of investors. Many facts and conditions have driven to an increased demand for good Governance. The springs of this demand were various negative acts, which hit business world. Examples of these acts are: creative accounting, managers who service only their own interests and go against investors' interests, weakness of auditors to control and report companies efficiently (for example, Enron scandal), enormous compensations for managers that in some cases threatened company's performance, policies of some investors for easy money etc. The representative examples of organizations' collapses give reasons to strongly believe that firm value is not exclusively depended on profitability ratios or/and growth prospects, but also on quality of control mechanisms, which ensure that organizations are well-managed as well as investors' wealth is increased. Finally, this situation led to presentation and establishment of management and administration principles named Governance. Tightened rules and regulations and adoption of codes (Cadbury Report, Greenbury Report) are result which derives from fact that better Governance will deliver higher shareholder value. In favor of this aspect, McKinsey and Company (2000) found that institutional investors are willing to pay significant premiums for companies that are well governed and that valuation of a firm depends not only on financial issues but also on Governance. Moreover, Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2004) have shown that investors in Germany are willing to pay a 20.2% premium for a company with high quality of Governance compared to another identical company but with a poor quality of Governance. The reason why investors are willing to pay this premium is fact that expected rate of return on equity is reduced as well as firm value is increased. Under these proportions and acceptances, can Governance change expected rates of return across companies as well as create perceivable value for shareholders? Governance tries to clarify rights and obligations of every single individual or company that are involved in organization's governance. Zingales (1998) believes that there is an agency relationship between principals and agents. The principle-agent problem is generative cause of existence of Governance. While traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (henceforth CAPM) predicts that expected returns on equity depend exclusively on size of covariance risk and not on Governance, level of agency costs nowadays varies among different governance systems. …