Toxin Puzzle Research Articles

Abraham, Isaac, and the toxin: a Kavkan reading of the binding of Isaac

AbstractI argue that the story of God's commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac can be read as a variant of Kavka's (1983) Toxin Puzzle. On this reading, Abraham has no reason to kill Isaac, only reason to intend to kill Isaac. On one version of the Kavkan reading, it's impossible for Abraham, thus situated, to form the intention to kill Isaac. This would make the binding an impossible story: I explore the ethical and theological consequences of reading the story in this way. Finally, I suggest that analytic philosophers may have more to contribute to interpretative projects in philosophical theology than generally practised.

Toxic intentions

ABSTRACT Pure voluntarism is the claim that we have the same voluntary control over intentions as we do decisions. The Toxin Puzzle is often taken to challenge pure voluntarism by supporting a reasons constraint on intentions. According to this constraint, one cannot voluntarily intend to do something that one lacks a practical reason to do. We present the results of three experiments stemming from this puzzle demonstrating that the concept does not support a reasons constraint and suggests that intentions are regarded as voluntary to the same degree that decisions are.

The Wrong Kind of Reason and the Toxin Puzzle

The Wrong Kind of Reason and the Toxin Puzzle

So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?

In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensitivity to the absence of possible motivational explanations for the intended action is constitutive of deliberation-based intentions. Since ordinary rational agents display this sensitivity, when placed in the toxin scenario they will believe that there is no motivational explanation for actually drinking the toxin and this is why they can’t form the intention to drink it in the first place. I thus argue that my Motivating-Explanatory Reason Principle correctly explains the toxin puzzle, thereby revealing itself as a genuine metaphysical constraint on intentions. I also explore at length the implications of my account for the nature of intention and rational agency.

The Toxin and the Dogmatist

According to the dogmatist, knowing p makes it rational to disregard future evidence against p. The standard response to the dogmatist holds that knowledge is defeasible: acquiring evidence against something you know undermines your knowledge. However, this response leaves a residual puzzle, according to which knowledge makes it rational to intend to disregard future counterevidence. I argue that we can resolve this residual puzzle by turning to an unlikely source—Kavka’s toxin puzzle. One lesson of the toxin puzzle is that it is irrational to intend to do that which you know will be irrational. This yields a simple reply to the dogmatist: it is irrational to intend to disregard future evidence, because you can know in advance that it will be irrational to do so.

Evil and God's Toxin Puzzle

AbstractI show that Kavka's toxin puzzle raises a problem for the “Responsibility Theodicy,” which holds that the reason God typically does not intervene to stop the evil effects of our actions is that such intervention would undermine the possibility of our being significantly responsible for overcoming and averting evil. This prominent theodicy seems to require that God be able to do what the agent in Kavka's toxin story cannot do: stick by a plan to do some action at a future time even though when that time comes, there will be no good reason for performing that action (and very good reason not to). I assess various approaches to solving this problem. Along the way, I develop an iterated variant of Kavka's toxin case and argue that the case is not adequately handled by standard causal decision theory.

Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box

The paper will show how one may rationalize one-boxing in Newcomb’s problem and drinking the toxin in the Toxin puzzle within the confines of causal decision theory by ascending to so-called reflexive decision models which reflect how actions are caused by decision situations (beliefs, desires, and intentions) represented by ordinary unreflexive decision models.

Newcomb’s problem and its conditional evidence: a common cause of confusion

This paper aims to make three contributions to decision theory. First there is the hope that it will help to re-establish the legitimacy of the problem, pace various recent analyses provided by Maitzen and Wilson, Slezak and Priest. Second, after pointing out that analyses of the problem have generally relied upon evidence that is conditional on the taking of one particular option, this paper argues that certain assumptions implicit in those analyses are subtly flawed. As a third contribution, the piece aims to draw attention to an important similarity between Newcomb’s problem and the toxin puzzle. In short, both problems illustrate the fact that you can have a reason to intend to φ without having a reason to actually φ.

ON THE RATIONALIST SOLUTION TO GREGORY KAVKA'S TOXIN PUZZLE

AbstractGregory Kavka's ‘Toxin Puzzle’ suggests that I cannot intend to perform a counter‐preferential action A even if I have a strong self‐interested reason to form this intention. The ‘Rationalist Solution,’ however, suggests that I can form this intention. For even though it is counter‐preferential, A‐ing is actually rational given that the intention behind it is rational. Two arguments are offered for this proposition that the rationality of the intention to A transfers to A‐ing itself: the ‘Self‐Promise Argument’ and David Gauthier's ‘Rational Self‐Interest Argument.’ But both arguments – and therefore the Rationalist Solution – fail. The Self‐Promise Argument fails because my intention to A does not constitute a promise to myself that I am obligated to honor. And Gauthier's Rational Self‐Interest Argument fails to rule out the possibility of rational irrationality.

Autonomous reasons for intending

An autonomous reason for intending to A would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for A-ing. Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue. This paper describes cases that more clearly favour the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort. Several objections to this view are considered and rejected. Finally, it is considered whether the existence of such reasons would conflict with an attractive coherence principle linking the rationality of intending with that of acting as intended. The paper concludes with a qualified affirmation of autonomous reasons for intending.

Fear and Integrity

I'll begin this paper with an autobiographical example — an instance of a common enough kind of case involving agents who are faced with making a choice they strongly care about, but who have tendencies that incline them towards choosing an option they prefer not to choose. Later in the paper, I apply some of the general lessons learned from this case to a philosophically more familiar example of a hard-to-make choice, and to the well-known problem the example generates for the idea of rational agency: Gregory Kavka's toxin puzzle (Kavka 1983).Some time ago I did a bungy jump. Nothing remarkable in that (nor in the fact that I have, or had, a great fear of heights; the desire to overcome a fear of heights is common among bungy jumpers).

Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions

It is widely held that any justifying reason for making a decision must also be a justifying reason for doing what one thereby decides to do. Desires to win decision prizes, such as the one that figures in Kavka’s toxin puzzle, might be thought to be exceptions to this principle, but the principle has been defended in the face of such examples. Similarly, it has been argued that a command to intend cannot give one a justifying reason to intend as commanded. Here it is argued that ordinary agents in ordinary cases can have justifying reasons for deciding that are not and will not be justifying reasons for doing what, in making those decisions, they come to intend to do. The paper concludes with some brief observations on the functions of decision-making.

The Authority of Intention

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesThe Authority of Intention*Govert den HartoghGovert den Hartogh Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 115, Number 1October 2004 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/421980 Views: 43Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref © 2004 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Roberto Fumagalli We Should Not Use Randomization Procedures to Allocate Scarce Life-Saving Resources, Public Health Ethics 173 (Nov 2021).https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phab025Roberto Fumagalli Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating, Theory and Decision 91, no.33 (Mar 2021): 337–356.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09801-8Matthew Heeney Diachronic agency and practical entitlement, European Journal of Philosophy 28, no.11 (Aug 2019): 177–198.https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12479Bruno Verbeek On the Normativity of Intentions, Topoi 33, no.11 (Nov 2013): 87–101.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9221-8KEN LEVY ON THE RATIONALIST SOLUTION TO GREGORY KAVKA'S TOXIN PUZZLE, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90, no.22 (Jun 2009): 267–289.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01340.x

Constraint Games and the Orthodox Theory of Rationality

Moral theorists and game theorists are both interested in situations where rational agents are ‘called upon’ to constrain their future actions and co-operate with others instead of being free riders. These theorists have constructed a variety of hypothetical games which illuminate this problem of constraint. In this paper, I draw a distinction between ‘behaviour games’ like the Newcomb paradox and ‘disposition games’ like Kavka's toxin puzzle, a prisoner's dilemma and Parfit's hitchhiker example. I then employ this distinction to argue that agents who subscribe to the orthodox theory of rationality do significantly better in disposition games than those who subscribe to revisionist theories like David Gauthier's, while revisionist agents do marginally better in behaviour games. I argue that because of agents' ability to manipulate their own weakness of will, orthodox agents do better at all of these games than has previously been thought. And, by elucidating the distinction between behaviour games and disposition games, I uncover the virtues that underlie the success of each theory of rationality.

Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle

Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle

Intentions, reasons, and beliefs: Morals of the toxin puzzle

Intentions, reasons, and beliefs: Morals of the toxin puzzle

The toxin puzzle

The toxin puzzle

Utilitarianisms

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionUtilitarianismsGerald BarnesGerald Barnes Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 82, Number 1Oct., 1971 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/291829 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 11Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1971-1972 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:John Pittard Evil and God's Toxin Puzzle, Noûs 52, no.11 (Jun 2016): 88–108.https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12154, Shams Ul Huda Action without Planning: A Preliminary Liver Transplantation, i-manager’s Journal on Nursing 5, no.11 (Apr 2015): 1–4.https://doi.org/10.26634/jnur.5.1.3490Moran Yemini Conflictual Moralities, Ethical Torture: Revisiting the Problem of “Dirty Hands”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no.11 (May 2013): 163–180.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9429-0Brian Kierland Cooperation, ‘Ought Morally’, and Principles of Moral Harmony, Philosophical Studies 128, no.22 (Mar 2006): 381–407.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7789-yMichael J. Almeida Collective Rationality and Simple Utilitarian Theories, Dialogue 33, no.33 (Apr 2010): 363–376.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300039019Michael J. Zimmerman Cooperation and doing the best one can, Philosophical Studies 65, no.33 (Mar 1992): 283–304.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354614Michael S. Moore Torture and the Balance of Evils, Israel Law Review 23, no.2-32-3 (Feb 2016): 280–344.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700016757Fred Feldman Individual Obligation and Group Welfare, (Jan 1986): 147–178.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8_7 Bart Gruzalski The Defeat of Utilitarian Generalization, Ethics 93, no.11 (Oct 2015): 22–38.https://doi.org/10.1086/292402 John Chandler Act-Utilitarianism and Collective Action, Ethics 84, no.11 (Oct 2015): 78–85.https://doi.org/10.1086/291905Íñigo Álvarez Gálvez Bibliografía, (): 387–395.https://doi.org/10.5211/9788496780842.ch9