Total Ignorance Research Articles

SynRec: A Prediction Technique using Collaborative Filtering and Synergy Score

Recommender systems are techniques designed to produce personalized recommendations. Data sparsity, scalability cold start and quality of prediction are some of the problems faced by a recommender system. Traditional recommender systems consider that all the users are independent and identical, its an assumption which leads to a total ignorance of social interactions and trust among user. Trust relation among users ease the work of recommender systems to produce better quality of recommendations. In this paper, an effective technique is proposed using trust factor extracted with help of ratings given so that quality can be improved and better predictions can be done. A novel-technique has been proposed for recommender system using film-trust dataset and its effectiveness has been justified with the help of experiments.

Attitude and behavior of clinical nurse towards self-health care: a cross-sectional survey.

Researches focus on the risk factors affecting the health of nurses have been amounting. However, the specific factors about nurse' attitude to health and health-seeking behavior pattern are not well explored. A questionnaire was sent out to all 620 nurses in department of surgery in Peking Union Medical College Hospital (PUMCH) and demographic information, educational background, clinical experience, and attitude to the disease were investigated. The survey indicated that 44.44% (N=212) of respondents did not consult physician. Instead, they self-managed their illness, with 60.38% (N=128) of non-consulters taking some medications. Education background (P=0.027) and income (P=0.010) were found to be the main factor affecting whether a doctor was consulted. Those who self-evaluated with well physical condition show higher strict compliance (55.00% vs. 41.64%), lower discount-compliance (43.75% vs. 56.15%), and lower total ignorance (1.25% vs. 2.21%), compared with those who self-evaluated not well (P=0.020). The respondents who thought the work stress was the influencing factor to the health were more likely to feedback a poor health status, worry about their health, fear to suffer from a disease, and complain about suffering from pain or discomfort. Half of nurses self-treat, with a large proportion self-prescribing, and do not believe in or comply with the doctor's advice, which warrant a closer look.

How the Economics Profession Overlooked Keynes’s IS-LM (LP) model in chapter 21 of the General Theory in the 20th and 21st centuries

J M Keynes’s brief and detailed summaries of his original IS-LM(LP) models in Chapters 15 and 21, respectively, of the General Theory were overlooked by the economics profession in the 20th and 21st centuries due to three main reasons. The first reason was the claims made by the Keynesian fundamentalists,Joan Robinson and GL S Shackle, that Keynes’s supposed definition of uncertainty as complete and total ignorance of the future precluded the use of formal mathematical and statistical models of the macro economy. Therefore, any IS-LM model in the General Theory was an impossibility. The second reason was based on the supposed claim ,made by Backhouse,Young, Dimand, and Rubin, that Keynes was an adherent of the Marshallian view of formal mathematical exposition, which supposedly emphasized presenting only verbal chains of exposition that were based on mathematical analysis, which was then removed from the published work. Therefore, although Keynes created earlier versions of IS-LM to work with in 1933,1934, and 1935, Keynes decided to remove his formal IS-LM model by scattering the three components of his IS-LM model throughout the General Theory in 1936. Keynes substituted a strictly verbal, literary, prose analysis in its place. The third reason was based on the claim, made by Hawtrey, Robertson, Robinson, Viner, Hansen and Ahiakpor, that Keynes’s liquidity preference analysis was restricted only to chapter 13 of the General Theory alone ,where the crucial analysis was based on the equation specified on page 168 of the General Theory, M=L(r),so that the demand and supply for money is identical to the demand and supply for liquidity. Keynes’s chapter 15 definition of liquidity preference on p.199 is ignored. Adherents of this view likewise overlooked Keynes’s analysis on pages 207-209 of chapter 15 and pages 298-306 of chapter 21 of the General Theory. All three of these reasons are badly flawed because they all ignore Keynes’s analysis on pages 199, 207-209 of Chapter 15 and pages 298-306 of chapter 21 of the General Theory. Once these pages are studied carefully, it becomes clear that Keynes incorporated an improved IS-LM(LP) model in the General Theory that was superior to the earlier 1933,1934,and 1935 versions he had presented in his student lectures and the mid 1934 draft copy of the General Theory. Keynes makes it crystal clear in his discussion on pages 298-299 that he was presenting a mathematical model that had the following characteristics : • One can calculate a quantitative answer using it • The model is composed of three elements a), b), and c). a) is the consumption function, C, with both the mpc and investment multiplier specified. b) is the Investment function, I, which is a downward sloping function of the rate of interest, r. c) is the Liquidity Preference equation from page 199 of chapter 15, which is a function of both of Y and r, where Y=C+I. • The three elements provide an analysis that is valuable in introducing order and method to the enquiry • The three elements define a set of simultaneous equations • The equations provide a determinate answer or result. • This result is an equilibrium position • There is no uncertainty /expectations in Keynes’s chapter 21 model of IS-LM(LP) Keynes perfectly described his IS-LM(LP) model in the General Theory on pp.298-299. It is a major improvement over his earlier 1933, 1934, and 1935 versions. The Hicksian IS-LM version, like Harrod’s version, of Keynes’s General Theory, which was published in Econometrica,1937, is an inferior version of Keynes’s IS-LM model in chapter 21 of the General Theory because the Hicksian version has no supporting, micro, D-Z analysis that incorporates expectations and uncertainty, as presented by Keynes in chapters 20 and 21 of the General Theory.

The Role of Ignorance About Keynes’s Inexact, Approximation Approach to Measurement in the A Treatise on Probability in the Keynes-Tinbergen Exchanges of 1938–1940

There is no evidence that J. Tinbergen ever read the technical analysis provided by J. M. Keynes in Parts II and V of the A Treatise on Probability in the 1938-1940 time period or at any later time in his life. The same conclusion holds for econometricians in general. They simply do not understand what Keynes’s Inexact, Approximation Approach to Measurement in the A Treatise on Probability entails. Tinbergen and Keynes held diametrically opposed positions on measurement. Tinbergen’s approach to measurement was guided by the Limiting Frequency interpretation of probability while Keynes’s approach followed the logical approach of George Boole. Tinbergen’s physics background led him to deploy an exact approach to measurement based on the specification of probability distributions, like the normal and lognormal, with exact and precisely defined measurements. All probabilities were assumed to be well defined, precise, exact, determinate, definite, additive, linear, independent single number of answers. Keynes’s approach was an inexact one to measurement based on his modification of Boole’s original approach in 1854 in The Laws of Thought in chapters 16-21. Probabilities for Keynes were, with a few exceptions, partially defined, imprecise, inexact, indefinite, indeterminate, nonadditive, nonlinear, and dependent. Probability estimates for Keynes required two numbers to specify the probability within a lower and upper bound(limit), and nor one like Tinbergen’s approach. Keynes called this approach Approximation. Keynesian probabilities are interval-valued. There are no more than a single handful of academics, worldwide today, who grasp the fact that Keynes’s approach to measurement in the A Treatise on Probability was an interval-valued approach that was covered by Keynes in chapters III and XV. There was no economist alive in the late 1930’s-1940’s who understood Keynes’s approach in the A Treatise on Probability. An example of this ignorance is Lawrence Klein’s review in 1951 of Harrod’s biography of Keynes. The assessments of the Keynes –Tinbergen exchanges in 1938-40 were practically identical to the assessment made of the A Treatise on Probability by Ronald Fisher in his 1923 Eugenics Review of the A Treatise on Probability, where Fisher completely overlooked the inexact approach to measurement that Keynes presented in Parts I –V of the A Treatise on Probability. He dismissed the A Treatise on Probability based on his belief that Keynes was arguing that probability could not be applied since it was, at best, ordinal in nature. Only one economist in the 20th century understood exactly what it was that Keynes had done in the A Treatise on Probability. That economist was named F. Y. Edgeworth. However, Edgeworth died in 1926. His two 1922 book reviews of the A Treatise on Probability required a great deal of mathematical and statistical competence on the part of a reader. That mathematical competence was missing from the economics profession in the late 1930s and 1940s. The result was that Edgeworth’s two superb reviews were forgotten and never read by economists. The problem, from Keynes’s perspective, was that Tinbergen was trying to apply to economic data techniques which were only sound in physics, where laboratory controlled environments with detailed experimental design could generate data and replicate/duplicate the experiments worldwide. Keynes had always argued that economics was not a physical or life science like physics, engineering, biology or chemistry and that it could never be like physics. A great abyss thus separated Tinbergen from Keynes from the very start of the private exchange of letters that began in 1938 to the final exchanges in the 1939-40 time period in the Economic Journal. Tinbergen’s complete and total ignorance of Keynes’s approach to inexact measurement meant that the possibility of some type of intellectual compromise was impossible from the very start. The main reason for the completely divergent views expressed by Keynes and Tinbergen in their 1938-40 exchanges in the Economic Journal was due to their completely different technical backgrounds. Keynes’s background was logic, mathematics, and philosophy. Tinbergen’s background was physics. There simply was no common ground between the two academics.

Гібридна війна як геополітичний конфлікт

Мета статті: вивчення феномену гібридної війни як сучасної форми вираження геополітичного конфлікту на основі результатів досліджень вітчизняних і зарубіжних науковців.
 Наукова новизна: поняття гібридної війни варто розглядати не тільки як різновид ведення війни у новітній історії людства. Гібридну війну доцільно кваліфікувати як новітню форму геополітичного конфлікту. Підтвердженням цьому є численні конфлікти, що відбуваються у різних точках планети, які стають виявами кризи попередньої системи міжнародної безпеки. Російська агресія проти України є сьогодні прикладом геополітичного конфлікту та гібридної форми війни, яка впливає і на світовий порядок. Захоплення Російською Федерацією українських територій стало можливим і через послаблення системи світової безпеки. Така ситуація створює потребу формування нових форм геополітичного співіснування.
 Висновки: Конфлікти різних видів пронизують всю історію людства. Міждержавні конфлікти характеризуються особливістю, яка полягає у тому, що вони можуть спричинити масову загибель людей як в країнах – учасницях конфлікту, так і в усьому світі, тобто, сучасні міждержавні конфлікти впливають на міжнародні відносини як локально, так і глобально, що перетворює їх у геополітичний конфлікт. Особливістю України є вразливість її геополітичного положення, зумовленого наявністю кордону з Російською Федерацією, що в умовах агресивної геополітики Російської Федерації спричиняє роль України як буферної зони. Ключовою характеристикою російської гібридної війни є повне ігнорування та пряме порушення базових міжнародних угод. У різні історичні періоди міждержавні конфлікти часто набували різних форм війни. Лише цивілізований розгляд геополітичного конфлікту сприяє залагодженню спірних питань між країнами та створює ситуацію, коли через вплив демократичних міждержавних інституцій унеможливлюється застосування силових методів та знижується інтенсивність гібридної війни. Міжнародне співробітництво – найбільш ефективна стратегія поведінки у геополітичному конфлікті, спрямована на конструктивне обговорення проблеми у пошуках рішення.

CONSECUENCIAS BIBLIÓFILAS DE LAS EMBAJADAS ENTRE ESPAÑA E IRÁN DEL SIGLO XVII

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, an unusual number of books were published that had as their object the trip to the East and the political analysis of that and other territories. These publications were given in the context of the Hispanic Monarchy and are good evidence of the interest in those lands and the political importance that still maintained a structure in decline.Some of these texts are a direct consequence of the important movement of embassies that occurred between Spain and Iran in a few years, but others respond to a broader vision and to more global interests. The success of these texts was uneven, but it is not an exaggeration to speak of the significant importance of several of them. Some of the studies or narrations became bibliophile material because of the relevance of the book but also because of its almost total ignorance, so we can talk about hidden gems in private libraries that delighted a few until they were published, some of them centuries later of his writing.The mere enumeration of these books, concentrated in a few years, surprises, and their texts form a corpus of knowledge about Iran or about the world that was being explored in those years (European vision) that was relevant for a long period of time.

Representing credal imprecision: from sets of measures to hierarchical Bayesian models

The basic Bayesian model of credence states, where each individual’s belief state is represented by a single probability measure, has been criticized as psychologically implausible, unable to represent the intuitive distinction between precise and imprecise probabilities, and normatively unjustifiable due to a need to adopt arbitrary, unmotivated priors. These arguments are often used to motivate a model on which imprecise credal states are represented by sets of probability measures. I connect this debate with recent work in Bayesian cognitive science, where probabilistic models are typically provided with explicit hierarchical structure. Hierarchical Bayesian models are immune to many classic arguments against single-measure models. They represent grades of imprecision in probability assignments automatically, have strong psychological motivation, and can be normatively justified even when certain arbitrary decisions are required. In addition, hierarchical models show much more plausible learning behavior than flat representations in terms of sets of measures, which—on standard assumptions about update—rule out simple cases of learning from a starting point of total ignorance.

The Whiteness of the Weasel

The Whiteness of the Weasel E. J. Myers (bio) We are not alone. I've known since boyhood that houses often have critters—that the structures we humans perceive as ours often contain other denizens who don't happen to share this proprietary attitude. The resulting interspecies disagreement often leads to conflict. During twenty-five years of residence in suburban New Jersey, for instance, I fought a low-intensity war against the squirrels on the property that my wife and I owned there. These cute troublemakers persistently invaded and nested in our attic, and I resolutely set traps to catch and relocate them to a nearby nature preserve. The result: nearly three hundred squirrels deported over the course of a quarter century. Following this and other experiences, I'm not surprised that when we moved to Vermont, the old house we bought would appeal to wildlife, nor am I shocked to hear scratchy sounds coming from the ceiling and the walls. Neither am I astonished one January morning when Edith announces: "There's a rat in the bathroom!" She utters these words emphatically but without alarm. "A rat? Are you sure?" "It's big, it's white, and it has huge black eyes." Having closed the door, Edith has trapped this critter in the room. [End Page 131] I'm puzzled by her description. It's true that a large rodent might well be a rat, but I'm surprised by the color. Most wild rats are gray, brown, or black. I've never heard of one that's white. I tell Edith I'll investigate; I ease into the bathroom; I look around. I sit on the closed toilet for a while and wait in silence. There's neither sight nor sound of an intruding animal. I don't doubt that she has spotted something, but whatever she saw has somehow escaped. A day later, after Edith has left Vermont for a work assignment, I prepare the house for my own week out of town. One of my chores is to move firewood from the attached garage into the house and then stock two racks near the wood stoves. I make multiple trips into the garage. On my third or fourth trip, something catches my attention: a rustling sound in the far right corner. I can't see what's making it. Then, after fifteen or twenty seconds, I catch sight of the intruder. A small creature, long and lithe, emerges from beneath the ride-on mower and slinks into view. Altogether white except for its black eyes and the black tip of its tail, this animal rears up on hind legs and stares at me. I grasp that it's a weasel of some sort. I'm struck at once by its beauty. This animal is agile, supple, and alert. Despite my total ignorance of weasels, I decide that this one is female. She stares at me with interest but without any sign of alarm. I realize just then what has drawn her out: a bag of frozen garbage that I had carelessly left on the garage floor the previous night. One corner has been chewed open. This little beast has clearly been exploring the trash. Even as I watch, she scampers over to the bag, pokes her head inside, and returns to pilfering whatever she can extract. I step closer. She startles at once and darts under the mower. There's no sign of her for several minutes. Impatient, I return to my task of stocking firewood. Each time I return to the garage, however, I find her exploring the garbage, so I walk over, surprise her with my approach, pick up the bag, and remove it. My later visits to the garage show her still present as she attempts to figure out what happened to her smorgasbord. It's clear to me that I can't let this animal remain here. For all I know, she is the source of the scratching sounds that Edith and I heard on the second floor. Spotting one such creature probably means that [End Page 132] others are present—an entire family, even. Very well, then: they have to go...

On J. M. Keynes's Use of Multiple Equilibrium (Not Partial Equilibrium) Modeling in the General Theory in 1936: The Aggregate Supply Curve

G L S Shackle and Joan Robinson both adopted the Neoclassical position that there could only be one theoretical equilibrium position in either the short run or long run. They combined this supposition with their own redefinition of the concept of uncertainty to mean complete, total, fundamental and radical uncertainty or ignorance of the future. They then claimed that it was impossible to use formal mathematical models in macroeconomics that incorporated the concept of equilibrium if there was complete and total uncertainty of the future. Pace Shackle and Robinson, Keynes never defined uncertainty as Ignorance. Keynes recognized that it was mainly only investment projects in long lived, fixed, durable, capital, producer goods that faced the problem of ignorance. Keynes explicitly dealt with this issue in his two 1937 contributions to the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Eugenics Review if one was dealing with decision problems dealing with the very distant future. An example of such a decision problem would be deciding to invest in a new technology today, given the great uncertainty generated by technological change, advance and innovation, plus the constant threat of technological obsolescence. In general, Keynes dealt with uncertainty as a range. Ignorance was one extreme. This was done by Keynes in the A Treatise on Probability through the use of his logical relation V, where the evidential weight of the argument is defined by V(a/h) = degree w, where 0≤w≤1 and w measures the degree of the completeness of the relevant information, knowledge, data or evidence. Keynes then defined uncertainty, U, to be an inverse function of w in the General Theory in chapter 12 on page 148. Again, Keynes never defined uncertainty as ignorance. It is Shackle and Robinson who claimed that uncertainty meant ignorance. Keynes introduced multiple equilibria into macroeconomics with his creation of the Aggregate Supply Curve, a locus of all D=Z intersections. Uncertainty is thus dealt with by multiple equilibria. There is no evidence that either Shackle or Robinson ever grasped any of Keynes’s theoretical advances In their lifetimes. The belief that Keynes’s approach in the GT was a multiple equilibrium one is correct. However, economists do not understand how Keynes carried out his modeling of multiple equilibria because they have not been able to follow Keynes’s mathematical exposition in Chapters 20 and 21 of the GT. Keynes’s ASC represents a locus of a set of multiple equilibria, where D=Z, in chapter 20. Out of this set, one actual Y value will be realized. This Y value is then combined with r,the rate of interest, to model his IS-LP(LM) model in chapter 21 of the GT. Keynes, as pointed out by Townshend and confirmed by Keynes in the Townshend–Keynes exchanges, made it crystal clear that his Liquidity Preference (LP) equation, specified on page 199 of the GT, in his IS-LP(LM) model, is directly based on his analysis in his A Treatise on Probability of non numerical (interval valued ) probabilities and weight of the evidence, w. This is not surprising at all since Keynes explicitly defined uncertainty(not radical uncertainty) as an inverse function of the weight of the evidence, w, on page 148 of chapter 12 of the GT and explicitly redirected Townshend to his footnote on p.148 (Keynes also asked Townshend to reread page 240 of the GT) explicitly linking uncertainty to the concept of weight. Hence, there is no need to develop from scratch mathematical models of complexity to understand Keynes’s mathematical modeling in the A Treatise on Probability and General Theory.

G. L. S. Shackle was J. M. Keynes's Rival and Opponent: He was an Austrian and Never a Keynesian of Any Type

Shackle was a tireless opponent of both Keynes and the Keynesian revolution. He was a 100% Austrian subjectivist. He never was a disciple of Keynes at any time in his life. Shackle was successful in a tricky sleight of hand and legerdemain due to the support of Joan Robinson and Paul Davidson, neither of whom had any idea of the concept of the weight of the evidence from the A Treatise on Probability that was the foundation for Keynes’s uncertainty analysis in both the A Treatise on Probability and General Theory. Shackle successfully substituted his rival and directly conflicting definition (See for example, pages 162-164 of Epistemics and Economics) of uncertainty, which meant total and complete ignorance. Shackle’s concept of total and complete ignorance goes under the synonyms irreducible uncertainty, fundamental uncertainty, unquantifiable uncertainty, utter uncertainty and radical uncertainty. None of Shackle’s analysis holds except in the special, but important, case of investment in long lived, physical durable capital or producer goods that are subject to innovation, technological change and advance, and obsolescence over time. Keynes’s treatment in the A Treatise on Probability and General Theory is superior to Shackle’s, so there is no need for any consideration of Shackle’s convoluted approach based on possibilities (not probabilities), imagination and the entrepreneur’s private dreams. Keynes was the first to put forth an original IS-LP (LM) model in October, 1933. This model appeared in the 1934 draft copy of the GT. This original model is very inferior to the final model constructed in chapters 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of the GT. It was presented in its entirety in chapter 21 in sections IV, V and VI and briefly in Section IV of chapter 15. The investment multiplier and marginal propensity to consume are both missing. Keynes had not yet integrated Y, Aggregate realized or actual Income, into the LP equation because he had not yet formulated his D-Z model, which allowed him to present an elasticity analysis in Section VI of chapter 21. There is no Shackleian interpretation of the GT. There is a deliberate, Shackleian misinterpretation of the 1937 QJE article, in which Shackle tries to sabotage the Keynesian revolution by attempting to claim that Keynes was really an Austrian Subjectivist like Shackle. Fitzgibbons was not able to come to the correct conclusion regarding Shackle simply because his belief in a Shackleian interpretation of Keynes makes no sense because Keynes had always rejected Austrian Subjectivism. King’s 2002 “history” is a version of Shackle’s claim that Keynes was an Austrian Subjectivist. King’s “History” is completely contradicted by the 1937-38 Keynes-Townshend correspondence, where Keynes agrees with Townshend’s tentative conclusion that the Theory of Liquidity Preference, as presented in the General Theory, is based on Keynes’s TP concepts of weight of the evidence and non numerical probabilities, which are interval valued probabilities that can be indeterminate or imprecise. The Keynes-Townshend correspondence represents a complete rejection of Shackle’s and Joan Robinson’s claims about radical uncertainty being the foundation of the GT. The Uncertainty fraud is the foundation upon which Post Keynesianism and Institutional economics is founded. This foundation is composed of the myths made up by Joan Robinson and GLS Shackle about Keynes and the GT. These myths were then passed on to hundreds of thousands of readers by way of Paul Davidson during the 37 years, from 1978-2014, that he was the editor of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics.

A man by Plato and Sophocles: the experience of comparative analysis

Constitutive aspects of two ways of cognition are clarified: Apollonian way with its synthetic view of the world, that expressed in Plato’s myth of cave and Dionysian way with its tragic self-cognition and attitude to the world, that expressed in Sophocles’ Oedipusology. For implementation of comparative analysis the author defines the key formal and informative aspects, regarding which we can compare man of cave by Plato and Oedipus by Sophocles. Showed, that the first conceptual sign is understanding of fundamental incompleteness of human existence. Grasped that the second sign is a condition of total ignorance with some psychological and existential trials: being on the bottom of the cave by Plato and being of Oedipus in Corinth by Sophocles. Clarified that the third sign of comparative analysis is transforming conditions with pain, torture, anger, fear etc. A cave man realizes that subjects in new view are different from previous view. Oedipus has in this case some doubts, he goes to Delphi, then he runs to Thebes and comes to grip with Sphinx. Showed, that the fourth sign of comparative analysis is a character of opening of wisdom: a cave man carries linear sequential climbing from empirical knowledge to rational knowledge, from rational knowledge to speculative knowledge, and Oedipus carries by discrete way from esoteric knowledge to knowledge-power, from knowledge-power to knowledge-of-himself. Grasped that the fifth sign of comparative analysis is a condition after cognition of wisdom: a cave man comes back to the cave, tries to save other people and meets his destiny as violent death, in opposite of this Oedipus leaves Thebes forever, disappears mystically and comes spiritual patron of Athens.

Intervention to improve awareness of the risk factors for osteonecrosis of the jaw in patients under treatment with bisphosponates. Randomised clinical trial

PurposeTo evaluate the effectiveness of a health education programme on knowledge and reduction of the risk factors for bisphosphonate-related osteonecrosis of the jaw. MethodsAn experimental study control group without intervention was performed with 60 subjects who had started treatment with bisphosphonates in the University Hospital of León from October to December 2014. Patients in the experimental group received a structured education intervention in two sessions. The data was collected from a heteroadministered questionnaire at the beginning and at the end of the study period for both groups. ResultsThe educational intervention designed showed a significantly increased adherence to healthy behaviours related to oral hygiene such as mechanical control of plaque and the use of clorhexidine prior to invasive oral procedures. All subjects reported that they had not been advised to maintain a good level of oral health before starting treatment. After the intervention high percentages of recognition of early diagnostic measures starting from a baseline total ignorance of them were determined. No conclusive information about the use of removable dental prostheses, toxic habits or maintaining proper metabolic control in patients with diabetes mellitus was observed. ConclusionsImproving adherence to healthy behaviours related to oral health following the intervention, as well as their contribution to the early identification of warning signs of jaw osteonecrosis, stresses the importance of the use of health education as a tool in routine clinical practice.

GLS Shackle (Weight of the Evidence, W, = 0) Against JM Keynes (Weight of the Evidence is 0 W 1)

In 1938, GLS Shackle had just finished his economics dissertation It was was supposed to have further advanced and developed the work done by Keynes in the General Theory on the connection between expectations and investment. Shackle had discovered, after reading the General Theory and tiny bits and pieces of the A Treatise on Probability, that Keynes was, not only not a radical subjectivist like Shackle, but was not any kind of a subjectivist at all. Keynes, in fact, had built an objective, logical theory of probability on the foundations of George Boole’s 1854 The laws of Thought. Keynes’s definition of uncertainty in the General Theory in chapter 12 on p. 148 defined uncertainty as an inverse function of the weight of the evidence, w, from the A Treatise on Probability, where weight came in degrees. Weight of the evidence was defined in the A Treatise on Probability as 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. Shackle’s definition was that weight, w, always equaled 0 because no one had any knowledge of the future. That meant that uncertainty for Keynes had to come in different gradations or degrees. Shackle’s definition of uncertainty was actually equivalent to Keynes’s definition of ignorance, where w, based on a scale from 0 (no evidence) to 1(complete evidence), equaled 0. Shackle’s definition of uncertainty directly contradicted Keynes’s definition of uncertainty. Shackle was in a quandary and deeply worried about what to do until he discovered that Keynes‘s February,1937 reply to his critics in the Quarterly Journal of Economics did not mention w or the A Treatise on Probability as he had in the General Theory. However, then another problem came up for Shackle. Keynes kept using the word “degrees” throughout his reply in 1937 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. Keynes made it crystal clear that uncertainty came in degrees. However, Shackle found a paragraph in Keynes’s reply where Keynes concluded the paragraph with the conclusion that “We simply do not know”. Shackle decided that he would, there after, put forth the canard that this paragraph represented the true meaning of the General Theory and that no one would have to read the A Treatise on Probability or the General Theory because Keynes had finally figured out what he had wanted to say all of his life in that one paragraph. All one had to do was to read the February,1937 reply to his critics in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. Unfortunately, Joan Robinson, Austin Robinson and R Kahn all seconded Shackle’s canard as representing the true meaning of Keynesian uncertainty. In general, all Post Keynesian and Institutionalist economists based their work on Shackle’s canard. Uncertainty for Post Keynesians means total ignorance, although Post Keynesians hide this by talking about “irreducible” uncertainty, non quantitative probabilities, incomparability, non measurability incommensurability, etc. The exchanges between Keynes and Townshend from 1937 till 1938 directly contradict Shackle’s ploy and demonstrate that Keynes’s concept of uncertainty came directly from the A Treatise on Probability. Shackle kept pushing his canard from 1938 till his death in 1992.

Intervention to improve awareness of the risk factors for osteonecrosis of the jaw in patients under treatment with bisphosponates. Randomised clinical trial.

To evaluate the effectiveness of a health education programme on knowledge and reduction of the risk factors for bisphosphonate-related osteonecrosis of the jaw. An experimental study control group without intervention was performed with 60 subjects who had started treatment with bisphosphonates in the University Hospital of León from October to December 2014. Patients in the experimental group received a structured education intervention in two sessions. The data was collected from a heteroadministered questionnaire at the beginning and at the end of the study period for both groups. The educational intervention designed showed a significantly increased adherence to healthy behaviours related to oral hygiene such as mechanical control of plaque and the use of clorhexidine prior to invasive oral procedures. All subjects reported that they had not been advised to maintain a good level of oral health before starting treatment. After the intervention high percentages of recognition of early diagnostic measures starting from a baseline total ignorance of them were determined. No conclusive information about the use of removable dental prostheses, toxic habits or maintaining proper metabolic control in patients with diabetes mellitus was observed. Improving adherence to healthy behaviours related to oral health following the intervention, as well as their contribution to the early identification of warning signs of jaw osteonecrosis, stresses the importance of the use of health education as a tool in routine clinical practice.

Direct and indirect admission of ignorance by children

Research has shown that children are able to admit their own ignorance directly (i.e., verbally) by 3years of age when they are totally ignorant about what is hidden in a box (total ignorance task) but fail to do so until 5 or 6years of age when having seen different objects without seeing which of them is being hidden (partial exposure task). This study investigated whether an earlier understanding of own ignorance in the partial exposure task is found when using an indirect measure—when children are allowed to either opt out from a risky decision (Experiment 1) or seek clarifying information by peeking inside (Experiment 2). No evidence for an earlier understanding was found in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, however, 3- and 4-year-olds searched for clarifying information under partial exposure more often when being ignorant than when being knowledgeable. We argue that this discrepancy is related to whether spontaneous information seeking involves metacognitive processes or not.

Richard E. Braithwaite on J. M. Keynes's A Treatise on Probability and Logical Theory of Probability: Ignorance is Bliss

Richard E Braithwaite’s Oct,1931 review article in Mind on Jefferys’ work on probability also summarized what the current assessment of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability and logical theory of probability was. This assessment is based on a complete and total ignorance on Braithwaite’s part about what Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability. He had no idea about what an interval valued, indeterminate probability is. He had no idea about how Keynes built on Boole’s upper-lower bound approach. He had no idea about the concept of the weight of the evidence, w, and how it is connected to the size of the difference between the lower and upper bound. He apparently forgot that Keynes’s logical approach to probability was carefully laid out in 1907 and 1908, which would be 12 or 13 years before Harold Jeffreys published his articles in 1919 with Wrinch.Finally, Braithwaite had no idea about how to compare objects using a relation of similarity and/or dissimilarity which, of course, is the basic requirement needed for pattern recognition, which is recognized as fundamental by cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists if decision makers are to successfully use their intuition and induction. He is totally oblivious to the connection between degrees of similarity and Keynes’s logical probability relations. In short, he was an ignorant fool who failed abysmally, like Hugh Townshend, to make use of the clues Keynes periodically sent his way.

LOGÍSTICA REVERSA: UM ESTUDO DE CASO EM EMPRESAS DO SETOR MADEIREIRO NA FRONTEIRA OESTE DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL – RS

Reverse logistics makes possible the return of waste from the timber industry to the production cycle. Waste management of the raw material wood is a necessity for most municipalities in the western border of Rio Grande do Sul (RS), may by his absence or inadequacy promote environmental degradation through the natural resource waste. This paper seeks to expand knowledge on the state of reverse logistics of the timber industry products in two municipalities of the western border of Rio Grande do Sul. With respect to methodology, we used a case study, characterized by descriptive and exploratory nature. The data collection techniques were through questionnaires answered by the managers of companies in the cities of Bagé and Sao Gabriel. The main results were analyzed companies have total ignorance of Law No. 12,305 which established the National Policy on Solid Waste and the main use of such wood waste, wood shavings and sawdust are like. The study shows that the greatest difficulty is the lack of responsible and / or owners of companies with respect to the reverse logistics. Reverse logistics is able to make a revaluation of post-consumer waste, increasing business competitiveness and reducing the amount of waste.

SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT: RISK ANALYSIS BASED ON DECISION TREES UNDER CONDITIONS OF TOTAL AND PARTIAL IGNORANCE

Sustainability project is an important part of project management and depends on many factors, such as financial resources, human resources, scheduling operations and especially potential risks. This paper presents a way to work with uncertain information processing project risk analysis with regard to its sustainability. Risk management is an important part of various disciplines, e.g. Project management, Crisis management, Change management, Information Security Management System, etc. Risk analysis is mostly based on expert estimates. However, this may be a problem with brand new tasks as identification of different threats and their numerical evaluations can be interpreted as a decision-making task which can be formalised as a decision tree. A decision-making task solution requires knowledge of all relevant input information items (III), such as probabilities, penalties and profits. If all those numerical values are known then the well-known methods of decision trees evaluations can be used. However, if complex project management problems are solved then a substantial set of relevant data items is missing or its accuracies are prohibitively low. The aim of this paper is to present easy approach how missing elements of the III set can be obtained and integrated into incomplete data sets. The paper contributes a common sense heuristics to obtain missing elements of the III set which can generate all numerical values, i.e. a problem under complete ignorance is solve, and a reconciliation mechanism based on linear programming which allows results of common sense heuristics simply integrate into incomplete data set, i.e. a problem under partial ignorance is solved. The results are therefore divided into two parts. In the first part solves a problem under total ignorance. The second part of the case study evaluates some unknown probabilities, therefore solves a problem under partial ignorance. Both tasks, i.e. partial and total ignorance are demonstrated using a quasi-realistic decision tree. The decision tree has one root node, 6 lotteries and 15 terminals; the total number of unknown probabilities is 21 under total ignorance and 18 probabilities are evaluated under partial ignorance.

Ideology as a Transmitted Disease: the World of Asahan Alham

Asahan Alham is an Indonesian writer who has published, under slightly different names, four books defined as belonging to different genres. Those books can be read in different ways according to the prior knowledge (or total ignorance) that one has of the author’s biography and according to the objectives and inclinations of each reader. They are books of adventures and stories of love; they are also documentary sources about various political contexts, in Indonesia, in the USSR, and in Vietnam. This article shows that the four books, beyond considerable formal differences, constitute, above all, the intimate autobiography of a man swept along in the political turmoil of Soekarno’s and Soeharto’s Indonesia, and that this autobiography is unique with respect to the norms of that genre in Indonesia. Asahan Alham has introduced fiction into all levels of his texts: his biography, the social context and his own feelings and opinions. That autobiography, the most introspective among its kind in Indonesia, records not only the factual and authentic experience of the author, but also the imaginary and fantastic world within him.

The Case for Morality Religious Higher Education as Academia

Higher Education is Globalization and Integration-but is it? Stern Warning: This article is highly “Politically Incorrect” and proud of it. An oft-spoken historian’s rule is that the Hebrew Bible did not and could not have contributed anything significant to the rise of modern ideas and institutions. Quite the opposite, it is claimed by some to have been a hindrance. The ‘faith’ is drawn from Marx, that religion is the opiate of the masses-and who wants to be ‘masses’?! It is always more chic to be ‘liberal’ and ‘secular’ and anti-religion. And, if one can ‘get away’ with it, to be anti-religion while proudly declaring a state of utter ignorance about the subject. We probably all know of a certain biologist who makes a point of searing anti-religion statements while expressing pride in total ignorance of the subject. This article is not about religion. It is about Higher Education and the similarities between two types of it, as well as certain debts academia owes to Judaic Higher Education. Judaism has a very long history. Jewish Higher Education has a history nearly as long. Rabbi Akiva is known to have had an “academy” consisting of some 24,000 students, in the town of Bnei Brak, around the year 130 CE. What did they study? How did they study and learn? More importantly for this discussion: What were the pedagogy techniques? How ‘academic’ was it, in the sense of what we are familiar with today? And what can modern academics learn from this? Why is that last question of significance? Because those same and similar techniques are still used in Judaic Religious Higher Education today, with great success!