Top-two Research Articles

Campaign Dynamics of the Top-Two Primary: Invoking Competition and Representational Pressure in one-party Contests

ABSTRACTWhen top-two primaries produce general election contests between two candidates of the same party, those candidates can no longer rely on party-based voting to win. By changing the mix of opponents that candidates face, the top-two primary broadens the electorate to which candidates are pressured to respond. In this paper, I investigate how same-party contests influence candidates’ campaign strategies and representational efforts by interviewing state legislative candidates in Washington and North Carolina. I focus on candidates in lopsided districts that favour one party, but those in Washington faced opponents from within their own party. Two key findings emerge from these interviews. First, candidates in one-party contests broaden the ideological range of voters and interest groups to whom they appeal. Second, candidates in one-party contests adopt vigorous campaign strategies, including voter contact efforts, that one would expect in a highly-competitive contest – even when the contest is not competitive. Ultimately, findings improve our understanding of the consequences of electoral rules for representation.

Extreme districts, moderate winners: Same-party challenges, and deterrence in top-two primaries

AbstractIn an effort to break the link between districts' lack of competitiveness and the election of ideologues, Washington and California recently adopted the “top-two” primary election system. Among other features, the top-two primary allows members of the same party to run against one another in the general election. Although proponents argue that this system encourages the election of more moderate candidates in highly partisan districts, early reports have uncovered mixed evidence of this effect. This study addresses this puzzle by first disentangling the conditions under which one should expect such primaries to encourage the election of more moderate candidates. Using election returns data from the 2008 through 2014 elections, I find that districts facing same-party general-election competition do elect more moderate legislators than similar districts not subject to same-party competition. However, using an application of a common regression discontinuity diagnostic test, I also find that elite actors appear able to strategically avoid this kind of competition—partially explaining why broader effects of the top-two have not been uncovered. The findings contribute not only to ongoing debates about the effectiveness of the top-two primary, but also to our understanding of how political elites may maneuver institutional changes to their own benefit.

Polarization and the Top-Two Primary: Moderating Candidate Rhetoric in One-Party Contests

Top-two primaries reshape the electoral process by changing the mix of opponents that candidates face, thus altering the electorate to which they must respond. Specifically, when top-two primaries produce two same-party opponents for the general election, candidates cannot simply rely on party-based voting to win. Advocates of the top-two primary system contend that if safe districts offer voters the choice between ideologically extreme and moderate candidates of the same party in the general election, voters should choose the more moderate option. Research to date suggests that this is not the case. If the top-two primary does invoke moderation, I argue that it should be because it is self-imposed by candidates in response to new electoral incentives. The change in primary rules should cause candidates to self-moderate in hopes of broadening the range of potential voters that they may capture. I test this proposition by examining the rhetoric found on state legislative candidate websites during the 2016 election. Results show that those facing same-party opponents use more moderate, bipartisan, and vague messaging when compared to those facing opponents of the opposite party.

The Top Two Primary: What Can California Learn from Washington?

The Top Two Primary: What Can California Learn from Washington?

Primary Divisiveness and General Election Success: A Re-examination

IS A CANDIDATE for elective office helped or harmed by a divisive primary election experience? The usual assumption is, of course, that the candidate's prospects are harmed because hotly contested primaries intensify the conflicts between different elements within the party. Such intraparty conflicts contribute to the loss of votes in the general election, for supporters of the loser either vote for the opposition or abstain from participating altogether. An abundant literature, both scholarly and journalistic, testifies to the destructiveness of divisive primary campaigns. The mood is wel expressed by Theodore H. White: