Ticket Voting Research Articles

The theory of straight ticket voting

This paper explores the effects of the straight-ticket voting option (STVO) on the positions of politicians. STVO, present in some US states, allows voters to select one party for all partisan elections listed on the ballot, as opposed to filling out each office individually. We analyse the effects of STVO on policy-making by building a model of pre-election competition. STVO results in greater party loyalty of candidates, while increasing the weight of non-partisan voters’ positions in candidate selection. This induces an asymmetric effect on vote shares and implemented policies in the two-party system.

Place, candidate roots, and voter preferences in an age of partisan polarization: Observational and experimental evidence

Throughout the mid-twentieth century, scholars identified considerable contextual variation in American electoral politics. Party platforms varied significantly across the country, split ticket voting was commonplace, and candidate idiosyncrasies appeared to matter a great deal to voters. According to previous research, candidates' roots seemed especially important to voters, with “homegrown” candidates enjoying a boost at the polls. There is good reason to expect, however, that voters may no longer care about candidate roots. Partisan politics have polarized, both ideologically amongst elites and “affectively” amongst the electorate, continually since the mid-1990s (Mason, 2018). In addition, recent work suggests that American political behavior has “nationalized; ” meaning that national level partisan cues dominate voters' decision calculus, from presidential to mayoral races (Hopkins 2018). Both trends suggest little to no role for apolitical candidate characteristics to factor into voters' evaluations of candidates. To reassess voters’ appetite for homegrown candidates, this paper features observational and conjoint experimental studies designed to discern whether individuals in the United States still care about candidate roots. Results indicate that, despite trends of partisan polarization and nationalization, voters continue to consider candidate roots important. Furthermore, this preference appears especially strong among those with a strong place identity, suggesting that those for whom geographical identity is most important are particularly sensitive to geographical cues.

The Ethnic Implications of Preferential Voting

Around the turn of the century, political developments in Northern Ireland, Fiji and Papua New Guinea encouraged claims that preferential voting systems could steer polities in the direction of ‘moderate’ multi-ethnic government. Sixteen years later, we have a longer time period and larger volume of data to reassess these verdicts. This article investigates ballot transfer and party vote–seat share patterns in the seven deeply divided polities with some experience of preferential voting for legislative elections or direct presidential elections (Northern Ireland, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Estonia, Sri Lanka, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Southern Rhodesia). We find little support for centripetalist claims that such systems encourage ‘moderate’ parties. We argue that where district magnitude is low, where voters are required to rank preferences and where ticket voting prevails, departures from vote–seat proportionality may favour ‘moderate’ parties, but such heavily engineered systems may simply advantage the larger parties or yield erratic outcomes.

Split Ticket Voting and Social Networks in New and Established Democracies: A Quasi-Experiment in the 1990 German Unification Elections

When deciding to cast a split ticket ballot, voters in established democracies can rely on their experience with democracy and long term party attachments to guide their voting behavior. However, voters in new democracies do not have these individual level sources of information and motivation, and may instead rely on information from their social networks. Using the 1990 Cross-National Election Project German Unification election study, I examine the information sources West and East Germans use when splitting their ballot. I find that political disagreement within a social network is much more influential in decisions to cast a split ticket ballot for East German voters, while individual-level traits, particularly party attachment, play a greater role for West German voters. These findings indicate that, in absence of competition between individual-level information sources, network characteristics may have a profound impact on political decision-making.

Do Coal Unions and Racial Diversity Affect Split Ticket Voting in Kentucky?

Do Coal Unions and Racial Diversity Affect Split Ticket Voting in Kentucky?

Ballot design and split ticket voting in multiparty systems: Experimental evidence on information effects and vote choice

This article presents the results of a large-scale e-vote experiment, conducted during the 2005 Congressional Election in Argentina, measuring the effect of different e-vote designs on split ticket voting. The experiment demonstrates that ballot design and e-vote technology significantly affect split ticket voting and the overall outcome of elections in multiparty settings. We explain these differences by analyzing the information cues used by voters when searching for their preferred parties and candidates. We show that cues that reinforce party-centric information on the ballot, such as the party name or the party logo, significantly decrease split ticket voting. By contrast, priming on candidate-centric features in the ballot significantly increases split ticket voting. We test for biases that result from selectively disclosing information on candidates or parties among voters with different levels of information.

Ideological Ambiguity and Split Ticket Voting

Recent research on congressional elections suggests that voters are more likely to split their votes in ideologically extreme districts. The authors suggest that in this type of context, uncertainty about candidate position rather than clarity explains the occurrence of ticket splitting. Using data from a rolling cross-section campaign survey where two incumbents competed in a predominately conservative district, the authors find that a substantial proportion of voters are likely to have difficulty identifying which congressional candidate was more conservative. Moreover, media exposure contributed to ambiguity over candidate position, which increases the likelihood of ticket splitting.

Split Ticket Voting in Mixed Member Proportional Systems: The Hypothetical Case of The Netherlands

In Mixed Member Proportional systems, voters are able to split their vote. To what extent do voters use this opportunity, which voters seem to use this opportunity most and what are the potential consequences of split ticket voting? These questions are answered by comparatively analyzing motives for split ticket voting and factors that facilitate such behavior and apply them to the Dutch situation. Moreover, we employ various simulations based on the last three parliamentary elections in order to assess the potential consequences of split ticket voting under different electoral system proposals. In general, these results indicate that split ticket voting will not have substantial effects on the distribution of seats in parliament.

Realignment and party revival: understanding American electoral politics at the turn of the twenty-first century

Preface Introduction: Realignment and the Revival of Parties A Century of Presidential Elections: From of to System of '96 The Democratic Party as a Multifactional System, 1896-1964 The Republican Party as a Bifactional System, 1896-1964 Ideological Polarization and Party Change: Realignment of the Factional Systems, 1964-1972 Party Decay and the New Nominating Politics, 1972-1980 Ideological Polarization and the Two-Tier Party System: Split Ticket Voting, Divided Government, and Realignment in American Politics Race and Class in the Post-New Deal Order Realignment and the Study of American Elections Conclusion: The Party System and American Democracy in the Twenty-First Century Epilogue: The Y2K Election

Split ticket voting in the 1995 Russian Duma elections

High levels of split ticket voting in elections usually indicate either an instrumental electorate, or widespread disaffection from the major parties. Elections to the Russian lower house, the Duma, permit voters both party list options and single-member ballots; as a result, the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections recorded some of the highest levels of split ticket voting ever recorded. Using national survey data collected just after the 1995 Duma election, we test two major explanations for split ticket voting, one based on the activities of voters, the other on the strategic behaviour of parties. The results show that split ticket voting is caused by voters, and more specifically, by their weak attachments to parties. But party strategy also plays a modest role in promoting the phenomenon. In the absence of major reform of the Russian electoral system, split ticket voting is likely to remain at high levels.

Analyzing the turnout-competition link with aggregate cross-sectional data*

Numerous papers by Public Choice oriented scholars and others have sought to test the hypothesis inspired by Downs (1957) that, ceteris paribus, turnout should be higher when elections are close. Most look in cross-sectional terms at variations in turnout at the constituency level for elections of a given type. By and large the results have been disappointing (see, e.g., Foster, 1984). We are skeptical of these weak findings and argue that a complete portrait of the turnout-competition link requires us to examine that link for at least three different types of turnout (turnout among potential eligibles, turnout among registrants, and turnout for a given office relative to other offices such as top of the ticket), and to take into account longitudinal changes in turnout. For recent off-year elections to the U.S. Senate and also for off-year elections to the U.S. House of Representatives in states where there was no gubernatorial or senatorial contest on the ballot, we find strong evidence for higher turnout among eligibles in close contests. For these elections to the U.S. Senate we also find evidence for an ecological effect that leads to turnout being maximized at values of competition other than 50–50. Moreover, when we look at turnout for office relative to top of the ticket voting in the California Assembly and the U.S. Senate in presidential years, we again find some evidence for an ecological effect in which turnout is maximized at a value of Republican vote share above 50 percent and find further strong evidence for a clear link between competition and turnout for office among those at the polls.

Economic Interests and the Framing of the 1988 and 1992 Deomcratic and Republican Party Platforms

In this paper, the role that economic groups play in attempting to shape party platforms is examined by analyzing economic group presence at the 1988 and 1992 Democratic and Republican platform writing hearings. Whether the same economic groups participating as witnesses in the platform writing hearings also contributed to the presidential campaigns is also explored. The findings suggest that economic interest group participation varied widely between 1988 and 1992 and declined across years. Trade associations dominated economic group participation whereas labor unions did not take an active role. Business interests showed a strong preference for the Republicans in 1988 and reasonably equal interest in both parties the following year. The participatory decline among these groups may be explained by a growing perception that platforms are less effective as campaign guides and policy tools in an era dominated by candidate centered elections, split ticket voting and increasing independent identification, all indicators of decreasing reliance on the parties at the mass and elite levels.

Split ticket voting in Australia: Dealignment and inconsistent votes reconsidered

This article critically examines the traditional American assumption that split ticket voting represents an indicator of partisan dysfunction and dealignment. It is argued that this assumption ignores the impact of system‐specific voting structures on voting patterns. Thus, we propose alternatively to explore ticket spitting in Australia, where a system of preferential vote and proportional representation creates very different structural opportunities for voters to pursue tactical votes that need not engender dealignment. Aggregate and survey data from the 1987 and 1990 federal elections are analysed. Aggregate results show a general upturn in voting consistent with tactical voting, while survey results suggest Australian ticket splitters are a tactically aware, politically interested subset who, in the context of wavering, but not supplanted partisanship, utilise especially Senate minor party votes to put a brake on major party hegemony.

The measurement of Presidential punch

Presidential punch is the effect on electoral outcomes of the endorsement or campaigning for others by a President who is not himself running. Distinct from the more well-researched topic of Presidential coattails—the propensity of strong Presidential candidates to pull Congressional and Senatorial candidates into office with themselves—Presidential punch requires more than straight ticket voting. Voters must be aware of an explicit endorsement and the effect of that awareness depends on their evaluation of the President. Analyses of data from 1977 gubernatorial elections in New Jersey and Virginia demonstrate that then-President Carter's impact on those races depended on the interaction of (a) knowledge of Carter's support for the Democratic candidate and (b) evaluation of Carter's performance as President.

Multi‐member electorates and the development of Australian party politics

Abstract Australian political scientists have paid little attention to voting in multi‐member electorates apart from the working of Proportional Representation in Tasmania and the Senate. Yet the existence of such electorates and the methods of voting therein probably helped Labor parties gain their first representation in the colonial parliaments. The strength of their organisations meant that those parties often fared well in the state‐wide electorates for the Senate after federation. From 1902 the prohibition of plumping in Senate elections fostered ticket voting. It not only introduced the first coercive element into the electoral system, but, by establishing a ‘winner‐take‐all’ method of voting, encouraged a two‐party system at federal level.

Who Were the Stalwarts? Who Were Their Rivals? Republican Factions in the Gilded Age

The years from Reconstruction to the Spanish-American War, the so-called Gilded Age, were a golden age of political partisanship. Crossover voting was rare; independents were scorned. To a degree unmatched since, party loyalty was a test of manhood; partisan allegiance represented a means of self-identification. To be a Republican or to be a Democrat-these were not lightly-made decisions but were shaped by self-interest, ethnicity, and, above all, history, most notably the polarizing trauma of the Civil War. Such passionately-held partisanship did not guarantee party unity. Quite the contrary; the very importance of parties as institutions intensified the internal struggle to control the party's machinery and shape its program. Yet, at the same time, the political imperatives of an era characterized by high voter turnout, straight ticket voting, and close national elections dictated a strategy of mobilizing one's own adherents rather than persuading the unpersuaded. Since one disgruntled faction could deprive the national ticket of victory by sitting on its hands, party managers were compelled to devote the bulk of their energies to securing party unity and enthusiasm. In the voluminous correspondence of James A. Garfield during the presidential campaign of 1880, for example, there is scarcely any mention of the Democrats, but considerable attention is paid to

Perception of Information Sources and Likelihood of Split Ticket Voting

Perception of Information Sources and Likelihood of Split Ticket Voting

The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876–1908

In the last two decades of political science, there has been considerable interest in the determinants of electoral behavior. Theories have been developed and tested on the sociological, psychological, and political antecedents of the vote. Virtually neglected in this search for determinants have been the institutional or structural properties of the electoral system itself. With a few notable exceptions, such factors as electoral qualification requirements, registration laws, and ballot and voting systems have not generated much research enthusiasm. These institutional properties, however, provide the framework within which the effects of other independent variables must be judged. This applies to all basic electoral research—whether time specific or longitudinal—but especially to the latter. Too often longitudinal research tries to trace the causes of changing voting patterns without taking into account the institutional framework. A pointed example of this is Walter Dean Burnham's recent description of this country's “changing political universe” around the turn of the century—a change which he ascribed to a breakdown in party competition and consequent voter alienation, but which undoubtedly could be partially, if not largely, explained by reference to the many institutional changes in voting rules which occurred during this period. The effects of institutional properties must be sorted out if the researcher is to establish reliable baselines against which to measure the effects of other variables.The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of one such institutional property of the electoral system—the Australian Ballot reform—on the changing split ticket voting patterns of the American electorate in the 1876–1908 time period.

Voting Statistics and Presidential Coattails

The coattail effect in presidential and congressional races was long supposed to show that the winning presidential candidate led his party to victory by adding votes to the ticket all along the line. The fact that the same party almost always won control of both houses of congress and usually also a majority of the governorships at stake at the time of a presidential victory made this a plausible theory.More recently, the sweeping nature of such an explanation has been challenged. The first criticism of the simple theory noted that even when a presidential candidate wins, congressional candidates in some districts lead the president. In these cases, presumably, the congressional candidates' coattails are more effective.A second criticism pointed to the paradox in the assumption that if a presidential candidate leads his party by a wide margin, he is an effective candidate for the party ticket. The greater the margin, presumably, the stronger are the presidential coattails. But large margins, on the contrary, must indicate that the presidential candidate has not been able to transfer all of his votes to the congressional ticket; and so it would seem that the attraction of his coattails is minimal if this margin is great. Thus the most significant symptom of the coattail process is straight ticket voting.

The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting

The extraordinary discrepancy in the popular vote for President Eisenhower and the vote for Republican Congressmen in the 1956 election dramatized a privilege which the American electorate exercises almost uniquely in the democratic world, the right of voters to split their ballots between the candidates of opposing political parties.The fact of ballot splitting in American elections is of course a commonplace but it has not been widely studied and it is not well understood. The aggregative statistics from the 1956 election make it apparent that millions of voters must have chosen President Eisenhower and a Democratic congressman but they do not tell us how many voters split their ballots in the opposite direction or how many voted for president but not for Congressman, and they give us only the vaguest indications of what was in the voters' minds when they crossed party lines in marking their ballots.