This paper analyzes several prevalent misconceptions about nuclear fuel cycles that breed fissile uranium-233 from thorium. Its main conclusions are: U-233, despite the gamma radioactivity of associated isotopes, is a rather attractive material for making fission bombs, and is a credible material for subnational as well as national groups to use for this purpose; (2) pure thorium cycles, which in effect merely substitute U-233 for Pu, would take many decades and much U to establish, and offer no significant safeguards advantage over Pu, cycles; (3) denatured Th-U cycles, which dilute the U-233 with inert U-238 to a level not directly usable in bombs, are not an effective safeguard even against subnational bomb-making; (4) several other features of mixed Th-U cycles are rather unattractive from a safeguards point of view; (5) thus, Th cycles of any kind are not a technical fix for proliferation (national or subnational) and, though probably more safeguardable than Pu cycles, are less so than once-through U cycles that entail no reprocessing; (6) while thorium cycles have some potential technical advantages, including flexibility, they cannot provide major savings in nuclear fuel resources compared to simpler ways of saving neutrons and U; and (7) while advocates of nuclearmore » power may find Th cycles worth exploring, such cycles do not differ fundamentally from U cycles in any of the respects--including safeguards and fuel resources--that are relevant to the broader nuclear debate, and should not be euphorically embraced as if they did.« less