Third-party Candidates Research Articles

The trail blazers: women as third-party candidates in elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1912–2012

ABSTRACTHistorically, very few female candidates have ever won election to the U.S. House of Representatives. In addition, very few third-party candidates have ever won election to the House. With data from 1912 to 2012 on more than 54,000 candidates, we provide an historical overview of third-party activity in general elections to the House and the participation of female candidates. Our analysis shows that third parties have been a consistent presence in elections to the House and a major avenue for women. Using a vector autoregression model and Granger causality tests, we also show that from 1912 to 1964, women nominated by third parties were “trail blazers” potentially influencing the movement of women into the major parties. We also show that since 1964, the presence of women among third-party nominees has been influenced by the increasing proportion of women as major-party nominees. Our analysis thus uncovers a “hidden history” that enhances our understanding of how women have participated in over a century of electoral politics.

Stealth Partisan Spoilers: Evaluating the Logic Behind Partisan Disaffiliation Requirements for Independent and Third-Party Candidates

In this article, we evaluate the rationale behind partisan disaffiliation laws, which prevent a candidate from running as an independent or from switching parties if they have not adequately severed their ties to an existing party. One prominent justification for these laws is that they help prevent voter confusion, which may result in the most preferred candidate losing. Utilizing a database of state legislative elections from 1968 to 2014, we categorize independent and third-party candidates into two groups: those who have run in the past as a Democrat or Republican, who we refer to as “stealth partisans,” and “pure” non-major party candidates. The findings reveal that the latter appear to have expressive motivations for running for office, making them less strategic about where to run and unlikely to run again. In contrast, stealth partisans are much more likely to have held state legislative office, and are more likely to have run multiple times; they are also more strategic, running under conditions that are advantageous for non-major party candidates. Voters react to this, giving pure non-major party candidates far fewer votes than stealth partisans and being more apt to vote for them when “spoiling” an election is less likely. As a result, pure non-major party candidates rarely deny winning candidates majorities, while stealth partisans who have won office in the past do so more than half the time. Our findings regarding “vote stealing” do not indicate a systematic tendency for stealth partisans to take substantially more votes from the party they recently left in comparison to the other major party. Overall, our findings indicate that partisan disaffiliation laws achieve the objectives they are designed to promote.

Waste Not, Vote Not (for Third Parties)?

I develop and demonstrate evidence for a theory of strategic, state-based voting in American presidential elections. Such voting occurs when individuals anticipate the behavior of their neighbors and cater their voting decisions accordingly. I turn to an infrequently-studied phenomenon to uncover evidence for this theory: support for minor-party presidential candidates. The Electoral College in the United States determines the victors of presidential elections. Since most states allocate their electors on a winner-takes-all basis, and because voting outcomes in some states are more unpredictable than in others, presidential candidates tend to cluster their campaign resources in competitive or “battleground” states. Voters who reside in these states live in different campaign environments than voters who reside in uncompetitive, “blackout” states. I suggest that voters in competitive states anticipate the decisions of their fellow residents and perceive that their votes have higher pivot values than votes in other states. The perceived value of votes is expected to vary across states due to differences in electoral competitiveness and the winner-takes-all nature of awarding Electoral College votes. As a result, I propose that voters in competitive states are more likely to vote strategically than voters in other states. To test my hypotheses, I turn to the election returns of third-party candidates in two recent presidential elections. I find that support for minor parties is positively associated with wider two-party margins of victory, after adjusting for ballot access and campaign resources.

Why news reporters ignore third-party candidates

In-depth interviews with eight political reporters who covered the 2002 gubernatorial campaigns in California and Wisconsin finds reporters produced little coverage of even the most serious third-party candidates because they define the campaign almost exclusively as a contest between the Democrats and Republicans.

Never Call Retreat: Theodore Roosevelt and the Great War. By J. Lee Thompson. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 362 pp.

Never Call Retreat: Theodore Roosevelt and the Great War. By J. Lee Thompson. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 362 pp. While at the George C. Marshall Foundation's archives researching General Marshall's involvement in the First World War, this reviewer had the pleasure of opening the first folder of the first box and seeing that the very first document was a 1917 letter from former President Theodore Roosevelt to a then-Captain Marshall, releasing him of his commitment to join a new volunteer unit that the former had hoped would be among the first American divisions sent to France. Roosevelt noted that despite the clear provisions in the recent draft legislation allowing for such units (up to four of them, in fact), and in spite of his own strenuous efforts to convince the administration that he was ready for the challenge, President Wilson simply would not authorize any at that time. Although Marshall's goal of being one of the first American officers sent to France was soon realized, Roosevelt's dreams for additional heroic military service were never personally fulfilled, and he had to settle for pushing the war effort at home and the pride of knowing that all four of his sons were doing their bit abroad. This unexpected letter was a reminder of the ways that Roosevelt, years after his departure from the White House and even after his failed run as a third-party candidate in 1912, was still very much near the center of American political and cultural life during the years of World War I. In Never Call Retreat, historian and professor J. Lee Thompson has produced an engaging, well-researched, and thoroughly documented narrative history of Roosevelt's Great War years that provides greater detail than any previous historical account. After a brief account of Roosevelt's 1910 visit to Europe to deliver a belated address for the Nobel Peace Prize (and, ironically, to meet with the German Kaiser), Thompson jumps to the summer of 1914 and covers the months and years until Roosevelt's death in January 1919- Thompson systematically covers three- to six-month periods per chapter, describing, or more accurately, usually just presenting Roosevelt's uniformly entertaining and strident views on the significant issues of the day, while also chronicling his activities and travels. As Thompson clearly shows, Roosevelt was as vocal and active as ever, and while his views were not as synchronized with those of the national electorate as they had been in 1904, his preaching and writing often proved prescient. The former president was at the vanguard of movements for national military preparedness, for undivided patriotic Americanism, and even for some sort of consortium of nations, such as a League of Peace, with the will and power to enforce justice and peace in the international arena. …

Virginia's Invisible Candidate

This study examines the 2013 Virginia gubernatorial campaign to see how the state's newspapers covered a third-party candidate in a year in which voters said they were looking for an alternative to the Democrat and Republican. The study found that the third-party gubernatorial candidate received significantly less news coverage than the Democrat and Republican, even though he had strong favorability ratings while the major-party nominees were highly unpopular. The Democrat and Republican were mentioned more frequently in stories, headlines, and leads; they were quoted more often; and their issue positions were discussed more frequently than were those of the Libertarian. The study supports critical studies theory that the mainstream news media protect established power rather than acting as a conduit through which citizens can learn about all of their choices in an election.

Americans’ Attitudes Toward the Political Parties and the Party System

Drawing on survey data from ANES, Gallup, Pew, and other polls, this article examines attitudes toward the parties and the party system from 1996 to 2014. A previous Poll Trends analysis of the parties, through 1995, found antipathy toward the party system but not toward the parties themselves. The data since 1996 demonstrate that extreme discontent now extends beyond the party system to the Republican and Democratic parties. The data also show that Americans have grown more likely to see sharp differences between the major parties, and to perceive both parties as too ideological. As for the party system, Americans express a high degree of ambivalence. On one hand, many believe that the major parties do not do an adequate job of representing the people, and that the country needs a third political party. On the other hand, there is skepticism that a third party would improve the quality of American democracy. Surveys continually register almost no support or even willingness to seriously consider support for a third-party candidate

Election Fundamentals and Polls Favor the Republicans

Election Fundamentals and Polls Favor the Republicans

Partisanship in the Antislavery Press during the 1844 Run of an Abolition Candidate for President

Historians label the 1844 presidential election as pivotal, heightening political andsectional tensions. Abolitionist third-party candidate James Birney was a viable alternative forantislavery voters in a campaign that featured two slaveholders. This study of antislaverynewspapers during that campaign concludes that although the antislavery press claimed to besingularly focused on abolition, its editors were distracted by the election and mirrored thepartisan press of that era in their treatment of the various candidates. Furthermore, Liberty Party editors and their Garrisonian counterparts addressed each other with the same level of disdain that they directed at the Whigs and Democrats.

The Business Cycle and the Entry of Third-Party Candidates in the State-Level Elections

The Business Cycle and the Entry of Third-Party Candidates in the State-Level Elections

Two presidents are better than one: the case for a bipartisan executive branch

When delegates discussed the structure of the presidency at the Constitutional Convention in June 1787, serious objections to a unitary executive were raised. Edmund Randolph warned, for example, that a one-person presidency would become the “foetus of monarchy.” Controversy over the idea of a single president was predictable. Only recently had the framers freed themselves from the tyranny of King George III, and they were firmly committed to creating a new government that would not abuse its powers and oppress its citizens. It must have seemed preposterous to replace a hereditary monarch with an elected monarch.To be sure, the framers invoked important arguments for a unitary executive. While Congress would deliberate, the president would act with decisiveness and dispatch. A single president would bring order and energy to the national government. With the passage of time, however, it has become clear that the founding fathers misjudged the consequences of their choice:They did not anticipate the extent to which executive power would expand and give us an “imperial presidency” that dominates Congress and that too often exercises its authority in ways that are detrimental to the national interest. They did not predict the role that political parties would come to play and how battles to capture the White House would greatly aggravate partisan conflict. They did not recognize that single presidents would represent party ideology much more than the overall public good. And they misjudged the advantages and disadvantages of single versus multiple decision makers.Had the framers been able to predict the future, they would have been far less enamored with the idea of a unitary executive and far more receptive to the alternative proposals for a plural executive that they rejected. Like their counterparts in Europe, they might well have created an executive branch in which power is shared among multiple persons from multiple political parties.If the presidency is to fulfill the founding fathers’ vision and function more effectively, it needs to be reconceived. This need for constitutional change led me to the proposal for reform that I consider in this book — the replacement of the one-person, one-party presidency with a two-person, two-party presidency.A coalition presidency carries the potential for many important benefits — a balancing of power between the executive and legislative branches, a dampening of partisan conflict in Washington, an executive branch more representative of the entire electorate, real opportunities for third-party candidates to win election, and wiser presidential decision making.After more than two hundred years with the Constitution’s one-person presidency, it may seem preposterous to suggest a plural executive. But a coalition presidency would be far more faithful to the framers’ view of executive power. They wanted a president with limited authority who would serve as a co-equal with Congress. They also believed that power should be contained by dividing it and requiring it to be shared. A two-person presidency relies on the framers’ structural devices to promote their core values. And by correcting the dysfunction in Washington and making the executive branch operate more effectively, a two-person, bipartisan presidency can be justified even without reference to original intent.

Partisan News and the Third-Party Candidate

By the 1844 presidential election, the United States was fully entrenched in a national two-party system that pitted Whigs against Democrats. Meanwhile, American newspapers were predominantly partisan organs that promoted their respective parties while attacking their opponents. Some special interest publications advocated for causes such as abolition, fames G. Birney, a slaveholder turned abolitionist, entered the 1844 race as a third-party candidate. This article studied coverage of his race in Democratic, Whig, and Liberty papers from New York, Kentucky, Alabama, and Ohio to determine whether abolitionist newspapers acted as a party press as well as how the two major parties’ newspapers treated the outsider. The two abolitionist journals became partisan organs for the Liberty candidate, advocating Birney and his platform while attacking the enemy. In the Democratic and Whig papers, coverage of the Liberty campaign consisted of linking Birney to the opposing party through rampant accusations of coalitions and forgeries.

News Coverage Different for Third-Party Candidates

A content analysis of coverage of gubernatorial campaigns shows that Green and Libertarian party candidates receive significantly different coverage than do major-party contenders. They appear less frequently in headlines, lead paragraphs and stories.

Hegemonic Duopoly at the Grass Roots: Why Progressive Third Parties Rarely Win State House Elections

This article addresses why US progressive third parties today seldom win state legislative elections, despite apparent opportunities to the contrary. It analyzes seventeen illustrative races for state representative in New England. It finds that seemingly viable progressive third-party candidates often lose because they are not sufficiently connected to their districts socially. Due to this deficit, they are unable to appeal to as many voters as typically better connected major party opponents. This is interpreted as indicative both of major parties' hegemonic ability to dominate local elections through sheer social influence and of the corresponding need for progressive third parties to develop more such influence.

Truman's triumphs: the 1948 election and the making of postwar America

The Chicago Tribune headline DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN remains infamously wrong about the outcome of the 1948 presidential election. But, as Andrew Busch reveals, there is much more to this story than the well-worn image of a victorious and beaming President Harry Truman parading the newspaper's erroneously headlined front page for all to see. Primarily a contest between Truman and challenger Thomas Dewey, the 1948 presidential race offered something for everyone, including two third-party candidates (Strom Thurmond and Henry Wallace), triumphant grit, tragic hubris, dangerous naivete, accidents of fate, accusations of betrayal, foreign crises, the birth of Israel in the Middle East, a dramatic special session of Congress, internecine battles among unions and liberals, spies, extremists galore (including Ku Klux Klansmen and Communists), the first televised convention, wayward polls, and, of course, a final result that surprised many. Amid a small library of books on the topic, Busch's stands out by offering the best scholarly study available--and the most readable. His fresh account goes beyond previous work by examining more closely the nomination season, key congressional elections, and the state of public opinion. He also digs into splits in both parties--the Democrats seeing Southern segregationists and the far left run their own candidates and the Republicans facing a division between philosophical wings representing the 80th Congress and the presidential ticket--and tells why the Republican schism proved more damaging. He concludes that the election was especially significant as an affirmation of the New Deal, of anti-Communist containment, and of gradual progress in civil rights--all of which established the political baseline for postwar America. Even readers knowledgeable about Truman's 1948 victory will discover new findings in this fresh and revealing account of that dramatic race. Truman's Triumphs recalls a contest with more twists and turns--and a different outcome--than most contemporaries anticipated, and makes engaging reading for scholar and history buff alike.

Third-Party Labels Bias Evaluations of Political Platforms and Candidates

The current research investigated the role that partisanship plays in evaluations of third-party political policies and candidate evaluations. Democratic and Republican participants read political party and candidate brochures labeled with their own party or with an ideologically similar third party (Green or Libertarian). All other brochure information was identical. Participants evaluated the policies and candidate more favorably and indicated a greater intention to vote for the candidate when the brochure was labeled with their own party than the third party. Study 2 suggested that these effects were not due to strategic voting and that emotion may be a mediating variable.

Third-party threat and the dimensionality of major-party roll call voting

This paper assesses the influence of the electoral threat of third parties on major-party roll call voting in the US House. Although low-dimensionality of voting is a feature of strong two-party politics, which describes the contemporary era, there is significant variation across members. I hypothesize that major-party incumbents in districts under a high threat from third-party House candidates cast votes that do not fit neatly onto the dominant ideological dimension. This hypothesis is driven by (1) third party interests in orthogonal issues, and (2) incumbents accounting for those interests when casting votes in order to minimize the impact of third parties. An empirical test using data from the 105th to 109th Congresses provides evidence of this effect.

Health Coverage for America: Signed, Sealed, and Delivered by the 2012 Election

The century-long struggle to establish a national health insurance system ended on November 8, 2012, when Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) told ABC News reporter Diane Sawyer on a live national television interview that Obamacare is the law of the land, and there would be no more attempts by the House to repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) (PPACA). Republicans opposed the bill from the start and fell just one Senate vote short in their attempt to defeat it. Anger about the new law contributed to the Republicans' victory in the 2010 midterm elections, in which they won 63 House seas and regained the majority they lost to the Democrats in 2006. After President Obama signed PPACA into law in March 2010, the newly elected Republican majority in the House voted more than 30 times to repeal it, despite their knowledge that repeal would never pass the Democrat-controlled Senate. While the House majority was approving repeal bills, other opponents of the law sought relief through the judiciary. Multiple lawsuits were filed by state attorneys general alleging the law to be unconstitutional, and these suits appeared to be making some headway as lower courts split on the constitutionality of the mandate requiring nearly everyone to buy health insurance or pay a tax. The Supreme Court resolved the conflicting lower court decisions last June in yet another close vote when their five-to-four decision ruled against the 26 state attorneys general. Only after the reelection of President Obama, buttressed by Democratic gains in both chambers of Congress, did the Republican leadership finally throw in the towel. Opposition to PPACA stands on reasonably firm political ground when you examine the lukewarm popular support for the law. The Kaiser Family Foundation conducted 32 monthly polls between March 2010 and November 2012 that showed the country to be consistently divided on the issue. The percentage of the population holding a favorable opinion of the law ranged between 34 percent and 50 percent, whereas those holding unfavorable opinions had a nearly identical monthly range of 35 percent to 51 percent. In 23 of the 32 months, the unfavorables outnumbered the favorables (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012c). Some argue that these polls do not really reflect PPACA's popular support. They point to other Kaiser surveys that have found broad endorsement for nearly all of the law's individual components when these were presented to survey respondents independently and not tied to PPACA (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a). Others note that some of the unfavorable opinions came from respondents who wanted the law to go further, but the larger truth is that the overwhelming political support enjoyed by programs like Medicare and Social Security has yet to materialize for PPACA. Deep-seated American ambivalence toward universal health coverage is 100 years old. In 1912, Teddy Roosevelt and his Progressive (Bull Moose) party first proposed universal health care to the national electorate. With support of Jane Addams, who gave a seconding speech for Roosevelt's nomination, and some large corporations like U.S. Steel, Roosevelt's campaign was more successful than that of any other third-party candidate in U.S. history, garnering far more popular and electoral votes than the incumbent president, William Howard Taft, a Republican. However, Roosevelt lost this White House bid to Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, and a credible call for national health insurance did not reemerge until the New Deal. Franklin Roosevelt initially included national health care in his Social Security legislation. However, he jettisoned that component of the bill when he deemed it politically unpalatable and a threat to enactment of his old age and unemployment insurance proposals (Physicians for a National Health Program, 2012). Attempts to enact national health insurance were revived under Harry Truman's Fair Deal after his election in 1948, when several of our European allies were creating national health care systems. …

Frontiers, Germs, and Nonconformist Voting

An emerging literature has documented differences in values and behavioral practices (including conformity) between frontiers (areas that were more recently settled) and areas with a longer history of settlement. However, so far there have been few tests of which mechanisms might contribute to the maintenance of such regional differences. The present study provides the first test of the hypothesis that differences in pathogen prevalence might underlie this regional variation. Specifically, the relationship between frontier settlement, pathogen prevalence, and nonconformist voting was explored. Date of statehood, a proxy for recency of settlement, was positively correlated with votes for third-party candidates, and this relationship was partially mediated by pathogen prevalence. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Expressive motives and third-party candidates

The electoral success of an extremist party usually attracts considerable attention. Yet, they rarely have an opportunity to directly influence policy as they are, more often than not, shut out of the policy-making process by mainstream parties. Extremist parties may, however, influence policy indirectly by inducing mainstream parties to adjust their electoral strategies. I consider a model of electoral competition between an expressive extremist party and two mainstream parties in first-past-the-post and majority runoff elections. The presence of an extremist party results in an equilibrium policy outcome that is further away from the extremist’s preferred policy but the magnitude of the effect is shown to depend on the type of electoral system.