AbstractBy supplementing the work of Schutz, the article critically contests the methodological requirement, widely accepted within phenomenological sociology, that social scientific constructs be consistent with the constructs of common-sense experience of social reality. First, the article proposes that insofar as our everyday ways of speaking and thinking perceive the world as consisting of static and self-consistent entities, adhering to the methodological requirement makes research vulnerable to substantialist assumptions. To be able to account for how things change and involve other entities in their make-up therefore ultimately requires going against common sense along the lines of processual-relational thinking. Second, the article suggests that adhering too strictly to the methodological requirement easily renders social scientific concepts reactive and representational, trapped within the present and the actual. Against this, the article argues for a view of concepts as active and creative, stressing their utopian aspects. Social scientific thinking that gravitates towards creation emphasises potentiality and the future instead of perpetuating the actual and the present: it engages with present practices, institutions, and structures for the benefit of the future. Instead of merely describing or representing the social world as it is, its concepts present a challenge to what is, and thereby open up new ways of thinking, acting, and being and potentially “give a new event to things”.