Theory Of Self-government Research Articles

Mary Astell on self-government and custom

ABSTRACT This paper identifies, develops, and argues for an interpretation of Mary Astell’s understanding of self-government. On this interpretation, what is essential to self-government, according to Astell, is an agent’s responsiveness to her own reasoning. The paper identifies two aspects of her theory of self-government: an ‘authenticity’ criterion of what makes our motives our own and an account of the capacities required for responsiveness to our own reasoning. The authenticity criterion states that when our motives arise from some external source without validation by our own understanding of the reasons supporting them, then they are not our own. The capacities requisite for responsiveness to our own reasoning are those of examining and evaluating our own motives and of resisting the social pressure to conform to others’ opinions. An upshot of this interpretation of Astell’s theory of self-government is that it reveals her insights into the ways ‘custom’ can undermine an individual’s ability to govern oneself.

Enlarging the British settler state of Canada: A liberal theory of government and violence

ABSTRACT This paper examines the writings of George Brown, a leading expansionist and liberal thinker in the British settler state of Canada. Studying George Brown’s thinking as a non-canonical colonial statesman and thinker who helped appropriate Indigenous lands exposes the specific liberal ideas that authorized the enlarging of British settler states. Specifically, inquiring into Brown’s liberalism brings out a powerful liberal theory of self-government, which he adjusted to the circumstances of expanding settler states on stolen Indigenous lands. Brown’s theory of self-government overturns some of John Stuart Mill’s most influential ideas, including his proposition that the legitimacy of despotism is contingent upon it being temporary and for the improvement of the colonized. Against conservative rivals, Brown argues settler communities must self-govern locally and adopt colonial policies, including territorial appropriation from Indigenous peoples. Analysing Brown’s liberal thinking, developed from within expanding settler colonies, finally surfaces the readiness of liberal thought and practice to use physical and military force against Indigenous Peoples, especially as they resist the liberal policies of settler self-government and dispossession.

Can self-governance tackle the water commons? — Causal evidence of the effect of rural water pollution treatment on farmers' health in China

The rural water commons issue is related to the well-being of farmers. Some studies have identified self-governance as an effective solution to the water commons issue, but there is little evidence about rural water pollution treatment. Based on the theory of self-governance, this study empirically tests whether self-governance can effectively address rural water pollution from the perspective of farmers' health demands. Using data from the China Labor-force Dynamics Survey (CLDS), we examine the effect of self-governance of rural water pollution on farmers' health. The results reveal that the self-governance of rural water pollution has no significant effect on farmers' health. Further evidence demonstrates that farmers' individual treatment of rural water pollution significantly reduces the probability of illness. The central conclusion is that in the context of Chinese rural water pollution control, self-governance has not responded effectively to the water commons issue, and individual treatment does not necessarily lead to the tragedy of the commons. A combination of farmers' treatment behavior and its health effects may be a possible pathway to tackle the rural water commons issue.

An Exploration of Elinor Ostrom’s Theory of Self-Governance

The theory of self-governance is a fundamental theory of collective action based on numerous empirical case studies by Elinor Ostrom, a contemporary exponent of the public choice school and public economics. Ostrom’s idea of autonomous governance is systematically and fully articulated in her book Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, published in 1990. It guides the development and use of public resources by tapping into the subjectivity of individual autonomy. The purpose of this paper is to explore the meaning and significance of the theory of self-governance through reading Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.

SELF-GOVERNANCE, ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

AbstractThis essay explains how to use the calculus of consent framework to think more rigorously about self-governance, and applies this framework to the issue of evaluating federal regulatory agencies. Robust political economy is the idea that institutions should be designed to work well even under weak assumptions about decision-makers’ knowledge and benevolence. I show how the calculus of consent can be used to analyze both incentives and knowledge problems. The calculus is simultaneously a theory of self-governance and a tool for robust political economy analysis. Applying this framework to the case of public administration leads to the conclusion that private goods (such as medicine) tend to be over-regulated, public goods tend to be under-regulated (such as enabling too much pollution), and regulatory agencies tend to be over-centralized (and should in most cases either be replaced with certification markets or moved to state level).

STATUS OF THE STATE THEORY OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD DOCTRINE OF MUNICIPAL LAW

Representatives of the “free community” theory were among the first to draw attention to the issues of local self-government. In the early nineteenth century. Treasury, ie government officials, was responsible for the affairs and property of the communities. As a result, the community economy has been virtually destroyed to nothing. Therefore, there is a need for scientific substantiation of the need to limit the intervention of central executive bodies in the public system of the economy. This task was intended to be solved by the theory of “free community”, which argued that the right of the community to settle its affairs has the same inalienable character as human rights and freedoms since the community has historically emerged before a state that should respect the freedom of public administration. At the same time, the idea of the inalienability of community rights was sufficiently vulnerable, because, on the one hand, to justify the inalienability of the rights of large territorial self-governing units (departments, provinces, lands, or regions) created by the state was rather difficult and, on the other, to deny them. other types of self-government, except for small rural and urban communities, was rather strange because it did not correspond to the real state of affairs. That is why the social theory of self-government is beginning to emerge, which, as characteristic features of local self-government, has advanced the non-state and usually economic nature of the activity of local self-government bodies. However, the practice has proved that self-government bodies exercise not only private-legal but also public functions, that is, those that are inherent to public authorities, which derive their powers from the state. In addition, the impossibility of clearly separating community affairs from state affairs entrusted to the community was clarified. That is why the state theory of self-government arises. The basic principle of all legal theories was the recognition of the community, county, city, province, in general, any self-governing local union, as a body of public law. At the same time, all representatives of legal theories recognized that the competence of local self-government bodies is not their independent function, it is a state function, that is, transferred by the state to be performed by independent local communities. Therefore, all cases that are administered by local governments are state affairs. The state government itself sets the limits of its competence, entrusting part of its affairs to local self-governing communities and recognizing them as independent public-law corporations. Local self-government bodies, although performing public duties, are not bodies of the state but of independent self-governing unions of communities, possessing the will and independence of the state and independent entities of public law, independent of the will of the state power, because the power itself wants to make them legally independent. Keywords: local self-government; state theory of local self-government; the theory of «free community»; public theory of self-government.

Municipal and legal views of L. von Stein

Considering the essence of self-government, L. Stein believed that the easiest way to understand it is to trace the historical course of the development of the idea of self-government, the creation and strengthening of its organs. Self-government could not arise with absolutism, both monarchical and republican. It is possible only in the context of a constitutional order that ensures the freedom of development of self-governing local institutions. L. Stein's views closely adhered to the public theory of self-government. He was closer to her than R. Gneist. In particular, for him the state and the self-governing unions are social organisms. The state has the task of carrying out tasks of national importance, and on the bodies of self-government the implementation of local, special tasks, which, by virtue of their local importance, must be entrusted to the bodies of local self-government, as institutions close to the locality and directly interested in the implementation of local affairs. Recognizing the community as a social organism and the presence of special local public affairs, which are the competence of local governments, L. Stein pointed out that at the same time these special public affairs are also public affairs. He did not oppose the self-government bodies of governmental bodies, but acknowledged that both of them and others make one common state business, only the first local and the second general. L. Stein considered that local self-government is a participation in government, since it expresses the representation of only those local interests that are conditioned by land ownership, through which only at least mainly the interests associated with this can be combined. possession. But in self-government there are many interests that have nothing to do with land ownership and a large number of citizens who do not have such ownership, so they, on the basis of L. Stein's definition, should be excluded from local self-government. Thus, in defining local self-government as his main feature, L. Stein took not land or territorial district but land property. As for the structure of local self-government bodies, L. Stein believed that any public association that performs the tasks of government should be a permanent, organized and recognized government. His organization should be similar to the state, which achieves the unity of free government. Thus, L. Stein, distinguishing between the competences of state bodies and self-government bodies, did not oppose them to each other, but believed that local self-government bodies could even cope better with “assigned cases” than the state authorities themselves. He considered the main feature of local selfgovernment not land or territorial district, but land ownership. At the same time, the basis of the election, from his point of view, is not ownership, but belonging to well-known corporations and paying taxes.

Self-Governance, Robust Political Economy, and the Reform of Public Administration

This paper explains how to use the calculus of consent framework to think more rigorously about self-governance, and applies this framework to the issue of evaluating federal regulatory agencies. Robust political economy is the idea that institutions should be designed to work well even under weak assumptions about decision-makers' knowledge and benevolence. I show how the calculus of consent can be used to analyze both incentives and knowledge problems. The calculus is simultaneously a theory of self-governance and a tool for robust political economy analysis. Applying this framework to the case of public administration leads to the conclusion that private goods (such as medicine) tend to be over-regulated, public goods tend to be under-regulated (such as enabling too much pollution), and regulatory agencies tend to be over-centralized (most of them should either be replaced with certification markets or moved to state level).

A theory of self-governance: de facto constitutions as filters

What is self-governance, and under what sets of institutions is it possible? This article explores this question from the perspective of informal (de facto) constitutionalism. The dominant approach, grounded in formal constitutionalism, overlooks crucial institutional features that determine whether governance is something done by individuals to themselves, as opposed to something done by some individuals to others. Understanding self-governance requires not only identifying the durable procedures for public decision-making, but also appreciating how these procedures act as filters that select for the acquisition of political power by individuals with specific and predictable characteristics. The article develops a novel constitutional typology based on the structure of political property rights, on the one hand, and the kinds of individuals that govern, on the other, and use this typology to discover the types of polities most likely to be self-governing.

Local government as an institution of civil society: municipal-legal problems of interaction and functioning

The article is devoted to the research of municipal-legal problems of increasing the efficiency of civil society functioning in Ukraine. The emphasis is on the need to improve and strengthen the legal status of local self-government as the fundamental institution of civil society. The contemporary theory of local self-government as an institution of civil society is considered, its role in ensuring the stability of the constitutional system and the development of constitutionalism in Ukraine is determined. The basic theories of self-government are analyzed, the definition of local self-government as one of the main forms of democracy and the constitutional means of limiting state power in the conditions of formation of civil society is proposed. This approach emphasizes the increasing role of the municipal-territorial factor in the life of civil society. It is connected with the creation of capable territorial communities, confirmation of democratic intentions of national states and their special attention to the inhabitants of certain territories.It is concluded that only realization for long time in the minds of residents - members of territorial communities - of stable anti-theatrical institutions, radical changes in the stereotypes of socio-political behavior of the general population, its self-organization and self-discipline, the formation of patriotic sentiments may in the future become the basis for leveling the conflict between state and public interest, the formation of an optimal balance between public and private, and, therefore, a powerful tool for improving efficiency the organization and functioning of civil society.

A Theory of Self-Governance: De Facto Constitutions as Filters

What is self-governance, and under what sets of institutions is it possible? We explore this question from the perspective of informal (de facto) constitutionalism. The dominant approach, grounded in formal constitutionalism, overlooks crucial institutional features that determine whether governance is something done by individuals to themselves, as opposed to something done by some individuals to others. Understanding self-governance requires not only identifying the durable procedures for public decision-making, but also appreciating how these procedures act as filters, which select for the acquisition of political power by individuals with specific and predictable characteristics. We develop a novel constitutional typology based on the structure of political property rights on the one hand, and the kinds of individuals that govern on the other, and use this typology to discover the types of polities most likely to be self-governing.

A planning theory of self-governance: reply to Franklin

Before considering Christopher Evan Franklin’s essay in Philosophical Explorations, “Bratman on Identity over Time and Identification at a Time” (2016), let me set the stage.1 My question is: what ...

The Platonic model: statement, clarification and defense

I defend Gary Watson's Platonic Model of free agency against two arguments by counterexample, one by J. David Velleman and the other by Michael Bratman. I claim that these arguments are unconvincing for three reasons. First, they do not accurately target the Platonic Model. Second, they do not convincingly present cases of self-governed action. Third, they call attention to issues about theoretical commitments that are not fit to be settled by appeal to cases. On the basis of this discussion, I draw some general lessons for the debate about which theory of self-governance is the best.

Emergence of Collective Action in a Groundwater Commons: Irrigators in the San Luis Valley of Colorado

Under what conditions are irrigators able to develop adaptive governance arrangements? This article addresses this question by developing an empirically grounded theory of self-governance of a snowmelt commons in southern Colorado. Drawing on previous work in collective action and institutional theory, we argue that self-regulation of the hydro-commons is driven by changes in shared user perceptions with regard to the salience and scarcity of the resource, as well as the perceived probability of salvaging the resource system. We further posit that several conditioning factors affect the likelihood of effective local responses, including the existing institutional arrangements for self-governance, techno-institutional complementarities, and vested interests. We test and refine our theoretical argument by conducting a historical analysis of regional responses to hydrologic, social, and institutional disturbances in Colorado's San Luis Valley.

Is self-governance of the commons feasible in the PRC? A case study of pasture governance in Zhua Xixiulong township, Gansu province

The concept of the “tragedy of the commons”, as articulated by Hardin (1968), has had a huge influence on the protection and management of pastures in countries where ecosystems of grasslands and livestock co-exist, including in the People’s Republic of China. In order to avoid “the tragedy” and to establish clear property rights, a policy was adopted in China under which winter pastures were contracted to households, while summer pastures remained “common”. The effect of this policy on pasture protection has been controversial. Some have argued that the capacity of herders for self-governance has been ignored since, according to Ostrom’s (1990) theory of self-governance, under certain conditions herders themselves should be able to govern pastures efficiently without external constraints. The findings of the present case study – conducted in Zhua Xixiulong township, Tianzhu county, Gansu province – temper this argument. They show that complete self-governance is not feasible in practice, because self-governance principles such as graduated sanctions and minimal recognition of rights to organise are not fully satisfied.

Self-determination, Non-domination, and Federalism

This article summarizes the theory of federalism as non-domination Iris Marion Young began to develop in her final years, a theory of self-government that tried to recognize interconnectedness. Levy also poses an objection to that theory: non-domination cannot do the work Young needed of it, because it is a theory about the merits of decisions not about jurisdiction over them. The article concludes with an attempt to give Young the last word.

The just state: rethinking self-government

This book provides a comprehensive theory of self-government, legitimating democracy and concretely conceiving how political institutions should be organised. Carefully and clearly evaluating the fundamental options of normative political theory, political philosopher Richard Dien Winfield shows how political self-determination has an exclusive validity independent of any assumptions, enabling democracy to be successfully defended against postmodernists and anti-modern fundamentalists.