Theory Of Moral Sentiments Research Articles

Limitations of Smithian Sympathy: Smith’s Social Sympathy and Wordsworth’s Unreadable City

In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith suggests an important theory about moral sentiments that influenced many contemporary writers. While some praised Smith’s original theory of moral sentiments that emphasized the importance of society, others have been more skeptical about the workings of Smithian sympathy. In this essay, I first explore the primary elements of Smith’s theory that make it unique and significant. Then, I turn to the evaluation of Smithian sympathy by another important thinker in the early nineteenth century, the Romantic poet William Wordsworth. Wordsworth evaluates the workings of Smithian sympathy in his portrayal of London in Book Seventh of The Prelude (1805), where the emerging city of London serves as a counterexample to the mechanism of Smithian sympathy as the London society fails to work as a mirror for its members. The examination of Book Seventh of The Prelude will not only illuminate the flaws in the Smithian scheme of sympathy but also highlight Wordsworth’s insights on the subject as well as his corrections to Smith’s system.

Sider Jost, Jacob. Interest and Connection in the Eighteenth Century: Hervey, Johnson, Smith, Equiano

Sider Jost, Jacob. <i>Interest and Connection in the Eighteenth Century: Hervey, Johnson, Smith, Equiano</i>

Our dynamic being within: Smithian challenges to the new paternalism

ABSTRACT This essay uses concepts from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments to develop ideas about choice and welfare. I use those ideas to offer several challenges to common approaches to behavioral welfare economics and new paternalist policy making. Drawing on Smith’s dialectical concept of practical reason, which he develops in expositing ideas about self-awareness and self-judgment, I first argue that inconsistency need not be viewed as pathological. Inconsistent choices might indicate legitimate context-dependencies as individuals reflect over disjointed perspectives and act accordingly. Understanding inconsistency as reasonable raises epistemic difficulties for identifying errant choices and designing corrective policies. Second, I draw on Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator to discuss dynamic aspects of welfare. Welfare is not simply a matter of preference satisfaction but involves a sense of progress and improvement towards better preferences. Smith’s account suggests that economists interested in welfare should focus on institutional arrangements that facilitate self-development.

By the same author: Presenting Adam Smith's works as a whole

AbstractIn the first edition of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in London in 1776, the ‘by the same author’ list is presented in a very unusual place: directly opposite the table of contents. That placement suggests a continuity and unity in Smith's published works. A photograph provides a touchstone to discuss: (a) the Language essay, (b) the full title of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and (c) Wealth of Nations under the ethical umbrella of Moral Sentiments.

DOES FRIENDSHIP STEM FROM ALTRUISM? ADAM SMITH AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LOVE-BASED AND INTEREST-BASED PREFERENCES

Friendship-and-love expresses musings about well-being—while the object of the musings, i.e., “well-being,” is the economist’s substantive satisfaction. Insofar as altruism is about well-being and not the musings, it cannot be subsumed under friendship-and-love. However, what is the basis of the difference between the economist’s substantive satisfaction and friendship-and-love? The answer can be found in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, chapter 2: how “mutual sympathy” differs from substantive satisfaction. Smith scholars generally miss the uniqueness of “mutual sympathy” and, indeed, fold it under Smith’s “sympathy” (and “empathy”)—with one exception. Robert Sugden highlights the uniqueness of mutual sympathy. However, he goes to the other end, that is, he folds Smith’s sympathy-and-empathy under mutual sympathy. This paper aims to avoid the folding in either direction. Indeed, it argues that each fellow-feeling deals with a question that is orthogonal to the other. Mutual sympathy originates love-based sociality (friendship-and-love), which can be juxtaposed to interest-based sociality, i.e., substantive satisfaction, such as altruism. These genera of sociality are about the nature of satisfaction or preferences, and hence in contrast to sympathy-and-empathy that are basically about judgments. As judgments, sympathy-and-empathy are ultimately about the nature of decision making, irrespective of whether the decisions concerning love-based or interest-based preferences.

STOP WARS

STOP WARS

The Paradox of Wealth and Happiness in Adam Smith’sThe Theory of Moral Sentiments

Smith’s statements on wealth and happiness are paradoxical. On the one hand, Smith states that individuals’ pursuit of wealth is beneficial for society because it leads to economic growth and establishes rank and order in society. On the other hand, he appears to say that pursuit of wealth leaves individuals unhappy. Griswold refers to this as ‘comic irony’. In this paper, by examining what Smith says about wealth and happiness, we attempt to resolve this paradox. Towards this end, we analyze the unconscious that is implicit in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. As we will describe, analyzing Smith’s statements by considering the role of the unconscious implies that the pursuit of great wealth can make individuals happy.

Adam Smith’s Cosmopolitan Liberalism: Taste, Political Economy, and Objectification

The cosmopolitan character of liberalism has been debated since its beginnings. The status of mercantilism, colonialism, and market relations is central to this debate. While most scholars agree that among eighteenth-century thinkers in the liberal tradition, Adam Smith is remarkably anti-colonial on both moral and economic grounds, they do not engage his theory of taste as part of his normative critique of the mercantilist and colonial projects and argument for free trade. Smith’s theory of taste, largely developed in Theory of Moral Sentiments and History of Astronomy, highlights the importance he placed on connecting with distant others despite the limitations of sympathy. I argue that for Smith, aesthetic judgment acts as an impetus to moral judgment because taste can overcome barriers to sympathy. However, taste has a dual-nature in Smith’s political economy. Bad taste widens the sympathetic gap. I show that the framework of taste in Smith’s moral theory applied to mercantilism and colonization demonstrates that substituting poor aesthetic judgment—love of order instead of true beauty—for sympathy objectifies distant others and prevents them from developing moral judgment through freely engaging in the market and sympathetic interaction.

Against Sympathy: Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Regressive Politics of Likeness

ABSTRACT Reading The Theory of Moral Sentiments in dialog with civil rights struggles in the United States and with decolonial thinking more generally, this essay argues that sympathy constrains the conditions for social change by restricting the legibility of Black suffering. To demonstrate as much, this essay offers a close reading of Smith’s account of sympathy and of the impartial spectator, following which this essay reads #BlackLivesMatter as a hashtag and social movement whose advocacy is counteracted by antisympathetic rhetorics of white universalism, Black respectability, and masculine supremacy. In response, this essay argues in favor of decolonial acts of listening that occur in the context of a societal project of restorative justice because it is the persistence of reified colonial sympathy-allocation patterns in the United States and elsewhere that are driving the disproportionate impacts of anthropogenic climate change, COVID-19, and other historic events on nonwhite, nonmale people around the world.

THE EDIFYING DISCOURSES OF ADAM SMITH: FOCALISM, COMMERCE, AND SERVING THE COMMON GOOD

Adam Smith’s discourses aim to encourage mores, practices, and public policies in service to the common good, or that which a universally benevolent spectator would approve of. The Wealth of Nations illustrates how in pursuing our own happiness within the bounds of prudence and commutative justice, we may be said, literally or metaphorically, to cooperate with God in furthering the happiness of humankind. The Theory of Moral Sentiments elaborates an ethic, here called “focalism,” that instructs us to proportion our beneficent efforts to our knowledge and ability. The relationship between political economy and focalism is bidirectionally reinforcing. In one direction, the ethic of focalism contributes to the moral authorization of self-love, thereby invigorating and dignifying honest commercial activities. In the other direction, the insights of political economy reinforce the ethic of focalism by elaborating how through prudent commerce and focal beneficence, we cooperate, even if only metaphorically, in a grand social enterprise.

FramingThe Wealth of Nations

AbstractWhen The Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, this was recognized as another work by the author of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, a work that Smith extended and revised through six editions until the year he died, in 1790. Smith had in 1776 refrained from elaborating arguments that he had already made in 1759, and this was likely well understood by his contemporaries. But by the later 1790s The Theory of Moral Sentiments was no longer so widely read and was becoming regarded as dated in its approach. Smith had located the nature and causes of the wealth of nations in human attributes and prudent policy; detached from the context provided by The Theory of Moral Sentiments, The Wealth of Nations was now treated as a repository of economic principles that required criticism and correction. It was quickly converted into the founding text of a new political economy, exemplified by the French translation by Garnier (1802), Jean-Baptiste Say's Traité (1803), and of course David Ricardo's Principles (1817). Political economists of the early nineteenth century disregarded most of those features of The Wealth of Nations that have since the later 1970s been reemphasized by new scholarship; that the Glasgow edition began publication for the 1976 bicentenary of The Wealth of Nations was at the time thought only fitting for a writer then treated as the property of economists. But by comparing Ricardo's Principles with Smith's Wealth of Nations we can better understand that this foreshortened appreciation of Adam Smith's work has a longer history than usually thought.

Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and the Reconceptualization of Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Scotland

Abstract One of the most powerful themes in the contemporary revisionist literature on the Scottish Enlightenment is the desire to understand the disciplinary context within which political economy began to develop. Central to this is the observation that Adam Smith was a professor of moral philosophy and conceived of his writing as a branch of that discipline. This article suggests that we can better come to understand some important elements of Smith's thinking if we appreciate and read The Theory of Moral Sentiments in the context of a philosophical debate between Smith and his contemporary Adam Ferguson, a debate that is driven by the pedagogical dimensions of moral philosophy in the eighteenth-century Scottish universities.

Market Affect and the Rhetoric of Political Economic Debates

Market Affect and the Rhetoric of Political Economic Debates

Achtung in Kant and Smith

Abstract This paper argues that Kant’s concept of ‘respect’ (Achtung) for the moral law has roots in Adam Smith’s concept of ‘regard’ for the general rules of conduct, which was translated as Achtung in the first German translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. After illustrating that Kant’s technical understanding of respect appeared relatively late in his intellectual development, I argue that Kant’s concept of respect and Smith’s concept of regard share a basic similarity: they are both a single complex phenomenon with two core aspects, namely an attitude and a feeling. I then suggest that the concept of regard offered Kant a way to deal a problem concerning moral motivation that he was trying to solve at the time he likely first read Smith. I conclude by drawing some implications from the account I have offered for our understanding of Kant’s relation to Smith more generally.

Interpersonal and Collective Affective Niche Construction: Empirical and Normative Perspectives on Social Media

This paper contributes to the interdisciplinary theory of collective affective niche construction, which extends the extended mind (ExM) thesis from cognitive to affective phenomena. Although theoretically innovative, the theory lacks a detailed psychological account of how collective affectivity is scaffolded. It has also been criticized for its uncritical assumption of the subject qua the autonomous user of the affective scaffolding as disposable resources, abstracting away from embedded subjectivity in particular techno-political arrangements. We propose that the social motivation hypothesis, an account grounded in recent empirical and theoretical developments in psychology as well as in the classic theory of moral sentiments, will address the former criticism by explicating the basic mechanisms of human social orientation at work in collective affective niche construction. We also begin to address the latter normative criticism in mobilizing a so-called we-mode approach to collective emotion. To make these theoretical dialectics salient, we study social media as a case of collective affective niches, focusing on the impact on subjective well-being. Finally, we briefly identify promising future directions in building a normative theory of affective niche construction on the collective level.

The Sympathy of Sophie de Grouchy, translator and critic of Adam Smith

Sophie de Grouchy is known to the public for her highly appreciated French translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) by Adam Smith (1794) and for her publication of the Letters on Sympathy (1798). This article aims to reconstruct Sophie de Grouchy’s criticism of TMS and to show that it is based on a misinterpretation of Smith’s concept of sympathy. In her interpretation, Sophie de Grouchy seems to decontextualise the category of sympathy from the whole of the Scottish thinker’s vision on this topic, adopting an interpretative canon that is strongly influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s thought.

Introduction

Introduction

The Routledge Guidebook to Smith's Wealth of Nations

The Routledge Guidebook to Smith's <i>Wealth of Nations</i>

Adam Smith between the Scottish and French Enlightenments

This paper discusses Adam Smith’s intellectual relationship with the French Enlightenment, with a particular focus on his view of French culture as conveyed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Compared to England at that time, eighteenth-century Scotland is considered as having a closer affiliation with France in terms of their intellectual and cultural life during what has been dubbed the Enlightenment. While David Hume was representative of the affinity between the French and Scottish literati, Smith also held an enduring interest in the French philosophy, literature, and other aspects of its civilisation, long before the historic visit to Toulouse and Paris (1764–1766) that would shape his political economy greatly. While this paper shall examine Smith’s Francophile and Europeanist tendency within his moral argument, it also emphasises that he was abundantly aware of the moral cultural tensions between these two branches of the European Enlightenment.

Applying Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments to elicited social norms: Giving and taking in dictator games

The main contribution of this paper lies in applying Adam Smith's moral theory to explain how some actions become jointly recognized as socially appropriate while others do not, and how these jointly recognized rules affect actual behavior. To illustrate the strength of Smith's theory, we apply it to the norm-elicitation method by Krupka and Weber (2013) among a representative sample to explain how different elicited social norms vary across “giving” and “taking” contexts in the dictator game.