Theory Of Mind Stories Research Articles

P-361 - Sex difference in neural correlates of theory of mind

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to predict behaviors of others in terms of their underlying mental states. Impairments in ToM have been found in many psychiatric/neurological disorders including schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Previous research has indicated that females score higher on standard tests of ToM, social sensitivity, and empathy than males do. To examine possible sex differences in the neural mechanisms associated with ToM, 16 female and 16 male adults were examined with fMRI while performing verbal (story) and nonverbal (cartoon) false-belief tasks. During the ToM condition, female participants showed significantly greater activity in the left superior frontal gyrus (SFG)/medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and left ventral prefrontal cortex (vPFC). In contrast, males showed greater activation in the TPJ and greater deactivation in the insula during the ToM cartoon, relative to the ToM story condition. These results suggest that males and females employ different brain regions for ToM depending on the modality involved in the ToM task. Implications of these results on the cognitive and affective neural bases of ToM and the aforementioned psychiatric disorders are discussed.

Acquisition of the concept of teaching and its relationship with theory of mind in French 3- to 6-year olds

Little is known about how and when preschoolers master the concept of teaching, particularly in relation to the acquisition of theory of mind (ToM). We investigated the relationship between the two in children aged 3–6 years old. One hundred and seventeen French preschool pupils answered questions about different teaching situations illustrated in ten stories involving knowledge differences and/or false belief. Four change-of-location ToM stories were also administered. Our results indicate a developmental progression from understanding teaching situations to grasping the notion of knowledge gaps. Moreover, they confirm that ToM seems to be involved in understanding more complex teaching situations.

Making sense of theory of mind and paranoia: The psychometric properties and reasoning requirements of a false belief sequencing task

Introduction. This study used Item–Response Theory (IRT) to model the psychometric properties of a false belief picture sequencing task. Consistent with the mental time travel hypothesis of paranoia, we anticipated that performance on this deductive theory of mind (ToM) task would not be associated with the presence of persecutory delusions but would be related to other clinical, cognitive, and demographic factors. Method. A large (N=237) and diverse clinical and nonclinical sample differing in levels of depression and paranoid ideation performed 2 ToM tasks: the false belief sequencing task and a ToM stories task that was used to assess the validity of the false belief sequencing task as a measure of ToM. Results. A unidimensional IRT model was found to fit the data well. Latent ToM ability as measured by the false belief sequencing task was negatively related with age and positively with IQ. In contrast to the ToM stories measure, there was no association between clinical diagnosis or symptoms and false belief picture sequencing after controlling for age and IQ. Conclusions. In line with mental time travel hypothesis of paranoia (Corcoran, 2010), performance on this deductive nonverbal ToM task is not related to the presence of paranoid symptoms. This measure is best suited for assessing ToM functioning where participants’ performance falls just short of the average latent ToM ability. Furthermore, it is sensitive to the effects of increasing age and decreasing IQ.

Theory of Mind as a potential trait marker of schizophrenia: A family study

Introduction. Although there is some evidence that Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits may be trait markers of schizophrenia it is not clear yet if ToM deficits are primary deficits, that is, to be independent of deficits in general intellectual abilities and executive function. The aim was to examine if ToM deficits may be trait markers of the illness and the effect of cognitive inhibition, general intellectual abilities and depression on ToM abilities of patients with schizophrenia and their unaffected parents. Methods. We assessed ToM abilities (first-order and second-order ToM stories, The Revised Eyes Test), cognitive inhibition (Stroop Task), general intellectual ability (Standard Progressive Matrices Test Plus) in patients with schizophrenia (N=21) and their unaffected fathers (N=21) and mothers (N=21) in comparison with healthy control families (healthy control males, N=21, healthy control fathers, N=21, healthy control mothers, N=21) Results. Patients showed deficits in first-order ToM tasks but some of these deficits were mediated by general intellectual abilities. Impairments in cognitive inhibition mediated only patients’ performance in The Revised Eyes Test. Patients showed deficits in second-order ToM stories independently of deficits in general intellectual abilities and cognitive inhibition. Unaffected parents did not show deficits in first-order ToM tasks, whereas they showed deficits in second-order ToM stories. However, the deficits that unaffected parents showed in second-order ToM stories were mediated by their deficits in general intellectual abilities, and there was an effect of remitted depression on the unaffected mothers’ performance. Conclusions. The results suggest that intact neurocognitive and general intellectual abilities are necessary in order patients and their unaffected parents to pass successfully ToM tasks. Patients and their unaffected parents show ToM deficits but these deficits are not similar. Patients show ToM deficits but these deficits seem to be a component of the pathophysiology of the illness (e.g., deficits in executive function, general intellectual abilities).

Social cognition in individuals with agenesis of the corpus callosum

Past research has revealed that individuals with agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC) have deficits in interhemispheric transfer, complex novel problem-solving, and the comprehension of paralinguistic aspects of language. Case studies and family reports also suggest problems in social cognition. The performance of 11 individuals with complete ACC and with normal intelligence was compared to that of 13 IQ- and age-matched controls on three measures of social cognition. Individuals with ACC were indistinguishable from controls on the Happé Theory of Mind Stories and the Adult Faux Pas Test, but performed significantly worse on various portions of the Thames Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) involving interpretations of videotaped social vignettes. Further analysis of the TASIT indicated that individuals with ACC showed deficiency in the recognition of emotion, weakness in understanding paradoxical sarcasm, and particular difficulty interpreting textual versus visual social cues. These results suggest that the tendency for deficient social cognition in individuals with ACC stems from a combination of difficulty integrating information from multiple sources, using paralinguistic cues for emotion, and understanding nonliteral speech. Together, these deficits would contribute to a less robust theory of mind.

Brain activation associated with theory of mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) which the ability to attribute mental states to others are important processes in social cognition. Brain imaging studies in healthy subjects have described a brain system involving medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus and temporal pole in ToM processing. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we used the picture sequencing tasks with both intentional story (ToM story) and physical story in order to allow comparison of brain activations in these two processes. Participants were ten right-handed healthy Japanese volunteers (male = 5, female = 5; mean age was 24.9 years, s.d. = 1.4). Functional images were acquired using a 1.5 T Siemens Magnetom Vision. Our results showed that the ToM story compared to the physical story revealed increased activations in bilateral superior frontal gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, and right middle frontal gyrus. Correct responses in the ToM story were associated with enhanced activations of right middle frontal gyrus, bilateral superior frontal gyrus, right orbital gyrus, and left inferior frontal gyrus. These activations are common to a part of results in previous brain imaging studies on ToM and social cognitive functions using various tasks. The present study suggests that social cognition in a nonverbal task is especially associated with the medial and right middle frontal function. These results have implications for our understanding of disorders characterized by impairments of social cognition which are related to making references about mental states of others, such as schizophrenia and autism.

Deception and false belief in paranoia: Modelling Theory of Mind stories

Background. This study used Item Response Theory (IRT) to model the psychometric properties of a Theory of Mind (ToM) stories task. The study also aimed to determine whether the ability to understand states of false belief in others and the ability to understand another's intention to deceive are separable skills, and to establish which is more sensitive to the presence of paranoia. Method. A large and diverse clinical and nonclinical sample differing in levels of depression and paranoid ideation performed a ToM stories task measuring false belief and deception at first and second order. Results. A three-factor IRT model was found to best fit the data, consisting of first- and second-order deception factors and a single false-belief factor. The first-order deception and false-belief factors had good measurement properties at low trait levels, appropriate for samples with reduced ToM ability. First-order deception and false beliefs were both sensitive to paranoid ideation with IQ predicting performance on false belief items. Conclusions. Separable abilities were found to underlie performance on verbal ToM tasks. However, paranoia was associated with impaired performance on both false belief and deception understanding with clear impairment at the simplest level of mental state attribution.

A transdiagnostic investigation of ‘theory of mind’ and ‘jumping to conclusions’ in patients with persecutory delusions

A tendency to make hasty decisions on probabilistic reasoning tasks and a difficulty attributing mental states to others are key cognitive features of persecutory delusions (PDs) in the context of schizophrenia. This study examines whether these same psychological anomalies characterize PDs when they present in the context of psychotic depression. Performance on measures of probabilistic reasoning and theory of mind (ToM) was examined in five subgroups differing in diagnostic category and current illness status. The tendency to draw hasty decisions in probabilistic settings and poor ToM tested using story format feature in PDs irrespective of diagnosis. Furthermore, performance on the ToM story task correlated with the degree of distress caused by and preoccupation with the current PDs in the currently deluded groups. By contrast, performance on the non-verbal ToM task appears to be more sensitive to diagnosis, as patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders perform worse on this task than those with depression irrespective of the presence of PDs. The psychological anomalies associated with PDs examined here are transdiagnostic but different measures of ToM may be more or less sensitive to indices of severity of the PDs, diagnosis and trait- or state-related cognitive effects.

Elevated emotional reactivity in affective but not cognitive components of theory of mind: A psychophysiological study

Recent research proposes that theory of mind (ToM), that is the ability to infer other people's mental state, is a multidimensional construct and that a distinction may be made between affective and cognitive ToM. We examined whether these two subcomponents of ToM correspond to different levels in skin conductance responses (SCRs). Seventeen healthy adults listened to ten affective (faux pas) ToM stories, ten cognitive ToM stories and ten non-ToM stories. Results demonstrated significantly elevated SCR for affective ToM as compared with cognitive ToM and control stories, with no differences in SCR levels in the latter two story types. We discuss the possible underlying mechanisms for these differential psychophysiological correlates of affective and cognitive ToM processing, and suggest further investigations especially in clinical populations.

ADOLESCENT EGOCENTRISM AND THEORY OF MIND: IN THE CONTEXT OF FAMILY RELATIONS

While dealing with the issues of theory of mind (ToM) and false belief, the author realized that adolescents have similar false beliefs to those of children, but in a more complex manner. These false beliefs seem to be related to a typical developmental issue called “egocentrism.” Participants in this study were 11 adolescents (ages 16–18) and their families from a middle SES high school. ToM stories and new imaginary audience and personal fable categories were examined. Every adolescent was interviewed about his or her family relationships. To observe them all together, the author wanted to analyze adolescents' most sophisticated relations: family relations. The results seemed to indicate that in the context of their family, adolescents have more emotional inference than social inference or intentions – that is, they have more thoughts about their parents' feelings. If they have to describe their parents' relations, they seem to have more ToM (overall inference).

Theory of mind and its relation to schizotypy

Introduction. Frith (1992) suggested that many psychotic symptoms are associated with impaired theory of mind (ToM), the ability to represent the mental states of others. Langdon and Coltheart (1999) found an association in a nonclinical adult population between schizotypal traits and poorer ToM on a picture-sequencing task. The present study attempted to replicate and extend this finding using a ToM story task. Methods. A total of 62 nonclinical individuals completed a schizotypy questionnaire (the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE) and a set of ToM stories. Matched “physical” control stories were administered to control for general reasoning ability. Executive function and current verbal IQ were assessed using the Cognitive Estimates Test and the Quick Test, respectively. Results. Schizotypal traits analogous to positive symptoms of schizophrenia (UE scale of the O-LIFE) predicted poorer scores on the ToM task, but were unrelated to scores on physical stories. Individuals with high scores for total schizotypy on the O-LIFE did not differ in ToM from those with low total scores. There was no association between poorer ToM and schizotypal traits analogous to the “behavioural signs” of schizophrenia. Executive function and verbal IQ did not significantly predict story scores. Conclusions. Positive schizotypal traits in the normal population are associated with subtle impairments in ToM, independent of reasoning ability, executive function, or verbal IQ. A strong association between poor ToM and “behavioural signs” may only appear in studies of schizophrenic patients, and not in studies of nonclinical individuals. The findings are discussed in relation to Frith's (1992) cognitive neuropsychological model of schizophrenia.

Reliability and validity of The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT): A clinical test of social perception

Purpose. The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) is an audiovisual tool designed for the clinical assessment of social perception with alternate forms for re-testing. Part 1 assesses emotion recognition, Parts 2 and 3 assess the ability to interpret conversational remarks meant literally (i.e., sincere remarks and lies) or non-literally (i.e., sarcasm) as well as the ability to make judgments about the thoughts, intentions and feelings of speakers. This paper aims to examine TASIT's reliability and validity.Method. Some 32 adults with severe, chronic brain injuries were administered Form A twice, one week apart. 38 adults with brain injuries were readministered alternate forms over a period of 5 – 26 weeks. Construct validity was examined in subsets of a sample of 116 adults with brain injuries by relating TASIT performance to standard tests of neuropsychological function and specific social perception measures.Results. Test-retest reliability ranged from 0.74 – 0.88. Alternate forms reliability ranged from 0.62 – 0.83. TASIT performance was associated with face perception, information processing speed and working memory. Socially relevant new learning and executive tasks were significantly associated with TASIT performance whereas non-social tasks showed little association. Social perception tasks such as Ekman photos and theory of mind stories were also associated.Conclusions. TASIT has adequate psychometric properties as a clinical test of social perception. It is not overly prone to practice effects and is reliable for repeat administrations. Performance on TASIT is affected by information processing speed, working memory, new learning and executive functioning, but the uniquely social material that comprises the stimuli for TASIT will provide useful insights into the particular difficulties people with clinical conditions experience when interpreting complex social phenomena.

THEORY OF MIND IN OLD ADULTS: THE PERFORMANCE ON HAPPE'S STORIES AND FAUX PAS STORIES

Theory of mind abilities in old adults did not receive attention until Happe, Winner, and Brownell (1998) found that the theory of mind performance improved with advancing age. However, Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, and Taylor (2002) and Sullivan and Ruffman (2004) reported that the old adults performed worse than the young adults on theory of mind stories. We used “strange stories” (Happe et al., 1998; Maylor et al., 2002) and faux pas stories (Stone Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003) separately to examine the theory of mind abilities of an old and a young group with IQ and educational level matched. We found that the performance of the old group was worse than that of the young group on the faux pas stories, especially in the faux pas understanding, but no significant difference existed between the two age groups in the strange stories understanding. Moreover, the performance on the faux pas and strange stories for both old and young adults was separately independent of fluid intelligence, full-scale IQ, verbal IQ, and performance IQ.

Les bases anatomiques de la Théorie de l'Esprit: une revue de la littérature

The theory of mind is the ability of human beings to mentalise about themselves and others in order to adapt their social behaviour. It is the principal element of social cognition. By understanding what people think, feel and intend, we can predict how people will behave and then, adapt our own behaviour. Even if the rudiments of the theory of mind are present early in life, usually only 4-year-old and older children are able to solve the false-belief tasks. At the moment, it is difficult to prove whether it is an independent cognitive function or whether it belongs to a more global cognitive process. It is necessary to learn the basis of social cognition and to understand the intentions of other individuals. More and more studies have tried to evaluate and analyse the neurophysiological and anatomical basis of the theory of mind. With different brain imaging studies the functions of the theory of mind become more and more evident. Today 13 functional MRI studies emphasise the critical role of medial prefrontal cortex in the theory of mind mechanism (Brodmann area 8/9). In fact, all the studies that used written theory of mind stories show that medial prefrontal cortex (BA8; extending into area BA9 and the anterior cingulated cortex) is activated while reading this type of stories. However, there is still some discrepancy concerning hemispheric dominance. Moreover, the medial prefrontal cortex is also activated in other cognitive tasks, especially concerning self-control, and the anterior paracingulate cortex plays a part in the cognitive aspects of emotions. Other brain regions, such as the temporal pole, the temporo-parietal junction, the amygdala, take also part in the mechanisms of mentalising and according to these different studies there is no predominant cerebral hemisphere. The activation of the temporal pole confirms the role of this brain part to generate the emotional and semantic context of our thoughts on the basis of our past experience. This information is necessary to adapt our behaviour to a new situation. The role of the superior temporal sulcus is not completely elucidated. It analyses the complex behaviour patterns, especially those of human beings. The amygdala takes part in the development of the theory of mind and helps to recognise the emotional expression of faces. In the studies of mentalising abilities in patients with acquired brain lesions, some results are even in contradiction with the functional MRI data and reveal mixed patterns of results. This can be explained by the biases in patient selection and the assessment methods used. In brain injury patients lesions of the orbito-frontal cortex result in theory-of-mind deficits, but the extension of lesions could influence these results. In a study with more circumscribed lesions the site of lesions does not reveal a link between the location of lesion and first- or second-order theory of mind impairment. On the contrary, this link is established between right prefrontal cortex and impairments in perspective taking and between medial frontal cortex and impairment in detection of deception. A ventral frontal lesion could disturb the ability to recognise facial emotional expressions. Further studies with larger groups of patients will be necessary to elucidate the theory of mind mechanisms and to determine their repercussions on social behaviour in case of brain injuries, especially frontal lesions.

Theory of mind: Independence of executive function and the role of the frontal cortex in acquired brain injury

Introduction. Theory of mind (ToM) deficits have recently been associated with executive dysfunction and frontal brain damage. This case study investigated ToM ability and its relation to executive functioning and the role of the frontal cortex, in an adult male with orbitofrontal (OF) damage and disturbance in social behaviour. It was hypothesised that both ToM ability and executive functioning would be impaired. It has also been suggested that ability to understand affective states may be mediated by OF structures. Understanding of affective state attribution was also investigated. Methods. A 59-year-old male Caucasian with social disturbance and OF damage was administered a battery of neuropsychological tests, tests of executive function, plus ToM stories and cartoons, in order to assess the ability to infer mental and affective states in others. Results. Ability to understand mental states and affective responses was found to be intact and independent of executive functioning. Conclusion. ToM ability appears to be independent of executive skills of overall strategy formation and not necessarily dependent on OF involvement. It is concluded that evidence supports the modular hypothesis of ToM and that this ability may be supported by more posterior regions.