Mental States Theory Research Articles

Are human brain organoids cloned human individuals? An ethical analysis

In recent years, there has been much ethical debate about human brain organoid research. However, the possibility that human brain organoids might be human individuals has not been examined. This is an important issue because if human brain organoids are human individuals, then the creation of human brain organoids could be a form of human reproductive cloning. We examine the implications of two mainstream bioethical views on the nature of human individuals for human brain organoids: (1) Functional Integration Theory, the view that the capacity to integrate vital functions is the criterion for human individuality, and (2) Mental State Theory, the view that some mental capacity is the criterion for human individuality. We find that under either theory of human individuality, human brain organoids could be human individuals in the future. According to a version of Functional Integration Theory that locates the integrative function in the human brainstem (Brainstem Theory), a well-developed human brainstem organoid can be a human individual. Further, on Mental State Theory, a human brain organoid with certain mental capacities can be a human individual. Our results, combined with the ban on human reproductive cloning, may provide some reasons to be more cautious in human brain organoid research. Alternatively, in light of the progress in human brain organoid research, it may be necessary to reconsider the ethics and laws surrounding human reproductive cloning. This research paves the way for the first time to examine the question of great ethical importance whether human brain organoids can be human individuals, and encourages further consideration.

Are human brain organoids cloned human individuals? An ethical analysis

In recent years, there has been much ethical debate about human brain organoid research. However, the possibility that human brain organoids might be human individuals has not been examined. This is an important issue because if human brain organoids are human individuals, then the creation of human brain organoids could be a form of human reproductive cloning. We examine the implications of two mainstream bioethical views on the nature of human individuals for human brain organoids: (1) Functional Integration Theory, the view that the capacity to integrate vital functions is the criterion for human individuality, and (2) Mental State Theory, the view that some mental capacity is the criterion for human individuality. We find that under either theory of human individuality, human brain organoids could be human individuals in the future. According to a version of Functional Integration Theory that locates the integrative function in the human brainstem (Brainstem Theory), a well-developed human brainstem organoid can be a human individual. Further, on Mental State Theory, a conscious human brain organoid can be a human individual. Our results, combined with the ban on human reproductive cloning, may provide some reasons to be more cautious in human brain organoid research. Alternatively, in light of the progress in human brain organoid research, it may be necessary to reconsider the ethics and laws surrounding human reproductive cloning. This research paves the way for the first time to examine the question of great ethical importance whether human brain organoids can be human individuals, and encourages further consideration.

The Multiple Perspectives Theory of Mental States in Communication.

Inspired by early proposals in philosophy, dominant accounts of language posit a central role for mutual knowledge, either encoded directly in common ground, or approximated through other cognitive mechanisms. Using existing empirical evidence from language and memory, we challenge this tradition, arguing that mutual knowledge captures only a subset of the mental states needed to support communication. In a novel theoretical proposal, we argue for a cognitive architecture that includes separate, distinct representations of the self and other, and a cognitive process that compares these representations continuously during conversation, outputting both similarities and differences in perspective. Our theory accounts for existing data, interfaces with findings from other cognitive domains, and makes novel predictions about the role of perspective in language use. We term this new account the Multiple Perspectives Theory of mental states in communication.

Williamson on Defining Knowledge

AbstractIn his outstanding book Knowledge and its Limits (2000), Williamson (a) claims that we have inductive evidence for some negative theses concerning the prospects of defining knowledge, like this: knowing cannot be defined in accordance with a determinate traditional conjunctive scheme; (b) defends a theory of mental states, mental concepts and the relations between the two, from which we would obtain additional, not merely inductive, evidence for this negative thesis; and (c) presents an alternative (non-traditional-conjunctive) definition of knowledge. Here I consider these issues and extract two relevant conclusions: (i) Williamson's theory of states and concepts only supports the negative thesis because this theory would explain too much, since it imposes implausible necessary limitations on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. So, there is no appropriate non-inductive evidence for the negative thesis. (ii) Williamson's own definition of knowledge is at risk.

Sistema penal inglés e imputación subjetiva

Although the discussion about mens rea is still in an incipient state, English criminal law provides a different perspective of analysis, which establishes inference rules of the mental states before defining the conceptual level. The idea that a theory of mental states will only be satisfactory if it allows or makes viable its application in criminal proceedings can constitute a contribution of English jurisprudential development to the dogmatics of continental criminal law.

Well-Being: Reality's Role

ABSTRACT:A familiar objection to mental state theories of well-being proceeds as follows: Describe a good life. Contrast it with one identical in mental respects, but lacking a connection to reality. Then observe that mental state theories of well-being implausibly hold both lives in equal esteem. Conclude that such views are false. Here we argue this objection fails. There are two ways reality may be thought to matter for well-being. We want to contribute to reality, and we want our experience of the world to be veridical. Yet, if one accepts that reality matters in either of these ways, one must posit differences in well-being where no such differences exist.

Nozick's experience machine is dead, long live the experience machine!

Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment (Nozick's scenario) is widely used as the basis for a “knockdown” argument against all internalist mental state theories of well-being. Recently, however, it has been convincingly argued that Nozick's scenario should not be used in this way because it elicits judgments marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. These arguments all include alternate experience machine thought experiments, but these scenarios also elicit judgments marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. In this paper, several experiments are conducted in order to create and test a relatively bias-free experience machine scenario. It is argued that if an experience machine thought experiment is used to evaluate internalist mental state theories of well-being, then this relatively bias-free scenario should be used over any of the existing scenarios. Unlike the existing experience machine scenarios, when this new scenario is used to assess internalist mental state theories of well-being, it does not provide strong evidence to refute or endorse them.

Is Lewis's Mixed Theory Mixed Up?

AbstractMy aim is to rekindle interest in David Lewis's (1983) infamous but neglected Mixed Theory of mental states. The Mixed Theory is a mix of physicalism and functionalism designed to capture the intuitions that both Martians and abnormal human Madmen can be in pain. The Mixed Theory is widely derided. But I offer a new development of the Mixed Theory immune to its most prominent objections. In doing so, I uncover a new motivation for the Mixed Theory: its unique ability to explain cases in which it is plausibly indeterminate whether something is in pain. The Mixed Theory, whether or not it is ultimately correct, at least deserves renewed attention.

Mind-brain correlations, identity, and neuroscience

One of the positive arguments for the type-identity theory of mental states is an inference-to-the-best-explanation (IBE) argument, which purports to show that type-identity theory is likely true since it is the best explanation for the correlations between mental states and brain states that we find in the neurosciences. But given the methods of neuroscience, there are other relations besides identity that can explain such correlations. I illustrate some of these relations by examining the literature on the function of the hypothalamus and its correlation with sensations of thirst. Given that there are relations besides identity that can explain such correlations, the type-identity theorist is left with a dilemma: either the correlations we consider are weak, in which case we do not have an IBE to an identity claim, or else the correlations we look at are maximally strong, in which case there are too few cases for the inductive part of the strategy to work.

Wartość (nie)istnienia

Niektórzy filozofowie twierdzą, że można kogoś skrzywdzić albo wyświadczyć mu dobrodziejstwo (korzyść), powołując go do istnienia. Twierdzenie to opiera się na założeniu, że możliwe jest porównanie aktualnego poziomu dobrostanu osoby z poziomem dobrostanu, jaki osoba ta miałaby, gdyby nigdy nie zaistniała. Celem tej pracy jest zbadanie, czy możliwe jest dokonanie takiej porównawczej oceny w sensowny, logiczny i metafizycznie niewadliwy sposób. Analizuję argumenty sformułowane przez Nilsa Holtuga i Melindę Roberts na rzecz tezy, że istnienie może być gorsze albo lepsze dla osoby od nieistnienia. Zaczynam od przedyskutowania Holtugowskiej obrony, która odwołuje się do trzech klasycznych teorii dobrostanu: teorii stanów mentalnych, teorii preferencji (w ujęciu satysfakcji preferencji) oraz teorii listy obiektywnej. Formuję zarzuty przeciwko jego argumentacji, w tym „zarzut braku odniesienia”, „zarzut braku podmiotu wartości”, „zarzut nieporównywalności”, „zarzut zrównania bezwartościowości z wartością zerową” oraz „zarzut naruszenia logiki relacji”. Z analiz tych wyciągam wniosek, że nie można twierdzić, że ktoś ma się gorzej albo lepiej niż miałby się, gdyby nie został powołany do istnienia. Na koniec, krótko omawiam argumentację Holtuga odwołującą się do teorii preferencji w ujęciu obiektu preferencji. Sugeruję, że również ten sposób obrony tezy, że istnienie może być gorsze albo lepsze dla osoby od nieistnienia, nie jest przekonujący, ponieważ teoria preferencji w ujęciu obiektu preferencji nie jest dobrym kandydatem na teorię dobrostanu.

Intention and Interpretation

This article addresses the terms under which discussions of legal (i.e. constitutional and statutory) interpretation take place, advocating a shift away from “originalism” as our axis of debate to “intentionalism.” I argue that originalism has far more in common with its foes than has been generally recognized, and that intentionalism better implicates the most fundamental aspect of such methods of interpretation, regarding the existence, nature, and importance of intentions. I assert that originalists, just as much as many traditionally considered opposed to them, are intentionalists because they rely on mental state theories of intention. Tracking debates in the philosophy of action and literary theory, I also suggest that it is helpful to talk of intentionalism because it more explicitly relates legal concerns to the interpretive concerns common to these other fields. My approach also engages the work of others who, in various ways, have earlier discussed in the legal literature the broader context and implications of intentionalism, and especially that of Heidi Hurd on the ubiquity of intentionalism in legal interpretation. Although I do not here limn or endorse a specific interpretive methodology, my conclusions do extend to asserting that originalism and textualism, instead of being complementary, are at direct odds with one another – with originalism being a form of intentionalism and textualism explicitly rejecting intentionalism.

Adaptação transcultural do Mental States Rating System para o português brasileiro

INTRODUÇÃO: O artigo apresenta a adaptação transcultural do Mental States Rating System, uma escala de análise de conteúdo do discurso, seja ele falado, descrito ou filmado, que abrange de modo amplo tipos de contratransferência. MÉTODO: Foram realizadas as etapas de equivalência conceitual, equivalência de itens, equivalência semântica, equivalência operacional, equivalência funcional e aprovação da versão final pelo autor original do instrumento. RESULTADOS: Os critérios de equivalência foram satisfeitos, tendo a versão final sido aprovada pelo autor do instrumento original. CONCLUSÃO: A adaptação do Mental States Rating System disponibiliza para uso um instrumento que não só abrange todas as categorias de contratransferência descritas na literatura, mas as amplia, através da Teoria dos Estados Mentais. Constitui, desse modo, uma ferramenta de grande utilidade para pesquisa em psicoterapia e psicanálise, onde a contratransferência tem se mostrado um importante recurso, tornando-se ainda mais crucial nas patologias fundamentadas em estágios precoces do desenvolvimento, nos casos graves e nos traumas severos.

Children's inferences from ‘knowing’ to ‘pretending’ and ‘believing’

Three studies investigatedchildren's ability to drawinferences fromtheproperties of one mental state to the properties of another. Inferences from knowledge/ignorance to the possible contents of pretends and beliefs are crucial to developing a representational theory of mental states. In Experiment 1, we replicated Lillard's (1993) finding that 4‐ and 6‐year‐olds fail to appreciate that a character who does not know about an entity cannot pretend to be that entity. We show that these children also fail a similar task in which the inference to be made is from not knowing to thinking (false belief). Lillard's inference tasks may be difficult because of their performance demands—specifically, children are not offered a plausible alternative content for the agent's pretence or belief state. In a second experiment, children were presented with know‐pretend and know‐think inference tasks which offered two options for the content of a character's mental state. One option was consistent with that character's knowledge state, while the other was not. Under these conditions, 4‐ and 6‐year‐oldchildren's performance improved significantly on both pretend and think. A third experiment investigated the role of the salience of the character's ignorance and the possible use of an association strategy in producing successful performance in Experiment 2. When the salience of the character's ignorance was reduced, children still succeeded on know‐pretend inferences but failed on know‐think inferences. These results suggest that children do not really grasp the theory of mental representation. The results better support the ToMM‐SP model of ‘theory of mind’ development. Accordingto this model, conceptpossession is prior to, and therefore does not depend upon, knowledge of theories, and task success depends upon the control of salience.

The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-being

L'A. se propose de defendre les theories mentales du bien-etre contre l'experience de pensee de R. Nozick fondee sur l'idee d'une machine a experiences (in «Anarchy, State and Utopia»). Examinant la notion de bien-etre personnel chez L. W. Summer et J. Griffin, l'A. rejette la proposition de toute vie alternative qui, au profit d'un plus grand plaisir ou d'une utilite maximale, exige l'abandon de notre vie et de nos engagements actuels. Refusant tout sacrifice du bien-etre aux valeurs et aux interactions rivales, l'A. montre que les theories de l'etat mental sont capables de rendre compte de ces intuitions qui nous poussent a un sacrifice apparent

Précis of The Intentional Stance

The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other “intentional” states to systems – living and nonliving – and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of “folk psychology,” but is also exploited (and is virtually unavoidable) in artificial intelligence and cognitive science more generally, as well as in evolutionary theory. An analysis of the role of the intentional stance and its presuppositions supports a naturalistic theory of mental states and events, their content or intentionality, and the relation between “mentalistic” levels of explanation and neurophysiological or mechanistic levels of explanation. As such, the analysis of the intentional stance grounds a theory of the mind and its relation to the body.

Functionalism, Homunculi-Heads, and Absent Qualia

It has recently become quite fashionable for one to defend a functionalist theory of mental states. However, as with most trends, functionalism has come under fire in certain philosophical quarters. In this paper, I shall not take up the question of whether any version of functionalism is true. I shall instead discuss a particular objection to a specific brand of functionalism.

Strawson's Transcendental Deduction

In Individuals P. F. Strawson presents an argument which, in his view, is sufficient to show that the No-Ownership (henceforth, NO) Theory of mental states is incoherent. In a later book, The Bounds of Sense, several complex variants of this argument are used to explicate and defend Kant's notion of the transcendental unity of the apperception. Although in Strawson's own view this transcendental unity is only the first level in the much richer notion of the person, it is a fundamental and essential constituent of the latter. Thus Strawson agrees with Kant that experiences are necessarily owned. An adequate theory of mind should therefore establish the existence of the subject of experiences, as a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. This is what the argument against the NO theory, which denies the claim that experience is inconceivable without the experiencing subject, is designed to achieve. In the present article I would like to argue that Strawson's argument against the NO theory is unsuccessful in all its versions (in Individuals and in The Bounds of Sense). As a corollary I shall claim that since the NO theory is more parsimonious it should be preferred to the traditional view defended by Strawson.

Thermodynamics, Statistical Mechanics and the Complexity of Reductions

That reductions of theories and unifications of science frequently occur by means of identifications is a widely accepted hypothesis of methodology. Usually we are concerned with the micro-reductions of things, in which an entity is identified with a structured aggregate of smaller constituents. And, it is frequently alleged, we must also take into account further identifications in which the attributes of the macro-object, expressed by predicates in the macro-theory, are identified with attributes of the aggregate of micro-entities differently expressed by predicates of the micro- or reducing theory.I am fundamentally in strong agreement with this view, but intend here to explore one case of inter-theoretic reduction where some important qualifications of this account of reduction are in order. Philosophical scepticism is frequently encountered as to the possibility of ever making coherent sense of the notion of attribute identification. This scepticism often shows itself in the opposition to the identificatory account of the reduction of the theory of mental states to that of neurological states.

III.—DR. BOSANQUET'S THEORY OF MENTAL STATES, JUDGMENT, AND REALITY

III.—DR. BOSANQUET'S THEORY OF MENTAL STATES, JUDGMENT, AND REALITY Get access J. E. TURNER J. E. TURNER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXVII, Issue 3, 1918, Pages 304–317, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXVII.3.304 Published: 01 January 1918