Theory-ladenness Of Observation Research Articles

Artefacts in experimental economics: preference reversals and the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism

Controversies in economics often fizzle out unresolved. One reason is that, despite their professed empiricism, economists find it hard to agree on the interpretation of the relevant empirical evidence. In this paper I will present an example of a controversial issue first raised and then solved by recourse to laboratory experimentation. A major theme of this paper, then, concerns the methodological advantages of controlled experiments. The second theme is the nature of experimental artefacts and of the methods devised to detect them. Recent studies of experimental science have stressed that experimenters are often merely concerned about determining whether a certain phenomeonon exists or not, or whether, when, and where it can be produced, without necessarily engaging in proving or disproving any theoretical explanation of the phenomenon itself. In this paper I shall be concerned mainly with such a case, and focus on the example of preference reversals, a phenomenon whose existence was until quite recently denied by the majority of economists. Their favourite strategy consisted in trying to explain the phenomenon away as an artefact of the experimental techniques used to observe it. By controlled experimentation, as we shall see, such an interpretation has been discredited, and now preference reversals are generally accepted as real. The problem of distinguishing an artefact from a real phenomenon is related to methodological issues traditionally discussed by philosophers of science, such as the theory-ladenness of observation and Duhem's problem. Part of this paper is devoted to clarifying these two philosophical problems, and to arguing that only the latter is relevant to the case in hand. The solutions to Duhem's problem devised by economic experimentalists will be presented and discussed. I shall show that they belong in two broad categories: independent tests of new predictions derived from the competing hypotheses at stake, and ‘no-miracle arguments’ from different experimental techniques delivering converging results despite their being theoretically independent.

A Theory-Laden Observation Can Test The Theory

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionsA Theory-Laden Observation Can Test The TheoryHAROLD I. BROWNHAROLD I. BROWNDepartment of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University,DeKalb IL 60115, USA Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 44, Number 3September 1993 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 6Total views on this site Citations: 3Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 6Total views on this site Citations: 3Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/44.3.555 Views: 6Total views on this site Citations: 3Citations are reported from Crossref © 1993 by The Author. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Aaron D. Cobb Michael Faraday’s “Historical Sketch of Electro‐Magnetism” and the Theory‐Dependence of Experimentation Aaron D. Cobb, Philosophy of Science 76, no.55 (Jul 2015): 624–636.https://doi.org/10.1086/605792T. Shogenji Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51, no.22 (Dec 2020): 287–298.https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/51.2.287 Harold I. Brown Circular Justifications, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994, no.11 (Oct 2015): 406–414.https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193045

The new philosophy of science and educational research

Our conceptions of educational research depend very much on our philosophical views. Positivism, in its various guises, is the dominant tradition. Three key positivist notions are considered and evaluated in the light of recent work in postpositivist philosophy of science. The first is foundationalism and the theory-ladenness of observation; the second is verification and holistic revision; the third is value-freedom and epistemic virtues. It is concluded that even if positivism is rejected, a scientific account of educational research can still be retained.

Discussion: In Defense of the Quine-Duhem Thesis: A Reply to Greenwood

While discussing the work of Kuhn and Hanson, John Greenwood (1990) misidentifies the nature of the relationship between the incommensurability of theories and the theory-ladenness of observation. After pointing out this error, I move on to consider Greenwood's main argument that the Quine-Duhem thesis suffers from a form of epistemological self-defeat if it is interpreted to mean that any recalcitrant observation can always be accommodated to any theory. Greenwood finds this interpretation implausible because some adjustments to auxiliary hypotheses undermine too much of the prior observational evidence for the test theory. I argue that Greenwood mistakes the logico-metaphysical Quine-Duhem thesis for an epistemological one. All the argument he takes to undercut it actually illustrates how well the thesis works on a practical level. This is illustrated with an example from contemporary immunology.

Rhetoric for Realism in Psychology

Greenwood's (1992) selection of arguments may be understood as being targeted at experimental psychologists. These arguments focus on empiricism's denial of meaningful theory, constructionism's denial of objectivity, and realism's avoidance of both, while allowing satisfactory insight into the social realm. I approve of Greenwood's approach, both its logic and its rhetoric, but I suggest some refinements. Greater attention to empiricist objections to realism, a different interpretation of the theory-ladenness of observations, and a firmer attack on the relativistic aspects of constructionism would make for a stronger argument.

Theory-ladenness of Observations as a Test Case of Kuhn’s Approach to Scientific Inquiry

The overall character of the ideas Thomas S. Kuhn has offered concerning the nature of scientific inquiry has been generally misunderstood, or, rather, misconstrued. (See Kuhn 1957,1970.) Kuhn’s ideas do not add up to a fully articulated analysis of the structure of the scientific process. Kuhn does not offer a theory of science which should be evaluated in the same way as, e.g., the hypothetico-deductive model of science or the inductivist one. What Kuhn does is best viewed as calling our attention to certain salient phenomena which a philosophical theorist of science must try to understand and to account for. We do injustice to Kuhn if we deal with his views as if they were finished products of philosophical theorizing. They are not. Rather, they are starting-points for such theorizing; they pose problems to be solved by a genuine theory of science.

Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionsCan a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?A. FRANKLIN M. ANDERSON D. BROCK S. COLEMAN J. DOWNING A. GRUVANDER J. LILLY J. NEAL D. PETERSON M. PRICE R. RICE L. SMITH S. SPEIRER and D. TOERINGA. FRANKLINUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author M. ANDERSONUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author D. BROCKUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author S. COLEMANUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author J. DOWNINGUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author A. GRUVANDERUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author J. LILLYUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author J. NEALUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author D. PETERSONUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author M. PRICEUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author R. RICEUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author L. SMITHUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author S. SPEIRERUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author and D. TOERINGUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 40, Number 2June 1989 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/40.2.229 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref © 1989 by The Authors. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:HAROLD I. BROWN A Theory-Laden Observation Can Test The Theory, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no.33 (Dec 2020): 555–559.https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/44.3.555

Some problems concerning the theory-ladenness of observations

Summary The view that observations in science are theory-laden is critically evaluated in this paper. A number of theses are distinguished concerning the alleged theory-ladenness of claims of the form ‘P observes X’ and ‘P observes that X is A’ that derive from some remarks of Hanson; each thesis is shown to be untenable. However a modicum of theory-ladenness is supported in the claim that some observation-that reports depend for their truth on other claims which in turn depend for their truth on a piece of scientific theory. Resume Est evaluee dans cet article de facon critique la conception selon laquelle les observations scientifiques sont impregnees de theorie (theory-laden). Un certain nombre de theses sont distin-guees concernant la soi-disant impregnation theorique ?enonces tels que ‘P observe X’ et ‘P observe que X est A. Ces theses derivent de remarques de Hanson et on montre qu'aucune ne peut etre soutenue. Cependant, la constatation que certaines observations-que dependent, quant a leur verite, ? autres enonces qui a leur tour dependent, quant a leur verite, ? une partie de theorie scientifique, justifie un peu ? impregnation theorique. Zusammenfassung Es wird die Auffassung, wonach Beobachtungen in der Wissenschaft theoriegeladen sind, einer kritischen Beurteilung unterzogen. Verschiedene Thesen bezuglich der Theoriegeladenheit von Behauptungen der Form ‘P beobachtet X’ und ‘P beobachtet, dass X ein A ist’ werden im Anschluss an Hanson unterschieden; alle erweisen sich als unhaltbar. Eine abgeanderte Auffassung von Theoriegeladenheit wird vorgeschlagen, nach welcher Berichte uber ‘Beobachtung, dass…'hinsichtlich ihrer Wahrheit von weiteren Aussagen abhangig sind, die ihrerseits von einem Stuck wissenschaftlicher Theorie abhangen.

The theory-ladenness of observations

The theory-ladenness of observations

Toward Understanding in International Relations

It is impossible to disagree with the denotation of an essay that concludes with a plea for abstract theorizing, quantitative and nonquantitative analyses 'of implicit theories, or of informal, ad hoc, or personal hunches', and smalland large-N studies. I am completely sympathetic with Bueno de Mesquita's rejection of empiricism and purely inductive exercises associated with justificationalist and neo-justificationalist epistemologies. Lakatos's (1970) sophisticated methodological falsification offers a reasonable set of criteria for assessing research. However, I am skeptical about the possibility of comparing theories which are drawn from different research programs, about the benefits of large-N over small-N studies, and about the merits of quantitative over nonquantitative research. Kuhn's (1962) Structure of Scientific Revolutions touched off a lengthy debate about realism and rationality, about theory-laden observation, theory incommensurability, and criteria for belief and evidence. Kuhn's work challenges the traditional views of major philosophers of science who had held, at least in part, that science is an effort to learn about the one real world, that there is a sharp distinction between scientific and other beliefs, that scientific findings are cumulative, that there is a clear distinction between theory and observation, that hypotheses are justified by observation, that theoretical formulations proceed through deductive reasoning, that concepts have fixed meanings, and that there is a basic unity to all sciences (Hacking, 1981a: 1-2). Kuhn strongly doubts that one could decide objectively about the relative merits of diffierent paradigms. Competing approaches often use different terms. Even when they use the same terms these terms take on different meanings: 'Though most of the same signs are used before and after a revolution-e.g. force, mass, element, compound, cell the ways in which some of them attach to nature had somehow changed. Successive theories are thus, we say, incommensurable' (Kuhn, 1970: 267). Kuhn argues that the choice among competing paradigms, a choice which could bring about a scientific revolution, involves sociological and psychological factors, not just some set of criteria that could be accepted as scientific in the traditional sense. Lakatos's sophisticated methodological falsification is an effort to rebut Kuhn, to establish both empirically and logically that science can and has progressed rationally. He contends that it is possible to establish objective criteria for deciding among competing paradigms. For Lakatos, progress involves selecting research programs

ARE PARADIGMS INCOMMENSURABLE?

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionsARE PARADIGMS INCOMMENSURABLE?*ALLAN FRANKLINALLAN FRANKLINUniversity of Colorado Search for more articles by this author * This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES–8204074. Any opinions, findings conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Volume 35, Number 1March 1984 Society: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Views: 13Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Views: 13Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/35.1.57 Views: 13Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref © 1984 by The Author. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:A. FRANKLIN, M. ANDERSON, D. BROCK, S. COLEMAN, J. DOWNING, A. GRUVANDER, J. LILLY, J. NEAL, D. PETERSON, M. PRICE, R. RICE, L. SMITH, S. SPEIRER, and D. TOERING Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no.22 (Dec 2020): 229–231.https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/40.2.229

Metaphorical Models of Mastery: or, How to Learn to do the Problems at the End of the Chapter of the Physics Textbook

Without question, one of the most important cluster of issues in recent philosophy of science has centered around the attack on the rigid positivist distinction between theory and observation or between a theoretical language and an observational language. Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hanson, Toulmin, and Polanyi are all names closely associated with one version or another of this attack. All have argued that observational categories are essentially theory-determined and there is no determinate observational base, or neutral observational language. Thus at least the positivist account of the objectivity of scientific knowledge would seem to be seriously threatened by the thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation. For without an independently accessible observational base against which to test scientific theories, wherein would objectivity consist ?A number of philosophers of science have rallied to the defense of objectivity against the threat posed by the thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation. One of the earliest defenses and still one of the most reasonable and persuasive was offered by Israel Schemer in his book, Science and Subjectivity.