A few years ago, an illusionist theory of consciousness appeared in the philosophy of consciousness. It makes an unexpected statement – there is actually no phenomenal consciousness, it is illusory. This illusion is created introspective distortion of physical processes in the brain, which seem to us to have special phenomenal properties. However, an equally strong form of physicalism in the philosophy of consciousness has already appeared more than fifty years ago – identity theory of the mental and physical. Moreover, the proponents of illusionism themselves admit their connection with the identity theorists. As a result, it is reasonable to ask whether illusionism is simply a modern adaptation of the identity theory, and not a new independent theory. This article is devoted to this issue. First, the author presents both theories, focusing on their key statements, arguments and advantages described by the followers of the respective approaches. Then the author makes a comparison, highlighting common places and differences for the approaches. Among the former, the following are noted: the physicalist spirit of both theories; their denial of the existence of a special mental properties metaphysically different from physical ones; argumentation in favor of the pragmatic attractiveness of a theory; defending their key theses as primarily hypotheses that may turn out to be true; a similar strategy for explaining the error, as a result of which we come to the conclusion about the existence of the mental. However, the author also points out a number of serious differences: different attitudes to the possibility of neutral notion for properties of experience; differences in the vision of the content of the mind-body problem; illusionist denial of the real referent of the language of phenomenality; the development of the concept of illusion, which entails a number of new solutions and problems; the epistemological significance of the main arguments of illusionism is more influential in comparison with identity theory. As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that, despite the fact that a significant part of the content of the theories coincides, illusionism has a number of key differences. This testifies, on the one hand, to the skillful use of past achievements of the physicalist-oriented philosophy of consciousness, and, on the other, to the fundamental novelty and independence of illusionism.