Is Reductive Materialism a Defensible Philosophy of Mind?

Abstract

Over the past decades, reductive materialism has made a recipe for philosophy of mind to explore the subtle nature of the human mind. By and large, many identity theorists were likely to argue that mental states can be found in cognitive faculties of the brain so that the mind, if not most, associates with discoverable phenomena with no burden of proof. To put this bluntly, reductive materialism is typically defined by its very nature: all mental states are neurological states of the brain; ergo, it is implausible to make room for the substance dualism thereto. In response to this naturalist stance, aka reductive materialism, this article, thereby, contends that reductive materialism cannot be placed in a defensible position in philosophy of mind vis-à-vis the Kripkean modality; accordingly, this brief survey has identified several barnstorming findings in support of the thesis: the necessity and contingency, the core plank of possibility, rigid and non-rigid designators, and conceivability and possibility. In spite of its limitations, the study certainly adds to our understanding of the so-called reductive materialism in philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, a full discussion of naturalism lies beyond the scope of this study. Further work is, therefore, needed to fully digest the implications of reductive materialism and Kripke’s modal argument.