Theories Of Coalition Formation Research Articles

Consociational and rational coalitions: Norm-based government formation and the case of the Dutch provinces

Following conventional models of coalition formation, parties should prefer coalitions that have a parliamentary majority, preferably with few parties that are very similar in ideological terms. However, empirically, we observe astonishing systematic deviations from this prediction. In some countries, coalition formation can hardly be explained on the basis of the rational-choice paradigm. An example of this is the Dutch system of consociational democracy where we observe a prominent role of parties that represent the social pillars. In this article, we analyze coalition formation in the Dutch provinces over the last 20 years and supplement established theories of coalition formation by a consociational democratic perspective. In accordance with this perspective, we find that more inclusive coalitions as well as coalitions that include the three pillar parties are indeed more likely to be formed. However, we detect considerable temporal variation. Coalition formation in the Dutch provinces can increasingly be explained with the help of conventional models, whereas norm-based deviations are less common than in the past. We attempt a pragmatist interpretation of this change. More generally, we join a recent move in the literature showing how more fine-tuned explanations can lead to a more complete picture of coalition formation.

Beyond the Barriers: Toward a Durable African American-Latino Political Coalition

Since the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, the influx of Latino immigrants to the United States has led to penetrating change in the nation's social and political landscapes. This essay addresses whether African Americans and Latinos can overcome a political and social environment that tends to differentiate rather than bond the two groups, despite their common experiences. Specifically, the following question is considered: Is it possible for African Americans and Latinos to build a durable political coalition that enhances their capacity to achieve political and policy goals from which they can mutually benefit? In addressing this question, the prospects of an African American-Latino political coalition are weighed in light of the barriers and William Gamson's (1961) theory of coalition formation. I extort the multidisciplinary scholarly research on Latino and African American politics to ascertain the coalitional experiences of the two groups, and to make a projection regarding t...

Evolution, Appearance, and Occupational Success

Visual characteristics, including facial appearance, are thought to play an important role in a variety of judgments and decisions that have real occupational outcomes in many settings. Indeed, there is growing evidence suggesting that appearance influences hiring decisions and even election results. For example, attractive individuals are more likely to be hired, taller men earn more, and the facial appearance of candidates has been linked to real election outcomes. In this article, we review evidence linking physical appearance to occupational success and evaluate the hypothesis that appearance based biases are consistent with predictions based on evolutionary theories of coalition formation and leadership choice. We discuss why appearance based effects are so pervasive, addressing ideas about a "kernel of truth" in attributions and about coalitional psychology. We additionally highlight that appearance may be differently related to success at work according to the types of job or task involved. For example, leaders may be chosen because the characteristics they possess are seen as best suited to lead in particular situations. During a time of war, a dominant-appearing leader may inspire confidence and intimidate enemies while during peace-time, when negotiation and diplomacy are needed, interpersonal skills may outweigh the value of a dominant leader. In line with these ideas, masculine-faced leaders are favored in war-time scenarios while feminine-faced leaders are favored in peace-time scenarios. We suggest that such environment or task specific competencies may be prevalent during selection processes, whereby individuals whose appearance best matches perceived task competences are most likely selected, and propose the general term "task-congruent selection" to describe these effects. Overall, our review highlights how potentially adaptive biases could influence choices in the work place. With respect to certain biases, understanding their origin and current prevalence is important in order to potentially reduce discrimination in the work place.

New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern with Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties

This article investigates the recent government participation of a number of radical right-wing populist parties in West European democracies. With the help of coalition formation theories the government coalitions in which these parties have participated are characterised and inferences are made about the reasons for the cooperation between mainstream right and radical right-wing populist parties. The accuracy of these inferences is then examined in more detail by analysing the changing electoral fortunes and party positions of both mainstream and radical right-wing populist parties. These analyses demonstrate that office, policy and votes made mainstream right parties turn to radical right-wing populist parties as new coalition partners and that two important changes in West European party systems have enabled the formation of the new alliances, the first being an electoral shift to the right and the second the convergence of party positions of mainstream right and radical right-wing populist parties.

Explaining Government Formation in Multi-level Settings: Coalition Theory Revisited—Evidence from the Spanish Case

This article argues that regional government formation in decentralized countries follows different rules than national government formation in unitary states. It revises some basic assumptions that classical coalition formation theory makes, positing that in multi-level settings parties do not behave as unitary actors, that the goals they pursue might vary across levels at any given time, that regional coalition formation is part of a two-level game and that the policy space in which coalitions are mapped is often two-dimensional. Employing a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques, several classical propositions are tested in light of these revised assumptions on data about Spanish regional governments. We find that classical predictors do their fair share, but multi-level factors are crucial in explaining the making and breaking of regional governments.

Coalition lobbying in Tanzania: the experiences of local NGOs

Abstract Among the few papers that have been written on interest group behaviour in developing countries, none considers how groups cooperate to influence public policy. This paper is intended to help fill that gap in the literature. It does so by comparing the formation and development of four non‐governmental organization (NGO) campaigns in Tanzania between 1997 and 2004. Three of these NGO campaigns were able to establish coalitions while one was not. The NGOs involved were attempting to influence public policy on three pieces of legislation: the Land Acts of 1999, the NGO Act of 2002 and the Environmental Management Act of 2004. Two theories of coalition formation, one of population ecology and one of resource dependency are used in the paper to assess their relevance to the Tanzanian experience. The paper finds that these theories do not adequately explain coalition formation in Tanzania. Of several factors predicted by these theories, only two are found to be related to coalition formation in the Tanzanian case. However, when coalitions do form they allow individual groups to pool scarce resources, share information and expertise and enhance the legitimacy of the policy argument. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making: A Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois

Redistricting politics in Illinois provide a novel opportunity for testing competing theories of law making. With this in mind, we demonstrate that the post-2000 Census redistricters in Illinois, dominated by Democrats, strategically reshuffled district demographic profiles in an attempt to convert relatively liberal Republican districts to conservative Democratic districts in the state Senate while decreasing and increasing the ideological diversity of the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in the House. Such reshufflings suggest that legislative politics in Illinois are conducted in a manner consistent with vote-buying theories of coalition formation.

Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Danish local government

Abstract. Theories of coalition formation represent a diverse set of arguments about why some government coalitions form while others do not. In this article, the authors present a systematic empirical test of the relative importance of the various arguments. The test is designed to avoid a circularity problem present in many coalition studies – namely that the theories are tested on data of national government coalitions in postwar Europe: the very data that gave rise to the theories in the first place. Instead, the authors focus on government coalitions at the municipal level. They base their analysis on an expert survey of almost 3,000 local councillors from all municipalities in Denmark. They use conditional logit analysis to model government formation as a discrete choice between all potential governments. The analysis confirms some, but far from all, traditional explanations such as those based on office and policy motives. At the same time, the analysis raises the question of whether actors really seek minimal coalitions.

The gamma-core and coalition formation

This paper reinterprets the γ-core (Chander and Tulkens in Int Tax Pub Financ 2:279-293, 1995; in Int J Game Theory 26:379-401, 1997) and jus- tifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition formation is formulated as an infinitely repeated game in which the players must choose whether to cooperate or not. It is shown that a certain equilibrium of this game correspondstothe γ-coreassumptionthatwhenacoalitionformstheremaining players form singletons, and that the grand coalition is an equilibrium coalition structure. JEL Classification numbers C71, C72, D62

The y-Core and Coalition Formation

This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition formation is formulated as an infinitely repeated game in which the players must choose whether to cooperate or not. It is shown that a certain equilibrium of this game corresponds to the gamma-core assumption that when a coalition forms the remaining players form singletons, and that the grand coalition is an equilibrium coalition structure.

Institutions and coalition formation: The German election of 2005

The German election of 2005 creates three puzzles for the literature on coalition formation. First, the election led to a rare event in German politics and in parliamentary systems more generally, a ‘grand coalition’ between the two largest parties. Second, a minority government, something which has never occurred in postwar Germany (except briefly as the result of the breakdown of a government coalition), was in fact one of the two most likely governments to form. Third, the parties of the left retained a comfortable majority in the Bundestag; however they did not form a coalition. The election of 2005 appears unique in German politics, but we argue that its outcome is easily understood using existing institutional theories of coalition formation. We examine party positions in two dimensions (economic and social) using computer-based word scoring of party manifestos. We demonstrate that the conditions for a SPD minority government were present in Germany due to its central location in the policy space. While the configuration of policy positions would thus have allowed the SPD to form a minority government, the role of the Federal President as a veto player could have prevented it from forming, and the presence of an opposition-controlled upper house would have decreased its effectiveness. The mere possibility of forming a minority government gave the SPD a bargaining advantage in the coalition negotiations with the CDU/CSU. We show that in the final portfolio allocation, the SPD received ministries which control approximately two-thirds of the federal budget.

Tests of Vote-Buyer Theories of Coalition Formation in Legislatures

Tests of Vote-Buyer Theories of Coalition Formation in Legislatures

Tests of Vote-Buyer Theories of Coalition Formation in Legislatures

Formal theories of “vote-buying” aim to explain legislative coalition building, and lobbying. While anecdotal evidence suggests that something approximating vote-buying occurs, these theories have not been subjected to substantial empirical tests. Using roll-call data from all House bills subject to votes on final passage in the House of Representatives in the 103rd Congress, this study tests the coalition size implications of vote-buying theories. The primary method of analysis is ordinary least squares. Variation in coalition size, as represented by the percentage of the chamber voting yea, is accounted for in a manner consistent with vote buying theories. By making an assumption about what kinds of legislation are likely to attract one, or multiple, vote-buyers, we are able to operationalize the number of vote-buyers lobbying on a given bill. Other theoretical predictors of coalition size are also entered into the analysis, and the results offer support for the family of theories. When controlling for different parliamentary procedures, bills that are likely to attract two vote-buyers generate coalitions that are approximately 6 percent larger than single vote-buyer bills.

The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies

In parliamentary democracies, participating in government provides access to office perks and policy influence. Because of this, as Riker (1962) demonstrated, there is a powerful logic behind the formation of minimum winning coalitions. Thus, an important question is why we regularly observe oversized coalitions. While several theories of coalition formation have been proposed, few have been tested in competition with one another. This article offers a simultaneous test of five main theories of coalition formation using data from 24 countries over the period from 1955 to 1998. The weight of the evidence suggests that oversized governments form when maintaining coalition bargains is harder (Carrubba and Volden 2000). Also, there is mixed support for oversized governments forming when the largest party is smaller and more extreme (Crombez 1996), but not when the status quo policy is more extreme (Baron and Diermeier 2001) and not to secure upper‐house majorities (Lijphart 1984; Sjölin 1993). Finally, while we descriptively observe oversized connected coalitions (Axelrod 1970), the logic behind their formation appears to differ from what Axelrod proposes.

Coordination problem and grand coalition: the puzzle of the government formation game in the Czech Republic, 1998

After the 1998 general elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, the largest party, the Social Democrats, formed a minority government. The formation of this government was puzzling for at least four reasons. First, according to the so-called Opposition Pact, the minority government was supported from the outside by the conservative Civic Democratic Party, the principal opponent of the Social Democrats in the party system. Second, the grand legislative coalition was not followed by the sharing of executive portfolios between the two largest parties. Third, the two parties entered into this agreement only weeks after they had explicitly stated their unwillingness to govern together. Fourth, neither theories of coalition formation nor those of minority government formation provide an accurate prediction for this outcome. This article provides a solution for these puzzles based on a game theoretic analysis.

Coalition Formation and the Regime Divide in New Democracies: East Central Europe

The ability to form stable governing coalitions is a basic precondition of effective democracy in multiparty parliamentary systems. Several explanations of the formation of such coalitions by political parties have contributed greatly to understanding how mature democracies function, but they have been less successful for the patterns of coalition formation in the new democracies of East Central Europe after the collapse of the Communist regimes in 1989. Party coalitions in East Central Europe are as diverse as they are puzzling. Some parties have formed stable coalitions between ideologically close allies. For example, the Czech government from 1992 to 1996 was heralded as an example of mature coalition formation and stability and was easily explained by spatial theories of coalition formation. However, parties in other countries, such as Poland, rejected the very idea of such alliances, despite ideological proximity and complementary policy goals. Instead they formed unstable and conflictual coalitions with secondor even third-best alternatives. Finally, in some cases parties from opposite ends of the political spectrum unexpectedly formed alliances, as in Slovakia. Such patterns run counter to the predictions of theories of coalition formation. While no theory claims to predict all cases of coalition formation, they seem unusually weak for the postcommunist countries. There may be a more parsimonious explanation of coalition patterns in the region. The fundamental predictor of coalition formation continues to be the regime divide, the depth and character of the persisting conflict between the successors to the pre-1989 Communist parties and the parties emerging from the Communist-era opposition. The deeper this divide is, the lower the chances are that coalitions will form on the basis of similar policy goals or ideology between the Communist successors and their opposition counterparts. As for coalition formation efforts of the Communist successor parties, even where they have succeeded in moderating their ideology and in radically transforming their image, the regime divide can prevent them from forming coalitions with parties that share their policy preferences. While this cleavage shows signs of waning, the expectation of electoral punishment has prevented policy-convergent coalitions in the region for over a decade. Thus, the peculiarities of postauthoritarian transitions and the constraints they impose on coalition building add to theories of coalition formation.

Consensual Coalitions? Coalition Formation in Norwegian Municipalities

While widely applied to political coalitions in national assemblies and cabinets, theories of coalition formation have seldom been tested at the local level of government. This article presents a model of coalition formation in connection with mayoral elections in Norwegian local councils and tests it on the basis of the first systematic collection of data on the election of mayors from a large number of municipalities. It finds small significant effects on the probability that oversized coalitions will be formed. Contrary to “common” knowledge, the size of a municipality has a positive influence on the conflictual climate, and thus on the size of the coalitions formed, which implies that the probability that an oversized coalition will form is higher in a large than in a small municipality. It also finds that the possibility that an oversized coalition will form increases if one party controls a majority of the councilors on its own, and if the majority is non‐socialistically controlled. The assumption of a strong norm for reaching consensus‐based decisions, reinforced by the design of the local political institutions, is supported.

International Institutions and Environmental Policy: International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy

International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular, it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries.

Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control

The paper analyzes the coalition formation process in a global emission game with asymmetric countries where the number of signatories, the abatement target and the policy instrument are chosen simultaneously. Exemplarily, a uniform emission reduction quota and an effluent charge are considered. Stability is analyzed in a supergame framework by applying the concept of coalition-proofness. The analysis also considers the impact of impatient agents, restricted and simple punishment profiles. Two main results may be mentioned: First, paradoxically, IEAs achieve only little (if signed at all) if the externality problem is distinct. Second, our model helps to explain the frequent appearance of emission quotas in international pollution control despite the recommendations by economists to use market-based instruments like effluent charges.

A probabilistic theory of coalition formation inn‐person sidepayment games

This paper describes the central‐union theory, which offers a new approach to the formation of coalition structures in cooperative, sidepayment, superadditive n‐person games. This theory treats for...