Metaphysical Theory Research Articles

Introduction

Introduction

Dispensing with Facts, Substances, and Structures

Abstract Despite the alleged roles played by structures, substances, and facts in mathematical and metaphysical theorizing, in this paper I provide a strategy to dispense with them. It is argued that one need not be committed to the existence of these posits nor with the metaphysically inflationary interpretations that support them. An alternative, deflationary approach is then sketched.

Ф.А. ГОЛУБИНСКИЙ И ПОИСК РЕЛИГИОЗНО-ФИЛОСОФСКОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ В РУССКОЙ ДУХОВНОЙ И ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛЬНОЙ КУЛЬТУРЕ XIX ВЕКА

The article analyzes the religious and philosophical heritage of F.A. Golubinsky, shows his contribution to the development of the domestic intellectual and spiritual tradition of the 19th century, which consists in combining rationalistic discursiveness with intuitism and mysticism. The consequence of such a connection was the theistic metaphysics of Golubinsky, which gave the Russian spiritual and academic philosophy a systematic character. The article examines individual elements of this system – ontology, gnoseology, metaphysical psychology, and concludes about their essential characteristics.

What Is Non-Naturalism?

Metaethicists often specify non-naturalism in different ways: some take it to be about identity, while others take it to be about grounding. But few directly address the taxonomical question of what the best way to understand non-naturalism is. That’s the task of this paper. This isn’t a merely terminological question about how to use the term “non-naturalism”, but a substantive philosophical one about what metaphysical ideology we need to capture the pre-theoretical concerns of non-naturalists. I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, non-naturalism is best characterized not in terms of identity or grounding, but in terms of essence. First, I lay out some desiderata for a good characterization of non-naturalism: it should (i) speak to and elucidate the non-naturalist’s core pre-theoretical commitments, (ii) render non-naturalism a substantive, local claim about normativity, and (iii) provide the most general characterization of the view possible (iv) in a way that best fits the spirit of paradigm non-naturalist views. I then argue that identity characterizations fail to satisfy the former two desiderata, while grounding characterizations at best don’t satisfy the latter two. So, I propose a new essence characterization of non-naturalism and argue that it does a better job of satisfying all four desiderata. Moreover, I argue that this essence characterization has important implications for both metaethical and metaphysical theorizing.

The Case Against Higher-Order Metaphysics

Although higher-order metaphysics seems prima facie to be a promising new approach to metaphysics, it is nonetheless based on a mistake. This mistake is tied to a misuse of formal languages in metaphysics in general, not just to the use of higher-order rather than lower-order languages. I hope to highlight the mistake by discussing a popular recent example of higher- order metaphysics: the argument that reality is not structured using reasoning inspired by the Russell-Myhill paradox. A key issue will be the relationship between higher-order quantification in formal languages and quantification in English, in particular the questions whether such quantifiers are already to be found in English, and whether they could simply be added to English if not in order to gain expressive strength. I will conclude that little of metaphysical significance follows from this Russell-Myhill inspired argument against structure. The reason why the results of higher-order logic show little of metaphysical significance generalizes to other uses of higher-order logic in metaphysical theorizing, and with it supports that higher-order metaphysics is a flawed research program. I end with some reflections on what positive role formal tools like higher-order logic can have in metaphysics, and what the fundamental mistake is on which higher-order metaphysics is based.

The language of physicalism: A conceptual review of physicalist ontology

In this paper, the author explores the development and influence of the language of physicalism on the understanding of the mind and body problem. Firstly, we will address the early development and, later, the transformation of physicalism from a language methodology to a metaphysical theory, which will receive its final form in the philosophy of mind. The chapter will be concluded with a short review of the identity theory, and consequently, the question about the legitimacy of the identification of philosophical and scientific concepts will arise. Afterwards, in the second chapter, the author will use the so-called problem picture in order to provide a conceptual analysis of the language of physicalism. That way, we will demonstrate how the transformation of crucial philosophical notions emerges from a wider linguistic and contextual background. In this case, philosophical concepts, or language, are influenced by the metaphysics of scientism. Finally, instead of a summary, the last chapter will provide a short sketch of the ontogrammatical method, whose task is to shed light upon ontological transformations via conceptual and linguistic analysis.

Interrupting the conversation: Donald MacKinnon, wartime tutor of Anscombe, Midgley, Murdoch and Foot

AbstractElizabeth Anscombe, Mary Midgley, Iris Murdoch and Philippa Foot all studied at Oxford University during the Second World War. One of their wartime tutors was Donald MacKinnon. This paper gives a broad overview of MacKinnon's philosophical outlook as it was developing at this time. Four talks from between 1938 and 1941—‘And the Son of Man That Thou Visiteth Him’ (1938), ‘What Is a Metaphysical Statement?’ (1940), ‘The Function of Philosophy in Education’ (1941) and ‘Revelation and Social Justice’ (1941)—give a foretaste of the conception of moral philosophy that he later articulated in A Study of Ethical Theory (1957). We identify aspects of his philosophical outlook and unusual treatment of method that likely shaped his teaching. We trace his influence in the work of Midgley, Murdoch and Foot, all of whom studied with him from Trinity Term 1940 until their finals in 1942. In the case of Anscombe, though she was briefly his student—he taught her Plato—she and MacKinnon moved in shared intellectual circles, and there is reason to think that some of the forces that shaped MacKinnon's outlook also shaped hers. The sketch we offer is incomplete—in particular, we are not able to do justice to MacKinnon's explicitly theological writings—but we hope to achieve three things. First, to go some way towards indicating the importance of the teacher MacKinnon to understanding the work of his better-known pupils. Second, to introduce a philosopher for whom the teaching of philosophy, practical ethics and metaphysical theory were deeply entwined. Third, to reflect on the relationship between, on the one hand, a conception of the practice and significance of metaphysics and, on the other, a view on the role and nature of philosophical teaching and learning.

Engelsianism, Second Internationalism, and the Loss of Marx’s Critical Method

This essay argues that the predominant view of ‘Marxism’ was largely shaped by Engels and the Second International. The predominant view of Marxism includes a metaphysical theory (Dialectical Materialism) and a Scientific Theory (Historical Materialism). Marx never used either phrase. Moreover, a close reading of his mature works and letters reveals that he explicitly rejected the content of those theories. Hence, in the shaping of ‘Marxism’, a series of confusions and inaccuracies about history and economic development were attributed to Marx. One source of miscommunication was Engels, who seems to have misunderstood Marx’s theories in Capital. Moreover, Engels’ writings provide the origin point for ‘Dialectical’ and ‘Historical Materialism’. These attributions to Marx were taken up by Lenin and Trotsky in the Second International. Unlike Engels, Lenin and the Second International had access to few of Marx’s writings, so they had to rely on Engels’ proclamations on Marx’s work for their understanding of ‘Marxism’. Subsequently, ‘Marxism’ has been perverted, as it relates to Marx’s actual method of analysis and presentation, in his critical engagement with capitalism. In this essay the author charts the miscommunication of Marx’s theories, and then provides the reader with Marx’s actual critical method for analyzing Capitalism.

Karl Popper and the Problem of Essentialism in Philosophy

In modern philosophy, essentialism is in most cases regarded as an outdated and, in fact, incorrect philosophical trend. And one of the scientists who created such a reputation of essentialism was the famous English philosopher of Austrian origin Karl Popper. The success of his book “The Open Society and its Enemies” led to the fact that in the West essentialism began to be considered not only cognitively untenable, but also suspicious as the theoretical basis of fascism, communism and totalitarianism. In the article, K. Popper’s arguments against essentialism are reviewed all over again, and it is shown that K. Popper’s criticism of essentialism as an anti-scientific and outdated doctrine is not the point of view of the philosophy as a whole, but it is just the position of empirical positivism. Essentialism deals with the reality that lies on the other side of phenomena. And this, according to K. Popper, necessarily leads to “ultimate” definitions. However, in accordance with the doctrine of falsification by K. Popper himself, every scientific conclusion within its expiration date is “ultimate”. The article shows that in reality essentialism did not only play an extraordinary role in the classical metaphysical theory of knowledge, but also continues to do so within the framework of modern ontology. Moreover, in the latter case, he does it with the help of abduction which is a specific form of logical inference generating scientific hypotheses. The existence of abduction in science, which generates new knowledge, suggests that essentialism is not something, at best, tolerable and excusable. This is the main way to development of sciences in general. In all cases, the author of the article considers only logical entities, but not legal, theological or any other.

Temporal Disorientation and Sentimental Time

Temporal Disorientation and Sentimental Time

PHILOSOPHY OF ISLAMIC SCIENCE IN AL-FARABI'S PERSPECTIVE

Philosophy that makes reason as a rejection is contrary to religion that comes from revelation. This understanding often leads to ideological resistance. This study aims to determine the relationship between philosophy and Islamic science that uses reason as a role. The purpose of this research is discussed through a literature study that examines problems in Al-Farabi's perspective. From the analysis, it is known that the philosophical theories of Al-Farabi's thoughts such as emanation theory, political theory, and metaphysical theory are able to connect philosophical concepts with religious science. Al-Farabi views science as the result of theorizing on various observations of the five senses and the mind of the many phenomena that are physical in nature. Al-Farabi had also mastered philosophy and believed in Islamic sources, and accepted them with reason and logic. Among the evidence that states the relationship between philosophy and religion according to Al-Farabi is the existence of a reciprocal relationship in terms of truth/haqq, philosophers and priests, or the concept of state and religion.

The Development and Validation of the Ontological Addiction Scale

Ontological Addiction Theory is a metaphysical theory of mental illness which conceptualises psychological suffering in terms of excessive ego-centeredness. This study aimed to develop and validate the Ontological Addiction Scale (OAS) and compare OAS scores with mental health measures. A 31-item prototype scale was developed based on traditional Buddhist theory and contemporary models of addiction. An ego-centeredness form of the Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory (FFNI) was the main criterion measure. For mental health measures, the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9), Generalised Anxiety Disorder Scale (GAD-7) and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) were used. The prototype OAS and two shorter versions showed excellent internal consistency and test–retest reliability. Construct validity was evidenced by medium to large correlations with criterion measures. OAS scores showed strong correlations with PHQ-9, GAD-7 and RSES, suggesting a clear relationship between OAS and mental health. The OAS appears to be a valid and reliable instrument suitable for assessing OA.

LSTM-RNN-FNN Model for Load Forecasting Based on Deleuze’s Assemblage Perspective

Reliable load forecasting is essential for electricity generation and even for people’s lives. However, the existing load forecasting theories cannot match the requirements of complex systems (e.g., smart grids). Deleuze’s metaphysical complexity theory is seen as the theoretical foundation for comprehending complex systems, and thus, a new perspective based on Deleuze’s assemblage concept is given. According to the assemblage perspective, the electrical load is a quantitative representation of the mutual becoming of people and electricity, and load forecasting is an attempt to control this continuous process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. We built an LSTM-RNN-FNN model for load forecasting based on the assemblage perspective, and the assessment results demonstrated that the model has high prediction performance. Furthermore, the performance of adding the temperature parameter into the network is also tested, while the correlation between the temperature and load is not strong enough and may not be suitable for load prediction. The assemblage perspective has significant implications for future load forecasting and potentially smart grid research.

Relief, time-bias, and the metaphysics of tense

Our emotional lives are full of temporal asymmetries. Salient among these is that we tend to feel differently about painful or unpleasant events depending on their temporal location: we feel anxiety or trepidation about painful events we anticipate in the future, and relief when they are over. One question, then, is whether temporally asymmetric emotions such as relief have any ramifications for the metaphysics of time. On what has become the standard way of finessing this question, the asymmetry of relief is an instance of the phenomenon of future-bias, a tendency to prefer painful events to be located in the past than in the future. The main question then posed is whether this pattern of preferences can be justified in the light of different metaphysical theories of time. In this paper I argue that this whole dialectic is misconceived. While many people may have future-biased preferences and these are a legitimate object of psychological study, this should be distinguished from the more basic phenomenon of relief that an unpleasant experience is over. Acknowledging the distinctness of these phenomena has two main consequences. First, if relief is not a manifestation of a time-biased preference, it is unclear what it would be for it to be justified or unjustified. This, in turn, should lead us to reassess how the psychology of relief bears on our metaphysical commitments. As I shall suggest, the real significance of the temporally asymmetric emotions for the metaphysics of time is that they manifest, and so reflection on them serves to draw our attention to, a structural feature of our awareness of the passage of time that resists re-articulation in other terms.

The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing

Abstract Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.

Meditation, Idealism and Materiality: Vivid Visualization in the Buddhist \u2018Qizil Yoga Manual\u2019 and the Context of Caves

This paper examines the topic of Yogācāra idealism through a little studied Buddhist meditation manual, the so-called ‘Yogalehrbuch’ or ‘Qizil Yoga Manual’, a primarily Buddhist Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text with Mahāyāna Yogācāra strands. What does this unique Central Asian text say about Buddhist meditation practices called yogācāra or yoga? It centres on methods of vivid visualization that are somewhat specific to the Central Asian region of Kucha on the Silk Road. To understand the Manual’s practice and definition of yogic meditation, this paper considers how some of the hyper-real visualizations in the dhātuprayoga section relate the mind to reality and whether Yogācāra meditation can be said to propose idealism as a metaphysical theory about the nature of reality. The paper also asks whether neurocognitive research insights can be useful in understanding what some regard as a ‘hallucination-like’ quality of some visualizations, which destabilise distinctions between appearances and reality. Furthermore, it argues that analyzing the materiality of meditation, particularly the environment of the cave, helps us to better understand the text’s techniques of yogic visualization. The paper concludes that the ‘Qizil Yoga Manual’ facilitates soteriological idealism and suggests that factoring in the material contexts of meditation is useful, both in deciphering the text’s meditation methods and in discussing the metaphysical theory of idealism.

The many‐worlds theory of consciousness

AbstractThis paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many‐worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first‐personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first‐personal realizers” of a shared “third‐personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first‐personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.

Theoretical-Methodological Principles of Teaching Historical Study of a Particular Region in the Context of Metaphysical Theory of a Personality

Theoretical-Methodological Principles of Teaching Historical Study of a Particular Region in the Context of Metaphysical Theory of a Personality

ПЕР. СТ.: РИФФЕР Ф. СОЗНАНИЕ: ТОЧКА ЗРЕНИЯ ФИЛОСОФИИ ПРОЦЕССА И ГЕНЕТИЧЕСКОГО СТРУКТУРАЛИЗМА - КРИТИЧЕСКОЕ СРАВНЕНИЕ И НЕКОТОРЫЕ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ

A selective translation of the article by the Austrian philosopher, theologian, psychologist and teacher from the Department of Pedagogical Sciences of the University of Salzburg F. Riffer seems appropriate, since it highlights the modern philosophical debates about the phenomenon of consciousness based on D. Chalmers' distinction between its easy and difficult problems. A.N. Whitehead's philosophy of the process provides a promising basis for solving a difficult problem in connection with the rootedness of the concept of consciousness in metaphysical theory. Whitehead's reflection is compared with the results of empirical studies of the phenomena of consciousness of J. Piaget. If they partially coincide, the position of the former seems to be more reasonable. This corresponds to W.E. Seeger's suggestion to pay more attention to processalism or the concept of a philosophical process. Whitehead's point of view on learning, consciousness and artificial intelligence is considered.

Tadeusz Czeżowski – obszary filozofowania

This article presents the views of Tadeusz Czeżowski, who was one of the most prominent representatives of the Lviv-Warsaw school. He formulated a number of rules defining the rules of conducting science. His most important conclusion is that also metaphysical theories have a specific logical structure, i.e. they are interpretations of logic, therefore there is nothing to prevent metaphysics from also being considered as a branch of science. According to Czeżowski, there are two types of ethical theories: empirical ethics, and deductive ethics. Czeżowski, however, did not attempt to create his own ethical system.