‘SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGY” To the Editor: In “Transformations and the Myth of ‘Engineering Science’ ” (TcfC, January 1988), I argued that a proposed mode of “scientific technology” must be illusory, if only because there is no discernible way to “be scientific” (pp. 79—80). In the same issue, Edwin Layton claimed that I had not even made “a token effort to base” my case on “empirical facts” (p. 83); I had been antischolarly (p. 83); and I had rejected “the idea that science can influence the way engineers” operate (p. 82). And David Channell said that I had misconstrued his theme (p. 101). Yet such criticisms, as expressed, only help to confirm how histrionic (concerning thespian praxis) have been the proposers of a “transformation” (Layton) to such a technical mode. Take Layton’s primary concern over my stance on empiricism. I am said to have assumed, as an “avowed empiricist” (p. 84), that “there is only one valid form of cognition, empiricism” (p. 82). Not so. In philosophical terms, my piece was rationalistic; it had more to do with reasoning than evidence, as Layton complained: “He does not treat evidence in a disciplined, critical manner” (p. 83). Further, while denying any discernible way to “be scientific,” I did not have to make any assumption about modes of human cognition. I am said by Layton to have rejected “empirical methods,” as shown by my “arbitrary classification of much (possibly all) scientific theory as magic” (p. 82). Not so, again. Neither the rejection nor classification appears in print. Part 4 treated the “magic of art,” a popular phrase for the use of human skill. In treating Malinowski, I wrote, as cited: “Magic is indeed invoked whenever there is thought to be a good deal of risk involved . . .” (pp. 80, 82). But anyone struggling to the end of the cited sentence and the surrounding paragraph can see the quote referred to one culture only. All Thebans are liars, therefore all men are liars—such is Layton’s dramatically indisciplined logic in conclud ing from “evidence” before him. I really did, however, cite Channell’s use of Rankine’s 19th-century classification of “empirical” as opposed to “scientific” technical praxis (pp. 73, 80), along with the proposition linking the latter to an “engineering science” whose identifiability I sought to deny. But the trouble with tackling thespian scholarship may be seen by third parties who note that I did not put into Channell’s mouth the phrase about “engineering science” being a “subspecies of science,” as he claimed (pp. 72, 101). The claim is a piece of theatrical makeup. 1024 “Scientific Technology” 1025 What, then, is the main issue raised? Layton thinks it is “scholar ship” (p. 83), together with his fiction that I have denied that engineers can “be taught scientific methods” and that such methods can be brought “to the practice of their profession” (p. 84). For me, those who argue for a “scientific technology” are bound to use an unworkable classification: say, mode A for “scientific technology” and modes non-A otherwise. For there to be an identifiable mode A, there must be the available yardstick(s) for recognizing it. Accordingly, Layton’s call for me to treat “empirical facts” (p. 83) is beside the point, one which his own attempted denial helps to confirm. Singular and plural forms of nouns are widely recognized as comprising different numbers. I argued expressly that there has been neither a discernibly known and articulated “method for doing science” nor an identifiable “cooking method” (pp. 70—71). Cooking was cited as an analogy; and most T&C readers will realize that the singular form of the English noun, method, was used intentionally. As part of his playwright’s case against his own fiction that I say there are no “valid scientific methods that can be taught” (p. 84), Layton has produced another transformation, a shift from my real-life position. “The bookstores are filled with cookbooks that teach readers how to cook. And there are many other vehicles for teaching cooking methods ...” he has written. “Fores’s claim is simply nonsense” (p. 84). How true, on the first issue! Nonsensical, indeed, is a claim I never made about methods (plural...