Theater Missile Defense Research Articles

Regional Missile Defense Architecture of the US and Their Partners In the Western Pacifi Security

China has the largest arsenal of missiles with a range of less than 5,500 km. In 2019, the US withdrew from the INF Treaty and decided to deploy the same kind of missiles in East Asia. At the same time Washington plans to strengthen the theater missile defense architecture in the region. The purpose of the article is to determine the potential impact of missile defense strengthening by the US and their partners in East Asia on regional security. It is necessary to understand the prospects of the situation, given the presence of several hotbeds of potential conflict in the Western Pacific. A critical analysis of the expected actions of China and the US in the region, the role of regional missile defense systems in those scenarios, and both sides’ doctrines of non-nuclear missile use is provided. In certain situations, an enhanced theater missile defense could help the US and their partners to strengthen regional deterrence, but not in all situations. The analysis of both sides’ doctrinal provisions help to understand how strengthening the regional missile defense by the US and their partners can destabilize the situation. It is concluded that theater missile defense, unlike arms control measures, is not a reliable tool for ensuring regional stability.

핵의 관점에서 본 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁

When we approach Russia-Ukraine War with the perspective of nuclear competition, relentless competition, driven by typical security dilemma, to achieve nuclear superiority is found to be strongly implicated before, during, and after the war. After the post-Cold War order emerged, the U.S. attempted to gain nuclear superiority over Russia by establishing theater missile defense system across Europe. Threat perception coming from the fear of its nuclear deterrence being undermined by America’s damage limitation strategy forced Russia to modernize its nuclear forces and extend the scope of nuclear deterrence to include the possible use of nuclear weapons even against conventional attacks. While Putin raising the prospect of using nuclear weapons invaded Ukraine, the U.S. response seemed to be constrained by the fear of nuclear escalation. Russia-Ukraine War has found 1994 Budapest Memorandum to be nothing more than empty statements and has awakened the world to the reality that nuclear threats are actively being used as a tool of intimation and escalation management. As such, Russia-Ukraine War has ushered us into “New Nuclear World” characterized by (1) the nuclear paradigm shift from non-proliferation to nuclear competition, (2) retreat of nuclear arms control regime, (3) and tripolar (U.S., Russia, and China) nuclear dynamics.

The Influence of NATO Regional Missile Defense on European Security

The problem of missile defense is considered by Russian researchers, first of all, as part of the strategic stability problem in relations between Russia and the United States. At the same time, the impact of regional missile defense (theater missile defense) on regional security remains largely unexplored. The US and NATO leadership continue to claim that Russia has deployed intermediate-range missiles in the European part of the country. As a response to this step, in addition to other measures of regional deterrence towards Russia, it is planned to strengthen NATO’s regional missile defense system. The purpose of this article is to determine the potential impact of enhancing NATO’s theater missile defense on regional security. The answer to this question is important for understanding the prospects for European security. This article provides a critical analysis of Western experts’ scenarios of actions of Russia and NATO around the Baltic countries the place and role of theater missile defense in these scenarios and compares the doctrinal guidelines of the United States and Russia regarding regional nonnuclear deterrence. There are situations in which NATO’s enhanced regional missile defense could strengthen regional deterrence, and there are situations where this is less likely. Taking into account the doctrinal guidelines of both sides, conclusions are drawn about the destabilizing potential of NATO’s regional missile defense enhancement and that, in strengthening regional stability, there is no alternative to arms control and transparency regimes.

Debates on the Role of the U.S. Theater Missile Defense in the Regional Deterrence of North Korea and Iran

North Korea and Iran have been featured in all official U.S. missile defense policy documents since the late 1990s. The threat posed by two countries to the United States and their allies’ armed forces deployed in various regions has been the main incentive for the development of regional missile defense (theater missile defense) programs for more than 20 years. All this time, there has been an ongoing debate among American politicians, strategists, and academic experts on the prospects and specifics of the regional missile defense architectures, levels of U.S. allies’ participation in their development, as well as the very need to deploy these systems in North-East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The paper attempts to summarize and analyze the arguments of both the proponents and opponents of the idea to use the regional missile defense systems in the regional deterrence of North Korea and Iran.The first section examines approaches of different U.S. administrations to this issue. The author emphasizes that the Biden administration officials have already confirmed most of the basic postulates formulated by the Trump administration on the matter. According to them, the high efficiency of regional missile defense facilitates regional deterrence of the DPRK and Iran.The second section examines debates in the U.S. expert community. The author identifies two main approaches. The first basically repeats the arguments of the U.S. administration on the benefits of regional missile defense for regional stability. According to the second approach, the regional missile defense may destabilize the situation in the region without enhancing the protection of the U.S. and their allies’ armed forces.The third section provides a critical analysis of the debate. The author concludes that the arguments and assessments of both the opponents and proponents of the deterrence of the DPRK and Iran by means of regional missile defense are theoretically ill-founded and often one-sided. Subsequently, many crucial issues related to the use of missile defense systems and their potential impact on the regional security remain understudied. All this suggests that there is a need for a more detailed study of this issue, particularly given increasing regional tensions.

Debates on the Role of the US Theatre Missile Defense in Regional Deterrence of Russia and China

Studies on missile defense, both in Russia and abroad, have been tradition- ally focused either on capabilities of the US national missile defense system to parry Russian or Chinese strategic nuclear forces, or on regional deter- rence of North Korea and Iran by means of regional missile defense (theater missile defense, TMD). However, the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) emphasized the role of the TMD systems in the regional deterrence of the Russian Federation and China. So far this issue has received little attention and this paper aims to fill that gap. The first section identifies the key points of the MDR concerning the capabilities of regional missile defense for regional deterrence of the major nuclear powers. The author also examines the views of different represen- tatives of the US Department of Defense on this issue, and concludes that the US military-political leadership has a generally positive assessment of the capabilities of the TMD systems to contain Russia and China in case of a regional crisis. In particular, planners emphasize the role of the regional missile defense in countering the ‘anti-access/access-denial’ capabilities and the concept of ‘escalate to de-escalate’ ascribed to Russia. At the same time, US policymakers express in that regard serious concerns about Russia’s and China’s progress in the development of hypersonic missile systems. The second section examines the ongoing debates in Western expert so- ciety on the role of the regional missile defense in terms of deterring Russia and China. The author concludes that in this respect experts can provisionally be divided into two groups. The first group generally supports the arguments of the US military-political leadership and is optimistic about TMD capabili- ties for regional deterrence of Russia and China. The second group is more critical of these capabilities. They point out the lack of accurate data on the combat capabilities of such systems in active warfare and criticize question- able theoretical assumptions of their opponents. The third section provides a critical analysis of the arguments presented in this debate. The author concludes that the current concepts of deterrence based on the use of regional missile defense systems do not fully address possible implications for regional security and strategic stability. The Russian Federation and China possess significant nuclear arsenals, which already make nuclear escalation involving these countries and the United States possible. Adding yet another variable (TMD) into this equation only aggravates the situation.

Противоракетная и противовоздушная оборона на театрах военных действий: история, реалии и перспективы

Противоракетная и противовоздушная оборона на театрах военных действий: история, реалии и перспективы

Mathematical foundations of noise reduction in theatre ballistic missile defence radar systems

In theatre missile defence (TMD), early recognition of an enemy theatre ballistic missile (TBM) firing is one of the most vital factors to ensure a successful missile defence. Satellite sensors usually work as the primary means for early confirmation of the TBM firing in TMD because the sensors would be able to cover the widest possible TBM launch area and they can visually confirm the TBM firing in the early stage of TBM flight. As a result, the sea-based TMD, called the navy theatre missile defence, can offer joint power projections with a vital, flexible, and robust TMD capability. However, the development of decoy tactics associated with TBM’s in-flight can cause satellite sensors to go blind and radar is always noise corrupted, thereby generating measurement errors. In this paper, we lay out some mathematical foundations of noise reduction in TBM defence radar systems. The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and this paper does not represent the views of any agency. Finally, all the references cited in this paper are unclassified documents.

The prediction of missile trajectories using a Kalman filter: a simulation study

The three-dimensional radar measurements, consisting of range, azimuth, and elevation angle of a flying TBM, help us estimate the theatre ballistic missile (TBM) parameters used in real navy theatre missile defence (NTMD) actions, such as active defence, passive defence, and attack operations. The main purpose of this paper is to optimise the estimation of TBM parameters using the Kalman filter techniques on noise corrupted three-dimensional radar measurement outputs. In this paper, we propose Kalman Filter models to optimally locate TBM positions in a three-dimensional space. More specifically, our proposed models and simulation studies show that we may be able to obtain optimal TBM parameters, such as TBM position, heading, speed, launch position, and destination point and arrival time at the target. The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and the paper does not represent the views of any agency. Finally, all the references cited in this paper are unclassified documents.

Nuclear elimination with or without missile defence?

The idea of nuclear elimination is becoming more popular. At the same time, missile defence is being built. The aim of this article is to link the two phenomena: does Global Zero require effective missile defence, or will missile defence hamper the road towards nuclear elimination? First, I will examine how proponents of the recent move towards nuclear elimination regard missile defence: are they in favour or against? This descriptive portion of the article is followed by a personal evaluation based on the literature. Assuming that nuclear elimination becomes a priority in order to win the fight against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and assuming that missile defence will not become reliable under real circumstances, then the best option seems to be zero offensive and zero defensive ballistic missiles. Second best would be to limit the existing missile defence capabilities to theatre missile defence, excluding those theatre missile defence systems (like advanced SM-3 missiles on Aegis ships) that can easily be plugged together to form a strategic missile defence capability.

MISSILE DEFENSE: WHERE DOES THE DANGER LIE?

The global missile defense system being built at the start of the 21st century is a purely American project, in which American missile defense elements and American money spent to deploy those elem...

Security Dilemma between a Sword and a Shield: Japan's Theater Missile Defense and China's Reactions, and Their Relational Dynamics

Security Dilemma between a Sword and a Shield: Japan's Theater Missile Defense and China's Reactions, and Their Relational Dynamics

South Korea's Missile Defense Policy: Dilemma and Opportunity for a Medium State

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery systems has made missile defense a key security challenge, but missile defense systems are highly controversial. I closely examine the development of the missile defense system in South Korea. South Korea has steadfastly remained outside the theater missile defense (TMD) structure, but it cooperates on missile defense, in a limited way, with its U.S. ally. South Korea's refusal to participate in TMD even as it quietly acquires air defense systems can be explained by political and diplomatic considerations regarding its neighbors (especially China), military and economic considerations about missile defense, and strategic considerations for the United States‐South Korea alliance. The TMD situation demonstrates South Korea's dilemma and opportunity as a medium power in a particularly harsh security environment. South Korea is walking a fine line to diversify security relations, to maintain the alliance structure with the United States (albeit in a changed form), and to build a self‐reliant military capability.

English

This paper proposes a solution methodology for a missile defence problem using theatremissile defence (TMD) concept. In the missile defence scenario, the concept of TMD is generallyused for the optimal allocation of interceptors to counter the attack missiles. The problem iscomputationally complex due to the presence of enormous state space. The Learning vectorquantiser–Radial basis function (LVQ-RBF) multi-agent hybrid neural architecture is used as thelearning structure, and Q-learning as the learning method. The LVQ-RBF multi-agent hybridneural architecture overcomes the complex state space issue using the partitioning and weightedlearning approach. The proposed LVQ-RBF multi- agent hybrid architecture improvises thelearning performance by the local and global error criterion. The state space is explored withinitial coarse partitioning by LVQ neural network. The fine partitioning of the state space isperformed using the multi-agent RBF neural network. The discrete reward scheme is used forLVQ-RBF multi-agent hybrid neural architecture. It has a hierarchical architecture which enablesquicker convergence without the loss of accuracy. The simulation of the TMD is performed with500 assets and six priority of assets.

SIMPLIFIED ADAPTIVE ESTIMATION

A simplified adaptive scheme is suggested for the estimation of the state vector of linear systems driven by white process noise that is added to an unknown deterministic signal. The design approach is based on embedding the Kalman filter within a simplified adaptive control loop that is driven by the innovation process. The simplified adaptive loop is idle during steady-state phases that involve white driving noise only. However, when the deterministic signal is added to the driving noise signal, the simplified adaptive control loop enhances the Kalman filter gains and helps in reducing the resulting transients. The stability of the overall estimation scheme is established under strictly passive conditions of a related system. The suggested method is applied to the target acceleration estimation problem in a Theater Missile Defense scenario.

The Netherlands: Procurement without debate

Experts and officials in the Netherlands do not approach the issue of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) as a major shift in defence thinking, including reconsideration of established thinking about str...

Theater Missile Defense and Japanese Nuclear Weapons

The development of a joint US-Japan theater missile defense system could have significant ramifications beyond the defense of Japan and of American forces in the region. A growing debate within Japan on its international security position, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and questions about the role of the United States in the region conspire to create conditions for significant changes in Japan's conception of its security status and its long‐term political-military calculations. By upgrading Japan's strategic responsibilities, theater missile defense could inadvertently induce a reassessment of many of its national security policies, perhaps even the decision to forego nuclear weapons.

La dissuasion nucléaire et les rapports sino-japonais - l'interaction entre une puissance nucléaire et une puissance non nucléaire en Asie de l'Est (Note)

Since the end of 1950s, the Japanese nuclear policy has consisted in keeping the legal option open for the development of the "defensive" nuclear weapons and maintaining a nuclear potential. The motivation of this" open nuclear option" of Japan would be mainly the development of the nuclear force of China. The us retreat of all the ground-launched and submarine-launched tactical nuclear weapons in 1991 implied the end of the age of dependence on tactical nuclear weapons for "war-fighting" in Asia. The conventional deterrence would already be sufficient for maintaining the stability of the East Asia. The mission of the extended nuclear deterrence of the United States could be reduced to Us vital role for countering only the nuclear attack of other country, not for any conventional attack. The controversies about the "antimissile defense" have influenced the security relationship between China and Japan. The important strategic significance of the antimissile defense for Beijing would be that a strategy of the first strike against China would be easier to consider. A theater missile defense in Japan would be less challenging for China and would be useful against the threat of missiles from North Korea. Nonetheless, a strategic missile defense could have a destabilizing impact on Sino-Japanese security relations. The Japanese nuclear policy would be a hind of "recessive deterrence" which operates by the potential and the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. The nuclear crisis in Korea provides a chance to observe the working dynamic of this deterrence. Owing to the worry about the nuclear proliferation of Japan, Tokyo finds it appropriate to ask Beijing to prevent the nuclear development of the North Korea and to maintain the credibility of the extended deterrence of the United States.

Arrows for India? - Technology transfers for ballistic missile defence and the missile technology control regime

This article discusses the proposed export of the Arrow II theatre missile defence interceptor from Israel to India. Because of its contribution to the development of the interceptor, the United States exercises re-transfer control and must agree to the proposed transfer. Under the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the US is committed to apply them also in a re-transfer situation. Also Israel has pledged that it will adhere to the MTCR Guidelines when exporting missile technology. The current US administration holds the view that MTCR and missile defences play complementary roles in countering the threat from ballistic missiles. The administration has furthermore declared the intention to implement the Guidelines of the MTCR in a manner that does not impede missile defence co-operation with other states. This article makes an assessment of a possible export of the Arrow II interceptor to India in light of US commitments under the MTCR Guidelines. It seeks to answer the question whether the proposed transfer would be in conformity with the guidelines. It is concluded that there need not always be complementarity between transfers of ballistic missile defence technologies and the Guidelines of the MTCR.

THAAD-Like High Altitude Theater Missile Defense: Strategic Defense Capability and Certain Countermeasures Analysis

By incorporating the publicly available information about the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) theater missile defense system and making some educated guesses about the unknown parameters of the system, we construct a computer model of a THAAD-like kill vehicle to simulate the endgame homing process. Using this model, we simulate endgame homing processes against incoming targets of different velocities, corresponding to theatre and strategic targets. We also simulate homing processes against certain types of countermeasures. The simulation results demonstrate that, given state-of-the-art technologies for infrared sensors, ground-based radars, and divert/attitude control thrusters, first, a THAAD-like defense would have nearly the same miss distance and kill probability against a strategic target as against a theater target, and second, countermeasures, like infrared stealth, radar jamming, and decoys, have the potential to defeat a THAAD-like kill vehicle using infrared homing during the endgame.

The Canadian Navy and the New Naval Environment in Asia

Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Canada. The views expressed here are the author's and should not be construed in any way as the official policy of Canada's Department of National Defence.CLAIMS OF NEWNESS ARE FREQUENTLY OVERBLOWN. But an examination of the Indo-Pacific naval environment over the past half-dozen years reveals a number of remarkable developments. The Chinese bracketed Taiwan with missiles (the Americans responded by inserting aircraft carriers), the Indians acquired the capability of deploying nuclear weapons at sea, and both India and China undertook historic, long-range voyages. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) despatched warships to the Indian Ocean for the first time since 1945 while the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) embarked on its first round-the-world cruise. The JMSDF opened fire in anger for the first time in 1999 when it sank a suspected North Korean spy ship. Likewise, the Royal Thai and Republic of (South) Korea navies engaged in armed clashes at sea.Regional navies began to build or buy bigger and bigger surface combatants including obsolescent Russian aircraft carriers. Warships of 6000-tonnes or over became more common in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Similarly, the number of conventional submarines rose dramatically with Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, India, and China adding them to their inventories. Even Taiwan attempted to acquire eight new diesel-electric boats while Canada began taking delivery of four Upholder-class submarines from the United Kingdom. These acquisitions were buttressed by the appearance of maritime patrol aircraft and by the deployment of new types of sea-going missiles.Piracy and sea robbery (attacks on ships not on the high seas) reached unprecedented levels in Southeast Asia, and disputes over fisheries, boundaries, and islets kept regional navies on a state of alert. At the same time the Indian and Chinese navies engaged in high-level naval diplomacy in Southeast Asia; the latter establishing its presence on the Bay of Bengal while the former developed links with China's rival, Vietnam.Both navies were the subject of increased attention by the United States Navy (USN). The growth of the PLAN was a source of concern for the Pentagon, and United States-China relations were strained by the willingness of the administration of George W. Bush to provide naval hardware to Taiwan. While relations between Washington and Beijing deteriorated in early 2001, following the collision of a Chinese interceptor plane and an American EP-3 surveillance plane on 1 April, they improved markedly between Washington and New Delhi, even before the events of 11 September 2001 united the two nations in the 'War on Terrorism.' Indeed, the revival of the relationship between the USN and the Indian Navy (frozen after India's nuclear tests in May 1998) constituted one of the major maritime developments in recent years. Elsewhere, however, USN-JMSDF collaboration on a theatre missile defence system for northeast Asian waters had a less positive impact, exciting vigorous opposition from the Chinese.For its part, Canada transferred a number of ships from the Atlantic command (MARLANT) to Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC), the naval formation on the West Coast. The Canadian Navy operated in the Persian Gulf from the early 1990s onwards as part of the United Nations-sanctioned maritime interdiction force against Iraq. Those deployments resulted in high levels of interoperability between Canadian and American warships. That interoperability facilitated Canadian naval support for the Australian-led humanitarian intervention in East Timor in 1999-2000 and underpins Canada's current commitment in southwest Asia to the United States-led War on Terrorism. In fact, Canada has probably contributed a larger proportion of its navy to the coalition effort than any other nation, and the Canadian Navy has had more ships engaged in the Arabian Sea campaign than at any time since 1945. …