Arrows for India? - Technology transfers for ballistic missile defence and the missile technology control regime

Abstract

This article discusses the proposed export of the Arrow II theatre missile defence interceptor from Israel to India. Because of its contribution to the development of the interceptor, the United States exercises re-transfer control and must agree to the proposed transfer. Under the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the US is committed to apply them also in a re-transfer situation. Also Israel has pledged that it will adhere to the MTCR Guidelines when exporting missile technology. The current US administration holds the view that MTCR and missile defences play complementary roles in countering the threat from ballistic missiles. The administration has furthermore declared the intention to implement the Guidelines of the MTCR in a manner that does not impede missile defence co-operation with other states. This article makes an assessment of a possible export of the Arrow II interceptor to India in light of US commitments under the MTCR Guidelines. It seeks to answer the question whether the proposed transfer would be in conformity with the guidelines. It is concluded that there need not always be complementarity between transfers of ballistic missile defence technologies and the Guidelines of the MTCR.