The Functioning Of The European Union Research Articles

Article: A Hamiltonian Moment for EU Taxation?

This contribution explores the possibility of a ‘Hamiltonian moment’ in the European Union (EU) public finances, drawing a parallel with the historical experience of the United States (US) in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It examines the different theoretical positions on the existence and scope of the EU’s authority to tax, as well as the legal and political challenges that such an authority would entail. It argues that the EU does have the power to levy taxes for funding its budget, based on Article 311 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), but that this power is constrained by the principles stemming from the common constitutional traditions, the respect for national identities, and the need for democratic legitimation. It suggests that a ‘Hamiltonian moment’ in the EU would require a qualitative change in the structure and size of the EU budget, as well as a stronger involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments in the decision-making process on the system of own resources.

Public Pension Funds in EU Member States: Their Comparability and Tax Treatment under the Free Movement of Capital (Keva and Others (Case C-39/23))

This note examines the tax treatment of public pension funds within the European Union in the context of the free movement of capital as contained in article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The note analyses recent developments regarding the imposition, by EU Member States, of withholding taxes on dividends received by non-resident public pension funds in circumstances in which resident public pension funds are exempt. In doing so, the article critiques the actual comparability of these situations. It underscores the limitations of article 65(1)(a) of the TFEU, which theoretically permits tax differentiation based on residence. Furthermore, the article highlights the crucial role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in ensuring that Member States comply with EU law, particularly in order to maintain a genuine internal market for cross-border investments.

Understanding the EU’s Competence to Harmonise Space Law Amid Publication Delays

In response to the European Commission’s unexpected decision on 9 April 2024 to indefinitely postpone the publication of the first draft of the European Union Space Law (EUSL), this article takes a critical look at the EU’s competence under the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Treaty of the European Union (TEU) to establish an EUSL that seeks to harmonize the national space laws of the Member States in the space security, safety, and sustainability domains. This article specifically examines the complexities around the Union’s competence to adopt space legislation in Articles 4(3) and 189 TFEU as one of the possible factors explaining the delay. It does this by analysing the legal foundations on which the EU has historically relied to pass space legislation and harmonize national laws. The article aims to address the concerns Member States may have regarding whether the Union must depend on its ‘space competence’ in Article 189 TFEU to achieve its security, safety, and sustainability objectives or if there is legal precedent allowing it to use a mix-and-match approach of its various competencies under the TEU and TFEU. The article concludes that the Union is competent to adopt an EUSL and suggests that it could employ various binding and non-binding strategies by relying on its competencies in overlapping domains, including inter alia, Articles 11, 114, 115, 167, 170–173, and 191–193 TFEU.

The Role of Frontex and Easo in the Field of Asylum Policies and the Guarantee of Respecting People's Rights and Integrity

In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in CHAPTER V titled "Area of freedom, security and justice" it has recognized the competence of the topic of immigration which has gone through an important process of agentization, as has happened with many policies of other EU countries. The role of the European Union in answering the questions and problems posed by migratory flows, affecting the countries that are part of it, has been for many months one of the elements of the major debate within the European institutions, between the states and, obviously. , within them, with significant consequences on the political level. Despite the inevitable and many difficulties - the basic and inalienable rights of those who come to a certain country and those of those who have lived there for a long time and have a good reason to wait, the Stockholm Program of adopted by the European Council aims precisely to face the challenge of "guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and the integrity of people, while at the same time guaranteeing security in Europe". This should be supported, among others, by the development and implementation of policies to control and combat irregular and clandestine immigration, improving cooperation with third countries (of origin and transit of migrants), the objective of reaching a system of common asylum applying the principle of solidarity between member states in accordance with the article. 67, par. 2, which should lead to "the further analysis and development of mechanisms for the voluntary and coordinated sharing of responsibilities between Member States". European agencies represent an important part of the Union's institutional mechanism. FRONTEX and EASO were presented as tools to facilitate or strengthen cooperation operational between the authorities of the Member States. However, the activities they perform go beyond simple coordination, as they have acquired characteristics that can have negative consequences for others. Received: 25 December 2023 / Accepted: 25 February 2024 / Published: 23 April 2024

Конституційні принципи права Європейського Союзу

The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of constitutional principles of law in the process of legitimization and functioning of the European Union. The author emphasizes the problems of practical implementation and application of constitutional principles at the supranational and national levels. It is noted that a condition for the EU's stable development is to ensure its legal homogeneity, which implies that the Member States must comply with the basic principles of the EU's functioning and the provisions of two constitutional acts - the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The article adopts a limited view of constitutionalism, which covers only those principles that regulate (a) the grounds for legitimacy at the level of the European Union and (b) the relationship between the supranational and national levels. These principles are: vesting of powers, subsidiarity, proportionality, institutional independence, and delegated sovereignty. The analysis of the five constitutional principles leads to the following conclusions: The Treaties on the European Union and the functioning of the European Union are not called a "constitution," but they have all the features of a codified body of constituent legal acts; the European Union is established as a federation, although in all respects it is a confederation, since the source of its legitimacy is the principles of delegation, subsidiarity and proportionality; the only direct source of legitimacy in the EU is the European Parliament, whose powers are still limited in certain areas due to the general EU restrictions on issues such as common taxation. The EU has a lot of potential power, despite the fact that the principle of delegation of powers aims to limit its powers to an exhaustive list of competences; a more effective and formalized platform for adopting laws in policy areas that intersect supranational and national levels is needed; the current system of providing national parliaments with reasoned opinions on draft legislation is rather limited to achieve a balance between the legitimacy of the Union and national legitimacy for powers that are actually exercised.

Margin Squeezing as a Manifestation of Abuse of Dominant Position

Margin squeezing is an abuse of dominant position, which is not directly mentioned in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Euro­pean General Court that have recognised this practice as anti­competitive, initially treating it as anti­competitive refusal to supply. Given the many similarities between these practices, there are questions as to whether margin squeeze should be consi­dered an separate manifestation of an abuse of dominant position. The aim of the article is to analyse the position of the European Commission in this regard and juxtapose it with the views contained in relevant judicial decisions, judgements, and rulings, as well as to compare it with the regulations adopted in the United States.

Introducing the legislative priority rule: a constitutional compass for the Court

Abstract The ambiguous nature of the internal market allows for EU legislative input on two tensions animating this field since its inception, those being how to divide power between the EU and Member States and how to reconcile the requirements of integration and regulation. The Court can sometimes struggle with accommodating such input with its Treaty interpretation, leading to further tension with the EU legislator. In the internal market for goods, however, it can rely on the Legislative Priority Rule to resolve disputes in a coherent, Treaty-compliant manner. Casting exhaustive EU legislation as the sole norm against which to assess national product measures, to the exclusion of Articles 34–36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), this longstanding Rule is, from one perspective, a simple procedural tool to establish the Court’s framework of reference. In reality, however, invoking (or excluding) the Rule can have a substantive and institutional dimension, as its application (or not) engages the relationships between national, secondary, and primary law and, by extension, the Member States, EU legislator, and Court. On the one hand, the Rule enforces EU primacy by pre-empting national competence in the presence of harmonization. On the other, by suspending direct application of Articles 34–35 TFEU, it also implies deference to the EU legislator, and indirectly to the Member States, which enjoy discretion to set standards and determine how power is shared. As a result, while Member States cannot avoid free movement obligations, they can defend national rules by reference to this EU standard to which they have contributed. There is in other words an alignment under the Rule between the dynamics of Exit and Voice, with the Court exercising boundary control to ensure compliance with primary law. It is on this basis that I have come to identify the Legislative Priority Rule as a sort of ‘constitutional compass’ to guide the distribution of power in the internal market for goods. Despite this key role, however, its existence and impact remain relatively unknown or at best ignored, reflecting a gap in understanding the Court’s toolbox for review and a failure to appreciate the role of secondary legislation in building a stable, Treaty-compliant regulatory system.

Exploring the Notions of Agreement, Collusion and Concerted Practice in Competition Act 2010

Cooperative activities among undertakings have the potential to disrupt fair competition, making it essential to delineate which agreements, practices, or arrangements fall under the purview of competition laws. This article aims to evaluate the existing provisions governing agreements and practices within the framework of the Competition Act 2010 while drawing relevant comparisons with the provisions outlined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It endeavors to address specific questions and considerations. Firstly, it delves into the fundamental elements and definitions of agreements and practices as specified by the Competition Act 2010. It then explores whether these provisions in CA 2010 align with or deviate from the corresponding articles within the TFEU, shedding light on potential convergences or divergences. Furthermore, this article examines whether there are notable resemblances or disparities between CA 2010 and TFEU in their definitions of agreements and practices related to competition. It scrutinizes the implications, if any, that arise from these disparities or similarities between CA 2010 and TFEU for undertakings operating within their respective jurisdictions. Finally, it highlights specific cases or instances, if any, where the interpretation of agreements and practices under CA 2010 significantly diverges from TFEU, potentially leading to legal challenges or uncertainties. Through this comprehensive analysis, the article aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of competition laws in both Pakistan and the European Union contexts.

Atheism in judicial discourse - An analysis of the Italian constitutional scenario

Starting from an analysis of the Italian model of church-state relationships, the present paper focuses on the status of atheistic convictions in Italy. Since the 1990s, where the Union of Atheist and Rationalist Agnostics claimed its right to start negotiations to enter into an agreement with the State, Italian courts have faced the crucial issue of the legal definition of a religious denomination. The decision of the Constitutional Court no. 52/2016 has been the final result of a lengthy and troubled process. The paper will explore the coherence of the decision with the Italian Constitutional framework, with the ECHR and with article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Finally, the paper will investigate on the option of enforcing an updated law regulating religious freedom and its predictable impact on non-religious communities.

Europe Is Looking for a Super-Judge

One of the cornerstones of the rule of law is an independent, impartial, and high-quality court. It is therefore of the utmost importance that respect for the rule of law in the European Union (inclusive of its member states) be ensured by a court whose members are themselves elected in accordance with the rule of law. This means that, just as for the courts of the Member States, the ideal – which one would hope gets reflected in real-world practice in most cases – is for the Court of Justice of the European Union to be led by independent and impartial judges. Judges who are not only well-versed in their own national law but also fluent in the nuances of European Union law, are oriented toward the global legal world, display an ability to work in an international environment (encompassing several languages, most importantly French as the working language of said court), have an outstanding record of professional and scientific excellence, express themselves clearly and convincingly (both verbally and in writing), and possess impeccable moral and ethical integrity – in short, individuals who are unquestionably leaders in their field and role models for other judges. Indeed, Article 253 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) specifies that the Court of Justice’s judges and Advocates General shall be chosen from among persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are lawyers of recognised competence, with appointment by common accord of the governments of the Member States for a term of six years after consulting with the panel provided for by Article 255 TFEU. Membership of the institution’s General Court is similarly regulated. Accordingly, Europe is looking for super-judges and super-Advocates General for the Court of Justice of the European Union. The article gives an overview of the process involved, focusing in particular on the work of the so-called Article 255 panel.

Critical Review Of The Atad Implementation: The Implementation of the ATAD in Finland

In this article, the authors provide an assessment of the Finnish implementation of the European Union (EU) Anti–Tax Avoidance Directives (ATAD I and II) in consideration of the EU primary law and secondary law requirements. It is focused on examining the conformity between the Finnish implementation rules and the fundamental freedoms arising out of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Although Finland already had an extensive anti-avoidance framework in place before implementing the ATAD I and ATAD II, Finland had to make some adjustments in almost all areas covered by the Directives. What is perhaps most interesting is that the Finnish general anti-abuse rule (GAAR) in section 28 of the Act on Assessment Procedure has retained the exact same textual form that it had decades previously. The essential question is as follows: Has the actual content of the general clause changed based on ATAD Article 6 and, if affirmative, in what way? Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), tax avoidance, anti-avoidance, controlled foreign company (CFC), exit taxation, general anti-abuse rule or general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), hybrid mismatches, interest limitation rule, EU law, implementation

Strategic Autonomy in Military Production: The EDF and the Constitutional Limits to EU Defence-Industrial Spending Power

The European Defence Fund (EDF) has for the first time enabled the European Union (EU) to fund military equipment development in pursuit of its strategic autonomy. But the EDF was based on competences for supporting industrial and research competitiveness, and not on the Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP). Since EU legal acts must be based on the functionally most appropriate competence, this choice of legal basis raises questions. This article therefore analyses whether the EDF was correctly adopted under a non-CFSP/CSDP legal basis, and if so, how its legal basis affects its capacity to contribute to EU strategic autonomy. The analysis reveals that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) grants the EU a competence to support defence-industrial competitiveness which is separate from the CFSP/CSDP, but stands in service to its military-strategic objectives. As the EDF is politically subordinate to the CFSP/CSDP, its defence-industrial impact depends on the Member States’ ability to achieve political consensus on the EU’s defence objectives and to determine strategic research and development (R&D) priorities in line with those objectives. Yet even in the face of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, such consensus seems far off. European Defence Fund, CSDP, strategic autonomy, EU constitutional law

The failure of Euratom to harmonize the EU nuclear safety and environmental regulation. Can a recent ECJ judgment become a breakthrough, beneficial for EU’s quest for a sustainable, renewable-driver future?

The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (known as the Euratom Treaty), which was signed on 25 March 1957, contained commitments to promote nuclear energy technology and to integrate financial and technical efforts to develop that technology in the six signatory countries, in order to enhance wealth creation and the wellbeing of their citizens. The 66 year history of the Euratom Treaty undoubtedly shows that it didn’t fulfil its promises and worse, it became completely obsolete in the light of the European integration efforts contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This article examines its fundamental shortcomings, whereby national interests in nuclear energy were at the forefront and whereby the harmonization of Nuclear Safety Standards and the protection of the environment and the health of the EU citizens became secondary, when confronted with industrial interests and the promotion of nuclear technologies (promotion which still continues for an industrial nuclear sector which is fully mature). This provoked a painful discord between nuclear counties and non-nuclear EU Member States, still the Achilles’ heel of Euratom as can be concluded from the discussion regarding nuclear energy as part of the EU Green Taxonomy. Euratom can be seen as the flagship of the pro-nuclear countries, albeit that the content of the Treaty is obsolete, as will be explained below from a legal angle. Because the EU Commission is the executive body of the Euratom Community, it is to blame for the failure to harmonize the safety standards as foreseen in the Euratom Treaty and for the unwillingness to integrate the EU legal environmental principles into nuclear law. It will be argued that the Nuclear Basic Safety Standards, as foreseen by the Euratom Treaty and the secondary Euratom Directives, are ‘empty shells’ and should no longer stand in isolation from the EU environmental acquis. The Justification and the ALARA principles should be informed by the Precautionary Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle. This entails that with the risks of global warming (such as heat waves, floodings, cooling water, wildfires, terrorism etc.) and the many caveats on nuclear decommissioning and disposal of high-level nuclear waste, the equation between the advantages of nuclear power (e.g., minor CO2 emissions) and its major risks should be reconsidered, not leaving this justification process to the nuclear industry, as in Belgium. The EU national governments should undertake this justification process at every stage of their political decisions regarding nuclear energy (e.g., life time extension), in full transparency and giving access to justice, as foreseen in the AARHUS Convention. A specialized EU Nuclear Safety Agency should receive a mandate by the EU Commission to harmonize such a justification process in the EU Member States and to harmonize the Nuclear Basic Safety Standards. The elementary decisions on the future of (nuclear) energy should be taken in a democratic way and not based on the promotional Euratom Treaty, in the light of the EU Green Deal and the energy transition towards renewable energy sources.

Possibilities of the Introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax in Germany: Comparison and Evaluation on the Basis of the Italian and French Transaction Tax With Regard of the EU Taxation Principles

This article evaluates the financial and economic implications of implementing a stock financial transaction tax (FTT) in Germany, setting aside the political dimensions prevalent in European discussions. It finds that an FTT decreases market efficiency and does not aid in stabilizing the financial system. Observations from France and Italy, where FTTs yielded revenues below projections, suggest that such a tax might be economically unfeasible for Germany. The study investigates whether a national FTT targeting transactions of German company shares on domestic exchanges—and levying the tax on the purchaser—conflicts with European Union principles, especially the free movement of capital as stated in Articles 63-65 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Moreover, it scrutinizes the compatibility of the proposed Franco-German cooperative FTT with German constitutional law and whether the financial sector’s contribution to the public good justifies the tax base under the Basic Law’s tax typology.

A Critical Analysis of the European Union Law-making Process and Sources of Law

This study focused on the critical analysis of the European Union law-making process and sources of law. The study employed doctrinal legal methodology which covers research into doctrines and analysis of the relevant legal instruments including; Treaty on European Union (TEU), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and other instruments, legal articles and books citing secondary materials where issues need to be placed in contexts of the European Union’s law-making process and sources of law. The findings on the European Union law making process revealed three major methods of the European Union’s legislative process which they entail: firstly, ordinary legislative process containing procedures such as formulation, first reading, second reading, conciliation, third reading and special provisions; secondly, special legislative process containing procedures such as consultation procedure, consent procedure and approval procedure; and thirdly, non-legislative procedures such as procedure for adopting delegated acts and implementing acts; and the findings of the study on the European Union’s sources of law indicates that are two major categories of sources of law including; primary source of law such as the European Union founding treaties like the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; and the secondary source of law such as legislative and non-legislative acts, international agreements, sui generis decisions, soft law, inter-institutional agreements, agreement between member states, legal unwritten custom; and thirdly, the general principles of law such as protection of the legitimate expectations, right to a fair hearing, the guarantee of fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality.

How Shall TFEU Article 102 on Abuse of Dominant Position be Interpreted in the Digital Platform Economy?

In 2021, The European General Court issued its judgment in Case T-612/17 Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping). The case concerned whether Google had abused its dominant market position by favouring its own comparison shopping service on its general results pages while demoting the results from competing comparison shopping services. The General Court stated that Google’s conduct was not competition on the merits and thus it had breached Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This article discusses firstly this judgment and its consequences for the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU in digital platform economy markets. Secondly, this article takes on the issue of abuse of dominant position in digital markets and tries to find out what kind of conduct of digital platform companies should be prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. The purpose is to identify what kind of conduct should be seen as an abuse of dominance and how to legally assess such conduct. The ECJ judgment states that self-preferencing can constitute a breach of Article 102 TFEU and that this can be seen as a form of discrimination. Besides self-preferencing or discrimination there is also other conduct that can be abusive. These include personalised pricing, forced free riding and different forms of information based abusive conducts. It is not clear how this conduct relate to Article 102 TFEU, but it is clear that should this conduct be seen abusive, it will be difficult to determine the basis for this since well-established theories of harm are incompatible. In addition, when assessing the abusive nature of such conduct, an effects-based case-by-case approach is needed.

ANTICOMPETITIVE PRICE FIXING IN DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS – ECJ C-211/22, SUPER BOCK V. PORTUGUESE COMPETITION AUTHORITY

On June 29, 2023, the judgment concerning the case C-211/22, Super Bock v. Portuguese Competition Authority, was released by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). This judgment delivers a comprehensive review of fundamental competition law principles pertaining to vertical agreements. In this judgement was examined the business approach of Super Bock, a manufacturing Portuguese company. The preliminary ruling emphasizes to the court referring the case the vital distinction between hardcore restrictions as defined by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) and competition-constraining practices falling within the purview of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Furthermore, the ruling clarifies the expansive scope of the term “agreement” according to Article 101(1) of the TFEU, while also highlighting the array of (both direct and indirect) evidence that can substantiate the identification of an agreement. In alignment with established legal precedents, ECJ reinforces the principle that an agreement encompassing nearly the entire geographical expanse, though not entirely exhaustive, of a Member State can still impact the inter-member trade. Vertical agreements involve relationships between entities at various levels of the supply chain, such as manufacturers and distributors. The key aspects addressed in this judgment have direct relevance to how manufacturers interact with their distribution networks and set pricing policies, which in turn can affect market dynamics and competition within the manufacturing industry. The Super Bock v. Portuguese Competition Authority judgment serves as a pivotal milestone in clarifying the legal framework governing vertical agreements in the European Union. Its comprehensive analysis of competition law principles provides valuable guidance to businesses operating within the EU, ensuring a more transparent and predictable regulatory environment for vertical agreements and, consequently, fostering healthy competition in the market. The ECJ confirmed for the first time the established EU law principles regarding vertical price-fixing agreements. It emphasizes that an agreement should not rigidly be classified by actions without considering the broader context. Although deviating from stricter framework centered on the primary purpose and severe restrictions may complicate the application of the law, this ruling encourages a more thoughtful evaluation of vertical agreements and their overlap with competition law.

RETRACTED: Anti-competitive behavior in digital markets

Abstract The regulations stated in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) define that it is prohibited for companies to engage in agreements that are anticompetitive in nature with one another. E-commerce platforms have emerged as significant commercial channels in the virtual realm. The antitrust scrutiny has been drawn towards the limitations imposed by both suppliers and marketplaces on selling through such platforms. There exists a perception among certain individuals that there is a degree of conflict between the two approaches, wherein competition authorities are accused of endorsing marketplace platforms by prohibiting platform bans in distribution contracts, while simultaneously scrutinizing the business practices of these platforms (Colomo, 2018). Notwithstanding, it is imperative to note that this does not inherently denote an inconsistency. Although it is crucial for retailers to retain their autonomy in terms of vending their products through diverse sales channels, it is incumbent upon marketplace platforms to adhere to the regulations governing antitrust. In this sense main purpose of this manuscript is the analysis of anti-competitive behavior in digital markets.

Review: Livestock transport of animals in a consumer society geared towards efficiency: efficiency, animal welfare or both?

The industrialisation and mechanisation of many work steps in the production of economic goods, which have ever been advancing in recent decades, do not stop at animal farming. In ever-increasing numbers, in ever shorter periods of time and with less and less human labour, animals are being "produced" in order to then being exported to other countries as animals for slaughter, as animals for breeding or as "surplus" animals - or to be processed into animal products. This is owed to an increasingly efficient way of work at different levels of production, which, however, leaves behind and disregards - sometimes at the highest level - the interests of the animals and of animal welfare, which are high-ranking values in the European Union (EU). These values are neglected, although there are special legal provisions, according to which animals submitted to animal farming must be protected and whose interests in integrity and welfare must be considered. In Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU recognises animals as sentient beings. According to this provision, the EU takes full account of the requirements of animal welfare. The Member States also commit themselves to the same through the TFEU. From the so-called "cross-section clause" of Article 13 TFEU, among other things, the possibility is derived, to justify trade restrictions with the realisation of animal welfare. This must be considered in the context of Art. 36 TFEU, which also explicitly permits (expressly allows for) such trade restrictions. However, in practice, the effects of the most efficient procedures with regard to the transportation of animals in large parts are not in line with the animal protection law of the European Union. The overriding principle of "effet-utile" ("useful effect"), which overrides Union law and the Union law's precedence over the law of the Member States, is also not considered in the interpretation and application of the Union's animal welfare law. The production of economic goods - from the point of view of the economic participants themselves - should run as efficiently as possible. However, important requirements of the Union's animal welfare law and the important principle of "effet-utile" are often forgotten or even deliberately ignored. The "effet-utile" principle also prescribes efficiency - the efficient and effective interpretation of the Union law, which seeks to protect high-priority values of the European Union, i.e. the life and well-being of animals. In the course of the current revision of the Regulation (EC) No. 1/2005, which regulates the transport of animals within and out of the European Union, the EU could take the principle of effectiveness into account and accordingly make some changes to important and partly unclear and circumventable regulations, and thus lead to effective and efficient animal welfare regulations after 15years of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2005.

THE COMPETITION INFRINGEMENTS iN LINER MARITIME TRANSPORT: ANANALYSIS BASED ON THE EU AND TURKEY*

This article aims ta reveal the competition issues in maritime transport and the harmonization of the arrangements between the EU and Turkey. The harmonization process is examined by comparing the relevant provisions in competition law, namely Article 101 and 102 in Treaty on the Functioning ofthe European Union (TFEU) and in Article 4 and 6 in the Law on the Protection of Competition Na. 4054. The impacts of cartel infringement and abuse of a dominant position in the !iner maritime transport is evaluated.