As Thailand entered the new decade of the 1980s, the kingdom faced pressures of unprecedented ferocity. Consolidation of Vietnamese military might all along Thailand's borders with Kampuchea as well as Laos macie the nation's exposed front-line position evident to the whole world, not to say to all Thais.' Conflict with militant communist power was now as immediate as it was intense. At the same time, Thailand's own political institutions continued to flounder towards resolution of their traditional dilem mas: adequate legitimacy to meet the needs of the modern era; the propeT blend of authoritarianism and popular participation; a modicum of economic and social justice; and the desired combination of military-dominated stability with civilian direction of a troubled economy and a rapidly changing society. Early in 1980, the latest in the country's frequent shifts in topmost military-political leadership took place, as General Kriangsak Chomanand ? Prime Minister since October 1977 ? resigned, to be replaced by General Prem Tinsulanonda. The host of international pressures set the stage for this action, though the principal catalytic events ? as is typical in Thailand ? were internal: a serious drought, a growing crisis over energy availability and costs, and problems associated with erratic industrial expansion and growing income disparities. The foreign policy situation ? especially the conflict between Vietnam and China ? did produce an unexpected bonus for the Bangkok regime: sudden weakening of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), now torn asunder by the tensions between its two competing communist mentors. The crisis within the CPT reduced for the moment the intensity of immediate internal pressures on the military-led coalition government of General Prem. Essentially, however, this simply provided a few months or maybe a few more years of additional time during which the traditional forms of governance in Thailand have an opportunity to devise responses to the deep fissures in this rapidly changing society, reforms adequate to stem the revolutionary tide in the years ahead. Whether the Prem Government (or any feasible successor to it) will be willing ? let alone capable ? to carry out such a series of profound social, economic, institutional, and political reforms remains to be seen. During the period of open politics in Thailand from October 1973 to October 1976, Thailand's leaders and people attempted to enact many of the very reforms that are still required. This attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, primarily because of the power of reactionary groups dedicated to preserving their own power and interests. Polarization and violence ensued, at a pace never witnessed before in this land; and the generals once again seized control of the political process.1 The challenge coming from Indochina in the latter years of the